How barriers become invisible: Children are less sensitive to constraints that are stable over time.

When making inferences about the mental lives of others (e.g., others' preferences), it is critical to consider the extent to which the choices we observe are constrained. Prior research on the development of this tendency indicates a contradictory pattern: Children show remarkable sensitivity to constraints in traditional experimental paradigms, yet often fail to consider real-world constraints and privilege inherent causes instead. We propose that one explanation for this discrepancy may be that real-world constraints are often stable over time and lose their salience. The present research tested whether children (N = 133, 5- to 12-year-old mostly US children; 55% female, 45% male) become less sensitive to an actor's constraints after first observing two constrained actors (Stable condition) versus after first observing two actors in contexts with greater choice (Not Stable condition). We crossed the stability of the constraint with the type of constraint: either the constraint was deterministic such that there was only one option available (No Other Option constraint) or, in line with many real-world constraints, the constraint was probabilistic such that there was another option, but it was difficult to access (Hard to Access constraint). Results indicated that children in the Stable condition became less sensitive to the probabilistic Hard to Access constraint across trials. Notably, we also found that children's sensitivity to constraints was enhanced in the Not Stable condition regardless of whether the constraint was probabilistic or deterministic. We discuss implications for children's sensitivity to real-world constraints. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: This research addresses the apparent contradiction that children are sensitive to constraints in experimental paradigms but are often insensitive to constraints in the real world. One explanation for this discrepancy is that constraints in the real world tend to be stable over time and may lose their salience. When probabilistic constraints (i.e., when a second option is available but hard to access) are stable, children become de-sensitized to constraints across trials. First observing contexts with greater choice increases children's sensitivity to both probabilistic and deterministic constraints.

Ask me why, don't tell me why: Asking children for explanations facilitates relational thinking.

Identifying abstract relations is essential for commonsense reasoning. Research suggests that even young children can infer relations such as "same" and "different," but often fail to apply these concepts. Might the process of explaining facilitate the recognition and application of relational concepts? Based on prior work suggesting that explanation can be a powerful tool to promote abstract reasoning, we predicted that children would be more likely to discover and use an abstract relational rule when they were prompted to explain observations instantiating that rule, compared to when they received demonstration alone. Five- and 6-year-olds were given a modified Relational Match to Sample (RMTS) task, with repeated demonstrations of relational (same) matches by an adult. Half of the children were prompted to explain these matches; the other half reported the match they observed. Children who were prompted to explain showed immediate, stable success, while those only asked to report the outcome of the pedagogical demonstration did not. Findings provide evidence that explanation facilitates early abstraction over and above demonstration alone.

Learning to recognize uncertainty vs. recognizing uncertainty to learn: Confidence judgments and exploration decisions in preschoolers.

During exploration, young children often show an intuitive sensitivity to uncertainty, despite their strong tendency towards overconfidence in their explicit judgments. Here, we examine the development of children's explicit and implicit recognition of uncertainty using the same stimuli. We presented 4- and 5-year-olds with objects that varied in their amount of perceptual occlusion, and assessed their ability to distinguish among them using two types of measures. Experiment 1 used a traditional 3-point confidence scale to examine children's explicit uncertainty judgments. We compared these confidence judgments before and after they observed disconfirming evidence, to assess the impact of this experience on their acknowledgement of uncertainty in later trials. Experiment 2 examined children's exploration preference as a measure of implicit sensitivity to uncertainty. Our results indicate that children intuitively recognize gaps in their knowledge, and that this implicit recognition may be leveraged to support their explicit judgments. Specifically, we found that children's baseline confidence judgments improved significantly following the presentation of disconfirming evidence. Furthermore, when asked to make exploration decisions about the same set of objects, children showed a spontaneous sensitivity to uncertainty, prior to any evidence. Taken together, these results suggest that children's exploration behavior may be used as an early developing measure of uncertainty control and raise the intriguing possibility that the experience of unexpected outcomes may play a role in the development of metacognition.

You can't change the past: Children's recognition of the causal asymmetry between past and future events.

This study explored children's causal reasoning about the past and future. U.S. adults (n = 60) and 3-to-6-year-olds (n = 228) from an urban, middle-class population (49% female; ~45% white) participated between 2017 and 2019. Participants were told three-step causal stories and asked about the effects of a change to the second event. Given direct interventions on the second event, children of all ages judged that the past event still occurred, suggesting even preschoolers understand time is irreversible. However, children reasoned differently when told that the second event did not occur, with no specific cause. In this case, 6-year-olds and adults inferred that the past event also did not occur. In both conditions, inferences that future events would change emerged gradually between 4 and 6.

Children acknowledge physical constraints less when actors behave stereotypically: Gender stereotypes as a case study.

A fundamental part of understanding structural inequality is recognizing that constrained choices, particularly those that align with societal stereotypes, are poor indicators of a person's desires. This study examined whether children (N = 246 U.S. children, 53% female; 61% White, 24% Latinx; 5-10 years) acknowledge constraints in this way when reasoning about gender-stereotypical choices, relative to gender-neutral and gender-counterstereotypical choices. Results indicated that children more frequently inferred preferences regardless of whether the actor was constrained when reasoning about gender-stereotypical choices, as compared to gender-neutral or gender-counterstereotypical choices. We also found evidence of an age-related increase in the general tendency to acknowledge constraints. We discuss the broader implications of these results for children's understanding of constraints within society.

Context shapes early diversity in abstract thought.

Early abstract reasoning has typically been characterized by a "relational shift," in which children initially focus on object features but increasingly come to interpret similarity in terms of structured relations. An alternative possibility is that this shift reflects a learned bias, rather than a typical waypoint along a universal developmental trajectory. If so, consistent differences in the focus on objects or relations in a child's learning environment could create distinct patterns of relational reasoning, influencing the type of hypotheses that are privileged and applied. Specifically, children in the United States may be subject to culture-specific influences that bias their reasoning toward objects, to the detriment of relations. In experiment 1, we examine relational reasoning in a population with less object-centric experience-3-y-olds in China-and find no evidence of the failures observed in the United States at the same age. A second experiment with younger and older toddlers in China (18 to 30 mo and 30 to 36 mo) establishes distinct developmental trajectories of relational reasoning across the two cultures, showing a linear trajectory in China, in contrast to the U-shaped trajectory that has been previously reported in the United States. In a third experiment, Chinese 3-y-olds exhibit a bias toward relational solutions in an ambiguous context, while those in the United States prefer object-based solutions. Together, these findings establish population-level differences in relational bias that predict the developmental trajectory of relational reasoning, challenging the generality of an initial object focus and suggesting a critical role for experience.

Thinking Counterfactually Supports Children's Evidence Evaluation in Causal Learning.

Often, the evidence we observe is consistent with more than one explanation. How do learners discriminate among candidate causes? The current studies examine whether counterfactuals help 5-year olds (N = 120) select between competing hypotheses and compares the effectiveness of these prompts to a related scaffold. In Experiment 1, counterfactuals support evidence evaluation, leading children to privilege and extend the cause that accounted for more data. In Experiment 2, the hypothesis that accounted for the most evidence was pitted against children's prior beliefs. Children who considered alternative outcomes privileged the hypothesis that accounted for more observations, whereas those who explained relied on prior beliefs. Findings demonstrate that counterfactuals recruit attention to disambiguating evidence and outperform explanation when data contrast with existing beliefs.

Children's Developing Ability to Resolve Disagreements by Integrating Perspectives.

Children live in a world where disagreement is commonplace. Although disagreement can sometimes be explained by differences in people's reliability, disagreement may also indicate that the referent elicits multiple perspectives. The present studies (total N = 129, 5- to 12-year-old ethnically diverse U.S. children, 42% girls) examined children's ability to resolve disagreement among two individuals by identifying referents that integrated the perspectives, and considered the extent to which any age-related change could be explained by epistemological understanding (i.e., acknowledging that two perspectives can be right). Children's age was positively correlated with their ability to integrate perspectives, and children performed at above-chance levels by approximately 10 years of age. Age differences in integrating perspectives were partially accounted for by epistemological understanding.

Toddlers learn and flexibly apply multiple possibilities.

The ability to consider multiple possibilities forms the basis for a wide variety of human-unique cognitive capacities. When does this skill develop? Previous studies have narrowly focused on children's ability to prepare for incompatible future outcomes. Here, we investigate this capacity in a causal learning context. Adults (N = 109) and 18- to 30-month olds (N = 104) observed evidence that was consistent with two hypotheses, each occupying a different level of abstraction (individual vs. relational causation). Results suggest that adults and toddlers identified multiple candidate causes for an effect, held these possibilities in mind, and flexibly applied the appropriate hypothesis to inform subsequent inferences. These findings challenge previous suggestions that the ability to consider multiple alternatives does not emerge until much later in development.

Design Drives Discovery in Causal Learning.

We assessed whether an artifact's design can facilitate recognition of abstract causal rules. In Experiment 1, 152 three-year-olds were presented with evidence consistent with a relational rule (i.e., pairs of same or different blocks activated a machine) using two differently designed machines. In the standard-design condition, blocks were placed on top of the machine; in the relational-design condition, blocks were placed into openings on either side. In Experiment 2, we assessed whether this design cue could facilitate adults' (N = 102) inference of a distinct conjunctive cause (i.e., that two blocks together activate the machine). Results of both experiments demonstrated that causal inference is sensitive to an artifact's design: Participants in the relational-design conditions were more likely to infer rules that were a priori unlikely. Our findings suggest that reasoning failures may result from difficulty generating the relevant rules as cognitive hypotheses but that artifact design aids causal inference. These findings have clear implications for creating intuitive learning environments.

Causal Learning Across Culture and Socioeconomic Status.

Extensive research has explored the ability of young children to learn about the causal structure of the world from patterns of evidence. These studies, however, have been conducted with middle-class samples from North America and Europe. In the present study, low-income Peruvian 4- and 5-year-olds and adults, low-income U.S. 4- and 5-year-olds in Head Start programs, and middle-class children from the United States participated in a causal learning task (N = 435). Consistent with previous studies, children learned both specific causal relations and more abstract causal principles across culture and socioeconomic status (SES). The Peruvian children and adults generally performed like middle-class U.S. children and adults, but the low-SES U.S. children showed some differences.

Explaining Constrains Causal Learning in Childhood.

Three experiments investigate how self-generated explanation influences children's causal learning. Five-year-olds (N = 114) observed data consistent with two hypotheses and were prompted to explain or to report each observation. In Study 1, when making novel generalizations, explainers were more likely to favor the hypothesis that accounted for more observations. In Study 2, explainers favored a hypothesis that was consistent with prior knowledge. Study 3 pitted a hypothesis that accounted for more observations against a hypothesis consistent with prior knowledge. Explainers were more likely to base generalizations on prior knowledge. Findings suggest that attempts to explain drive children to evaluate hypotheses using features of "good" explanations, or those supporting generalizations with broad scope, as informed by children's prior knowledge and observations.

Learning to learn from stories: children's developing sensitivity to the causal structure of fictional worlds.

Fiction presents a unique challenge to the developing child, in that children must learn when to generalize information from stories to the real world. This study examines how children acquire causal knowledge from storybooks, and whether children are sensitive to how closely the fictional world resembles reality. Preschoolers (N = 108) listened to stories in which a novel causal relation was embedded within realistic or fantastical contexts. Results indicate that by at least 3 years of age, children are sensitive to the underlying causal structure of the story: Children are more likely to generalize content if the fictional world is similar to reality. Additionally, children become better able at discriminating between realistic and fantastical story contexts between 3 and 5 years of age.

Toddlers infer higher-order relational principles in causal learning.

Children make inductive inferences about the causal properties of individual objects from a very young age. When can they infer higher-order relational properties? In three experiments, we examined 18- to 30-month-olds' relational inferences in a causal task. Results suggest that at this age, children are able to infer a higher-order relational causal principle from just a few observations and use this inference to guide their own subsequent actions and bring about a novel causal outcome. Moreover, the children passed a revised version of the relational match-to-sample task that has proven very difficult for nonhuman primates. The findings are considered in light of their implications for understanding the nature of relational and causal reasoning, and their evolutionary origins.

Learners' causal intuitions explain behavior in control of variables tasks.

Self-directed learners are described as "intuitive scientists," yet they often struggle in assessments of their scientific reasoning skills. We investigate a novel explanation for this apparent gap between formal and informal scientific inquiry behavior. Specifically, we consider whether learners' documented failure to correctly apply the control of variables strategy might stem from a mismatch between task presentation and their intuitions as causal learners. In Experiment 1, children (7- and 9-year-olds) and adults were tested on a version of a traditional multivariate reasoning task (Tschirgi, 1980) that was modified to clarify ambiguous elements of the causal logic in the original design. In all age groups, a significant majority of participants selected informative experiments on this modified task, avoiding confounded actions with positive tangible outcomes. In Experiment 2, we replicate these results with real-world stimuli, and in Experiments 3 and 4, we provide direct evidence that self-directed learners apply specific causal intuitions to experimentation tasks. Together, these findings support a novel alternative interpretation of the apparently paradoxical gap between learners' success in informal exploration and their error-prone experimentation-both behaviors are consistent with an intuitively causal approach to scientific inquiry. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Calculated Comparisons: Manufacturing Societal Causal Judgments by Implying Different Counterfactual Outcomes.

How do people come to opposite causal judgments about societal problems, such as whether a public health policy reduced COVID-19 cases? The current research tests an understudied cognitive mechanism in which people may agree about what actually happened (e.g., that a public health policy was implemented and COVID-19 cases declined), but can be made to disagree about the counterfactual, or what would have happened otherwise (e.g., whether COVID-19 cases would have declined naturally without intervention) via comparison cases. Across two preregistered studies (total N = 480), participants reasoned about the implementation of a public policy that was followed by an immediate decline in novel virus cases. Study 1 shows that people's judgments about the causal impact of the policy could be pushed in opposite directions by emphasizing comparison cases that imply different counterfactual outcomes. Study 2 finds that people recognize they can use such information to influence others. Specifically, in service of persuading others to support or reject a public health policy, people systematically showed comparison cases implying the counterfactual outcome that aligned with their position. These findings were robust across samples of U.S. college students and politically and socioeconomically diverse U.S. adults. Together, these studies suggest that implied counterfactuals are a powerful tool that individuals can use to manufacture others' causal judgments and warrant further investigation as a mechanism contributing to belief polarization.

Children's recognition of causal system categories across superficially distinct events.

A deep understanding of any phenomenon requires knowing how its causal elements are related to one another. Here, we examine whether children treat causal structure as a metric for assessing similarity across superficially distinct events. In two experiments, we presented 156 4-7-year-olds (approximately 55% of participants identified as White, 29% as multiracial, and 12% as Asian) with three-variable narratives in which story events unfold according to a causal chain or a common effect structure. We then asked children to make judgments about which stories are the most similar. In Experiment 1, we presented all events in the context of simple, illustrated stories. In Experiment 2, we removed all low-level linguistic cues that may have supported children's similarity judgments in Experiment 1 and used animated videos to support understanding of the causal elements in each story. Results indicated a gradual shift between 4 and 7 years in children's use of causal structure as a metric of similarity between narratives: While we found that children as young as five were capable of correctly representing the causal structure of each story individually, only 6- and 7-year-olds relied on shared causal structure across stories when making similarity judgments. We discuss these findings in light of children's developing causal and abstract reasoning and propose directions for future work. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Emphasizing others' persistence can promote unwarranted social inferences in children and adults.

People often hear stories about individuals who persist to overcome their constraints. While these stories can be motivating, emphasizing others' persistence may promote unwarranted judgments about constrained individuals who do not persist. Using a developmental social inference task (Study 1a: n = 124 U.S. children, 5-12 years of age; Study 1b: n = 135 and Study 2: n = 120 U.S. adults), the present research tested whether persistence stories lead people to infer that a constrained individual who does not persist, and instead accepts the lower-quality option that is available to them, prefers it over a higher-quality option that is out of reach. Study 1 found evidence for this effect in children (1a) and adults (1b). Even persistence stories about failed outcomes, which emphasize how difficult it would have been to get the higher-quality option, had this effect. Study 2 found that the effect generalized to adults' judgments about an individual facing a different type of constraint from those mentioned in the initial stories. Taken together, emphasizing others' persistence may encourage unwarranted judgments about individuals who are still constrained to lower-quality options. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Visual explanations prioritize functional properties at the expense of visual fidelity.

Visual explanations play an integral role in communicating mechanistic knowledge about how things work. What do people think distinguishes such pictures from those that are intended to convey how things look? To explore this question, we used a drawing paradigm to elicit both visual explanations and depictions of novel machine-like objects, then conducted a detailed analysis of the semantic information conveyed in each drawing. We found that visual explanations placed greater emphasis on parts of the machines that move or interact to produce an effect, while visual depictions emphasized parts that were visually salient, even if they were static. Moreover, we found that these differences in visual emphasis impacted what information naive viewers could extract from these drawings: explanations made it easier to infer which action was needed to operate the machine, but more difficult to identify which machine it represented. Taken together, our findings suggest that people spontaneously prioritize functional information when producing visual explanations but that this strategy may be double-edged, facilitating inferences about physical mechanism at the expense of preserving visual fidelity.

Thinking Structurally: A Cognitive Framework for Understanding How People Attribute Inequality to Structural Causes.

To make accurate causal inferences about social-group inequalities, people must consider structural causes. Structural causes are a distinct type of extrinsic cause-they are stable, interconnected societal forces that systematically advantage some social groups and disadvantage others. We propose a new cognitive framework to specify how people attribute inequality to structural causes. This framework is rooted in counterfactual theories of causal judgment and suggests that people will recognize structural factors as causal when they are perceived as "difference-making" for inequality above and beyond any intrinsic causes. Building on this foundation, our framework makes the following contributions. First, we propose specific types of evidence that support difference-making inferences about structural factors: within-group change (i.e., observing that disadvantaged groups' outcomes improve under better societal conditions) and well-matched between-group comparisons (i.e., observing that advantaged group members, who have similar baseline traits to the disadvantaged group, experience more favorable societal conditions and life outcomes). Second, we consider contextual, cognitive, and motivational barriers that may complicate the availability and acceptance of this evidence. We conclude by exploring how the framework might be applied in future research examining people's causal inferences about inequality.