Measuring catastrophic medical expenditures: Reflections on three issues.

In the "basic" approach, medical expenses are catastrophic if they exceed a prespecified percentage of consumption or income; the approach tells us if expenses cause a large percentage reduction in living standards. The ability-to-pay (ATP) approach defines expenses as catastrophic if they exceed a prespecified percentage of consumption less expenses on nonmedical necessities or an allowance for them. The paper argues that the ATP approach does not tell us whether expenses are large enough to undermine a household's ability to purchase nonmedical necessities. The paper compares the income-based and consumption-based variants of the basic approach, and shows that if the individual is a borrower after a health shock, the income-based ratio will exceed the consumption-based ratio, and both will exceed the more theoretically correct Flores et al. ratio; whereas if the individual continues to be a saver after a health shock, the ordering is reversed and the income-based ratio may not overestimate Flores et al.'s ratio. Last, the paper proposes a lifetime money metric utility (LMMU) approach defining medical expenses as catastrophic in terms of their lifetime consequences. Under certain assumptions, the LMMU and Flores et al. approaches are identical, and neither requires data on how households finance their medical expenses.

Getting Incentives Right? The Impact of Hospital Capitation Payment in Vietnam.

This paper evaluates the impact on cost and utilization of a shift from fee-for-service to capitation payment of district hospitals by Vietnam's social health insurance agency. Hospital fixed effects analysis suggests that capitation leads to reduced costs. Hospitals also increased service provision to the uninsured who continue to pay out-of-pocket on a fee-for-service basis. The study points to the need to anticipate unintended effects of payment reforms, especially in the context of a multiple purchaser system. Copyright © The World Bank Health Economics © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Health-system reform and universal health coverage in Latin America.

Starting in the late 1980s, many Latin American countries began social sector reforms to alleviate poverty, reduce socioeconomic inequalities, improve health outcomes, and provide financial risk protection. In particular, starting in the 1990s, reforms aimed at strengthening health systems to reduce inequalities in health access and outcomes focused on expansion of universal health coverage, especially for poor citizens. In Latin America, health-system reforms have produced a distinct approach to universal health coverage, underpinned by the principles of equity, solidarity, and collective action to overcome social inequalities. In most of the countries studied, government financing enabled the introduction of supply-side interventions to expand insurance coverage for uninsured citizens--with defined and enlarged benefits packages--and to scale up delivery of health services. Countries such as Brazil and Cuba introduced tax-financed universal health systems. These changes were combined with demand-side interventions aimed at alleviating poverty (targeting many social determinants of health) and improving access of the most disadvantaged populations. Hence, the distinguishing features of health-system strengthening for universal health coverage and lessons from the Latin American experience are relevant for countries advancing universal health coverage.

Encouraging Health Insurance for the Informal Sector: A Cluster Randomized Experiment in Vietnam.

Subsidized voluntary enrollment in government-run health insurance schemes is often proposed as a way of increasing coverage among informal sector workers and their families. We report the results of a cluster randomized experiment, in which 3000 households in 20 communes in Vietnam were randomly assigned at baseline to a control group or one of three treatments: an information leaflet about Vietnam's government-run scheme and the benefits of health insurance, a voucher entitling eligible household members to 25% off their annual premium, and both. At baseline, the four groups had similar enrollment rates (4%) and were balanced on plausible enrollment determinants. The interventions all had small and insignificant effects (around 1 percentage point or ppt). Among those reporting sickness in the 12 months prior to the baseline survey the subsidy-only intervention raised enrollment by 3.5 ppts (p = 0.08) while the combined intervention raised enrollment by 4.5 ppts (p = 0.02); however, the differences in the effect sizes between the sick and non-sick were just shy of being significant. Our results suggest that information campaigns and subsidies may have limited effects on voluntary health insurance enrollment in Vietnam and that such interventions might exacerbate adverse selection. Copyright © The World Bank Health Economics © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Effects of Price, Information, and Transactions Cost Interventions to Raise Voluntary Enrollment in a Social Health Insurance Scheme: A Randomized Experiment in the Philippines.

A cluster randomized experiment was undertaken testing two sets of interventions encouraging enrollment in the Individually Paying Program (IPP), the voluntary component of the Philippines' social health insurance program. In early 2011, 1037 unenrolled IPP-eligible families in 179 randomly selected intervention municipalities were given an information kit and offered a 50% premium subsidy valid until the end of 2011; 383 IPP-eligible families in 64 control municipalities were not. In February 2012, the 787 families in the intervention sites who were still IPP-eligible but had not enrolled had their vouchers extended, were resent the enrollment kits and received SMS reminders. Half the group also received a 'handholding' intervention: in the endline interview, the enumerator offered to help complete the enrollment form, deliver it to the insurer's office in the provincial capital, and mail the membership cards. The main intervention raised the enrollment rate by 3 percentage points (ppts) (p = 0.11), with an 8 ppt larger effect (p < 0.01) among city-dwellers, consistent with travel time to the insurance office affecting enrollment. The handholding intervention raised enrollment by 29 ppts (p < 0.01), with a smaller effect (p < 0.01) among city-dwellers, likely because of shorter travel times, and higher education levels facilitating unaided completion of the enrollment form. Copyright © The World Bank Health Economics © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The Impact of a Pay-for-Performance Scheme on Prescription Quality in Rural China.

In this prospective study, conducted in China where providers have traditionally been paid fee-for-service, and where drug spending is high and irrational drug prescribing common, township health centers in two counties were assigned to two groups: in one fee-for-service was replaced by a capitated global budget (CGB); in the other by a mix of CGB and pay-for-performance. In the latter, 20% of the CGB was withheld each quarter, with the amount returned depending on points deducted for failure to meet performance targets. Outcomes studied included indicators of rational drug prescribing and prescription cost. Impacts were assessed using differences-in-differences, because political interference led to non-random assignment across the two groups. The combination of capitated global budget and pay-for-performance reduced irrational prescribing substantially relative to capitated global budget but only in the county that started above the penalty targets. Endline rates were still appreciable, however, and no effects were found in either county on out-of-pocket spending. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Monitoring progress towards universal health coverage at country and global levels.

Universal health coverage (UHC) has been defined as the desired outcome of health system performance whereby all people who need health services (promotion, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation, and palliation) receive them, without undue financial hardship. UHC has two interrelated components: the full spectrum of good-quality, essential health services according to need, and protection from financial hardship, including possible impoverishment, due to out-of-pocket payments for health services. Both components should benefit the entire population. This paper summarizes the findings from 13 country case studies and five technical reviews, which were conducted as part of the development of a global framework for monitoring progress towards UHC. The case studies show the relevance and feasibility of focusing UHC monitoring on two discrete components of health system performance: levels of coverage with health services and financial protection, with a focus on equity. These components link directly to the definition of UHC and measure the direct results of strategies and policies for UHC. The studies also show how UHC monitoring can be fully embedded in often existing, regular overall monitoring of health sector progress and performance. Several methodological and practical issues related to the monitoring of coverage of essential health services, financial protection, and equity, are highlighted. Addressing the gaps in the availability and quality of data required for monitoring progress towards UHC is critical in most countries.

Are health shocks different? Evidence from a multishock survey in Laos.

Using primary data from Laos, we compare a broad range of different types of shocks in terms of their incidence, distribution between the poor and the better off, idiosyncrasy, costs, coping responses, and self-reported impacts on well-being. Health shocks are more common than most other shocks, more concentrated among the poor, more idiosyncratic, more costly, trigger more coping strategies, and highly likely to lead to a cut in consumption. Household members experiencing a health shock lost, on average, 0.6 point on a five-point health scale; the wealthier are better able to limit the health impacts of a health shock.

Benefit-incidence analysis: are government health expenditures more pro-rich than we think?

Authors of benefit-incidence analyses (BIA) have to impute subsidies using assumptions about the relationship between unobserved subsidies 'captured' by the household and what can be observed at the household and aggregate levels. This paper shows that one of the two assumptions used in BIA studies to date will necessarily produce a more pro-rich (or less pro-poor) picture of government health spending than the other, depending on whether utilization is more pro-rich or pro-poor than fees paid to public providers. Both assumptions have their disadvantages, and the paper suggests a couple of alternatives that explicitly link fees paid to the costliness of care. It shows that in the most likely case where fees are distributed in a more pro-rich fashion than utilization, the two traditional assumptions will produce less pro-rich distributions of subsidies than the two new alternatives. Also considered are three complications that arise in BIA studies, including factoring in social health insurance. The paper's theoretical results are illustrated with an empirical BIA for Vietnam.

The concentration index of a binary outcome revisited.

The binary variable is one of the most common types of variables in the analysis of income-related health inequalities. I argue that while the binary variable has some unusual properties, it shares many of the properties of the ratio-scale variable and hence lends itself to both relative and absolute inequality analyses, albeit with some qualifications. I argue that criticisms of the normalization I proposed in an earlier paper, and of the use of the binary variable for inequality analysis, stem from a misrepresentation of the properties of the binary variable, as well as a switch of focus away from relative inequality to absolute inequality. I concede that my normalization is not uncontentious, but, in a way, that has not previously been noted.

Who is more likely to return for TB test results? A survey at three high-burden primary healthcare facilities in Cape Town, South Africa.

BACKGROUND: In low- and middle-income countries with a high burden of tuberculosis (TB), a large proportion of people who are tested for TB do not return to the health facility to collect their test results and initiate treatment, thus putting themselves at increased risk of adverse outcomes. METHODS: This prospective study aimed to identify predictors of returning to the primary health care (PHC) facility to collect TB test results. From 15 August to 15 December 2017, 1105 people who tested for pulmonary TB at three Cape Town PHC facilities were surveyed. Using multi-variate logistic regressions on an analysis sample of 1097 people, three groups of predictors were considered: (i) demographics, health and socio-economic status; (ii) costs and benefits; and (iii) behavioural factors. RESULTS: Forty-four percent of people tested returned to the PHC facility to collect their test results within the stipulated 2 days, and 68% returned before the end of the study period. Return was strongly and positively correlated with expecting a TB-positive result, cognitive avoidance and postponement behaviour. CONCLUSION: Interventions to improve pre-treatment loss to follow-up should target patients who think they do not have TB, and those with a history of postponement behaviour and cognitive avoidance.

Social health insurance reexamined.

Social health insurance (SHI) is enjoying something of a revival in parts of the developing world. Many countries that have in the past relied largely on tax finance (and out-of-pocket payments) have introduced SHI, or are thinking about doing so. And countries with SHI already in place are making vigorous efforts to extend coverage to the informal sector. Ironically, this revival is occurring at a time when the traditional SHI countries in Europe have either already reduced payroll financing in favor of general revenues, or are in the process of doing so. This paper examines how SHI fares in health-care delivery, revenue collection, covering the formal sector, and its impacts on the labor market. It argues that SHI does not necessarily deliver good quality care at a low cost, partly because of poor regulation of SHI purchasers. It suggests that the costs of collecting revenues can be substantial, even in the formal sector where non-enrollment and evasion are commonplace, and that while SHI can cover the formal sector and the poor relatively easily, it fares badly in terms of covering the non-poor informal sector workers until the economy has reached a high level of economic development. The paper also argues that SHI can have negative labor market effects.

Estimating health insurance impacts under unobserved heterogeneity: the case of Vietnam's health care fund for the poor.

Vietnam's health care fund for the poor (HCFP) uses government revenues to finance health care for the poor, ethnic minorities living in selected mountainous provinces, and all households living in communes officially designated as highly disadvantaged. As of 2006, the program, which started in 2003, covered around 60% of those eligible. Those who were covered (about 20% of the population) were disproportionately poor, and around 80% of those covered were eligible. Estimates of the program's impact were obtained using a method that takes into account unobserved heterogeneity--including unobserved idiosyncratic returns--but requires minimal assumptions. The downside is that it provides an estimate only of the program's impact on those covered by it; it cannot therefore answer the question of how those currently uncovered will fare when they are eventually covered. The results suggest that HCFP has had no impact on use of services, but has substantially reduced out-of-pocket spending.

A comprehensive assessment of universal health coverage in 111 countries: a retrospective observational study.

BACKGROUND: The goal of universal health coverage (UHC) requires that everyone receive needed health services, and that families who get needed services do not suffer undue financial hardship. Tracking progress towards UHC requires measurement of both these dimensions, and a way of trading them off against one another. METHODS: We measured service coverage by a weighted geometric average of four prevention indicators (antenatal care, full immunisation, and screening for breast and cervical cancers) and four treatment indicators (skilled birth attendance, inpatient admission, and treatment for acute respiratory infection and diarrhoea), financial protection by the incidence of catastrophic health expenditures (those exceeding 10% of household consumption or income), and a country's UHC performance as a geometric average of the service coverage index and the complement of the incidence of catastrophic expenditures. Where possible, we adjusted service coverage for inequality, penalising countries with a high level of inequality. The bulk of data used in this study were from the World Bank's Health Equity and Financial Protection Indicators database (2019 version), comprising data from household surveys. Gaps in the data were supplemented with other survey data and (where necessary) non-survey data from other sources (administrative, modelled, and imputed data). FINDINGS: A low incidence of catastrophic expenses sometimes reflects low service coverage (often in low-income countries) but sometimes occurs despite high service coverage (often in high-income countries). At a given level of service coverage, financial protection also varies. UHC index scores are generally higher in higher-income countries, but there are variations within income groups. Adjusting the UHC index for inequality in service coverage makes little difference in some countries, but reduces it by more than 10% in others. Seven of the 12 countries for which we were able to produce trend data have increased their UHC index over time (with the greatest average yearly increases seen in Ghana [1·43%], Indonesia [1·85%], and Vietnam [2·26%]), mostly by improving both financial protection and service coverage. Some increased their UHC index, despite reductions in financial protection, by substantially increasing their service coverage. The UHC index decreased in five of 12 countries with trend data, mostly because financial protection worsened with stagnant or declining service coverage. Our UHC indicators (except inpatient admissions) are significantly and positively associated with GDP per capita, and most are correlated with the share of health spending channelled through social health insurance and government schemes. However, associations of our UHC indicators with the share of GDP spent on health and the shares of health spending channelled through non-profit and private insurance are ambiguous. INTERPRETATION: Progress towards UHC can be tracked using an index that captures both service coverage and financial protection. Although per-capita income is a good predictor of a country's UHC index score, some countries perform better than others in the same income group or even in the income group above their own. Strong UHC performance is correlated with the share of a country's health budget that is channelled through government and social health insurance schemes. FUNDING: None.

The Case Against Labor-Tax-Financed Social Health Insurance For Low- And Low-Middle-Income Countries.

An increasing interest in initiating and expanding social health insurance through labor taxes in low- and low-middle-income countries goes against available empirical evidence. This article builds on existing recommendations by leading health financing experts and summarizes recent research that makes the case against labor-tax financing of health care in low- and low-middle-income countries. We found very little evidence to justify the pursuit of labor-tax financing for health care in these countries and persistent evidence that such policies could lead to increased inequality and fragmentation of the health system. We recommend that countries considering such policies heed the evidence on labor-tax financing and seek alternative approaches to health financing: primarily using general taxes or, depending on the context, general taxes combined with adequately regulated insurance premiums.

Correcting the concentration index: a comment.

In a recent article in this journal, Erreygers [Erreygers, G., 2008. Correcting the concentration index. Journal of Health Economics] has proposed a new measure of income-related health inequality to overcome three shortcomings of the concentration index (CI). I think Erreygers is absolutely right to probe on these issues, and I welcome his generalization of my normalization which was specific to the case of a binary health indicator. However, I have misgivings about his paper. His goal of correcting the CI so as to make it usable with interval-scale variables seems misguided. The CI reflects a commitment on the part of the analyst to measuring relative inequality. Armed only with an interval-scale variable, one simply has to accept that one can meaningfully measure only differences and therefore settle for measuring absolute inequality. Erreygers, index inevitably ends up as a measure of absolute inequality. His objection to my approach to getting round the bounds problem is that my normalization of the CI does not produce a measure of absolute inequality. But that was never my intention! In this comment I also show that - somewhat paradoxically at first glance - my index is also not a pure index of relative inequality. This seems to be an inevitable consequence of tackling the bounds issue.

Europe and central Asia's great post-communist social health insurance experiment: Aggregate impacts on health sector outcomes.

The post-Communist transition to social health insurance in many of the Central and Eastern European and Central Asian countries provides a unique opportunity to try to answer some of the unresolved issues in the debate over the relative merits of social health insurance and tax-financed health systems. This paper employs regression-based generalizations of the difference-in-differences method on panel data from 28 countries for the period 1990-2004. We find that, controlling for any concurrent provider payment reforms, adoption of social health insurance increased national health spending and hospital activity rates, but did not lead to better health outcomes.