Theory-of-Mind Development in Young Deaf Children With Early Hearing Provisions.

Deaf and hard-of-hearing (DHH) children born to hearing parents have profound theory-of-mind (ToM) delays, yet little is known about how providing hearing assistance early in life, through cochlear implants and hearing aids, influences their ToM development. We thus addressed (a) whether young DHH children with early hearing provision developed ToM differently than older children did in previous research and (b) what ToM understandings characterize this understudied population. Findings from 84 three- to six-year-old DHH children primarily acquiring spoken language demonstrated that accumulated hearing experience influenced their ToM, as measured by a five-step ToM scale. Moreover, language abilities mediated this developmental relationship: Children with more advanced language abilities, because of more time using cochlear implants and hearing aids, had better ToM growth. These findings demonstrate the crucial relationships among hearing, language, and ToM for DHH children acquiring spoken language, thereby addressing theoretical and practical questions about ToM development.

Caregiving relationships as evolutionary and developmental bases of obligation.

Obligation as defined by Tomasello requires mutually capable parties, but one-sided caregiver relationships reveal its developmental and evolutionary precursors. Specifically, "coercive" emotions may prompt protective action by caregivers toward infant primates, and infants show distress toward caregivers when they appear to violate expectations in their relationships. We argue that these early social-relational expectations and emotions may form the base of obligation.

Longitudinal Theory of Mind (ToM) Development From Preschool to Adolescence With and Without ToM Delay.

Longitudinal tracking of 107 three- to-thirteen-year-olds in a cross-sequential design showed a 6-step theory of mind (ToM) sequence identified by a few past cross-sectional studies validly depicted longitudinal ToM development from early to middle childhood for typically developing (TD) children and those with ToM delays owing to deafness or autism. Substantively, all groups showed ToM progress throughout middle childhood. Atypical development was more extended and began and ended at lower levels than for TD children. Yet most children in all groups progressed over the study's mean 1.5 years. Findings help resolve theoretical debates about ToM development for children with and without delay and gain strength and weight via their applicability to three disparate groups varying in ToM timing and sequencing.

Explaining the Unpredictable: The Development of Causal Theories of Mind in Deaf and Hearing Children.

Two studies of 100 children aged 3-12 years examined theory of mind (ToM) understanding via explanations and predictions in hearing preschoolers and ToM-delayed deaf children. Study 1's 75 children (31 deaf; 44 hearing) displayed an "explanation advantage," devising valid epistemic ToM explanations despite failing simpler forced-choice false-belief (FB) prediction tests. This novel discovery for deaf children extended to unexpectedly frequent cognitive ("think" or "know") explanations. Study 2 (with 25 additional deaf children; Mage  = 9) showed that microgenetic FB explanation practice resulted in significant gains on FB prediction posttests that were absent in a non-ToM control group. Implications for (a) explanation's interconnection with conceptual development, (b) designing ToM interventions, and (c) teaching deaf and hearing children are discussed.

Creepiness Creeps In: Uncanny Valley Feelings Are Acquired in Childhood.

The uncanny valley posits that very human-like robots are unsettling, a phenomenon amply demonstrated in adults but unexplored in children. Two hundred forty 3- to 18-year-olds viewed one of two robots (machine-like or very human-like) and rated their feelings toward (e.g., "Does the robot make you feel weird or happy?") and perceptions of the robot's capacities (e.g., "Does the robot think for itself?"). Like adults, children older than 9 judged the human-like robot as creepier than the machine-like robot-but younger children did not. Children's perceptions of robots' mental capacities predicted uncanny feelings: children judge robots to be creepy depending on whether they have human-like minds. The uncanny valley is therefore acquired over development and relates to changing conceptions about robot minds.

Children's Early Awareness of Comprehension as Evident in Their Spontaneous Corrections of Speech Errors.

A crucial human cognitive goal is to understand and to be understood. But understanding often takes active management. Two studies investigated early developmental processes of understanding management by focusing on young children's comprehension monitoring. We ask: When and how do young children actively monitor their comprehension of social-communicative interchanges and so seek to clarify and correct their own potential miscomprehension? Study 1 examined the parent-child conversations of 13 children studied longitudinally in everyday situations from the time the children were approximately 2 years through 3 years. Study 2 used a seminaturalistic situation in the laboratory to address these questions with more precision and control with 36 children aged 2-3 years.

Aggression, Sibling Antagonism, and Theory of Mind During the First Year of Siblinghood: A Developmental Cascade Model.

A developmental cascade model was tested to examine longitudinal associations among firstborn children's aggression, theory of mind (ToM), and antagonism toward their younger sibling during the 1st year of siblinghood. Aggression and ToM were assessed before the birth of a sibling and 4 and 12 months after the birth, and antagonism was examined at 4 and 12 months in a sample of 208 firstborn children (initial Mage  = 30 months, 56% girls) from primarily European American, middle-class families. Firstborns' aggression consistently predicted high sibling antagonism both directly and through poorer ToM. Results highlight the importance of examining longitudinal influences across behavioral, social-cognitive, and relational factors that are closely intertwined even from the early years of life.

Deaf and hearing children's development of theory of mind, peer popularity, and leadership during middle childhood.

This study had two primary aims. First, we compared deaf and hearing children during middle and late childhood on (a) cognitive understanding of basic and advanced theory of mind (ToM) and (b) social dimensions of peer group relations, including popularity, isolation, leadership, and the disposition to interact positively with peers. Second, using correlational analyses, we examined ToM's connections with these social variables to see whether and how ToM impacts children's social lives. A total of 57 children (36 deaf children of hearing parents and 21 hearing children) 6 to 14years of age completed a 6-step developmental ToM Scale, and their teachers reported on the social variables. Hearing children outperformed deaf children on ToM and all teacher-rated variables. For deaf children, popularity correlated positively, and social isolation correlated negatively, with ToM even after controlling for age, gender, and language ability. For hearing children, the only ToM link was a weak correlation with leadership. Possible reasons for the differences between deaf and hearing groups are discussed, together with the likelihood of bidirectional causal links and implications for deaf children's social development in school.

Theory-of-Mind Training Causes Honest Young Children to Lie.

Theory of mind (ToM) has long been recognized to play a major role in children's social functioning. However, no direct evidence confirms the causal linkage between the two. In the current study, we addressed this significant gap by examining whether ToM causes the emergence of lying, an important social skill. We showed that after participating in ToM training to learn about mental-state concepts, 3-year-olds who originally had been unable to lie began to deceive consistently. This training effect lasted for more than a month. In contrast, 3-year-olds who participated in control training to learn about physical concepts were significantly less inclined to lie than the ToM-trained children. These findings provide the first experimental evidence supporting the causal role of ToM in the development of social competence in early childhood.

Infants' use of social partnerships to predict behavior.

The experiences of social partners are important motivators of social action. Can infants use such experiences to make predictions about how social agents will behave? Sixteen-month-old infants were introduced to two social pairs. Initial events established within-pair cooperation as well as between-pair conflict involving an individual from each pair. Following these events, infants looked longer when between-pair members who had never previously interacted now cooperated - instead of conflicted - with each other. Thus, infants tracked the third-person allegiances and inferred that the conflict would generalize across social partnerships. These findings demonstrate a critical feature of early social cognition and promote needed, further research on the role of social allegiances in social cognition across development.

Infants' goal anticipation during failed and successful reaching actions.

The ability to interpret and predict the actions of others is crucial to social interaction and to social, cognitive, and linguistic development. The current study provided a strong test of this predictive ability by assessing (1) whether infants are capable of prospectively processing actions that fail to achieve their intended outcome, and (2) how infants respond to events in which their initial predictions are not confirmed. Using eye tracking, 8-month-olds, 10-month-olds, and adults watched an actor repeatedly reach over a barrier to either successfully or unsuccessfully retrieve a ball. Ten-month-olds and adults produced anticipatory looks to the ball, even when the action was unsuccessful and the actor never achieved his goal. Moreover, they revised their initial predictions in response to accumulating evidence of the actor's failure. Eight-month-olds showed anticipatory looking only after seeing the actor successfully grasp and retrieve the ball. Results support a flexible, prospective social information processing ability that emerges during the first year of life.

Informants' traits weigh heavily in young children's trust in testimony and in their epistemic inferences.

This study examined how informants' traits affect how children seek information, trust testimony, and make inferences about informants' knowledge. Eighty-one 3- to 6-year-olds and 26 adults completed tasks where they requested and endorsed information provided by one of two informants with conflicting traits (e.g., honesty vs. dishonesty). Participants also completed tasks where they simultaneously considered informants' traits and visual access to information when inferring their knowledge and trusting their testimony. Children and adults preferred to ask and endorse information provided by people who are nice, smart, and honest. Moreover, these traits influenced the knowledge that young children attributed to informants. Children younger than 5 years of age reported that people with positive traits were knowledgeable even when they lacked access to relevant information.

What makes Voldemort tick? Children's and adults' reasoning about the nature of villains.

How do children make sense of antisocial acts committed by evil-doers? We addressed this question in three studies with 434 children (4-12 years) and 277 adults, focused on participants' judgments of both familiar and novel fictional villains and heroes. Study 1 established that children viewed villains' actions and emotions as overwhelmingly negative, suggesting that children's well-documented positivity bias does not prevent their appreciation of extreme forms of villainy. Studies 2 and 3 assessed children's and adults' beliefs regarding heroes' and villains' moral character and true selves, using an array of converging evidence, including: how a character felt inside, whether a character's actions reflected their true self, whether a character's true self could change over time, and how an omniscient machine would judge a character's true self. Across these measures, both children and adults consistently evaluated villains' true selves to be more negative than heroes'. Importantly, at the same time, we also detected an asymmetry in the judgments, wherein villains were more likely than heroes to have a true self that differed from their outward behavior. More specifically, across the ages studied participants more often reported that villains were inwardly good, than that heroes were inwardly bad. Implications, limitations, and directions for future research are discussed in light of our expanding understanding of the development of true self beliefs.

Neural correlates of belief- and desire-reasoning in 7- and 8-year-old children: an event-related potential study.

Theory of mind requires belief- and desire-understanding. Event-related brain potential (ERP) research on belief- and desire-reasoning in adults found mid-frontal activations for both desires and beliefs, and selective right-posterior activations only for beliefs. Developmentally, children understand desires before beliefs; thus, a critical question concerns whether neural specialization for belief-reasoning exists in childhood or develops later. Neural activity was recorded as 7- and 8-year-olds (N = 18) performed the same diverse-desires, diverse-beliefs, and physical control tasks used in a previous adult ERP study. Like adults, mid-frontal scalp activations were found for belief- and desire-reasoning. Moreover, analyses using correct trials alone yielded selective right-posterior activations for belief-reasoning. Results suggest developmental links between increasingly accurate understanding of complex mental states and neural specialization supporting this understanding.

The mind behind the message: advancing theory-of-mind scales for typically developing children, and those with deafness, autism, or Asperger syndrome.

Children aged 3-12 years (n = 184) with typical development, deafness, autism, or Asperger syndrome took a series of theory-of-mind (ToM) tasks to confirm and extend previous developmental scaling evidence. A new sarcasm task, in the format of H. M. Wellman and D. Liu's (2004) 5-step ToM Scale, added a statistically reliable 6th step to the scale for all diagnostic groups. A key previous finding, divergence in task sequencing for children with autism, was confirmed. Comparisons among diagnostic groups, controlling age, and language ability, showed that typical developers mastered the 6 ToM steps ahead of each of the 3 disabled groups, with implications for ToM theories. The final (sarcasm) task challenged even nondisabled 9-year-olds, demonstrating the new scale's sensitivity to post-preschool ToM growth.

Sociocultural input facilitates children's developing understanding of extraordinary minds.

Three- to 5-year-old (N = 61) religiously schooled preschoolers received theory-of-mind (ToM) tasks about the mental states of ordinary humans and agents with exceptional perceptual or mental capacities. Consistent with an anthropomorphism hypothesis, children beginning to appreciate limitations of human minds (e.g., ignorance) attributed those limits to God. Only 5-year-olds differentiated between humans' fallible minds and God's less fallible mind. Unlike secularly schooled children, religiously schooled 4-year-olds did appreciate another agent's less fallible mental abilities when instructed and reminded about those abilities. Among children who understood ordinary humans' mental fallibilities, knowledge of God predicted attributions of correct epistemic states to extraordinary agents. Results suggest that, at a certain point in ToM development, sociocultural input can facilitate an appreciation for extraordinary minds.

Altruism, hypocrisy and theory of mind in autistic and nonautistic children.

Children make choices between generosity and greed every day. Often they must also choose between confession or denial of antisocial acts like greed, thereby displaying either honesty or hypocrisy. Such choices pose cognitive challenges that, in theory, might reflect children's developing social-cognitions and affect their daily social lives and developmental opportunities. Individual differences in altruism and hypocrisy were examined in relation to theory of mind (ToM) in 102 school-age children (44 autistic; 58 typically developing) using ecologically valid altruism and hypocrisy tests where generosity had lasting real-life costs and hypocrisy was self-serving. Selfless altruism was abundant for autistic and nonautistic children alike and was significantly predicted by ToM over and above other predictors like age, gender, and language. More nonautistic (74%) than autistic children (41%) displayed hypocrisy, although individual ToM differences among ASD children were not significantly correlated with it. Findings extend to new instances (altruism and hypocrisy) evidence of ToM's importance for everyday social behaviors that impact upon peer relations while also extending past evidence that: (a) unexpected sociomoral strengths can coexist with ToM delays, (b) attention to individual differences is crucial, and (c) autistic children's capacity to develop sociomoral reasoning should not be underestimated. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Observant, nonaggressive temperament predicts theory of mind development.

Temperament dimensions influence children's approach to and participation in social interactive experiences which reflect and impact children's social understandings. Therefore, temperament differences might substantially impact theory of mind development in early childhood. Using longitudinal data, we report that certain early temperament characteristics (at age 3)--lack of aggressiveness, a shy-withdrawn stance to social interaction, and social-perceptual sensitivity--predict children's more advanced theory-of-mind understanding two years later. The findings contribute to our understanding of how theory of mind develops in the formative preschool period; they may also inform debates as to the evolutionary origins of theory of mind.

Sequential progressions in a theory-of-mind scale: longitudinal perspectives.

Consecutive retestings of 92 U.S. preschoolers (n=30), Chinese preschoolers (n=31), and deaf children (n=31) examined whether the sequences of development apparent in cross-sectional results with a theory-of-mind scale also appeared in longitudinal assessment. Longitudinal data confirmed that theory-of-mind progressions apparent in cross-sectional scaling data also characterized longitudinal sequences of understanding for individual children. The match between cross-sectional and longitudinal sequences appeared for children who exhibit different progressions across cultures (United States vs. China) and for children with substantial delays (deaf children of hearing parents). Moreover, greater scale distances reflected larger longitudinal age differences.

How Bilingualism Informs Theory of Mind Development.

The possibility and nature of bilingual advantage for theory of mind (ToM), that is, young bilingual children outperforming their monolingual peers, have been discussed increasingly since the first research on the topic was published in 2003. Because accumulating evidence demonstrates a ToM advantage for bilingual individuals, in this article, we focus on how this advantage arises. We consider how current theoretical positions, including executive function, metalinguistic awareness, and sociolinguistic awareness accounts, explain such an advantage in young bilingual children. These theoretical accounts receive some, but only partial, support, so further research and theory are needed to understand comprehensively the relationship between bilingualism and ToM.