Episodic thought distinguishes spontaneous cognition in waking from REM and NREM sleep.

Evidence suggests continuity between cognition in waking and sleeping states. However, one type of cognition that may differ is episodic thoughts of the past and future. The current study investigated this across waking, NREM sleep and REM sleep. We analyzed thought reports obtained from a large sample of individuals (N = 138) who underwent experience-sampling during wakefulness as well as serial awakenings in sleep. Our data suggest that while episodic thoughts are common during waking spontaneous thought, episodic thoughts of both the past and the future rarely occur in either N2 or REM sleep. Moreover, replicating previous findings, episodic thoughts during wakefulness exhibit a strong prospective bias and frequently involve autobiographical planning. Together, these results suggest that the occurrence of spontaneous episodic thoughts differs substantially across waking and dreaming sleep states. We suggest that this points to a difference in the way that human consciousness is typically experienced across the sleep-wake cycle.

The stability of visual perspective and vividness during mental time travel.

When remembering or imagining, people can experience an event from their own eyes, or as an outside observer, with differing levels of vividness. The perspective from, and vividness with, which a person remembers or imagines has been related to numerous individual difference characteristics. These findings require that phenomenology during mental time travel be trait-like-that people consistently experience similar perspectives and levels of vividness. This assumption remains untested. Across two studies (combined N = 295), we examined the stability of visual perspective and vividness across multiple trials and timepoints. Perspective and vividness showed weak within-session stability when reported across just a few trials but showed strong within-session stability when sufficient trials were collected. Importantly, both visual perspective and vividness demonstrated good-to-excellent across-session stability across different delay intervals (two days to six weeks). Overall, our results suggest that people dependably experience similar visual phenomenology across occurrences of mental time travel.

People infuse their passwords with autobiographical information.

Passwords might unlock more than our computer accounts. A New York Times Magazine described anecdotes of people who infused their passwords with autobiographical information [Urbina, I. (2014, November 20). The Secret Life of Passwords. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/magazine/the-secret-life-of-passwords.html ]. We suspected people infused their passwords with autobiographical information so they could privately remember that information. Across two studies we took a systematic approach to address the extent to which people infused passwords with autobiographical information and the functions that information served. We also examined the self-reported consequences of people infusing their passwords with autobiographical information. Across both studies, 41.6-71.1% of people infused their passwords with autobiographical memories; in Study 2, 9.3% of people infused their passwords with episodic future thoughts. People who infused their password with autobiographical information reported that information served identity, social, and directive functions, and they created their password to remember that information. These studies show that people do not simply use passwords to unlock their computer accounts. Some people might use passwords as mementos to cue autobiographical information.

Wanting or having to: The role of goal self-concordance in episodic future thinking.

While it is established that goal processing is a central component of episodic future thinking, how personal goals shape future event representations is not fully understood. Here, we explored the influence of the source of motivation underlying goal pursuit. Personal goals differ in their degree of self-concordance, which depends on the primary motives underlying goal pursuit. We distinguished between self-concordant (what one wants to achieve) and non-self-concordant (what one has to achieve) goals. Participants were asked to imagine specific future events associated with each type of goals. We found that self-concordant future events have a privileged phenomenological status: they are associated with a stronger sense of "realness" and of pre-experiencing the future, are more integrated with autobiographical knowledge, and are characterized by more positive and intense emotions. Furthermore, psychological need satisfaction was a characteristic component of self-concordant future thoughts. Implications of these findings for motivation and goal pursuit are discussed.

The Contextual Association Network Activates More for Remembered than for Imagined Events.

The human capacities to remember events from the past and imagine events in the future rely on highly overlapping neural substrates. Neuroimaging studies have revealed brain regions that are more active for imagined events than remembered events, but the reverse pattern has not been shown consistently. Given that remembered events tend to be associated with more contextual information ( Johnson et al. 1988), one might expect a set of regions to demonstrate greater activity for remembered events. Specifically, regions sensitive to the strength of contextual associations might be hypothesized to show greater activity for remembered events. The present experiment tests this hypothesis. fMRI was used to identify brain regions within the contextual association network ( Bar and Aminoff 2003); regions within this network were then examined to see whether they showed differential activity during remembering and imagining. Bilateral regions within the parahippocampal cortex and retrosplenial complex responded more strongly to remembered past events, supporting work that suggests these events have more contextual information associated with them. Follow-up voxel-wise analysis demonstrated the specificity of these results, as did re-analysis of previous experimental datasets. These results suggest that a key differentiating feature of remembering and imagining is the strength of contextual associations.

Functional and structural cerebral changes in key brain regions after a facilitation programme for episodic future thought in relapsing-remitting multiple sclerosis patients.

Increasingly studied, episodic future thought (EFT) impairment negatively affects patients' daily life. Along these lines, working with relapsing-remitting multiple sclerosis (RR-MS) patients, we documented the clinical effectiveness of a mental visual imagery (MVI)-based facilitation programme on EFT impairment related to executive function difficulties. We aimed at improving the characterisation of the cognitive and neural underpinnings of RR-MS patients' EFT amelioration, by exploring the structural and functional brain changes following the MVI programme. Seventeen non-depressed RR-MS patients were recruited and randomly assigned in the (i) experimental group (n=10), who followed the MVI programme or in the control group (n=7), who followed a verbal control programme. Using an adapted version of the Autobiographical Interview to assess EFT, after facilitation, significant improvement was observed in the experimental group only. This was accompanied by increased activation in the prefrontal region during the generation of future events and was positively correlated with grey matter volume increase in this same brain area. Increased activations in the parahippocampal and the middle temporal gyri were also observed in the experimental group in post-facilitation. Likewise, functional connectivity changes were observed in the posterior brain regions after facilitation. Only minor cerebral changes were observed in the control group, likely reflecting practice effects. Our study showed that EFT improvement following the MVI programme led to functional and structural changes in brain regions sustaining contextual processing, visual imagery, the integration and maintenance of multimodal information. Taken together, these findings suggest that a cognitive intervention focusing on scene construction can be efficient to alleviate EFT impairment related to executive dysfunction. As such, this study opens the way to the development of tailor-made rehabilitation programmes using the different cognitive mechanisms involved in EFT.

Episodic future thought: contributions from working memory.

The ability to imagine hypothetical events in one's personal future is thought to involve a number of constituent cognitive processes. We investigated the extent to which individual differences in working memory capacity contribute to facets of episodic future thought. College students completed simple and complex measures of working memory and were cued to recall autobiographical memories and imagine future autobiographical events consisting of varying levels of specificity (i.e., ranging from generic to increasingly specific and detailed events). Consistent with previous findings, future thought was related to analogous measures of autobiographical memory, likely reflecting overlapping cognitive factors supporting both past and future thought. Additionally, after controlling for autobiographical memory, residual working memory variance independently predicted future episodic specificity. We suggest that when imagining future events, working memory contributes to the construction of a single, coherent, future event depiction, but not to the retrieval or elaboration of event details.

Task-related and resting-state fMRI identify distinct networks that preferentially support remembering the past and imagining the future.

The relation between episodic memory and episodic future thought (EFT) remains an active target of research. A growing literature suggests that similar cognitive processes and neural substrates tend to support these acts. However, direct comparisons of whole-brain activity reveal clear differences, with numerous regions more active when engaging in EFT than when remembering, and a smaller collection of regions displaying the opposite pattern of activity. Although various network labels have been applied to prior neuroimaging results, to date no formal resting-state functional connectivity analysis has been conducted. In the current experiment, 48 subjects remembered events from their past and engaged in EFT. Resting-state data were collected from all subjects. Task results replicated recent findings, with more activity during EFT in regions across frontal and parietal cortex, and with more activity during remembering in a smaller number of predominantly parahippocampal and retrosplenial regions. Resting-state connectivity analysis, based on seed locations defined using the fMRI task data, indicated that regions preferentially activated during EFT fell primarily within the default mode network, while those more active during remembering fell primarily within the contextual association network. These results suggest that despite their general similarity, the functional network membership of regions showing task differences is dissociable. We discuss our results in light of several hypotheses that attempt to relate remembering and EFT, and suggest that the data speak to differences in the relative contributions of episodic and semantic memory, as well as controlled and automatic processing, during the acts of remembering or engaging in EFT.

Mental simulation and experience as determinants of performance expectancies in people with schizophrenia spectrum disorder.

People with schizophrenia demonstrate both impairment in mental time travel and reduced expectancies of performance on future tasks. We aimed to reconcile these findings within the Kahneman and Tversky (1982) simulation heuristic framework by testing a key prediction that impaired future simulation would be associated with reduced performance expectancies in people with schizophrenia spectrum disorder (SZSPEC). A total of 54 individuals (30 people with SZSPEC and 24 healthy controls) generated mental simulations of everyday scenarios; after each response they rated performance expectations, distress and the similarity of the scenario to experience. Independent raters coded the coherence of responses. We found that people with SZSPEC had, compared to healthy controls, lower performance expectations and greater anticipated distress when imaging everyday scenarios. Lower performance expectancies were associated with lower experience of similar scenarios, greater negative symptoms and social withdrawal in the SZSPEC group. The current study confirmed previous findings of both impaired mental simulation and abnormal performance expectations in people with SZSPEC, together with the association of the latter with negative symptoms. Experience with social or occupational activities plays a more important role in determining performance expectancies in people with SS than the ability to mentally simulate scenarios.

Visual perspective in remembering and episodic future thought.

According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, remembering and episodic future thinking are supported by a common set of constructive processes. In the present study, we directly addressed this assertion in the context of third-person perspectives that arise during remembering and episodic future thought. Specifically, we examined the frequency with which participants remembered past events or imagined future events from third-person perspectives. We also examined the different viewpoints from which third-person perspective events were remembered or imagined. Although future events were somewhat more likely to be imagined from a third-person perspective, the spatial viewpoint distributions of third-person perspectives characterizing remembered and imagined events were highly similar. These results suggest that a similar constructive mechanism may be at work when people remember events from a perspective that could not have been experienced in the past and when they imagine events from a perspective that could not be experienced in the future. The findings are discussed in terms of their consistency with--and as extensions of--the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis.

A reverse order interview does not aid deception detection regarding intentions.

Promising recent research suggests that more cognitively demanding interviews improve deception detection accuracy. Would these cognitively demanding techniques work in the same way when discriminating between true and false future intentions? In Experiment 1 participants planned to complete a task, but instead were intercepted and interviewed about their intentions. Participants lied or told the truth, and were subjected to high (reverse order) or low (sequential order) cognitive load interviews. Third-party observers watched these interviews and indicated whether they thought the person was lying or telling the truth. Subjecting participants to a reverse compared to sequential interview increased the misidentification rate and the appearance of cognitive load in truth tellers. People lying about false intentions were not better identified. In Experiment 2, a second set of third-party observers rated behavioral cues. Consistent with Experiment 1, truth tellers, but not liars, exhibited more behaviors associated with lying and fewer behaviors associated with truth telling in the reverse than sequential interview. Together these results suggest that certain cognitively demanding interviews may be less useful when interviewing to detect false intentions. Explaining a true intention while under higher cognitive demand places truth tellers at risk of being misclassified. There may be such a thing as too much cognitive load induced by certain techniques.

Impaired mental simulation of specific past and future personal events in non-depressed multiple sclerosis patients.

The aims of the present study were (i) to explore autobiographical memory and episodic future thought in multiple sclerosis (MS), using Levine's Autobiographical Interview; (ii) to investigate the influence of the Interview's high retrieval support condition (the specific probe phase) on MS patients' past and future simulations and (iii) to obtain the patients' estimations of their own difficulties, during the test, and in everyday life. To that end, we examined 39 non-depressed relapsing-remitting MS patients and 34 healthy subjects matched for gender, age and education level. The 73 participants underwent an adapted version of the Autobiographical Interview in two conditions: remembering and imagining personal events. The group of patients also underwent an extended neuropsychological baseline, including particularly, anterograde memory and executive functions. The results showed that the MS patients' scores on the baseline were mildly or not impaired. On the contrary, the Autobiographical Interview measure, i.e., the mean number of internal details, for each of the two phases of the test - free recall and specific probe - was significantly lower in simulated past and future events in comparison with the healthy controls. Within each group, autobiographical memory performance was superior to episodic future thought performance. A strong positive correlation was observed between past and future mental simulation scores in both groups. In conclusion, our results showed, for the first time, the co-occurrence of deficit of remembering the past and imagining the future in MS patients. They also showed more difficulty in imagining future events than remembering past events for both patients and normal controls. MS being a neurological condition very frequent in the young adult population, the clinical considerations of our study might be of interest. Indeed, they give rise to new insights on MS patients' daily life difficulties related to impaired mental simulation of personal events despite general abilities, including anterograde memory, only mildly or not impaired.

Episodic Future Thought: An Emerging Concept.

The ability to mentally simulate hypothetical scenarios is a rapidly growing area of research in both psychology and neuroscience. Episodic future thought, or the ability to simulate specific personal episodes that may potentially occur in the future, represents one facet of this general capacity that continues to garner a considerable amount of interest. The purpose of this article is to elucidate current knowledge and identify a number of unresolved issues regarding this specific mental ability. In particular, this article focuses on recent research findings from neuroimaging, neuropsychology, and clinical psychology that have demonstrated a close relation between episodic future thought and the ability to remember personal episodes from one's past. On the other hand, considerations of the role of abstracted (semantic) representations in episodic future thought have been noticeably absent in the literature. The final section of this article proposes that both episodic and semantic memory play an important role in the construction of episodic future thoughts and that their interaction in this process may be determined by the relative accessibility of information in memory.