The political polarization of COVID-19 treatments among physicians and laypeople in the United States.

In the United States, liberals and conservatives disagree about facts. To what extent does expertise attenuate these disagreements? To study this question, we compare the polarization of beliefs about COVID-19 treatments among laypeople and critical care physicians. We find that political ideology predicts both groups' beliefs about a range of COVID-19 treatments. These associations persist after controlling for a rich set of covariates, including local politics. We study two potential explanations: a) that partisans are exposed to different information and b) that they interpret the same information in different ways, finding evidence for both. Polarization is driven by preferences for partisan cable news but not by exposure to scientific research. Using a set of embedded experiments, we demonstrate that partisans perceive scientific evidence differently when it pertains to a politicized treatment (ivermectin), relative to when the treatment is not identified. These results highlight the extent to which political ideology is increasingly relevant for understanding beliefs, even among expert decision makers such as physicians.

Superhuman artificial intelligence can improve human decision-making by increasing novelty.

How will superhuman artificial intelligence (AI) affect human decision-making? And what will be the mechanisms behind this effect? We address these questions in a domain where AI already exceeds human performance, analyzing more than 5.8 million move decisions made by professional Go players over the past 71 y (1950 to 2021). To address the first question, we use a superhuman AI program to estimate the quality of human decisions across time, generating 58 billion counterfactual game patterns and comparing the win rates of actual human decisions with those of counterfactual AI decisions. We find that humans began to make significantly better decisions following the advent of superhuman AI. We then examine human players' strategies across time and find that novel decisions (i.e., previously unobserved moves) occurred more frequently and became associated with higher decision quality after the advent of superhuman AI. Our findings suggest that the development of superhuman AI programs may have prompted human players to break away from traditional strategies and induced them to explore novel moves, which in turn may have improved their decision-making.

Loss aversion, the endowment effect, and gain-loss framing shape preferences for noninstrumental information.

We often talk about interacting with information as we would with a physical good (e.g., "consuming content") and describe our attachment to personal beliefs in the same way as our attachment to personal belongings (e.g., "holding on to" or "letting go of" our beliefs). But do we in fact value information the way we do objects? The valuation of money and material goods has been extensively researched, but surprisingly few insights from this literature have been applied to the study of information valuation. This paper demonstrates that two fundamental features of how we value money and material goods embodied in Prospect Theory-loss aversion and different risk preferences for gains versus losses-also hold true for information, even when it has no material value. Study 1 establishes loss aversion for noninstrumental information by showing that people are less likely to choose a gamble when the same outcome is framed as a loss (rather than gain) of information. Study 2 shows that people exhibit the endowment effect for noninstrumental information, and so value information more, simply by virtue of "owning" it. Study 3 provides a conceptual replication of the classic "Asian Disease" gain-loss pattern of risk preferences, but with facts instead of human lives, thereby also documenting a gain-loss framing effect for noninstrumental information. These findings represent a critical step in building a theoretical analogy between information and objects, and provide a useful perspective on why we often resist changing (or losing) our beliefs.

Coordination and expertise foster legal textualism.

A cross-cultural survey experiment revealed a dominant tendency to rely on a rule's letter over its spirit when deciding which behaviors violate the rule. This tendency varied markedly across (k = 15) countries, owing to variation in the impact of moral appraisals on judgments of rule violation. Compared with laypeople, legal experts were more inclined to disregard their moral evaluations of the acts altogether and consequently exhibited stronger textualist tendencies. Finally, we evaluated a plausible mechanism for the emergence of textualism: in a two-player coordination game, incentives to coordinate in the absence of communication reinforced participants' adherence to rules' literal meaning. Together, these studies (total n = 5,794) help clarify the origins and allure of textualism, especially in the law. Within heterogeneous communities in which members diverge in their moral appraisals involving a rule's purpose, the rule's literal meaning provides a clear focal point-an identifiable point of agreement enabling coordinated interpretation among citizens, lawmakers, and judges.

Difficult climate-adaptive decisions in forests as complex social-ecological systems.

Climate change threatens the social, ecological, and economic benefits enjoyed by forest-dependent communities worldwide. Climate-adaptive forest management strategies such as genomics-based assisted migration (AM) may help protect many of these threatened benefits. However, such novel technological interventions in complex social-ecological systems will generate new risks, benefits, and uncertainties that interact with diverse forest values and preexisting risks. Using data from 16 focus groups in British Columbia, Canada, we show that different stakeholders (forestry professionals, environmental nongovernmental organizations, local government officials, and members of local business communities) emphasize different kinds of risks and uncertainties in judging the appropriateness of AM. We show the difficulty of climate-adaptive decisions in complex social-ecological systems in which both climate change and adaptation will have widespread and cascading impacts on diverse nonclimate values. Overarching judgments about AM as an adaptation strategy, which may appear simple when elicited in surveys or questionnaires, require that participants make complex trade-offs among multiple domains of uncertain and unknown risks. Overall, the highest-priority forest management objective for most stakeholders is the health and integrity of the forest ecosystem from which all other important forest values derive. The factor perceived as riskiest is our lack of knowledge of how forest ecosystems work, which hinders stakeholders in their assessment of AM's acceptability. These results are further evidence of the inherent risk in privileging natural science above other forms of knowledge at the science-policy interface. When decisions are framed as technical, the normative and ethical considerations that define our fundamental goals are made invisible.

A framing effect in the judgment of discrimination.

Discrimination is not only an objective fact but also a subjective judgment. While extensive research has studied discrimination as an objective fact, we study the judgment of discrimination and show that it is malleable while holding objective discrimination constant. We focus on a common situation in real life: the constituent groups in a candidate pool are unequal (e.g., fewer female candidates than male candidates for tech jobs), and observers (e.g., the public) see only one side of the decision outcome (e.g., only the hired applicants, not the rejected ones). Ten experiments reveal a framing effect: people judge the decision-maker (e.g., the tech firm) as more discriminatory against the minority in the candidate pool if people see the composition of the accepted candidates than if they see the composition of the rejected candidates, even though the information in the two frames is equivalent (i.e., knowing the information in one frame is sufficient to infer the information in the other). The framing effect occurs regardless of whether the decision-maker is objectively discriminatory, replicates across diverse samples (Americans, Asians, and Europeans) and types of discrimination (e.g., gender, race, political orientation), and has significant behavioral consequences. We theorize and show that the framing effect arises because, when judging discrimination, people overlook information that they could infer but is not explicitly given, and they expect equality in the composition of the constituent groups in their given frame. This research highlights the fallibility of judged discrimination and suggests interventions to reduce biases and increase accuracy.

A moral trade-off system produces intuitive judgments that are rational and coherent and strike a balance between conflicting moral values.

How does the mind make moral judgments when the only way to satisfy one moral value is to neglect another? Moral dilemmas posed a recurrent adaptive problem for ancestral hominins, whose cooperative social life created multiple responsibilities to others. For many dilemmas, striking a balance between two conflicting values (a compromise judgment) would have promoted fitness better than neglecting one value to fully satisfy the other (an extreme judgment). We propose that natural selection favored the evolution of a cognitive system designed for making trade-offs between conflicting moral values. Its nonconscious computations respond to dilemmas by constructing "rightness functions": temporary representations specific to the situation at hand. A rightness function represents, in compact form, an ordering of all the solutions that the mind can conceive of (whether feasible or not) in terms of moral rightness. An optimizing algorithm selects, among the feasible solutions, one with the highest level of rightness. The moral trade-off system hypothesis makes various novel predictions: People make compromise judgments, judgments respond to incentives, judgments respect the axioms of rational choice, and judgments respond coherently to morally relevant variables (such as willingness, fairness, and reciprocity). We successfully tested these predictions using a new trolley-like dilemma. This dilemma has two original features: It admits both extreme and compromise judgments, and it allows incentives-in this case, the human cost of saving lives-to be varied systematically. No other existing model predicts the experimental results, which contradict an influential dual-process model.

Vicarious punishment of moral violations in naturalistic drama narratives predicts cortical synchronization.

Punishment of moral norm violators is instrumental for human cooperation. Yet, social and affective neuroscience research has primarily focused on second- and third-party norm enforcement, neglecting the neural architecture underlying observed (vicarious) punishment of moral wrongdoers. We used naturalistic television drama as a sampling space for observing outcomes of morally-relevant behaviors to assess how individuals cognitively process dynamically evolving moral actions and their consequences. Drawing on Affective Disposition Theory, we derived hypotheses linking character morality with viewers' neural processing of characters' rewards and punishments. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine neural responses of 28 female participants while free-viewing 15 short story summary video clips of episodes from a popular US television soap opera. Each summary included a complete narrative structure, fully crossing main character behaviors (moral/immoral) and the consequences (reward/punishment) characters faced for their actions. Narrative engagement was examined via intersubject correlation and representational similarity analysis. Highest cortical synchronization in 9 specifically selected regions previously implicated in processing moral information was observed when characters who act immorally are punished for their actions with participants' empathy as an important moderator. The results advance our understanding of the moral brain and the role of normative considerations and character outcomes in viewers' engagement with popular narratives.

The anterior cingulate cortex is involved in intero-exteroceptive integration for spatial image transformation of the self-body.

Spatial image transformation of the self-body is a fundamental function of visual perspective-taking. Recent research underscores the significance of intero-exteroceptive information integration to construct representations of our embodied self. This raises the intriguing hypothesis that interoceptive processing might be involved in the spatial image transformation of the self-body. To test this hypothesis, the present study used functional magnetic resonance imaging to measure brain activity during an arm laterality judgment (ALJ) task. In this task, participants were tasked with discerning whether the outstretched arm of a human figure, viewed from the front or back, was the right or left hand. The reaction times for the ALJ task proved longer when the stimulus presented orientations of 0°, 90°, and 270° relative to the upright orientation, and when the front view was presented rather than the back view. Reflecting the increased reaction time, increased brain activity was manifested in a cluster centered on the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), suggesting that the activation reflects the involvement of an embodied simulation in ALJ. Furthermore, this cluster of brain activity exhibited overlap with regions where the difference in activation between the front and back views positively correlated with the participants' interoceptive sensitivity, as assessed through the heartbeat discrimination task, within the pregenual ACC. These results suggest that the ACC plays an important role in integrating intero-exteroceptive cues to spatially transform the image of our self-body.

What do cancer survivors believe caused their cancer? A secondary analysis of cross-sectional survey data.

PURPOSE: Given that risk reduction and healthy lifestyles can prevent 4 in 10 cancers, it is important to understand what survivors believe caused their cancer to inform educational initiatives. METHODS: In this secondary analysis, we analyzed cancer survivor responses on the Causes Subscale of the Revised Illness Perception Questionnaire, which lists 18 possible causes of illness and a free text question. We used descriptive statistics to determine cancer survivors' agreement with the listed causes and conducted separate partial proportional odds models for the top three causes to examine their associations with sociodemographic and clinical characteristics. Content analysis was used to examine free text responses. RESULTS: Of the 1,001 participants, most identified as Caucasian (n = 764, 77%), female (n = 845, 85%), and were diagnosed with breast cancer (n = 656, 66%). The most commonly believed causes of cancer were: stress or worry (n = 498, 51%), pollution in the environment (n = 471, 48%), and chance or bad luck (n = 412, 42%). The associations of sociodemographic and clinical variables varied across the models. Free text responses indicated that hereditary and genetic causes (n = 223, 22.3%) followed by trauma and stress (n = 218, 21.8%) and bad luck or chance (n = 79, 7.9%) were the most important causes of cancer. CONCLUSIONS: Study results illuminate cancer survivors' beliefs about varying causes of their cancer diagnosis and identify characteristics of survivors who are more likely to believe certain factors caused their cancer. Results can be used to plan cancer education and risk-reduction campaigns and highlight for whom such initiatives would be most suitable.

Can Invalid Information Be Ignored When It Is Detected?

With the rapid spread of information via social media, individuals are prone to misinformation exposure that they may utilize when forming beliefs. Over five experiments (total N = 815 adults, recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk in the United States), we investigated whether people could ignore quantitative information when they judged for themselves that it was misreported. Participants recruited online viewed sets of values sampled from Gaussian distributions to estimate the underlying means. They attempted to ignore invalid information, which were outlier values inserted into the value sequences. Results indicated participants were able to detect outliers. Nevertheless, participants' estimates were still biased in the direction of the outlier, even when they were most certain that they detected invalid information. The addition of visual warning cues and different task scenarios did not fully eliminate systematic over- and underestimation. These findings suggest that individuals may incorporate invalid information they meant to ignore when forming beliefs.

People Endorse Harsher Policies in Principle Than in Practice: Asymmetric Beliefs About Which Errors to Prevent Versus Fix.

Countless policies are crafted with the intention of punishing all who do wrong or rewarding only those who do right. However, this requires accommodating certain mistakes: some who do not deserve to be punished might be, and some who deserve to be rewarded might not be. Six preregistered experiments (N = 3,484 U.S. adults) reveal that people are more willing to accept this trade-off in principle, before errors occur, than in practice, after errors occur. The result is an asymmetry such that for punishments, people believe it is more important to prevent false negatives (e.g., criminals escaping justice) than to fix them, and more important to fix false positives (e.g., wrongful convictions) than to prevent them. For rewards, people believe it is more important to prevent false positives (e.g., welfare fraud) than to fix them and more important to fix false negatives (e.g., improperly denied benefits) than to prevent them.

Learning From Aggregated Opinion.

The capacity to leverage information from others' opinions is a hallmark of human cognition. Consequently, past research has investigated how we learn from others' testimony. Yet a distinct form of social information-aggregated opinion-increasingly guides our judgments and decisions. We investigated how people learn from such information by conducting three experiments with participants recruited online within the United States (N = 886) comparing the predictions of three computational models: a Bayesian solution to this problem that can be implemented by a simple strategy for combining proportions with prior beliefs, and two alternatives from epistemology and economics. Across all studies, we found the strongest concordance between participants' judgments and the predictions of the Bayesian model, though some participants' judgments were better captured by alternative strategies. These findings lay the groundwork for future research and show that people draw systematic inferences from aggregated opinion, often in line with a Bayesian solution.

Personal Misconduct Elicits Harsher Professional Consequences for Artists (vs. Scientists): A Moral-Decoupling Process.

Recent years have brought increased accountability for personal misconduct, yet often, unequal consequences have resulted from similar offenses. Findings from a unique archival data set (N = 619; all university faculty) and three preregistered experiments (N = 2,594) show that the perceived artistic-versus-scientific nature of the offender's professional contributions influences the professional punishment received. In Study 1, analysis of four decades of university sexual-misconduct cases reveals that faculty in artistic (vs. scientific) fields have on average received more severe professional consequences. Study 2 demonstrates this experimentally, offering mediational evidence that greater difficulty morally decoupling art (vs. science) contributes to the phenomenon. Study 3 provides further evidence for this mechanism through experimental moderation. Finally, Study 4 shows that merely framing an individual's work as artistic versus scientific results in replication of these effects. Several potential alternative mechanisms to moral decoupling are tested but not supported. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed.

How Do the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review's Assessments of Comparative Effectiveness Compare With the German Federal Joint Committee's Assessments of Added Benefit? A Qualitative Study.

OBJECTIVES: We compared the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review's (ICER) ratings of comparative clinical effectiveness with the German Federal Joint Committee's (G-BA) added benefit ratings, and explored what factors may explain the disagreement between the 2 organizations. METHODS: We included drugs if they were assessed by ICER under its 2020 to 2023 Value Assessment Framework and had a corresponding assessment by G-BA as of January 2024 for the same indication, patient population, and comparator drug. To compare assessments, we modified ICER's proposed crosswalk between G-BA and ICER benefit ratings to account for G-BA's certainty ratings. We also determined whether each pair was based on similar evidence. Assessment pairs exhibiting disagreement based on the modified crosswalk despite a similar evidence base were qualitatively analyzed to identify reasons for disagreement. RESULTS: Out of 15 drug assessment pairs matched on indication, patient subgroup, and comparator, none showed agreement in their assessments when based on similar evidence. Disagreement was attributed to differences in evidence evaluation, including evaluations of safety, generalizability, and study design, as well as G-BA's rejection of the available evidence in 4 cases as unsuitable. CONCLUSIONS: The findings demonstrate that even under conditions where populations and comparators are identical and the evidence base is consistent, different assessors may arrive at divergent conclusions about comparative effectiveness, thus underscoring the presence of value judgments within assessments of clinical effectiveness. To support initiatives that seek to facilitate the exchange of value assessments between countries, these value judgments should always be transparently presented and justified in assessment summaries.

Challenges Addressing Lung Cancer Screening for Patients With Multimorbidity in Primary Care: A Qualitative Study.

PURPOSE: Many individuals who are eligible for lung cancer screening have comorbid conditions complicating their shared decision-making conversations with physicians. The goal of our study was to better understand how primary care physicians (PCPs) factor comorbidities into their evaluation of the risks and benefits of lung cancer screening and into their shared decision-making conversations with patients. METHODS: We conducted semistructured interviews by videoconference with 15 PCPs to assess the extent of shared decision-making practices and explore their understanding of the intersection of comorbidities and lung cancer screening, and how that understanding informed their clinical approach to this population. RESULTS: We identified 3 themes. The first theme was whether to discuss or not to discuss lung cancer screening. PCPs described taking additional steps for individuals with complex comorbidities to decide whether to initiate this discussion and used subjective clinical judgment to decide whether the conversation would be productive and beneficial. PCPs made mental assessments that factored in the patient's health, life expectancy, quality of life, and access to support systems. The second theme was that shared decision making is not a simple discussion. When PCPs did initiate discussions about lung cancer screening, although some believed they could provide objective information, others struggled with personal biases. The third theme was that ultimately, the decision to be screened was up to the patient. Patients had the final say, even if their decision was discordant with the PCP's advice. CONCLUSIONS: Shared decision-making conversations about lung cancer screening differed substantially from the standard for patients with complex comorbidities. Future research should include efforts to characterize the risks and benefits of LCS in patients with comorbidities to inform guidelines and clinical application.

Distinctive modes of cortical communications in tactile temporal order judgment.

Temporal order judgment of two successive tactile stimuli delivered to our hands is often inverted when we cross our hands. The present study aimed to identify time-frequency profiles of the interactions across the cortical network associated with the crossed-hand tactile temporal order judgment task using magnetoencephalography. We found that the interactions across the cortical network were channeled to a low-frequency band (5-10 Hz) when the hands were uncrossed. However, the interactions became activated in a higher band (12-18 Hz) when the hands were crossed. The participants with fewer inverted judgments relied mainly on the higher band, whereas those with more frequent inverted judgments (reversers) utilized both. Moreover, reversers showed greater cortical interactions in the higher band when their judgment was correct compared to when it was inverted. Overall, the results show that the cortical network communicates in two distinctive frequency modes during the crossed-hand tactile temporal order judgment task. A default mode of communications in the low-frequency band encourages inverted judgments, and correct judgment is robustly achieved by recruiting the high-frequency mode.

Distinctive features of experiential time: Duration, speed and event density.

William James's use of "time in passing" and "stream of thoughts" may be two sides of the same coin that emerge from the brain segmenting the continuous flow of information into discrete events. Herein, we investigated how the density of events affects two temporal experiences: the felt duration and speed of time. Using a temporal bisection task, participants classified seconds-long videos of naturalistic scenes as short or long (duration), or slow or fast (passage of time). Videos contained a varying number and type of events. We found that a large number of events lengthened subjective duration and accelerated the felt passage of time. Surprisingly, participants were also faster at estimating their felt passage of time compared to duration. The perception of duration scaled with duration and event density, whereas the felt passage of time scaled with the rate of change. Altogether, our results suggest that distinct mechanisms underlie these two experiential times.

The sense of agency in near and far space.

The sense of agency is the ability to recognize that we are the actors of our actions and their consequences. We explored whether and how spatial cues may modulate the agency experience by manipulating the ecological validity of the experimental setup (real-space or computer-based setup) and the distance of the action-outcome (near or far). We tested 58 healthy adults collecting explicit agency judgments and the perceived time interval between movements and outcomes (to quantify the intentional binding phenomenon, an implicit index of agency). Participants show greater implicit agency for voluntary actions when there is a temporal and spatial action-outcome contingency. Conversely, participants reported similar explicit agency for outcomes appearing in the near and far space. Notably, these effects were independent of the ecological validity of the setting. These results suggest that spatial proximity, realistic or illusory, is essential for feeling implicitly responsible for the consequences of our actions.

Task relevance alters the effect of emotion on congruency judgments during action understanding.

The congruency judgments in action understanding helps individuals make timely adjustments to unexpected occurrence, and this process may be influenced by emotion. Previous research has showed contradictory effect of emotion on conflict processing, possibly due to the degree of relevance between emotion and task. However, to date, no study has systematically manipulated the relevance to explore how emotion affects congruency judgments in action understanding. We employed a cue-target paradigm and controlled the way emotional stimuli were presented on the target interface, setting up three experiments: emotion served as task-irrelevant distractor, task-irrelevant target and task-relevant target. The results showed that when emotion was irrelevant to the task, it impaired congruency judgements performance, regardless of a distractor or a target, while task-relevant emotion facilitated this process. These findings indicate that the impact of emotion on congruency judgements during action understanding depends on the degree of emotion-task relevance.