Linguistic inferences without words.

Contemporary semantics has uncovered a sophisticated typology of linguistic inferences, characterized by their conversational status and their behavior in complex sentences. This typology is usually thought to be specific to language and in part lexically encoded in the meanings of words. We argue that it is neither. Using a method involving "composite" utterances that include normal words alongside novel nonlinguistic iconic representations (gestures and animations), we observe successful "one-shot learning" of linguistic meanings, with four of the main inference types (implicatures, presuppositions, supplements, homogeneity) replicated with gestures and animations. The results suggest a deeper cognitive source for the inferential typology than usually thought: Domain-general cognitive algorithms productively divide both linguistic and nonlinguistic information along familiar parts of the linguistic typology.

Event representations constrain the structure of language: Sign language as a window into universally accessible linguistic biases.

According to a theoretical tradition dating back to Aristotle, verbs can be classified into two broad categories. Telic verbs (e.g., "decide," "sell," "die") encode a logical endpoint, whereas atelic verbs (e.g., "think," "negotiate," "run") do not, and the denoted event could therefore logically continue indefinitely. Here we show that sign languages encode telicity in a seemingly universal way and moreover that even nonsigners lacking any prior experience with sign language understand these encodings. In experiments 1-5, nonsigning English speakers accurately distinguished between telic (e.g., "decide") and atelic (e.g., "think") signs from (the historically unrelated) Italian Sign Language, Sign Language of the Netherlands, and Turkish Sign Language. These results were not due to participants' inferring that the sign merely imitated the action in question. In experiment 6, we used pseudosigns to show that the presence of a salient visual boundary at the end of a gesture was sufficient to elicit telic interpretations, whereas repeated movement without salient boundaries elicited atelic interpretations. Experiments 7-10 confirmed that these visual cues were used by all of the sign languages studied here. Together, these results suggest that signers and nonsigners share universally accessible notions of telicity as well as universally accessible "mapping biases" between telicity and visual form.

Iconic enrichments: Signs vs. gestures.

Semantic work on sign language iconicity suggests, as do Goldin-Meadow & Brentari (G-M&B) in their target article, that "sign should be compared with speech-plus-gesture, not speech alone" (sect. 7.1). One key question is whether speech-plus-gesture and sign-with-iconicity really display the same expressive resources. This need not be the case, because gestural enrichments are typically not at-issue, whereas iconic enrichments in sign language can often be at-issue. Future research should thus focus on the "projection" properties of different sorts of iconic enrichment in both modalities.

Inconsistent effects of components as evidence for non-compositionality in chimpanzee face-gesture combinations? A response to Oña et al (2019).

Using field observations from a sanctuary, Oña and colleagues (DOI: 10.7717/peerj.7623) investigated the semantics of face-gesture combinations in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). The response of the animals to these signals was encoded as a binary measure: positive interactions such as approaching or grooming were considered affiliative; ignoring or attacking was considered non-affiliative. The relevant signals are illustrated in Fig. 1 (https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj.7623/fig-1), together with the outcome in terms of average affiliativeness. The authors observe that there seems to be no systematicity in the way the faces modify the responses to the gestures, sometimes reducing affiliativeness, sometimes increasing it. A strong interpretation of this result would be that the meaning of a gesture-face combination cannot be derived from the meaning of the gesture and the meaning of the face, that is, the interpretation of chimpanzees' face-gesture combinations are non compositional in nature. We will revisit this conclusion: we will exhibit simple compositional systems which, after all, may be plausible. At the methodological level, we argue that it is critical to lay out the theoretical options explicitly for a complete comparison of their pros and cons.

Minimal Compositionality versus Bird Implicatures: two theories of ABC-D sequences in Japanese tits.

It was argued in a series of experimental studies that Japanese tits (Parus minor) have an ABC call that has an alert function, a D call that has a recruitment function, and an ABC-D call that is compositionally derived from ABC and D, and has a mobbing function. A key conclusion was that ABC-D differs from the combination of separate utterances of ABC and of D (e.g. as played by distinct but close loudspeakers). While the logic of the argument is arguably sound, no explicit rule has been proposed to derive the meaning of ABC-D from that of its parts. We compare two analyses. One posits a limited instance of semantic compositionality ('Minimal Compositionality'); the other does without compositionality, but uses instead a more sophisticated pragmatics ('Bird Implicatures'). Minimal Compositionality takes the composition of ABC and D to deviate only minimally from what would be found with two independent utterances: ABC means that 'there is something that licenses an alert', D means that 'there is something that licenses recruitment', and ABC-D means that 'there is something that licenses both an alert and recruitment'. By contrast, ABC and D as independent utterances yield something weaker, namely: 'there is something that licenses an alert, and there is something that licenses recruitment', without any 'binding' across the two utterances. The second theory, Bird Implicatures, only requires that ABC-D should be more informative than ABC, and/or than D. It builds on the idea, proposed for several monkey species, that a less-informative call competes with a more informative one (the 'Informativity Principle'): when produced alone, ABC and D trigger an inference that ABC-D is false. We explain how both Minimal Compositionality and Bird Implicatures could have evolved, and we compare the predictions of the two theories. Finally, we extend the discussion to some chimpanzee and meerkat sequences that might raise related theoretical problems.

The ABC-D of animal linguistics: are syntax and compositionality for real?

In several animal species, an alarm call (e.g. ABC notes in the Japanese tit Parus minor) can be immediately followed by a recruitment call (e.g. D notes) to yield a complex call that triggers a third behaviour, namely mobbing. This has been taken to be an argument for animal syntax and compositionality (i.e. the property by which the meaning of a complex expression depends on the meaning of its parts and the way they are put together). Several additional discoveries were made across species. First, in some cases, animals respond with mobbing to the order alarm-recruitment but not to the order recruitment-alarm. Second, animals sometimes respond similarly to functionally analogous heterospecific calls they have never heard before, and/or to artificial hybrid sequences made of conspecific and heterospecific calls in the same order, thus adding an argument for the productivity of the relevant rules. We consider the details of these arguments for animal syntax and compositionality and argue that, with one important exception (Japanese tit ABC-D sequences), they currently remain ambiguous: there are reasonable alternatives on which each call is a separate utterance and is interpreted as such ('trivial compositionality'). More generally, we propose that future studies should argue for animal syntax and compositionality by explicitly pitting the target theory against two deflationary analyses: the 'only one expression' hypothesis posits that there is no combination in the first place, for example just a simplex ABCD call; while the 'separate utterances' hypothesis posits that there are separate expressions (e.g. ABC and D), but that they form separate utterances and are neither syntactically nor semantically combined.

Formal Models at the Core.

The grammatical paradigm used to be a model for entire areas of cognitive science. Its primary tenet was that theories are axiomatic-like systems. A secondary tenet was that their predictions should be tested quickly and in great detail with introspective judgments. While the grammatical paradigm now often seems passé, we argue that in fact it continues to be as efficient as ever. Formal models are essential because they are explicit, highly predictive, and typically modular. They make numerous critical predictions, which must be tested efficiently; introspective judgments do just this. We further argue that the grammatical paradigm continues to be fruitful. Within linguistics, implicature theory is a recent example, with a combination of formal explicitness, modularity, and interaction with experimental work. Beyond traditional linguistics, the grammatical paradigm has proven fruitful in the study of gestures and emojis; literature ("Free Indirect Discourse"); picture semantics and comics; music and dance cognition; and even reasoning and concepts. We argue, however, that the grammatical paradigm must be adapted to contemporary cognitive science. Computational methods are essential to derive quantitative predictions from formal models (Bayesian pragmatics is an example). And data collection techniques offer an ever richer continuum of options, from introspective judgments to large-scale experiments, which makes it possible to optimize the cost/benefit ratio of the empirical methods that are chosen to test theories.

Boundaries in space and time: Iconic biases across modalities.

The idea that the form of a word reflects information about its meaning has its roots in Platonic philosophy, and has been experimentally investigated for concrete, sensory-based properties since the early 20th century. Here, we provide evidence for an abstract property of 'boundedness' that introduces a systematic, iconic bias on the phonological expectations of a novel lexicon. We show that this abstract property is general across events and objects. In Experiment 1, we show that subjects are systematically more likely to associate sign language signs that end with a gestural boundary with telic verbs (denoting events with temporal boundaries, e.g., die, arrive) and with count nouns (denoting objects with spatial boundaries, e.g., ball, coin). In Experiments 2-3, we show that this iconic mapping acts on conceptual representations, not on grammatical features. Specifically, the mapping does not carry over to psychological nouns (e.g. people are not more likely to associate a gestural boundary with idea than with knowledge). Although these psychological nouns are still syntactically encoded as either count or mass, they do not denote objects that are conceived of as having spatial boundaries. The mapping bias thus breaks down. Experiments 4-5 replicate these findings with a new set of stimuli. Finally, in Experiments 6-11, we explore possible extensions to a similar bias for spoken language stimuli, with mixed results. Generally, the results here suggest that 'boundedness' of words' referents (in space or time) has a powerful effect on intuitions regarding the form that the words should take.

Orangutans' Comprehension of Zoo Keepers' Communicative Signals.

Zoological institutions often encourage cooperative interactions between keepers and animals so as to promote animals' welfare. One useful technique has been conditioning training, whereby animals learn to respond to keepers' requests, which facilitates a number of, otherwise sensitive, daily routines. As various media have been used to convey keepers' instructions, the question remains of which modality is best to promote mutual understanding. Here, we explored this question with two captive female orangutans. In the first experiment, we compared orangutans' understanding of previously acquired instructions when those were performed with verbal signals only, gazes only, gestures only, and when all those modalities were combined. Our results showed that gestures were sufficient for successful comprehension by these two apes. In the second experiment, we asked whether this preference could be driven by the non-arbitrary relationship that gestures bear to what they refer to, through iconicity or pointing. Our results revealed that neither iconicity nor pointing helped the subjects comprehend the keepers' instructions. Our results indicate a preference for instructions given through gestural signals in two captive female orangutans, although its cause remains elusive. Future practice may encourage the use of gestures in communication between keepers and orangutans in general or potentially other animals.

What Do Monkey Calls Mean?

A field of primate linguistics is gradually emerging. It combines general questions and tools from theoretical linguistics with rich data gathered in experimental primatology. Analyses of several monkey systems have uncovered very simple morphological and syntactic rules and have led to the development of a primate semantics that asks new questions about the division of semantic labor between the literal meaning of monkey calls, additional mechanisms of pragmatic enrichment, and the environmental context. We show that comparative studies across species may validate this program and may in some cases help in reconstructing the evolution of monkey communication over millions of years.

The role of the striatum in sentence processing: disentangling syntax from working memory in Huntington's disease.

The role of sub-cortical structures in language processing remains controversial. In particular, it is unclear whether the striatum subserves language-specific processes such as syntax or whether it solely affects language performance via its significant role in executive functioning and/or working memory. Here, in order to address this issue, we attempted to equalize working memory constraints while varying syntactic complexity, to study sentence comprehension in 15 patients with striatal damage, namely Huntington's disease at early stage, and in 15 healthy controls. More particularly, we manipulated the syntactic relation between a name and a pronoun while holding the distance between them constant. We exploited a formal principle of syntactic theory called Principle C. This principle states that whereas in a sentence such as "Paul smiled when he entered" Paul and he can be a single person, this interpretation is blocked in sentences such as "He smiled when Paul entered". In a second experiment we varied working memory load using noun-adjective gender agreement in center-embedded and right-branching relatives (e.g., "the girl who watches the dog is green" vs. "the girl watches the dog which is green"). The results show that HD patients correctly establish name-pronoun co-reference but they fail to block it when Principle C should apply. Furthermore, they have good performance with both center-embedded and right-branching relatives, suggesting that their difficulties in sentence comprehension do not arise from memory load impairment during sentence processing. Taken together, our findings indicate that the striatum holds a genuine role in syntactic processing, which cannot be reduced to its involvement in working memory. However, it only impacts on particular aspects of syntax that may relate to complex computations whereas other operations appear to be preserved. Hypotheses about the role of the striatum in syntactic processing are discussed.