The relation of subjective experience to cognitive processing.

Barzykowski and Moulin argue that common memory processes form the basis of involuntary autobiographical memory and the déjà vu experience. We think that they underemphasize the potential dissociability between processes that enact retrieval and the processes that produce conscious experience. We propose that retrieval and conscious experience result from different processes in both involuntary autobiographical memory and déjà vu experiences.

Ease-of-learning judgments are based on both processing fluency and beliefs.

Processing fluency influences many types of judgments. Some metacognitive research suggests that the influence of processing fluency may be mediated by participants' beliefs. The current study explores the influence of processing fluency and beliefs on ease-of-learning (EOL) judgments. In two experiments (Exp 1: n = 94; Exp 2: n = 146), participants made EOL judgments on 24 six-letter concrete nouns, presented in either a constant condition (high fluency) with upper-case letters (e.g., BUCKET) or an alternating condition (low fluency) with mixed upper- and lower-case letters (e.g., bUcKeT). After judging words individually, participants studied the words and completed a free recall test. Finally, participants indicated what condition they believed made the words more likely to be learned. Results show constant-condition words were judged as more likely to be learned than alternating condition words, but the difference varied with beliefs. Specifically, the difference was biggest when participants believed the constant condition made words more likely to be learned, followed by believing there was no difference, and then believing the alternating condition made words more likely to be learned. Thus, we showed that processing fluency has a direct effect on EOL judgments, but the effect is moderated by beliefs.

Metacognition and conscious experience.

Morsella et al. focus on the conscious nature of sensation. However, also critical to an understanding of consciousness is the role of internally generated experience, such as the content of autobiographical memory or metacognitive experiences. For example, tip-of-the-tongue states are conscious feelings that arise when recall fails. Internally driven experiences drive us to action and therefore are consistent with the current approach.

Contextual information influences the feeling of knowing in episodic memory.

The feeling of knowing (FOK) predicts the likelihood of eventually recognizing currently unrecalled items. Koriat (1993, 1995) showed that retrieval of partial target information influences FOK ratings. Building on Koriat's view, the noncriterial-recollection hypothesis contends that contextual information influences FOKs (Brewer, Marsh, Clark-Foos, & Meeks, 2010). Our study assessed the validity of the noncriterial-recollection hypothesis by controlling the amount of potentially-retrievable contextual information presented to participants. We varied the amount of contextual information accompanying the name and image of imaginary animals. There were three information conditions: minimum (name and image), medium (name, image, and country), and maximum (name, image, country, diet and weight). Information condition did not affect recall accuracy. The minimum condition resulted in greater response output (recall and commission errors together). FOKs for unrecalled items were lower in the minimum condition than the other conditions. Consistent with the noncriterial-recollection hypothesis, FOKs were positively correlated with the retrieval of contextual information.

Image Clarity Affects Tip-of-the-Tongue Rates for Faces.

Tip-of-the-tongue states are subjective experiences that unrecalled target words will be remembered. This study investigates if the visual fluency of familiar faces affects the likelihood of tip-of-the-tongue experiences (TOTs) as well as name recall and name recognition. To manipulate visual fluency, three levels of clarity for 396 celebrity faces were set: high, medium, and low clarity. Four hundred and twenty-nine participants were asked to recall the last names of the celebrities for all clarity levels, and, if they did not recall, to indicate if they experienced a TOT. Following the TOT question, they performed a name recognition test. Results showed that higher-clarity faces resulted in higher TOT rates than lower-clarity faces for unrecalled faces. Name recall was also higher for clearer faces. However, clarity level did not affect the correct answer rate on the name recognition test. These results support the view that perceptual cue-based factors influence TOT experiences.

Sensitivity vs. awareness curve: A novel model-based analysis to uncover the processes underlying nonconscious perception.

In this study, we present a novel model-based analysis of the association between awareness and perceptual processing based on a multidimensional version of signal detection theory (general recognition theory, or GRT). The analysis fits a GRT model to behavioral data and uses the estimated model to construct a sensitivity versus awareness (SvA) curve, representing sensitivity in the discrimination task at each value of relative likelihood of awareness. This approach treats awareness as a continuum rather than a dichotomy, but also provides an objective benchmark for low likelihood of awareness. In two experiments, we assessed nonconscious facial expression recognition using SvA curves in a condition in which faces (fearful vs. neutral) were rendered invisible using continuous flash suppression (CFS) for 500 and 700 milliseconds. We predicted and found nonconscious processing of face emotion, in the form of higher than chance-level sensitivity in the area of low likelihood of awareness.

The effect of being in a tip-of-the-tongue state on subsequent items.

The tip-of-the-tongue state (TOT) is the feeling that an inaccessible item will be recalled. In the TOT induction paradigm, participants are given a list of general information questions or word definitions, and the participants indicate whether they are in a TOT for each item. The present study explored the effect that being in a TOT for one item (N) has on the recall and the likelihood of a TOT for the subsequent item (N + 1). Three experiments were conducted. All three experiments showed that TOTs do not affect the rate of recall for the next item but decrease the likelihood of a TOT for the next item. This effect extended to items occurring two items after the initial TOT (N + 2) in two experiments. Thus, TOTs are less likely to occur after another TOT than after an item not in a TOT. These data are interpreted within a metacognitive framework.

Tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states: retrieval, behavior, and experience.

The tip-of-the-tongue state (TOT) is the feeling that accompanies temporary inaccessibility of an item that a person is trying to retrieve. TOTs have been studied experimentally since the seminal work of Brown and McNeill (1966). TOTs are experiences that accompany some failed or slow retrievals, and they can result in changes in retrieval behavior itself, allowing us to study the interplay among experience, retrieval, and behavior. We often attribute the experience of the TOT to the unretrieved target, but TOTs are based on a variety of cues, heuristics, or sources of evidence, such as partial information, related information, and cue familiarity, that predict the likelihood of overcoming retrieval failure. We present a synthesis of the direct-access view, which accounts for retrieval failure, and the heuristic-metacognitive view, which accounts for the experience of the TOT. We offer several avenues for future research and applications of TOT theory and data.

The MAPS model of self-regulation: Integrating metacognition, agency, and possible selves.

Self-regulation, a social-cognitive process at the intersection of metacognition, motivation, and behavior, encompasses how people conceptualize, strive for, and accomplish their goals. Self-regulation is critical for behavioral change regardless of the context. Research indicates that self-regulation is learned. Integral to successful self-regulation of behavior are: (a) an articulated concept of one's possible selves, (b) metacognitive knowledge and effective strategies, and (c) a sense of one's own agency. We present the theoretical linkages, research evidence, and applied utility for these three components in promoting self-regulation of behavior, specifically in the domain of learning. We propose the MAPS model to account for the pathways of influence that lead to behavioral change. This model illustrates the dynamic and feed-forward processes that derive from the interactions among possible selves, metacognition, and agency to provide the context for developing self-regulated and effective learning that promotes student success, the transfer of knowledge, and the foundation for life-long learning.

Continuous flash suppression: Known and unknowns.

Studies utilizing continuous flash suppression (CFS) provide valuable information regarding conscious and nonconscious perception. There are, however, crucial unanswered questions regarding the mechanisms of suppression and the level of visual processing in the absence of consciousness with CFS. Research suggests that the answers to these questions depend on the experimental configuration and how we assess consciousness in these studies. The aim of this review is to evaluate the impact of different experimental configurations and the assessment of consciousness on the results of the previous CFS studies. We review studies that evaluated the influence of different experimental configuration on the depth of suppression with CFS and discuss how different assessments of consciousness may impact the results of CFS studies. Finally, we review behavioral and brain recording studies of CFS. In conclusion, previous studies provide evidence for survival of low-level visual information and complete impairment of high-level visual information under the influence of CFS. That is, studies suggest that nonconscious perception of lower-level visual information happens with CFS, but there is no evidence for nonconscious high-level recognition with CFS.

Epistemic Curiosity and the Region of Proximal Learning.

We propose a framework for understanding epistemic curiosity as a metacognitive feeling state that is related to the individual's Region of Proximal Learning (RPL), an adaptive mental space where we feel we are on the verge of knowing or understanding. First, we review several historical views, contrasting the RPL perspective with alternative views of curiosity. Second, we detail the processes, conditions, and outcomes within the RPL framework which are proposed to be related to curiosity. Finally, we review several lines of evidence relevant to the relation between RPL and curiosity. These include (1) differences in the conditions under which experts and novices mind wander, (2) experiments investigating people's choices of whether to study materials for which they have high versus low feelings of knowing, (3) results related to people's engagement with corrections to errors made with high confidence, and (4) curiosity, attention, and learning data related to the tip-of-the-tongue state.

The tip-of-the-tongue state and curiosity.

Theories of study time allocation and of curiosity suggest that people are most engaged with and want to devote their time to materials that are not completely mastered but also are not so difficult that they might be impossible. Their curiosity is thought to be triggered by items that are almost known, or are in what is sometimes called the region of proximal learning. Answers that are on the tip-of-the-tongue (TOT)-not immediately recallable but nevertheless evoking a feeling of imminent recall-seem, intuitively, to be materials that have this characteristic of being almost, but not quite, fully known. We therefore, hypothesized that people would be particularly curious to see the answers to questions for which the answers were on the tips of their tongues. To test the TOT curiosity hypothesis, we gave participants 82 general information questions and quickly asked whether the answers were or were not on the tips of their tongues and whether they wanted to see the answers later. Overwhelmingly, items that were accompanied by a TOT feeling were those which evoked participants' curiosity, regardless of whether the feeling occurred in conjunction with an error of commission, an error of omission, or even with the correct answer.

Episodic memory in nonhumans: what, and where, is when?

Episodic memory is defined as the recollection of specific events in one's past, accompanied by the experience of having been there personally. This definition presents high hurdles to the investigation of episodic memory in nonhumans. Recent studies operationalize episodic memory as memory for when and where an event occurred, for the order in which events occurred, or for an animal's own behavior. None of these approaches has yet generalized across species, and each fails to capture features of human episodic memory. Nonetheless, the study of episodic memory in nonhumans seems less daunting than it did five years ago. To demonstrate a correspondence between human episodic memory and nonhuman memory, progress is needed in three areas. Putative episodic memories in nonhumans should be shown to be; first, represented in long-term memory, rather than short-term or working memory; second, explicit, or accessible to introspection; and third, distinct from semantic memory, or general knowledge about the world.

Implicit metacognition, explicit uncertainty, and the monitoring/control distinction in animal metacognition.

Smith et al. demonstrate the viability of animal metacognition research. We commend their effort and suggest three avenues of research. The first concerns whether animals are explicitly aware of their metacognitive processes. The second asks whether animals have metaknowledge of their own uncertain responses. The third issue concerns the monitoring/control distinction. We suggest some ways in which these issues elucidate metacognitive processes in nonhuman animals.

Metacognition does not imply self-reflection, but it does imply function.

Is self-reflection necessary for metacognition to occur? Like Kornell (2014, pp. 143-149), we struggle with this question. If humans metacognition is not always self-reflective, why should we expect animals to be so? We suggest that one way to pursue metacognition in animals is to examine its ecological and evolutionary relevance.

Animal cognition: monkeys recall previously seen images.

A recent study has found that rhesus macaques can recall newly presented shapes: this demonstration of recall in non-human primates suggests that some animals have recollection processes similar to those of humans.

The effects of emotion on tip-of-the-tongue states.

Tip-of-the-tongue states (TOTs) are judgments of the likelihood of imminent retrieval for items currently not recalled. In the present study, the relation of emotion to the experience of TOTs is explored. Emotion-inducing questions (e.g., "What is the term for ritual suicide in Japan?") were embedded among neutral questions (e.g., "What is the capital of Denmark?"). Participants attempted to recall the answers and, if unsuccessful, were asked if they were in a TOT and given a recognition test. For unrecalled items, there were significantly more TOTs for the emotional items than for the neutral items, even though the recognition performance was identical. There were more TOTs for questions that followed emotional questions than TOTs for questions that followed neutral questions, suggesting the emotional arousal lasts beyond the specific question. These findings suggest that emotional cues increase the likelihood of TOTs. These data are consistent with a metacognitive view of TOTs.

English speakers attend more strongly than Spanish speakers to manner of motion when classifying novel objects and events.

Three experiments provide evidence that the conceptualization of moving objects and events is influenced by one's native language, consistent with linguistic relativity theory. Monolingual English speakers and bilingual Spanish/English speakers tested in an English-speaking context performed better than monolingual Spanish speakers and bilingual Spanish/English speakers tested in a Spanish-speaking context at sorting novel, animated objects and events into categories on the basis of manner of motion, an attribute that is prominently marked in English but not in Spanish. In contrast, English and Spanish speakers performed similarly at classifying on the basis of path, an attribute that is prominently marked in both languages. Similar results were obtained regardless of whether categories were labeled by novel words or numbered, suggesting that an English-speaking tendency to focus on manner of motion is a general phenomenon and not limited to word learning. Effects of age of acquisition of English were also observed on the performance of bilinguals, with early bilinguals performing similarly in the 2 language contexts and later bilinguals showing greater contextual variation.

Working memory load differentially affects tip-of-the-tongue states and feeling-of-knowing judgments.

Tip-of-the-tongue states (TOTs) are judgments of the likelihood of imminent retrieval for items currently not recalled, whereas feeling-of-knowing judgments (FOKs) are predictions of successful recognition for items not recalled. The assumption has been that similar metacognitive processes dictate these similar judgments. In Experiment 1, TOTs and FOKs were compared for general information questions. Participants remembered four digits (working memory load) during target retrieval for half of the questions, and there was no memory load for the other questions. Working memory did not affect recall but decreased the number of TOTs and increased FOKs. In Experiment 2, participants maintained six digits during retrieval. TOTs decreased in the working memory condition, but FOKs remained constant. Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiment 2 while asking for FOKs for recall. In each of the first three experiments, positive metacognitive judgments also affected working memory performance, supporting the idea that working memory and metamemory use similar monitoring processes. In Experiment 4, visual working memory did not affect TOTs or FOKs. The data support a view that TOTs and FOKs are separable metacognitive entities.