Heritable human genome editing: correction, selection and treatment.

Heritable human genome editing (HHGE) to correct a nuclear gene sequence that would result in a serious genetic condition in a future child is presented as 'treatment' in various ethics and policy materials, and as morally preferable to the 'selection' practice of preimplantation genetic testing (PGT), which is subject to the disability critique. However, whether HHGE is 'treatment' for a future child, or another form of 'selection', or whether HHGE instead 'treats' prospective parents, are now central questions in the debate regarding its possible legalisation. This article argues that the idea of 'treatment' for a future child is largely a proxy for 'seriousness of purpose', intended to distinguish HHGE to avoid serious genetic conditions from less obviously justifiable uses; that HHGE is best understood, and morally justified, as a form of 'treatment' for prospective parents who strongly desire an unaffected genetically related child and who have no, or poor, options to achieve this; that HHGE would be morally permissible if consistent with that child's welfare; that legalisation is supportable with reference to the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights; and that HHGE is morally distinguishable from PGT.

Germline Genetic Modification and Identity: the Mitochondrial and Nuclear Genomes.

In a legal 'first', the UK removed a prohibition against modifying embryos in human reproduction, to enable mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs), a move the Government distanced from 'germline genetic modification', which it aligned with modifying the nuclear genome. This paper (1) analyzes the uses and meanings of this term in UK/US legal and policy debates; and (2) evaluates related ethical concerns about identity. It shows that, with respect to identity, MRTs and nuclear genome editing techniques such as CRISPR/Cas-9 (now a policy topic), are not as different as has been supposed. While it does not follow that the two should be treated exactly alike, one of the central reasons offered for treating MRTs more permissively than nuclear genetic modification, and for not regarding MRTs as 'germline genetic modification', is thereby in doubt. Identity cannot, by itself, do the work thus far assigned to it, explicitly or otherwise, in law and policy.

RISKS, REASONS AND RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENGLISH ABORTION LAW.

Although there is no right to abort in English law but rather abortion is a crime, the lawful grounds for which are instantiated in the Abortion Act 1967 (as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990), the regulation of abortion is sometimes perceived as being fairly 'liberal'. Accordingly, the idea that aspects of English law could be criticised under the European Convention on Human Rights, with which the UK must comply following the Human Rights Act 1998, may seem unlikely. Indeed, English law is compatible with the consensus amongst contracting states that abortion should be available on maternal health grounds. However, analysis of the UK's negative obligations under Article 8 shows that section 1(1)(a) of the Act is problematic as it operates in the first trimester. Further, given the European Court of Human Rights' emphasis on the reduced margin of appreciation once a state has legalised abortion to some degree and its jurisprudence relating to a state's positive obligations, the analysis shows that, while English law may not be problematic in relation to the lack of guidelines relating to the lawful grounds for abortion, it may well be in relation to the lack of a formal system for the review of any two doctors' decision not to grant a termination. Notwithstanding the morally serious nature of the decision to abort, the analysis overall raises questions about the need for at least some degree of abortion law reform, particularly in relation to the first trimester, towards a more autonomy-focused, though time-limited, rights-based approach.

Embryo futures and stem cell research: the management of informed uncertainty.

In the social worlds of assisted conception and stem cell science, uncertainties proliferate and particular framings of the future may be highly strategic. In this article we explore meanings and articulations of the future using data from our study of ethical and social issues implicated by the donation of embryos to human embryonic stem cell research in three linked assisted conception units and stem cell laboratories in the UK. Framings of the future in this field inform the professional management of uncertainty and we explore some of the tensions this involves in practice. The bifurcation of choices for donating embryos into accepting informed uncertainty or not donating at all was identified through the research process of interviews and ethics discussion groups. Professional staff accounts in this study contained moral orientations that valued ideas such as engendering patient trust by offering full information, the sense of collective ownership of the National Heath Service and publicly funded science and ideas for how donors might be able to give restricted consent as a third option.

No small matter for some: practitioners' views on the moral status and treatment of human embryos.

In this paper, we discuss findings from two studies designed to access and analyse the beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours of health-care professionals and scientists working in morally contested fields of biomedicine that involve the embryo. We seek to support the view that the embryo typically 'matters' to the people we interviewed and whose work we observed, even though it is impossible for them to agree in terms of why that is, and even though their work is of the type to which the moral guardians of the embryo object. In the first part of this paper, we touch on the policy and legal position in relation to embryos, noting Margot Brazier's account of the development of the relevant regulation in the UK and the importance of her claim that the embryo is widely thought to have an important symbolic value. We then turn to explore some of the views, attitudes, and work practices of those whose work involves the embryo, whether that be in relation to fertility treatment services, including IVF and PGD, or research that uses embryos. Our discussion shows the extent to which the embryo typically matters, in various ways, to those working in these fields.

Donation of 'spare' fresh or frozen embryos to research: who decides that an embryo is 'spare' and how can we enhance the quality and protect the validity of consent?

This paper analyses elements of the legal process of consent to the donation of 'spare' embryos to research, including stem-cell research, and makes a recommendation intended to enhance the quality of that process, including on occasion by guarding against the invalidity of such consent. This is important in its own right and also so as to maximise the reproductive treatment options of couples engaged in in vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment and to avoid possible harms to them. In Part 1, with reference to qualitative data from three UK IVF clinics, we explore the often delicate and contingent nature of what comes to be, for legal purposes, a 'spare' embryo. The way in which an embryo becomes 'spare', with its implications for the process of consent to donation to research, is not addressed in the relevant reports relating to or codes of practice governing the donation of embryos to research, which assume an unproblematic notion of the 'spare' embryo. Significantly, our analysis demonstrates that there is an important and previously unrecognised first stage in the donation of a 'spare' embryo to research, namely: consent to an embryo being 'spare' and so, at the same time, to its disuse in treatment. This is not explicitly covered by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Act 1990, as amended by the HFE Act 2008. Having identified this important initial stage in the process of consent to the donation of a 'spare' embryo to research in conclusion to Part 1, in Part 2 we analyse the idea of consent to an embryo's disuse in treatment on the basis that it is 'spare' with reference to the legal elements of consent, namely information as to nature and purpose, capacity, and voluntariness. We argue that there are in fact three related consent processes in play, of which the principal one concerns consent to an embryo's disuse in treatment. If the quality of this first consent is compromised, in turn this will impact on the quality of the consent to the donation of that 'spare' embryo to research, followed by the quality of consent to future cycles of assisted reproduction treatment in the event that these are needed as a result of a donation decision. The analysis overall is of central relevance to the debate as to whether, and if so when, it should be permissible to request the donation of fresh embryos for research, as opposed to those that have been frozen and, for instance, have reached the end of their statutory storage term. This has a particular bearing on the donation of embryos to stem-cell research since there is a debate as to whether fresh embryos are most useful for this.

Facilitating choice, framing choice: staff views on widening the scope of preimplantation genetic diagnosis in the UK.

In the UK, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) is responsible for licensing preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). To date, licenses have been issued for the testing of about 70 genetic conditions, drawing on three key 'ethical principles'. Following a public consultation, the HFEA has recently widened the scope for PGD to include susceptibility to late onset, lower penetrance conditions such as inherited breast cancer. As the numbers and types of conditions which can potentially be tested for rises, the question of how, and indeed what limits should be set is timely. Drawing on qualitative interviews and ethics discussion groups which took place prior to or during the HFEA consultation, this paper explores the views of staff working in or linked to one PGD Unit in the UK, as to how they saw these potential changes. The paper thus provides an opportunity to develop greater understanding of how staff working in a morally contentious, innovative area viewed the potential expansion of their work, prior to that expansion taking place. Key themes include 'drawing lines' on behalf of others, particularly with the current emphasis on individual reproductive autonomy; and balancing the invasiveness and possible risks of PGD treatment against the 'seriousness' of the condition. More broadly, the paper highlights the complexities involved in trying to develop general 'ethical principles' to govern the use of ever evolving reproductive technologies.

Social welfare, genetic welfare? Boundary-work in the IVF/PGD clinic.

Through the lens of the 'welfare of the child' assessment, this paper explores how staff working in the area of in vitro fertilisation and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (IVF/PGD) balance reflexive relations of legitimacy and accountability between the public and private spheres, and between medicine, the citizen and the state. The wider research of which this analysis is a part uses multiple methods to study two National Health Service Assisted Conception Units in England. Research methods used included observation clinics and interviews with staff from a range of disciplines. We illustrate how the staff reveal tensions between their views that the welfare of the child assessment can be seen as intrusive and discriminatory, and on the other hand that medical intervention in reproduction should be socially and professionally accountable. These tensions can be understood sociologically in terms of a gradual movement from socially based solutions to fertility problems and disabilities, towards a biomedical, and arguably genetically oriented worldview of such problems. Rather than being viewed as discrete, these two orientations should be seen as indicating an emergent direction of travel along a continuum, with elements of both being present in the accounts. We argue that consideration of the welfare of the child involves staff in ethical boundary-work across the two orientations and between the accountabilities and responsibilities of healthcare professionals, individuals and the state.

Choosing between possible lives: legal and ethical issues in preimplantation genetic diagnosis.

This article critically appraises the current legal scope of the principal applications of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). This relatively new technique, which is available to some parents undergoing in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment, aims to ensure that a child is not born with a seemingly undesirable genetic condition. The question addressed here is whether there should be serious reasons to test for genetic conditions in embryos in order to be able to select between them. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority and the Human Genetics Commission have decided that there should be such reasons by broadly aligning the criteria for PGD with those for selective abortion. This stance is critically explored, as are its implications for the possible use of PGD to select either against or for marginal features or for significant traits. The government is currently reviewing the legal scope and regulation of PGD.

Constructing an ethical framework for embryo donation to research: is it time for a restricted consent policy?

An Ethics & Policy Workshop was held with 20 invited UK stakeholders to consider whether embryo donors should be able to restrict the future use of human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) created from their embryos. Participants cited tensions between pure altruism and a more reciprocal basis for donation; and between basic research (in which genetic material would never form part of another living being) and treatment applications. Two restriction models were suggested to acknowledge specific ethical issues raised by hESCs' use in research and treatments: (1) a two tier system: hESCs with unrestricted consent could go to the UK Stem Cell Bank; those with restricted consent could be used in individual labs which could guarantee to honour the restrictions, and Bank deposit would not be required. (2) a three category system: restrictions could include (i) basic hESC research; (ii) hESC research and treatment; no gamete derivation (iii) 'unrestricted' hESC research and treatment.

Choosing embryos: ethical complexity and relational autonomy in staff accounts of PGD.

The technique of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is commonly explained as a way of checking the genes of embryos produced by IVF for serious genetic diseases. However, complex accounts of this technique emerged during ethics discussion groups held for PGD staff. These form part of a study exploring the social processes, meanings and institutions that frame and produce 'ethical problems' for practitioners, scientists and others working in the specialty of PGD in the UK. Two 'grey areas' raised by staff are discussed in terms of how far staff are, or in the future may be, able to support autonomous choices of women/couples: accepting 'carrier' embryos within the goal of creating a 'healthy' child; and sex selection of embryos for social reasons. These grey areas challenged the staff's resolve to offer individual informed choice, in the face of their awareness of possible collective social effects that might ensue from individual choices. We therefore argue that these new forms of choice pose a challenge to conventional models of individual autonomy used in UK genetic and reproductive counselling, and that 'relational autonomy' may be a more suitable ethical model to describe the ethical principles being drawn on by staff working in this area.

Testing the embryo, testing the fetus.

This paper stems from an ethnographic, multidisciplinary study that explored the views and experiences of practitioners and scientists on social, ethical and clinical dilemmas encountered when working in the area of PGD for serious genetic disorders. We focus here on staff perceptions and experiences of working with embryos and helping women/couples to make choices that will result in selecting embryos for transfer and disposal of 'affected' embryos, compared to the termination of affected pregnancies following PND. Analysis and discussion of our data led us to consider the possible advantages of PGD and whether a gradualist account of the embryo's and fetus's moral status can account for all of these, particularly since a gradualist account concentrates on the significance of time (developmental stage) and makes no comment as to the significance of place (in-vitro, in-utero).