A moral trade-off system produces intuitive judgments that are rational and coherent and strike a balance between conflicting moral values.

How does the mind make moral judgments when the only way to satisfy one moral value is to neglect another? Moral dilemmas posed a recurrent adaptive problem for ancestral hominins, whose cooperative social life created multiple responsibilities to others. For many dilemmas, striking a balance between two conflicting values (a compromise judgment) would have promoted fitness better than neglecting one value to fully satisfy the other (an extreme judgment). We propose that natural selection favored the evolution of a cognitive system designed for making trade-offs between conflicting moral values. Its nonconscious computations respond to dilemmas by constructing "rightness functions": temporary representations specific to the situation at hand. A rightness function represents, in compact form, an ordering of all the solutions that the mind can conceive of (whether feasible or not) in terms of moral rightness. An optimizing algorithm selects, among the feasible solutions, one with the highest level of rightness. The moral trade-off system hypothesis makes various novel predictions: People make compromise judgments, judgments respond to incentives, judgments respect the axioms of rational choice, and judgments respond coherently to morally relevant variables (such as willingness, fairness, and reciprocity). We successfully tested these predictions using a new trolley-like dilemma. This dilemma has two original features: It admits both extreme and compromise judgments, and it allows incentives-in this case, the human cost of saving lives-to be varied systematically. No other existing model predicts the experimental results, which contradict an influential dual-process model.

The Conception of Synthetic Entities from a Personalist Perspective.

Synthetic biology opens up the possibility of producing new entities not found in nature, whose classification as organisms or machines has been debated. In this paper we are focusing on the delimitation of the moral value of synthetic products, in order to establish the ethically right way to behave towards them. In order to do so, we use personalism as our ethical framework. First, we examine how we can distinguish between organisms and machines. Next, we discuss whether the products of synthetic biology can be considered organisms at all and assess what their moral value is and how should we behave towards them. Finally, we discuss the hypothetical case of synthetic humans.

Amplio, Ergo Sum.

This article aims to explore the idea that enhancement technologies have been and will continue to be an essential element of what we might call the "human continuum," and are indeed key to our existence and evolution into persons. Whereas conservative commentators argue that enhancement is likely to cause us to lose our humanity and become something other, it is argued here that the very opposite is true: that enhancement is the core of what and who we are. Using evidence from paleoanthropology to examine the nature of our predecessor species, and their proclivities for tool use, we can see that there is good reason to assume that the development of Homo sapiens is a direct result of the use of enhancement technologies. A case is also made for broad understandings of the scope of enhancement, based on the significant evolutionary results of acts that are usually dismissed as "unremarkable." Furthermore, the use of enhancement by modern humans is no different than these prehistoric applications, and is likely to ultimately have similar results. There is no good reason to assume that whatever we may become will not also consider itself human.

The Edge of Human? The Problem with the Posthuman as the 'Beyond'.

This article asks whether enhancement can truly lead to something beyond humanity, or whether it is, itself, an inherently human act. The 'posthuman' is an uncertain proposition. What, exactly, would one be? Many commentators suggest it to be an endpoint for the use of enhancement technologies, yet few choose to codify the term outright; which frequently leads to unnecessary confusion. Characterizing and contextualizing the term, particularly its more novel uses, is therefore a valuable enterprise. The abuse of the term 'Human', especially in the context of the enhancement debate and the myriad meanings ascribed to it, could give 'posthuman' very different slants depending on one's assumptions. There are perhaps three main senses in which the term 'human' is employed: the biological, the moral, and the self-idealizing. In the first of these, 'human' is often conflated with Homo sapiens, and used interchangeably to denote species; in the second, 'human' (or 'humanity') generally refers to a community of beings which qualify as having a certain moral value; and the third, the self-idealizing sense, is more descriptive; a label denoting the qualities that make us who we are as beings, or 'what matters about those who matter'. So, what might enhancement make us? A novel species or genus of hominid? Or, perhaps, a morally more valuable being than a regular human? Of course, there's a third option: that a posthuman is a being which embodies our self-ideal more successfully than we do ourselves - one 'more human than human'. Which to choose?

Relationship between Moral Values for Driving Behavior and Brain Activity: An NIRS Study.

Although there are clear moral components to traffic violations and risky and aggressive driving behavior, few studies have examined the relationship between moral values and risky driving. This study aimed to examine the relationship between moral views of driving behavior and brain activity. Twenty healthy drivers participated in this study. A questionnaire regarding their moral values concerning driving behavior was administered to the participants. Brain activity was measured using near-infrared spectroscopy while eliciting moral emotions. Based on the results of the questionnaire, the participants were divided into two groups: one with high moral values and the other with low moral values. Brain activity was statistically compared between the two groups. Both groups had significantly lower activity in the prefrontal cortex during the self-risky driving task. The low moral group had significantly lower activity in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex than the high moral group, while it had lower activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the self-risky driving task than in the safe driving task. Regardless of their moral values, the participants were less susceptible to moral emotions during risky driving. Furthermore, our findings suggest that drivers with lower moral values may be even less susceptible to moral emotions.

How Do Technological Artefacts Embody Moral Values?

According to some philosophers of technology, technology embodies moral values in virtue of its functional properties and the intentions of its designers. But this paper shows that such an account makes the values supposedly embedded in technology epistemically opaque and that it does not allow for values to change. Therefore, to overcome these shortcomings, the paper introduces the novel Affordance Account of Value Embedding as a superior alternative. Accordingly, artefacts bear affordances, that is, artefacts make certain actions likelier given the circumstances. Based on an interdisciplinary perspective that invokes recent moral anthropology, I conceptualize affordances as response-dependent properties. That is, they depend on intrinsic as well as extrinsic properties of the artefact. We have reason to value these properties. Therefore, artefacts embody values and are not value-neutral, which has practical implications for the design of new technologies.

The moral status of cerebral organoids.

Organoids are 3D biological structures constructed from stem cells in vitro. They partially mimic the function of real organs. Although the number of articles detailing this technology has increased in recent years, papers debating their ethical issues are few. In addition, many of such articles outline a mere summary of potential ethical concerns associated with organoids, although some have focused on consciousness assessment or organoid use in cystic fibrosis treatment. This article seeks to evaluate the moral status of cerebral organoids and to determine under which conditions their use should be allowed from a bioethical standpoint. We will present an overview of recent steps in developing highly advanced cerebral organoids, followed by an analysis of their ethics based on three factors: human origin, a specific biological threshold (which, once crossed, grants an entity moral status), and the potential to generate human beings. We will also make practical recommendations for researchers working in this biological field.

A crítica de Hegel à filosofia moral kantiana depois de Rawls / Hegel's critique of kantian moral philosophy after Rawls

O artigo visa mostrar que a crítica de Hegel à filosofia moral kantiana, a partir a interpretação de Rawls, deve ser revista em alguns aspectos, tais como: a aplicação do imperativo categórico; o problema do formalismo e o próprio construtivismo moral em Kant. Uma reconstrução dos principais aspectos da interpretação rawlsiana da filosofia prática de Kant é necessária, considerando a crítica hegeliana. Essa é explicitada tendo em vista os avanços que ela representa dentro de uma perspectiva dialética e de possíveis reparos que a ela podem ser feitos.

The article aims to show that Hegel's critique of Kantian moral philosophy, based on Rawls' interpretation, must be revised in some aspects, such as: the application of the categorical imperative; the problem of formalism and Kant's moral constructivism itself. A reconstruction of the main aspects of Rawlsian interpretation of Kant's practical philosophy is necessary, considering Hegel's critique. This is explained in view of the advances it represents within a dialectical perspective and the possible repairs that can be made to it.

Discussion on the Moral Value of Health / 中国医学伦理学

From the perspective of individuals,health is the cornerstone to be competent for their learning and work,achieve their academics and career,and create valuable and happy life.From the perspective of society,health is the basis to promote family well-being,achieve national prosperity,boost social productive forces,economics,and civilization and harmony.From the perspective of nation,health is the guarantee to achieve the national development goals,enhance the comprehensive national strength,enhance the international status,and show the national image in the world.