Human infants are aroused and concerned by moral transgressions.

Humans reason and care about ethical issues, such as avoiding unnecessary harm. But what enables us to develop a moral capacity? This question dates back at least to ancient Greece and typically results in the traditional opposition between sentimentalism (the view that morality is mainly driven by socioaffective processes) and rationalism [the view that morality is mainly driven by (socio)cognitive processes or reason]. Here, we used multiple methods (eye-tracking and observations of expressive behaviors) to assess the role of both cognitive and socioaffective processes in infants' developing morality. We capitalized on the distinction between moral (e.g., harmful) and conventional (e.g., harmless) transgressions to investigate whether 18-mo-old infants understand actions as distinctively moral as opposed to merely disobedient or unexpected. All infants watched the same social scene, but based on prior verbal interactions, an actor's tearing apart of a picture (an act not intrinsically harmful) with a tool constituted either a conventional (wrong tool), a moral (producing harm), or no violation (correct tool). Infants' anticipatory looks differentiated between conventional and no violation conditions, suggesting that they processed the verbal interactions and built corresponding expectations. Importantly, infants showed a larger increase in pupil size (physiological arousal), and more expressions indicating empathic concern, in response to a moral than to a conventional violation. Thus, infants differentiated between harmful and harmless transgressions based solely on prior verbal interactions. Together, these convergent findings suggest that human infants' moral development is fostered by both sociocognitive (inferring harm) and socioaffective processes (empathic concern for others' welfare).

Social Media and Morality.

Nearly five billion people around the world now use social media, and this number continues to grow. One of the primary goals of social media platforms is to capture and monetize human attention. One means by which individuals and groups can capture attention and drive engagement on these platforms is by sharing morally and emotionally evocative content. We review a growing body of research on the interrelationship of social media and morality as well its consequences for individuals and society. Moral content often goes viral on social media, and social media makes moral behavior (such as punishment) less costly. Thus, social media often acts as an accelerant for existing moral dynamics, amplifying outrage, status seeking, and intergroup conflict while also potentially amplifying more constructive facets of morality, such as social support, prosociality, and collective action. We discuss trends, heated debates, and future directions in this emerging literature.

The Moral Psychology of Artificial Intelligence.

Moral psychology was shaped around three categories of agents and patients: humans, other animals, and supernatural beings. Rapid progress in artificial intelligence has introduced a fourth category for our moral psychology to deal with: intelligent machines. Machines can perform as moral agents, making decisions that affect the outcomes of human patients or solving moral dilemmas without human supervision. Machines can be perceived as moral patients, whose outcomes can be affected by human decisions, with important consequences for human-machine cooperation. Machines can be moral proxies that human agents and patients send as their delegates to moral interactions or use as a disguise in these interactions. Here we review the experimental literature on machines as moral agents, moral patients, and moral proxies, with a focus on recent findings and the open questions that they suggest.

The moral filter of patriotic prejudice: How Americans view Chinese in the COVID-19 era.

About one in six Asian Americans have fallen victim to anti-Asian racism during the COVID-19 pandemic [J. Lee, K. Ramakrishnan, aapidata.com/blog/discrimination-survey-2022/]. By examining anti-Asian racism in the United States primarily as a domestic issue, most prior studies have overlooked the connections between shifting US-China relations and Americans' prejudices against the Chinese in China and, by extension, East Asian Americans. This study investigates the patterns and perceptual bases of nationality-based prejudices against Chinese amid the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. Our nationally representative online survey experiment reveals that Americans assess a hypothetical Chinese person in China as inferior in multiple social and psychological characteristics to an otherwise identical Japanese person in Japan or East Asian American. Furthermore, subjects who perceive China as more threatening to America's national interests assess Chinese more negatively, especially in terms of trustworthiness and morality, suggesting that perceived China threats propel Americans' negative stereotypes about Chinese. A contextual analysis further indicates that counties with a higher share of Trump voters in 2016 tend to perceive all East Asian-origin groups similarly as a racial outgroup. By contrast, residents in predominantly Democrat-voting counties tend to perceive Chinese in China more negatively relative to Asian Americans, despite broadly viewing East Asians more favorably. Overall, this study underscores the often-overlooked relationships between the prevailing anti-Asian sentiments in the United States and the US-China geopolitical tensions and America's domestic political polarization.

Beneficial effects of communicating intentions when delivering moral criticism: Cognitive and neural responses.

People often do not accept criticism on their morality, especially when delivered by outgroup members. In two preregistered studies, we investigated whether people become more receptive to such negative feedback when feedback senders communicate their intention to help. Participants received negative feedback from ostensible others on their selfish (rather than altruistic) decisions in a donation task. We manipulated the identity of a feedback sender (ingroup vs. outgroup) and the intention that they provided for giving feedback. A sender either did not communicate any intentions, indicated the intention to help the feedback receiver improve, or communicated the intention to show moral superiority. We measured participants' self-reported responses to the feedback (Study 1, N = 44) and additionally recorded an EEG in Study 2 (N = 34). Results showed that when no intentions were communicated, participants assumed worse intentions from outgroup senders than ingroup senders (Study 1). However, group membership had no significant effect once feedback senders made their intentions explicit. Moreover, across studies, when feedback senders communicated their intention to help, participants perceived feedback as less unfair compared with when senders tried to convey their moral superiority. Complementing these results, exploratory event-related potential results of Study 2 suggested that communicating the intention to help reduced participants' attentional vigilance toward negative feedback messages on their morality (i.e., decreased P200 amplitudes). These results demonstrate the beneficial effects of communicating the intention to help when one tries to encourage others' moral growth through criticism.

Preregistered Replication and Extension of "Moral Hypocrisy: Social Groups and the Flexibility of Virtue".

The tendency for people to consider themselves morally good while behaving selfishly is known as moral hypocrisy. Influential work by Valdesolo and DeSteno (2007) found evidence for intergroup moral hypocrisy such that people were more forgiving of transgressions when they were committed by an in-group member than an out-group member. We conducted two experiments to examine moral hypocrisy and group membership in an online paradigm with Prolific workers from the United States: a direct replication of the original work with minimal groups (N = 610; nationally representative) and a conceptual replication with political groups (N = 606; 50% Democrats and 50% Republicans). Although the results did not replicate the original findings, we observed evidence of in-group favoritism in minimal groups and out-group derogation in political groups. The current research finds mixed evidence of intergroup moral hypocrisy and has implications for understanding the contextual dependencies of intergroup bias and partisanship.

Personal Misconduct Elicits Harsher Professional Consequences for Artists (vs. Scientists): A Moral-Decoupling Process.

Recent years have brought increased accountability for personal misconduct, yet often, unequal consequences have resulted from similar offenses. Findings from a unique archival data set (N = 619; all university faculty) and three preregistered experiments (N = 2,594) show that the perceived artistic-versus-scientific nature of the offender's professional contributions influences the professional punishment received. In Study 1, analysis of four decades of university sexual-misconduct cases reveals that faculty in artistic (vs. scientific) fields have on average received more severe professional consequences. Study 2 demonstrates this experimentally, offering mediational evidence that greater difficulty morally decoupling art (vs. science) contributes to the phenomenon. Study 3 provides further evidence for this mechanism through experimental moderation. Finally, Study 4 shows that merely framing an individual's work as artistic versus scientific results in replication of these effects. Several potential alternative mechanisms to moral decoupling are tested but not supported. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed.

Modular morals: Mapping the organization of the moral brain.

Is morality the product of multiple domain-specific psychological mechanisms, or one domain-general mechanism? Previous research suggests that morality consists of a range of solutions to the problems of cooperation recurrent in human social life. This theory of 'morality as cooperation' suggests that there are (at least) seven specific moral domains: family values, group loyalty, reciprocity, heroism, deference, fairness and property rights. However, it is unclear how these types of morality are implemented at the neuroanatomical level. The possibilities are that morality is (1) the product of multiple distinct domain-specific adaptations for cooperation, (2) the product of a single domain-general adaptation which learns a range of moral rules, or (3) the product of some combination of domain-specific and domain-general adaptations. To distinguish between these possibilities, we first conducted an anatomical likelihood estimation meta-analysis of previous studies investigating the relationship between these seven moral domains and neuroanatomy. This meta-analysis provided evidence for a combination of specific and general adaptations. Next, we investigated the relationship between the seven types of morality - as measured by the Morality as Cooperation Questionnaire (Relevance) - and grey matter volume in a large neuroimaging (n = 607) sample. No associations between moral values and grey matter volume survived whole-brain exploratory testing. We conclude that whatever combination of mechanisms are responsible for morality, either they are not neuroanatomically localised, or else their localisation is not manifested in grey matter volume. Future research should employ phylogenetically informed a priori predictions, as well as alternative measures of morality and of brain function.

Anonymity in sharing morally salient news: the causal role of the temporoparietal junction.

Considering the crucial role of morality in shaping one's reputation, exploring factors that modulate people's decision to share morally salient news is important. Previous studies suggested that self-expression and socializing are 2 key factors for news-sharing behaviors, suggesting the key role of anonymity in such decisions. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), the present study focused on how anonymity modulates the sharing of morally salient information, as well as its neural mechanisms. Results showed that compared to moral news, people were more reluctant to share immoral news, especially when they share it with their real names shown. On the neural level, we found that this effect was associated with the activity of the left temporoparietal junction (TPJ), as well as its functional connection to its right counterpart. Dynamic causal modeling analysis revealed the moral valence of news and the anonymity of sharing modulated the effective connectivity between the left TPJ and the middle frontal gyrus as well as the medial frontal gyrus. There was no significant difference when sharing news anonymously. Further, a followed-up tDCS experiment supported the causal role of the left TPJ in this behavioral effect. Taken together, these results suggested that people concern more about social repercussion, when they share the news with their real-names shown, especially when sharing immoral news, and this effect is associated with stronger neural activation in the left TPJ, as well as changes in its functional connectivity with other brain regions.

Multidimensional profiles of head start preschoolers' moral self-concept predict subsequent, but not concurrent, aggression.

The moral self-concept (MSC) describes how children view themselves as moral agents. Research suggests that the MSC may relate to moral behavior, yet little is known about how MSC relates to moral behavior in preschoolers. One hundred six low-income children (M age = 52.78 months, SD = 6.61 months) and their teachers participated in this study. In the fall, children completed a MSC puppet task measure. In the fall and spring, teachers reported via children's survey prosocial behavior and aggressive behavior. We used a person-centered approach to identify profiles of MSC, which revealed two profiles of behavior: comforting prosocials and helpful aggressors. Comforting prosocials showed a moderate preference for comforting, a slight preference for helping, and a slight preference for avoiding aggression. Helpful aggressors had a moderate aversion to comforting, a strong preference for helping, and a slight preference for aggressive behavior. Subsequent analysis of covariance analysis revealed that MSC profiles did not differ in concurrent behavior but did differ in behavior 6 months later. The comforting prosocial group participated in more aggression than the helpful aggressors. Additionally, analysis of covariance analysis of change in aggression scores over time showed that comforting prosocials aggression increased, while helpful aggressors aggression decreased. Both groups over time decreased in prosocial behavior, but to different degrees. Overall, findings reveal that the MSC in preschoolers may relate to future not concurrent moral behavior.

People accept breaks in the causal chain between crime and punishment.

Crime and punishment are usually connected. An agent intentionally causes harm, other people find out, and they punish the agent in response. We investigated whether people care about the integrity of this causal chain. Across seven experiments, participants (total N = 1,709) rated the acceptability of punishing agents for one crime when the agents had committed a different crime. Overall, participants generally approved of such wayward punishment. They endorsed it more strongly than punishing totally innocent agents, though they often approved of punishing agents for their correct crimes more strongly. Participants sometimes supported wayward punishment when wrongdoers were punished for a different kind of crime than the one committed, and they supported several different kinds of wayward punishments. Together the findings show that people often tolerate breaks in the causal chain between crime and punishment.

Why moral psychology needs personality psychology.

People vary in how they perceive, think about, and respond to moral issues. Clearly, we cannot fully understand the psychology of morality without accounting for individual differences in moral functioning. But decades of neglect of and explicit skepticism toward such individual differences has resulted in a lack of integration between moral psychology and personality psychology-the study of psychological differences between people. In recent years, these barriers to progress have started to break down. This special issue aims to celebrate and further increase the visibility of the personality psychology of morality. Here, we introduce the articles in this special issue by highlighting some important contributions a personality-based perspective has to offer moral psychology-particularly in comparison to the currently prominent social psychological approach. We show that personality psychology is well-placed to (a) contribute toward a rigorous empirical foundation for moral psychology, (b) tackle the conceptualization and assessment of stable moral tendencies, (c) assess the predictive validity of moral traits in relation to consequential outcomes, (d) uncover the mechanisms underlying individual differences in moral judgments and behavior, and (e) provide insights into moral development. For these reasons, we believe that moral psychology needs personality psychology to reach its full scholarly potential.

What moral weight should patient-led demand have in clinical decisions about assisted reproductive technologies?

Evidence suggests that one reason doctors provide certain interventions in assisted reproductive technologies (ART) is because of patient demand. This is particularly the case when it comes to unproven interventions such as 'add-ons' to in vitro fertilisation (IVF) cycles, or providing IVF cycles that are highly unlikely to succeed. Doctors tend to accede to demands for such interventions because patients are willing to do and pay 'whatever it takes' to have a baby. However, there is uncertainty as to what moral weight should be placed on patient-led demands in ART, including whether it is acceptable for such demands to be invoked as a justification for intervention. We address this issue in this paper. We start by elucidating what we mean by 'patient-led demand' and synthesise some of the evidence for this phenomenon. We then argue that a doctor's professional role morality (PRM) yields special responsibilities, particularly in commercialised healthcare settings such as ART, because of the nature of professions as social institutions that are distinct from markets. We argue on this basis that, while there may be reasons (consistent with PRM) for doctors to accede to patient demand, this is not always the case. There is often a gap in justification between acceding to patient-led demands and providing contested interventions, particularly in commercial settings. As a result, acceding to demand in such settings needs a strong justification to be consistent with PRM.

How university diversity rationales inform student preferences and outcomes.

It is currently commonplace for institutions of higher education to proclaim to embrace diversity and inclusion. Though there are numerous rationales available for doing so, US Supreme Court decisions have consistently favored rationales which assert that diversity provides compelling educational benefits and is thus instrumentally useful. Our research is a quantitative/experimental effort to examine how such instrumental rationales comport with the preferences of White and Black Americans, specifically contrasting them with previously dominant moral rationales that embrace diversity as a matter of intrinsic values (e.g., justice). Furthermore, we investigate the prevalence of instrumental diversity rationales in the American higher education landscape and the degree to which they correspond with educational outcomes. Across six experiments, we showed that instrumental rationales correspond to the preferences of White (but not Black) Americans, and both parents and admissions staff expect Black students to fare worse at universities that endorse them. We coded university websites and surveyed admissions staff to determine that, nevertheless, instrumental diversity rationales are more prevalent than moral ones are and that they are indeed associated with increasing White-Black graduation disparities, particularly among universities with low levels of moral rationale use. These findings indicate that the most common rationale for supporting diversity in American higher education accords with the preferences of, and better relative outcomes for, White Americans over low-status racial minorities. The rationales behind universities' embrace of diversity have nonlegal consequences that should be considered in institutional decision making.

Cosmopolitan morality trades off in-group for the world, separating benefits and protection.

Global cooperation rests on popular endorsement of cosmopolitan values-putting all humanity equal to or ahead of conationals. Despite being comparative judgments that may trade off, even sacrifice, the in-group's interests for the rest of the world, moral cosmopolitanism finds support in large, nationally representative surveys from Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, China, Japan, the United States, Colombia, and Guatemala. A series of studies probe this trading off of the in-group's interests against the world's interests. Respondents everywhere distinguish preventing harm to foreign citizens, which almost all support, from redistributing resources, which only about half support. These two dimensions of moral cosmopolitanism, equitable security (preventing harm) and equitable benefits (redistributing resources), predict attitudes toward contested international policies, actual charitable donations, and preferences for mask and vaccine allocations in the COVID-19 response. The dimensions do not reflect several demographic variables and only weakly reflect political ideology. Moral cosmopolitanism also differs from related psychological constructs such as group identity. Finally, to understand the underlying thought structures, natural language processing reveals cognitive associations underlying moral cosmopolitanism (e.g., world, both) versus the alternative, parochial moral mindset (e.g., USA, first). Making these global or local terms accessible introduces an effective intervention that at least temporarily leads more people to behave like moral cosmopolitans.

Personal experiences bridge moral and political divides better than facts.

Both liberals and conservatives believe that using facts in political discussions helps to foster mutual respect, but 15 studies-across multiple methodologies and issues-show that these beliefs are mistaken. Political opponents respect moral beliefs more when they are supported by personal experiences, not facts. The respect-inducing power of personal experiences is revealed by survey studies across various political topics, a field study of conversations about guns, an analysis of YouTube comments from abortion opinion videos, and an archival analysis of 137 interview transcripts from Fox News and CNN. The personal experiences most likely to encourage respect from opponents are issue-relevant and involve harm. Mediation analyses reveal that these harm-related personal experiences increase respect by increasing perceptions of rationality: everyone can appreciate that avoiding harm is rational, even in people who hold different beliefs about guns, taxes, immigration, and the environment. Studies show that people believe in the truth of both facts and personal experiences in nonmoral disagreement; however, in moral disagreements, subjective experiences seem truer (i.e., are doubted less) than objective facts. These results provide a concrete demonstration of how to bridge moral divides while also revealing how our intuitions can lead us astray. Stretching back to the Enlightenment, philosophers and scientists have privileged objective facts over experiences in the pursuit of truth. However, furnishing perceptions of truth within moral disagreements is better accomplished by sharing subjective experiences, not by providing facts.

Mothering and Mental Health Care: Moral Sense-Making Among Mexican-American Mothers of Adolescents in Treatment.

This article explores the experiences of Mexican American mothers who, confronted with the troubled emotions and behaviors of their adolescent children, felt compelled to seek help from mental health clinicians. Their experience is situated in the context of both psychiatrization, or the tendency to treat social problems as mental illness, and the landscape of contemporary mothering in the U.S., where maternal determinism, mother-blame, and the demand for intensive parenting hold sway. In this context, the moral crisis of mental health care-seeking for their children forces mothers to reconcile multiple competing stakes as they navigate the overlapping, and sometimes conflicting, moral-cultural worlds constituted by family and community, as well as mental health care providers. At the same time, it allows them an opportunity to creatively "reenvision" their ways of being mothers and persons. Their stories and struggles shed new light on contemporary conversations about psychiatrization, everyday morality, and mothering.

What Do We Teach to Engineering Students: Embedded Ethics, Morality, and Politics.

In the past few years, calls for integrating ethics modules in engineering curricula have multiplied. Despite this positive trend, a number of issues with these 'embedded' programs remains. First, learning goals are underspecified. A second limitation is the conflation of different dimensions under the same banner, in particular confusion between ethics curricula geared towards addressing the ethics of individual conduct and curricula geared towards addressing ethics at the societal level. In this article, we propose a tripartite framework to overcome these difficulties. Our framework analytically decomposes an ethics module into three dimensions. First, there is the ethical dimension, which pertains to the learning goals. Second, there is the moral dimension, which addresses the moral relevance of engineers' conduct. Finally, there is the political dimension, which scales up issues of moral relevance at the civic level. All in all, our framework has two advantages. First, it provides analytic clarity, i.e. it enables course instructors to locate ethical dilemmas in either the moral or political realm and to make use of the tools and resources from moral and/or political philosophy. Second, it depicts a comprehensive ethical training, which enables students to both reason about moral issues in the abstract, and to socially contextualize potential solutions.

Genetic Enhancement, Human Rights, and Regioglobal Bioethics.

This article examines the cross-cultural bioethical concerns stemming from the potential use of CRISPR-Cas9 for genetic enhancement projects. It emphasizes the need to differentiate between basic and non-basic human rights when considering genetic enhancement, as recent international declarations lack this distinction. Basic rights possess a universal nature and are applicable across cultures, while non-basic rights are culturally specific and should be determined within respective regions. To illustrate this, the study explores the acceptance or rejection of non-basic rights related to genetic enhancement in two distinct cultural categories: Type-A and Type-B cultures. Type-A cultures predominantly adhere to a liberal moral framework, while Type-B cultures are rooted in Confucian morality. Additionally, the article argues for two basic rights in genetic enhancement: the right to be free from bodily harm and the right to be free from deception. These rights differ from non-basic rights and should be universally upheld in all cultures. By analyzing a hypothetical case and drawing parallels with the He Jiankui incident, the article investigates the violation of these two basic rights in each scenario, regardless of cultural context. Consequently, both cases should be unequivocally rejected in both Type-A and Type-B cultures.

Understanding moral distress in home-care nursing: An interview study.

BACKGROUND: Moral distress is a far-reaching problem for nurses in different settings as it threatens their health. AIM: This study examined which situations lead to moral distress in home-care nursing, how and with which consequences home-care nurses experience moral distress, and how they cope with morally stressful situations and the resulting moral distress. RESEARCH DESIGN: A qualitative interview study with reflexive thematic analysis was used. PARTICIPANTS AND RESEARCH CONTEXT: We conducted semi-structured interviews with 20 home-care nurses in Germany. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS: The study was approved by the Data Protection Office and Ethics Committee of the German Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. FINDINGS: Twenty (14 female and 6 male) home-care nurses were interviewed between April and August 2023 at their chosen location. The situations leading to moral distress were inadequate care of the person in need of care, not being able to protect one's health, extended responsibility for the entire care arrangement, work-privacy conflicts, and conflicts between the understanding of care or professional ethics and the performance and billing system. The nurses experienced moral distress as they worked alone and provided care in the patient's territory. Short- and long-term strains with destructive cognitions, negative emotions, physical symptoms, and health consequences were reported. They faced challenges in coping with moral distress on institutional and individual levels. CONCLUSIONS: In cases of tension between the service and billing system and the understanding of these nurses' care services, moral distress is unavoidable. Alternative forms of organization and billing modalities, such as payment by time and the expansion and refinancing of service, should be implemented. The latter relates to systematic case and ethics meetings. Further, a transfer of medical activities, such as the prescription of wound material to registered nurses, could prevent morally stressful situations and improve patients' quality of care.