Europe's Climate Target for 2050: An Assessment.

Decarbonisation is harder for transport, heating, industry and agriculture. That is, a doubling of the decarbonisation rate requires much more than a doubling of the policy effort. The low-hanging fruit has been picked.

Coastal flood damage and adaptation costs under 21st century sea-level rise.

Coastal flood damage and adaptation costs under 21st century sea-level rise are assessed on a global scale taking into account a wide range of uncertainties in continental topography data, population data, protection strategies, socioeconomic development and sea-level rise. Uncertainty in global mean and regional sea level was derived from four different climate models from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5, each combined with three land-ice scenarios based on the published range of contributions from ice sheets and glaciers. Without adaptation, 0.2-4.6% of global population is expected to be flooded annually in 2100 under 25-123 cm of global mean sea-level rise, with expected annual losses of 0.3-9.3% of global gross domestic product. Damages of this magnitude are very unlikely to be tolerated by society and adaptation will be widespread. The global costs of protecting the coast with dikes are significant with annual investment and maintenance costs of US$ 12-71 billion in 2100, but much smaller than the global cost of avoided damages even without accounting for indirect costs of damage to regional production supply. Flood damages by the end of this century are much more sensitive to the applied protection strategy than to variations in climate and socioeconomic scenarios as well as in physical data sources (topography and climate model). Our results emphasize the central role of long-term coastal adaptation strategies. These should also take into account that protecting large parts of the developed coast increases the risk of catastrophic consequences in the case of defense failure.

The potential of water markets to allocate water between industry, agriculture, and public water utilities as an adaptation mechanism to climate change.

One of the climate change scenarios that have been developed for the Netherlands predicts hotter and drier summers and a substantial drop in river discharge. This might lead to water scarcity with detrimental economic and environmental effects. Among the possible adaptation responses to climate change-induced water scarcity, the re-allocation of water resources among competing uses should also be considered. In this paper, we extend and apply a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to assess the potential of water markets (water allocation according to its shadow price) to guide the allocation of scarce water across agriculture, manufacturing, and public water supply. We develop four scenarios in which the scope of water markets is increased from industry-specific to economy-wide. The results show that the agricultural sector bears nearly all of the losses from a new water-scarce climate, while the manufacturing sectors are able to mitigate their losses to a large extent by technical measures. Extending the scope of water markets unambiguously increases economic output and results in a re-allocation of water to the manufacturing sector from the agricultural sector and from public water services. If, perhaps for political reasons, public water services are excluded from water trading, water is re-allocated from agriculture to manufacturing. Depending on which sectors are included, the construction of a water market can have negative or positive effects on a sector's output, and although the implementation of water markets may be positive for overall economic output and can hence assist adaptation, the effect on vulnerable or societally sensitive economic sectors, such as public water, should be taken into account when implementing such a market.

Socioeconomic distribution of emissions and resource use in Ireland.

This paper aims to determine emissions polluted directly and indirectly by an average person, for each household type, across a wide range of emissions. There are five household type categories: location, income decile, household composition, size and number of disabled residents. Ireland's Sustainable Development Model (ISus) is used which allows the analysis of direct and indirect sources of pollution per household as the model is based on an input-output methodology. Four sets of results are presented: first for greenhouse gas emissions, second for air pollutants, third for persistent organic pollutants and lastly for metals. An analysis section shows how the picture changes when one controls for the size and income of households. All results analysed are for the year 2006. Most greenhouse gas and metal emissions are polluted via indirect means, although direct sources of emissions play a role for CO(2), SO(2) and CO. The results suggest that the richest decile is the biggest emitter and poorer and larger households are seen to emit the least per person. It is also shown that household income has a stronger relationship with pollution than household size per person.

Probabilistic projections of baseline twenty-first century CO2 emissions using a simple calibrated integrated assessment model.

Probabilistic projections of baseline (with no additional mitigation policies) future carbon emissions are important for sound climate risk assessments. Deep uncertainty surrounds many drivers of projected emissions. Here, we use a simple integrated assessment model, calibrated to century-scale data and expert assessments of baseline emissions, global economic growth, and population growth, to make probabilistic projections of carbon emissions through 2100. Under a variety of assumptions about fossil fuel resource levels and decarbonization rates, our projections largely agree with several emissions projections under current policy conditions. Our global sensitivity analysis identifies several key economic drivers of uncertainty in future emissions and shows important higher-level interactions between economic and technological parameters, while population uncertainties are less important. Our analysis also projects relatively low global economic growth rates over the remainder of the century. This illustrates the importance of additional research into economic growth dynamics for climate risk assessment, especially if pledged and future climate mitigation policies are weakened or have delayed implementations. These results showcase the power of using a simple, transparent, and calibrated model. While the simple model structure has several advantages, it also creates caveats for our results which are related to important areas for further research. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10584-021-03279-7.

The distributional impact of climate change.

Poorer, hotter countries are more vulnerable to climate change and will experience more negative impacts. The pattern of vulnerability between countries is used to impute impacts for income deciles within countries, for administrative regions, and for grid cells. Almost three-quarters of people will face worse impacts than their country average. Between-country variation is larger than within-country variation for income deciles and regions, and about as large for grid cells. I here revisit earlier estimates of the economic impact of climate change and extend the analysis to impute the distribution of impacts within countries.

Mediterranean UNESCO World Heritage at risk from coastal flooding and erosion due to sea-level rise.

UNESCO World Heritage sites (WHS) located in coastal areas are increasingly at risk from coastal hazards due to sea-level rise. In this study, we assess Mediterranean cultural WHS at risk from coastal flooding and erosion under four sea-level rise scenarios until 2100. Based on the analysis of spatially explicit WHS data, we develop an index-based approach that allows for ranking WHS at risk from both coastal hazards. Here we show that of 49 cultural WHS located in low-lying coastal areas of the Mediterranean, 37 are at risk from a 100-year flood and 42 from coastal erosion, already today. Until 2100, flood risk may increase by 50% and erosion risk by 13% across the region, with considerably higher increases at individual WHS. Our results provide a first-order assessment of where adaptation is most urgently needed and can support policymakers in steering local-scale research to devise suitable adaptation strategies for each WHS.

The economic impact of restricted water supply: a computable general equilibrium analysis.

Water problems are typically studied at the level of the river catchment. About 70% of all water is used for agriculture, and agricultural products are traded internationally. A full understanding of water use is impossible without understanding the international market for food and related products, such as textiles. The water embedded in commodities is called virtual water. Based on a general equilibrium model, we offer a method for investigating the role of water resources and water scarcity in the context of international trade. We run five alternative scenarios, analyzing the effects of water scarcity due to reduced availability of groundwater. This can be a consequence of physical constraints, and of policies curbing water demand. Four scenarios are based on a "market solution", where water owners can capitalize their water rent or taxes are recycled. In the fifth "non-market" scenario, this is not the case; supply restrictions imply productivity losses. Restrictions in water supply would shift trade patterns of agriculture and virtual water. These shifts are larger if the restriction is larger, and if the use of water in production is more rigid. Welfare losses are substantially larger in the non-market situation. Water-constrained agricultural producers lose, but unconstrained agricultural produces gain; industry gains as well. As a result, there are regional winners and losers from water supply constraints. Because of the current distortions of agricultural markets, water supply constraints could improve allocative efficiency; this welfare gain may more than offset the welfare losses due to the resource constraint.

Global economic impacts of climate variability and change during the 20th century.

Estimates of the global economic impacts of observed climate change during the 20th century obtained by applying five impact functions of different integrated assessment models (IAMs) are separated into their main natural and anthropogenic components. The estimates of the costs that can be attributed to natural variability factors and to the anthropogenic intervention with the climate system in general tend to show that: 1) during the first half of the century, the amplitude of the impacts associated with natural variability is considerably larger than that produced by anthropogenic factors and the effects of natural variability fluctuated between being negative and positive. These non-monotonic impacts are mostly determined by the low-frequency variability and the persistence of the climate system; 2) IAMs do not agree on the sign (nor on the magnitude) of the impacts of anthropogenic forcing but indicate that they steadily grew over the first part of the century, rapidly accelerated since the mid 1970's, and decelerated during the first decade of the 21st century. This deceleration is accentuated by the existence of interaction effects between natural variability and natural and anthropogenic forcing. The economic impacts of anthropogenic forcing range in the tenths of percentage of the world GDP by the end of the 20th century; 3) the impacts of natural forcing are about one order of magnitude lower than those associated with anthropogenic forcing and are dominated by the solar forcing; 4) the interaction effects between natural and anthropogenic factors can importantly modulate how impacts actually occur, at least for moderate increases in external forcing. Human activities became dominant drivers of the estimated economic impacts at the end of the 20th century, producing larger impacts than those of low-frequency natural variability. Some of the uses and limitations of IAMs are discussed.

Shapley values for assessing research production and impact of schools and scholars.

Performance measures of individual scholars tend to ignore the context. I introduce contextualised metrics: cardinal and ordinal pseudo-Shapley values that measure a scholar's contribution to (perhaps power over) her own school and her market value to other schools should she change job. I illustrate the proposed measures with business scholars and business schools in Ireland. Although conceptually superior, the power indicators imply a ranking of scholars within a school that is identical to the corresponding conventional performance measures. The market value indicators imply an identical ranking within schools and a very similar ranking between schools. The ordinal indices further contextualise performance measures and thus deviate further from the corresponding conventional indicators. As the ordinal measures are discontinuous by construction, a natural classification of scholars emerges. Averaged over schools, the market values offer little extra information over the corresponding production and impact measures. The ordinal power measure indicates the robustness or fragility of an institution's place in the rank order. It is only weakly correlated with the concentration of publications and citations.

Credit where credit's due: accounting for co-authorship in citation counts.

I propose a new method (Pareto weights) to objectively attribute citations to co-authors. Previous methods either profess ignorance about the seniority of co-authors (egalitarian weights) or are based in an ad hoc way on the order of authors (rank weights). Pareto weights are based on the respective citation records of the co-authors. Pareto weights are proportional to the probability of observing the number of citations obtained. Assuming a Pareto distribution, such weights can be computed with a simple, closed-form equation but require a few iterations and data on a scholar, her co-authors, and her co-authors' co-authors. The use of Pareto weights is illustrated with a group of prominent economists. In this case, Pareto weights are very different from rank weights. Pareto weights are more similar to egalitarian weights but can deviate up to a quarter in either direction (for reasons that are intuitive).

Sea-level rise and its possible impacts given a 'beyond 4°C world' in the twenty-first century.

The range of future climate-induced sea-level rise remains highly uncertain with continued concern that large increases in the twenty-first century cannot be ruled out. The biggest source of uncertainty is the response of the large ice sheets of Greenland and west Antarctica. Based on our analysis, a pragmatic estimate of sea-level rise by 2100, for a temperature rise of 4°C or more over the same time frame, is between 0.5 m and 2 m--the probability of rises at the high end is judged to be very low, but of unquantifiable probability. However, if realized, an indicative analysis shows that the impact potential is severe, with the real risk of the forced displacement of up to 187 million people over the century (up to 2.4% of global population). This is potentially avoidable by widespread upgrade of protection, albeit rather costly with up to 0.02 per cent of global domestic product needed, and much higher in certain nations. The likelihood of protection being successfully implemented varies between regions, and is lowest in small islands, Africa and parts of Asia, and hence these regions are the most likely to see coastal abandonment. To respond to these challenges, a multi-track approach is required, which would also be appropriate if a temperature rise of less than 4°C was expected. Firstly, we should monitor sea level to detect any significant accelerations in the rate of rise in a timely manner. Secondly, we need to improve our understanding of the climate-induced processes that could contribute to rapid sea-level rise, especially the role of the two major ice sheets, to produce better models that quantify the likely future rise more precisely. Finally, responses need to be carefully considered via a combination of climate mitigation to reduce the rise and adaptation for the residual rise in sea level. In particular, long-term strategic adaptation plans for the full range of possible sea-level rise (and other change) need to be widely developed.

The direct impact of climate change on regional labor productivity.

Global climate change will increase outdoor and indoor heat loads, and may impair health and productivity for millions of working people. This study applies physiological evidence about effects of heat, climate guidelines for safe work environments, climate modeling, and global distributions of working populations to estimate the impact of 2 climate scenarios on future labor productivity. In most regions, climate change will decrease labor productivity, under the simple assumption of no specific adaptation. By the 2080s, the greatest absolute losses of population-based labor work capacity (in the range 11% to 27%) are seen under the A2 scenario in Southeast Asia, Andean and Central America, and the Caribbean. Increased occupational heat exposure due to climate change may significantly impact on labor productivity and costs unless preventive measures are implemented. Workers may need to work longer hours, or more workers may be required, to achieve the same output and there will be economic costs of lost production and/or occupational health interventions against heat exposures.

Impacts and responses to sea-level rise: a global analysis of the SRES scenarios over the twenty-first century.

Taking the Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) climate and socio-economic scenarios (A1FI, A2, B1 and B2 'future worlds'), the potential impacts of sea-level rise through the twenty-first century are explored using complementary impact and economic analysis methods at the global scale. These methods have never been explored together previously. In all scenarios, the exposure and hence the impact potential due to increased flooding by sea-level rise increases significantly compared to the base year (1990). While mitigation reduces impacts, due to the lagged response of sea-level rise to atmospheric temperature rise, impacts cannot be avoided during the twenty-first century by this response alone. Cost-benefit analyses suggest that widespread protection will be an economically rational response to land loss due to sea-level rise in the four SRES futures that are considered. The most vulnerable future worlds to sea-level rise appear to be the A2 and B2 scenarios, which primarily reflects differences in the socio-economic situation (coastal population, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP/capita), rather than the magnitude of sea-level rise. Small islands and deltaic settings stand out as being more vulnerable as shown in many earlier analyses. Collectively, these results suggest that human societies will have more choice in how they respond to sea-level rise than is often assumed. However, this conclusion needs to be tempered by recognition that we still do not understand these choices and significant impacts remain possible. Future worlds which experience larger rises in sea-level than considered here (above 35 cm), more extreme events, a reactive rather than proactive approach to adaptation, and where GDP growth is slower or more unequal than in the SRES futures remain a concern. There is considerable scope for further research to better understand these diverse issues.

Adapting to climate: a case study on riverine flood risks in the Netherlands.

Climate change may well lead to an increased risk of river floods in the Netherlands. However, the impacts of changes in water management on river floods are larger, either enhancing or reducing flood risks. Therefore, the abilities of water-management authorities to learn that climate and river flows are changing, and to recognize and act upon the implications, are of crucial importance. At the same time, water-management authorities respond to other trends, such as the democratization of decision making, which alter their ability to react to climate change. These complex interactions are illustrated with changes in river flood risk management for the Rhine and the Meuse in the Netherlands over the last 50 years. A scenario study is used to seek insight into the question of whether current water-management institutions and their likely successors are capable of dealing with plausible future flood risks. The scenarios show that new and major infrastructure is needed to keep flood risks at their current level. Such a structural solution to future flood risks is feasible, but requires considerable political will and institutional reform, both for planning and implementation. It is unlikely that reform will be fast enough or the will strong enough.