Tipping the balance between fairness and efficiency through temporoparietal stimulation.

Maximizing the welfare of society requires distributing goods between groups of people with different preferences. Such decisions are difficult because different moral principles impose irreconcilable solutions. For example, utilitarian efficiency (maximize overall outcome across individuals) may need trade-off against Rawlsian fairness norms (maximize the outcome for the worst-off individual). We identify a brain mechanism enabling decision-makers to solve such trade-offs between efficiency and fairness using separate neuroimaging and sham-controlled brain stimulation experiments. As activity in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) increases, people are more likely to implement the Rawlsian fairness criterion rather than efficiency or inequality concerns. Strikingly, reducing TPJ excitability with brain stimulation reduces the concern for fairness in fairness-efficiency trade-offs. Moreover, the reduced fairness concerns statistically relate to stimulation-induced reductions in perspective-taking skills as measured in a separate task. Together, our findings not only reveal the neural underpinning of efficiency-fairness trade-offs but also recast the role of TPJ in social decision-making by showing that its perspective-taking function serves to promote fairness for the worst-off rather than efficiency or equality.

Belief Updating during Social Interactions: Neural Dynamics and Causal Role of Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex.

In competitive interactions, humans have to flexibly update their beliefs about another person's intentions in order to adjust their own choice strategy, such as when believing that the other may exploit their cooperativeness. Here we investigate both the neural dynamics and the causal neural substrate of belief updating processes in humans. We used an adapted prisoner's dilemma game in which participants explicitly predicted the coplayer's actions, which allowed us to quantify the prediction error between expected and actual behavior. First, in an EEG experiment, we found a stronger medial frontal negativity (MFN) for negative than positive prediction errors, suggesting that this medial frontal ERP component may encode unexpected defection of the coplayer. The MFN also predicted subsequent belief updating after negative prediction errors. In a second experiment, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to investigate whether the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) causally implements belief updating after unexpected outcomes. Our results show that dmPFC TMS impaired belief updating and strategic behavioral adjustments after negative prediction errors. Taken together, our findings reveal the time course of the use of prediction errors in social decisions and suggest that the dmPFC plays a crucial role in updating mental representations of others' intentions.

Neural Reward Representations Enable Utilitarian Welfare Maximization.

From deciding which meal to prepare for our guests to trading off the proenvironmental effects of climate protection measures against their economic costs, we often must consider the consequences of our actions for the well-being of others (welfare). Vexingly, the tastes and views of others can vary widely. To maximize welfare according to the utilitarian philosophical tradition, decision-makers facing conflicting preferences of others should choose the option that maximizes the sum of the subjective value (utility) of the entire group. This notion requires comparing the intensities of preferences across individuals. However, it remains unclear whether such comparisons are possible at all and (if they are possible) how they might be implemented in the brain. Here, we show that female and male participants can both learn the preferences of others by observing their choices and represent these preferences on a common scale to make utilitarian welfare decisions. On the neural level, multivariate support vector regressions revealed that a distributed activity pattern in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), a brain region previously associated with reward processing, represented the preference strength of others. Strikingly, also the utilitarian welfare of others was represented in the VMPFC and relied on the same neural code as the estimated preferences of others. Together, our findings reveal that humans can behave as if they maximized utilitarian welfare using a specific utility representation and that the brain enables such choices by repurposing neural machinery processing the reward others receive.

Pre-supplementary motor area strengthens reward sensitivity in intertemporal choice.

Previous investigations on the causal neural mechanisms underlying intertemporal decision making focused on the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex as neural substrate of cognitive control. However, little is known, about the causal contributions of further parts of the frontoparietal control network to delaying gratification, including the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) and posterior parietal cortex (PPC). Conflicting previous evidence related pre-SMA and PPC either to evidence accumulation processes, choice biases, or response caution. To disentangle between these alternatives, we combined drift diffusion models of decision making with online transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over pre-SMA and PPC during an intertemporal decision task. While we observed no robust effects of PPC TMS, perturbation of pre-SMA activity reduced preferences for larger over smaller rewards. A drift diffusion model of decision making suggests that pre-SMA increases the weight assigned to reward magnitudes during the evidence accumulation process without affecting choice biases or response caution. Taken together, the current findings reveal the computational role of the pre-SMA in value-based decision making, showing that pre-SMA promotes choices of larger, costly rewards by strengthening the sensitivity to reward magnitudes.

Learning from Ingroup Experiences Changes Intergroup Impressions.

Humans form impressions toward individuals of their own social groups (ingroup members) and of different social groups (outgroup members). Outgroup-focused theories predict that intergroup impressions are mainly shaped by experiences with outgroup individuals, while ingroup-focused theories predict that ingroup experiences play a dominant role. Here we test predictions from these two psychological theories by estimating how intergroup impressions are dynamically shaped when people learn from both ingroup and outgroup experiences. While undergoing fMRI, male participants had identical experiences with different ingroup or outgroup members and rated their social closeness and impressions toward the ingroup and the outgroup. Behavioral results showed an initial ingroup bias in impression ratings which was significantly reduced over the course of learning, with larger effects in individuals with stronger ingroup identification. Computational learning models revealed that these changes in intergroup impressions were predicted by the weight given to ingroup prediction errors. Neurally, the individual weight for ingroup prediction errors was related to the coupling between the left inferior parietal lobule and the left anterior insula, which, in turn, predicted learning-related changes in intergroup impressions. Our findings provide computational and neural evidence for ingroup-focused theories, highlighting the importance of ingroup experiences in shaping social impressions in intergroup settings.Significance Statement:Living in multicultural societies, humans interact with individuals of their own social groups (ingroup members) and of different social groups (outgroup members). However, little is known about how people learn from the mixture of ingroup and outgroup interactions, the most natural experiences in current societies. Here, participants had identical, intermixed experiences with different ingroup and outgroup individuals and rated their closeness and impressions toward the ingroup and the outgroup. Combining computational models and fMRI, we find that the weight given to ingroup experiences (ingroup prediction errors) is the main source of intergroup impression change, captured by changes in connectivity between the parietal lobe and insula. These findings highlight the importance of ingroup experiences in shaping intergroup impressions in complex social environments.

The right temporoparietal junction enables delay of gratification by allowing decision makers to focus on future events.

Studies of neural processes underlying delay of gratification usually focus on prefrontal networks related to curbing affective impulses. Here, we provide evidence for an alternative mechanism that facilitates delaying gratification by mental orientation towards the future. Combining continuous theta-burst stimulation (cTBS) with functional neuroimaging, we tested how the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) facilitates processing of future events and thereby promotes delay of gratification. Participants performed an intertemporal decision task and a mental time-travel task in the MRI scanner before and after receiving cTBS over the rTPJ or the vertex (control site). rTPJ cTBS led to both stronger temporal discounting for longer delays and reduced processing of future relative to past events in the mental time-travel task. This finding suggests that the rTPJ contributes to the ability to delay gratification by facilitating mental representation of outcomes in the future. On the neural level, rTPJ cTBS led to a reduction in the extent to which connectivity of rTPJ with striatum reflected the value of delayed rewards, indicating a role of rTPJ-striatum connectivity in constructing neural representations of future rewards. Together, our findings provide evidence that the rTPJ is an integral part of a brain network that promotes delay of gratification by facilitating mental orientation to future rewards.

Brain stimulation over dorsomedial prefrontal cortex modulates effort-based decision making.

Deciding whether to engage in strenuous mental activities requires trading-off the potential benefits against the costs of mental effort, but it is unknown which brain rhythms are causally involved in such cost-benefit calculations. We show that brain stimulation targeting midfrontal theta oscillations increases the engagement in goal-directed mental effort. Participants received transcranial alternating current stimulation over dorsomedial prefrontal cortex while deciding whether they are willing to perform a demanding working memory task for monetary rewards. Midfrontal theta tACS increased the willingness to exert mental effort for rewards while leaving working memory performance unchanged. Computational modelling using a hierarchical Bayesian drift diffusion model suggests that theta tACS shifts the starting bias before evidence accumulation towards high reward-high effort options without affecting the velocity of the evidence accumulation process. Our findings suggest that the motivation to engage in goal-directed mental effort can be increased via midfrontal tACS.

Causal role of lateral prefrontal cortex in mental effort and fatigue.

Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is well-known for its role in exerting mental work, however the contribution of DLPFC for deciding whether or not to engage in effort remains unknown. Here, we assessed the causal role of DLPFC in effort-based decision making. We disrupted functioning of DLPFC with noninvasive brain stimulation before participants repeatedly decided whether to exert mental effort in a working memory task. We found the same DLPFC subregion involved in mental effort exertion to influence also effort-based decisions: First, it enhanced effort discounting, suggesting that DLPFC may signal the capacity to successfully deal with effort demands. Second, a novel computational model integrating the costs of enduring effort into the effort-based decision process revealed that DLPFC disruption reduced fatigue after accumulated effort exertion, linking DLPFC activation with fatigue. Together, our findings indicate that in effort-based decisions DLPFC represents the capacity to exert mental effort and the updating of this information with enduring time-on-task, informing theoretical accounts on the role of DLPFC in the motivation to exert mental effort and the fatigue arising from it.

The Causal Role of the Lateral Prefrontal Cortex for Task-order Coordination in Dual-task Situations: A Study with Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation.

Dual tasks are characterized by the requirement for additional task-order coordination processes that schedule the processing order of two temporally overlapping tasks. Preliminary evidence from functional imaging studies suggests that lateral pFC (lPFC) activation correlates with implementing these task-order coordination processes. However, so far, it is unclear whether the lPFC is also causally involved in coordinating task order during dual-task performance and which exact mechanisms are implemented by this brain region. In this study, we addressed these open issues by applying online TMS during a dual-task situation. For this purpose, participants performed a dual task in fixed-order blocks with a constant order of tasks and in random-order block, in which the order of tasks varied randomly and thus demands on task-order coordination were increased. In Experiment 1, TMS of the lPFC compared with control TMS conditions impaired dual-task performance in random-order blocks, whereas performance in fixed-order blocks was unaffected by TMS. In Experiment 2, we tested for the specificity of the lPFC TMS effect on task-order coordination by applying TMS over the preSMA. We showed that preSMA TMS did not affect dual-task performance, neither in fixed-order nor in random-order blocks. Results of this study indicate that the lPFC, but not the preSMA, is causally involved in implementing task-order coordination processes in dual-task situations.

The role of the dorsal medial frontal cortex in central processing limitation: a transcranial magnetic stimulation study.

When humans perform two tasks simultaneously, responses to the second task are increasingly delayed as the interval between the two tasks decreases (psychological refractory period). This delay of the second task is thought to reflect a central processing limitation at the response selection stage. However, the neural mechanisms underlying this central processing limitation remain unclear. Using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), we examined the role of the dorsal medial frontal cortex (dMFC) in a dual-task paradigm in which participants performed an auditory task 1 and a visual task 2. We found that dMFC TMS, relative to control conditions, reduced the psychological refractory period for task 2 processing, whereas we observed no dMFC TMS effects on task 1 processing. This suggests a causal role of the dMFC in coordinating response selection processes at the central bottleneck.

The importance of working memory updating in the Prisoner's dilemma.

Successful cooperation requires that humans can flexibly adjust choices to their partner's behaviour. This, in turn, presupposes a representation of a partner's past decisions in working memory. The aim of the current study was to investigate the role of working memory processes in cooperation. For that purpose, we tested the effects of working memory updating (Experiment 1) and working memory maintenance demands (Experiments 2 and 3) on cooperative behaviour in the Prisoner's dilemma game. We found that demands on updating, but not maintenance, of working memory contents impaired strategy use in the Prisoner's dilemma. Thus, our data show that updating a partner's past behaviour in working memory represents an important precondition for strategy use in cooperation.

Dissociable effects of motivation and expectancy on conflict processing: an fMRI study.

Previous studies suggest that both motivation and task difficulty expectations activate brain regions associated with cognitive control. However, it remains an open question whether motivational and cognitive determinants of control have similar or dissociable impacts on conflict processing on a neural level. The current study tested the effects of motivation and conflict expectancy on activity in regions related to processing of the target and the distractor information. Participants performed a picture-word interference task in which we manipulated the size of performance-dependent monetary rewards (level of motivation) and the ratio of congruent to incongruent trials within a block (level of conflict expectancy). Our results suggest that motivation improves conflict processing by facilitating task-relevant stimulus processing and task difficulty expectations mainly modulate the processing of distractor information. We conclude that motivation and conflict expectancy engage dissociable control strategies during conflict resolution.

The Importance of the Lateral Prefrontal Cortex for Strategic Decision Making in the Prisoner's Dilemma.

Previous functional imaging studies investigating the neural basis of strategic decision making in the prisoner's dilemma reported a correlation between cooperative behavior and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) activity; however, the precise function of the DLPFC in establishing cooperation remains unclear so far. The present study investigated the causal role of the DLPFC in an iterative prisoner's dilemma game with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). We discovered that disrupting the DLPFC with TMS decreased cooperation rates in comparison to control conditions, with this effect being most pronounced when the partner had defected previously. Thus, the current results suggest that the DLPFC contributes to strategic decision making in the prisoner's dilemma game.

Dissociable networks control conflict during perception and response selection: a transcranial magnetic stimulation Study.

Current models of conflict processing propose that cognitive control resolves conflict in the flanker task by enhancing task-relevant stimulus processing at a perceptual level. However, because conflicts occur at both a perceptual and a response selection level in that task, we tested the hypothesis of conflict-specific control networks for perceptual and response selection conflicts using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). TMS of the presupplementary motor area selectively disrupted the processing of response selection conflict, whereas TMS of the posterior intraparietal sulcus/inferior parietal lobule interfered with perceptual conflict processing. In more detail, the presupplementary motor area seems to resolve response selection conflict mainly when no conflicts have occurred in the previous trial. In contrast, the posterior intraparietal sulcus/inferior parietal lobule may resolve perceptual conflicts selectively when a conflict has occurred in the previous trial. The current data show the need for revising models of cognitive control by providing evidence for the existence of conflict-specific control networks resolving conflict at different processing levels.

Motivational and cognitive determinants of control during conflict processing.

Previous studies suggest that both reward anticipation and expected or experienced conflicts activate cognitive control. The present study investigated how these factors interact during conflict processing. In two experiments, participants performed a variant of the Stroop task, receiving performance-dependent monetary rewards in some blocks. In addition, we manipulated the level of conflict-triggered reactive and expectancy-driven proactive control: In Experiment 1, we compared the Stroop effect after previously congruent and incongruent trials to examine the conflict adaptation effect (reactive control). We found that the level of motivation did not interact with conflict adaptation. In Experiment 2, we varied the proportion of congruent and incongruent trials to manipulate conflict expectancy (proactive control). The data suggest the effects of motivation to be less pronounced under conditions of high conflict expectancy. We conclude that the interaction of motivation with cognitive determinants of control depends on whether these activate proactive or reactive control processes.

Lower motivation for rewarded mental effort in tobacco dependence.

Tobacco dependence is characterized by decision-making impairments, which may increase the risk of smoking relapse by lowering the capacity to resist the immediate gratification of nicotine consumption. Because controlling one's desires for immediate rewards is experienced as effortful, aversion to effortful control processes may also influence the prospects of successful smoking cessation. We therefore tested whether persons who smoke, compared with persons who do not smoke, show a lower willingness to engage in goal-directed mental effort. Thirty-seven persons who smoke and 38 persons who do not smoke performed a decision task requiring choices on whether to exert a demanding attention task for monetary rewards. Using state-of-the-art drift-diffusion modeling, we found that persons who smoke showed a stronger starting bias toward effort-free rewards. Taken together, our process model approach allowed us to identify the subcomponents of the decision process underlying the stronger aversion against mental effort in tobacco dependence, which may contribute to altered decision making by lowering the motivation to engage in effortful control processes when trying to suppress the desire for nicotine consumption. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Cathodal HD-tDCS above the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex increases environmentally sustainable decision-making.

Environmental sustainability is characterized by a conflict between short-term self-interest and longer-term collective interests. Self-control capacity has been proposed to be a crucial determinant of people's ability to overcome this conflict. Yet, causal evidence is lacking, and previous research is dominated by the use of self-report measures. Here, we modulated self-control capacity by applying inhibitory high-definition transcranial current stimulation (HD-tDCS) above the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) while participants engaged in an environmentally consequential decision-making task. The task includes conflicting and low conflicting trade-offs between short-term personal interests and long-term environmental benefits. Contrary to our preregistered expectation, inhibitory HD-tDCS above the left dlPFC, presumably by reducing self-control capacity, led to more, and not less, pro-environmental behavior in conflicting decisions. We speculate that in our exceptionally environmentally friendly sample, deviating from an environmentally sustainable default required self-control capacity, and that inhibiting the left dlPFC might have reduced participants' ability to do so.

Causal involvement of dorsomedial prefrontal cortex in learning the predictability of observable actions.

Social learning is well established across species. While recent neuroimaging studies show that dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC/preSMA) activation correlates with observational learning signals, the precise computations that are implemented by DMPFC/preSMA have remained unclear. To identify whether DMPFC/preSMA supports learning from observed outcomes or observed actions, or possibly encodes even a higher order factor (such as the reliability of the demonstrator), we downregulate DMPFC/preSMA excitability with continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS) and assess different forms of observational learning. Relative to a vertex-cTBS control condition, DMPFC/preSMA downregulation decreases performance during action-based learning but has no effect on outcome-based learning. Computational modeling reveals that DMPFC/preSMA cTBS disrupts learning the predictability, a proxy of reliability, of the demonstrator and modulates the rate of learning from observed actions. Thus, our results suggest that the DMPFC is causally involved in observational action learning, mainly by adjusting the speed of learning about the predictability of the demonstrator.

An integrative framework of conflict and control.

People regularly encounter various types of conflict. Here, we ask if, and, if so, how, different types of conflict, from lab-based Stroop conflicts to everyday-life self-control or moral conflicts, are related to one other. We present a framework that assumes that action-goal representations are hierarchically organized, ranging from concrete actions to abstract goals. The framework's key assumption is that conflicts involving more abstract goals (e.g., self-control/moral conflict) are embedded in a more complex action space; thus, to resolve such conflicts, people need to consider more associated goals and actions. We discuss how differences in complexity impact conflict resolution mechanisms and the costs/benefits of resolving conflicts. Altogether, we offer a new way to conceptualize and analyze conflict regulation across different domains.

Working memory demands modulate cognitive control in the Stroop paradigm.

One important task of cognitive control is to regulate behavior by resolving information processing conflicts. In the Stroop task, e.g., incongruent trials lead to conflict-related enhancements of cognitive control and to improved behavioral performance in subsequent trials. Several studies suggested that these cognitive control processes are functionally and anatomically related to working memory (WM) functions. The present study investigated this suggestion and tested whether these control processes are modulated by concurrent WM demands. For this purpose, we performed three experiments in which we combined different WM tasks with the Stroop paradigm and measured their effects on cognitive control. We found that high WM demands led to a suppression of conflict-triggered cognitive control, whereas our findings suggest that this suppression effect is rather due to WM updating than to maintenance demands. We explain our findings by assuming that WM processes interfere with conflict-triggered cognitive control, harming the efficiency of these control processes.