Evidence for goal- and mixed evidence for false belief-based action prediction in 2- to 4-year-old children: A large-scale longitudinal anticipatory looking replication study.

Unsuccessful replication attempts of paradigms assessing children's implicit tracking of false beliefs have instigated the debate on whether or not children have an implicit understanding of false beliefs before the age of four. A novel multi-trial anticipatory looking false belief paradigm yielded evidence of implicit false belief reasoning in 3- to 4-year-old children using a combined score of two false belief conditions (Grosse Wiesmann, C., Friederici, A. D., Singer, T., & Steinbeis, N. [2017]. Developmental Science, 20(5), e12445). The present study is a large-scale replication attempt of this paradigm. The task was administered three times to the same sample of N = 185 children at 2, 3, and 4 years of age. Using the original stimuli, we did not replicate the original finding of above-chance belief-congruent looking in a combined score of two false belief conditions in either of the three age groups. Interestingly, the overall pattern of results was comparable to the original study. Post-hoc analyses revealed, however, that children performed above chance in one false belief condition (FB1) and below chance in the other false belief condition (FB2), thus yielding mixed evidence of children's false belief-based action predictions. Similar to the original study, participants' performance did not change with age and was not related to children's general language skills. This study demonstrates the importance of large-scaled replications and adds to the growing number of research questioning the validity and reliability of anticipatory looking false belief paradigms as a robust measure of children's implicit tracking of beliefs.

An fMRI study on alexithymia and affective state recognition in the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test.

Recognizing others' affective states is essential for successful social interactions. Alexithymia, characterized by difficulties in identifying and describing one's own emotions, has been linked to deficits in recognizing emotions and mental states in others. To investigate how neural correlates of affective state recognition are affected by different facets of alexithymia, we conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging study with 53 healthy participants (aged 19-36 years, 51% female) using the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) and three different measures of alexithymia [Toronto Structured Interview for Alexithymia (TSIA), Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20), and Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire]. In addition, we examined brain activity during the RMET and replicated previous findings with task-related brain activation in the inferior frontal and temporal gyri, as well as the insula. No association was found between alexithymia and behavioral performance in the RMET, possibly due to the low number of participants with high alexithymia levels. Region of interest based analyses revealed no associations between alexithymia and amygdala or insula activity during the RMET. At the whole-brain level, both a composite alexithymia score and the unique variance of the alexithymia interview (TSIA) were associated with greater activity in visual processing areas during the RMET. This may indicate that affective state recognition performance in alexithymia relies on a higher compensatory activation in visual areas.

Timing matters: disentangling the neurocognitive sequence of mentalizing.

A recent electrocorticographic study by Tan et al. makes an important contribution to understanding the processes involved in mentalizing by adding the temporal dimension to the brain network of mentalizing. Combined with multivariate methods, this approach has the potential to unveil the precise representations underlying mentalizing and their functional interplay.