Freeman's transorbital lobotomy as an anomaly: A material culture examination of surgical instruments and operative spaces.

In 1946, Walter Freeman introduced the transorbital ice pick lobotomy. Touted as a procedure that could be learned and subsequently performed by psychiatrists outside of the operating room, the technique was quickly criticized by neurosurgeons. In this article, we take a material culture approach to consider 2 grounds upon which neurosurgeons based their objections-surgical instruments and operative spaces. On both counts, Freeman was in contravention of established normative neurosurgical practices and, ultimately, his technique was exposed as an anomaly by neurosurgeons. Despite its rejection, the transorbital lobotomy became entrenched in contemporary memory and remains the emblematic procedure of the psychosurgery era.

"Mere guesswork": Clarifying the role of intelligence, mentality, and psychometric testing in the diagnosis of "mental defectives" for sterilization in Alberta from 1929 to 1972.

From 1929 until 1972, the Alberta Eugenics Board (the Board) recommended that 4,739 individuals be sterilized. The original 1928 act that legalized eugenic sterilization stipulated that the surgery itself required the consent of the individual or their caregiver; however, in 1937, the Alberta government removed the consent requirement for such cases where the Board determined individual patients to be "mental defectives." By analyzing published reports, case histories, medical journals, and primary sources from the Board, we situate the concept of "mental defective" in a historical context to clarify the Board's diagnostic process. By analyzing how the Board found individuals to be "mental defectives," we challenge a previous historiographic assumption that intelligence tests played a critical or defining role in this diagnostic process. We argue that the notion of the "mental defective" used by the Board had a long history before the advent of intelligence testing and eugenic thought. This history helps to explain how and why the Board relied extensively on the broader examination of behavior, social status, and physical appearance as core evidence in the diagnosis of "mental defect." Intelligence tests were certainly important as they shed light on an individual's academic ability. However, this alone was only one part of "mentality." Defects of mentality were understood to be broad and multifactorial, and included difficult, if not impossible, to measure attributes such as personality, emotionality, and morality. Further research should incorporate the concept of mentality in the history of psychology, testing, and eugenics. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Idols of the psychologist: Johannes Linschoten and the demise of phenomenological psychology in the Netherlands.

Before and after World War II, a loose movement within Dutch psychology solidified as a nascent phenomenological psychology. Dutch phenomenological psychologists attempted to generate an understanding of psychology that was based on Husserlian interpretations of phenomenological philosophy. This movement came to a halt in the 1960s, even though it had been exported to North America and elsewhere as "phenomenological psychology." Frequently referred to as the "Utrecht school," most of the activity of the group was centered at Utrecht University. In this article, the authors examine the role played by Johannes Linschoten in both aspects of the development of a phenomenological psychology: its rise in North America and Europe, and its institutional demise. By the time of his early death in 1964, Linschoten had cast considerable doubt on the possibilities of a purely phenomenological psychology. Nonetheless, his own empirical work, especially his 1956 dissertation published in German, can be seen to be a form of empiricism inspired by phenomenology but that clearly distanced itself from the more elitist and esoteric aspects of Dutch phenomenological psychology.

Health psychology in autobiography: Three Canadian critical narratives.

Three Canadian colleagues in health psychology recount their careers in a field of research and practice whose birth they witnessed and whose developments they have critiqued. By placing the development of health psychology in Canada in a context that is both institutional and personal, Stam, Murray, and Lubek raise a series of questions about health psychology and its propagation. While uniquely Canadian their professional careers were affected by international colleagues as well as others-patients and community members-whose views shaped their perspectives. This article is a plea for the continuing development of critical voices in health psychology.

Physician, heal thyself: the fate of the professional cum critic.

Reminding us of the crucial tasks that require our urgent ministrations, Hepworth rightly notes that critique has its limits. I agree and note that our fates as critics are bound to a professionalism we may not be able to escape.

Inductive inference or inductive behavior: Fisher and Neyman-Pearson approaches to statistical testing in psychological research (1940-1960).

The application of statistical testing in psychological research over the period of 1940-1960 is examined in order to address psychologists' reconciliation of the extant controversy between the Fisher and Neyman-Pearson approaches. Textbooks of psychological statistics and the psychological journal literature are reviewed to examine the presence of what Gigerenzer (1993) called a hybrid model of statistical testing. Such a model is present in the textbooks, although the mathematically incomplete character of this model precludes the appearance of a similarly hybridized approach to statistical testing in the research literature. The implications of this hybrid model for psychological research and the statistical testing controversy are discussed.

Beyond Papanicolaou: all things are full of words.

Papanicolaou argues that there is an isomorphism between our perceptions of the world and the structure of the world. Daring as this hypothesis is, I argue that it is not possible to know this to be the case and that it is premised on epistemological individualism, a thesis itself replete with problems.

The neurosciences and the search for a unified psychology: the science and esthetics of a single framework.

The search for a so-called unified or integrated theory has long served as a goal for some psychologists, even if the search is often implicit. But if the established sciences do not have an explicitly unified set of theories, then why should psychology? After examining this question again I argue that psychology is in fact reasonably unified around its methods and its commitment to functional explanations, an indeterminate functionalism. The question of the place of the neurosciences in this framework is complex. On the one hand, the neuroscientific project will not likely renew and synthesize the disparate arms of psychology. On the other hand, their reformulation of what it means to be human will exert an influence in multiple ways. One way to capture that influence is to conceptualize the brain in terms of a technology that we interact with in a manner that we do not yet fully understand. In this way we maintain both a distance from neuro-reductionism and refrain from committing to an unfettered subjectivity.

Cancer narratives and the cancer support group.

We conceptualize the experience of cancer as requiring 'biographical work' and examine the nature of this work in the context of peer support groups. Interviews with participants and leaders of support groups were used to theorize the importance of support to cancer patients with varying stages and length of disease. Patient interviews led us to describe the process of joining, belonging, and identifying with, support groups as an important process within patients' ongoing biographical work and encompassing a search for a 'separate social space'. We discuss the implications for understanding the stigmatizing nature of cancer and the 'civic life' these groups support.

A transnational perspective on psychosurgery: beyond Portugal and the United States.

The history of psychosurgery is most often recounted as a narrative wherein Portuguese and American physicians play the leading role. It is a traditional narrative in which the United States and, at times, Portugal are central in the development and spread of psychosurgery. Here we largely abandon the archetypal narrative and provide one of the first transnational accounts of psychosurgery to demonstrate the existence of a global psychosurgical community in which more than 40 countries participated, bolstered, critiqued, modified and heralded the treatment. From its inception in 1935 until its decline in the mid-1960s, psychosurgery was performed on almost all continents. Rather than being a phenomenon isolated to the United States and Portugal, it became a truly transnational movement.

Managing victim status in group therapy for men: a discourse analysis.

In contrast to the abundance of research on women victims, this article sheds light on the discourse of men who are self-identified as victims of their female partners' abuse. The purpose of this study was to investigate the most salient identity constructions and abuse conceptualizations among participants of group psychotherapy for men who have been abused in intimate, heterosexual partner relationships (i.e., Calgary Counselling Centre's 14-week group program titled "A Turn for the Better"). The men's identity work was examined using the methods and theoretical perspective of discourse analysis. Analysis of the talk demonstrated that the group agenda was to work through the ambiguity of abuse in the service of having the men identify themselves as victims. Thus, both the men and the group facilitators actively constructed "true victim" subject positions through their resistance to commonsense orientations of (a) "men as perpetrators" and (b) whether abuse consisted of more than physical violence. The therapeutic language of resistance was a common strategy used to manage victim status but also required further negotiation as it entailed a component of abuse (i.e., risked positioning the men as abusers rather than victims). The discussion focuses on how these findings may differ from the identity work present in women victim therapeutic groups. In addition, we note that it is difficult to uphold the victim-versus-perpetrator dichotomy in therapeutic discourse.

The fault is not in ourselves, but in our methods: comment on Schwarz.

Schwarz is right to question the methodological foundations of much of contemporary personality research. I argue that he does not go far enough, opting instead to salvage the psychometric tradition for research it cannot possibly accomplish, namely the understanding of persons in an evolutionary and historical context. Furthermore he does not address the question of measurement that has bedeviled the discipline. For all its historical tenacity, the psychometric tradition has been good at classification but weak at understanding, explanation, or description of the phenomena that most interest psychologists.

Medicalizing melancholia: exploring profiles of psychiatric professionalization.

The nineteenth century was the site of radical changes in understanding mental illness. The professionalization of psychiatry consisted primarily of the discipline's aspiration to the status of an expert medical subspecialty. While all forms of insanity were eventually reframed in medical terms, melancholia--for moral and nosological reasons--assumed a special role that made it an ideal diagnosis for conceptual reframing. Our analysis of the journal literature of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in North America and Germany traces several ways in which melancholia was medicalized. As the care for the insane shifted into the professional realm of physicians and medical terminology came to replace prior descriptors of mental illness, melancholia was replaced by depression. In addition, the process of delineating affective pathology assumed a distinctly medical flavor. Finally, melancholia was firmly medicalized when its boundaries blurred with neurasthenia. Differences in how ordinary affective terms became medicalized in German and North American psychiatry illustrate the importance of local historical approaches.

Unifying psychology: epistemological act or disciplinary maneuver?

Two arguments with attempts to unify psychology are adumbrated in this commentary. First, the unification of psychology is largely a disciplinary maneuver and not primarily an epistemological act. Second, the discipline of psychology has been unified for some time around a series of methodological and functional categories that have served to support its institutional projects but hide metaphysical problems.