One Health surveillance of West Nile and Usutu viruses: a repeated cross-sectional study exploring seroprevalence and endemicity in Southern France, 2016 to 2020.

BackgroundWest Nile virus (WNV) and Usutu virus (USUV), two closely related flaviviruses, mainly follow an enzootic cycle involving mosquitoes and birds, but also infect humans and other mammals. Since 2010, their epidemiological situation may have shifted from irregular epidemics to endemicity in several European regions; this requires confirmation, as it could have implications for risk assessment and surveillance strategies.AimTo explore the seroprevalence in animals and humans and potential endemicity of WNV and USUV in Southern France, given a long history of WNV outbreaks and the only severe human USUV case in France in this region.MethodsWe evaluated the prevalence of WNV and USUV in a repeated cross-sectional study by serological and molecular analyses of human, dog, horse, bird and mosquito samples in the Camargue area, including the city of Montpellier, between 2016 and 2020.ResultsWe observed the active transmission of both viruses and higher USUV prevalence in humans, dogs, birds and mosquitoes, while WNV prevalence was higher in horses. In 500 human samples, 15 were positive for USUV and 6 for WNV. Genetic data showed that the same lineages, WNV lineage 1a and USUV lineage Africa 3, were found in mosquitoes in 2015, 2018 and 2020.ConclusionThese findings support existing literature suggesting endemisation in the study region and contribute to a better understanding of USUV and WNV circulation in Southern France. Our study underlines the importance of a One Health approach for the surveillance of these viruses.

COVID-19 in India: Making a case for the one health surveillance system.

Pandemics like COVID-19 warrant an urgent implementation of the one health surveillance (OHS) system to the focus on multisectoral, multidisciplinary, multi-institutional, and multispecialty coordination, in all aspects of the response to outbreaks that might involve humans, animals, and their environment. The Indian system so far has evolved in conducting surveillance and monitoring of parameters within the domain of human health, animal health, and the environment, but in silos. This commentary piece provides an opinion to boost the existing surveillance activities for early detection and ways to develop an integrated OHS to prevent future COVID-19 like pandemics in India. It also attempts to provide possible solutions at the interface of human-animal-environment, from the simpler to the complex system integration with the principles of one health.

An early start of West Nile virus seasonal transmission: the added value of One Heath surveillance in detecting early circulation and triggering timely response in Italy, June to July 2018.

In Italy, the 2018 West Nile virus transmission season started early with a high number of cases reported. One-Health surveillance, within the Italian West Nile national preparedness and response plan, detected viral circulation 9 days before symptom-onset of the first confirmed human case; triggering timely implementation of blood and transplant safety measures. This is an example of how functional coordination allows health authorities to use early warning triggers from surveillance systems to implement preventive measures.

Economics of zoonoses surveillance in a 'One Health' context: an assessment of Campylobacter surveillance in Switzerland.

Cross-sectorial surveillance and general collaboration between the animal and the public health sectors are increasingly recognized as needed to better manage the impacts of zoonoses. From 2009, the Swiss established a Campylobacter mitigation system that includes human and poultry surveillance data-sharing within a multi-sectorial platform, in a 'One Health' approach. The objective of this study was to explore the economics of this cross-sectorial approach, including surveillance and triggered interventions. Costs and benefits of the One Health and of the uni-sectorial approach to Campylobacter surveillance were identified using an economic assessment framework developed earlier. Cost information of surveillance activities and interventions was gathered and disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) associated with the disease estimated for 2008 and 2013. In the first 5 years of this One Health approach to Campylobacter mitigation, surveillance contributed with information mainly used to perform risk assessments, monitor trends and shape research efforts on Campylobacter. There was an increase in costs associated with the mitigation activities following integration, due mainly to the allocation of additional resources to research and implementation of poultry surveillance. The overall burden of campylobacteriosis increased by 3·4-8·8% to 1751-2852 DALYs in 2013. In the timing of the analysis, added value associated with this cross-sectorial approach to surveillance of Campylobacter in the country was likely generated through non-measurable benefits such as intellectual capital and social capital.

Implementation of One Health surveillance systems: Opportunities and challenges - lessons learned from the OH-EpiCap application.

As the complexity of health systems has increased over time, there is an urgent need for developing multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary collaborations within the domain of One Health (OH). Despite the efforts to promote collaboration in health surveillance and overcome professional silos, implementing OH surveillance systems in practice remains challenging for multiple reasons. In this study, we describe the lessons learned from the evaluation of OH surveillance using OH-EpiCap (an online evaluation tool for One Health epidemiological surveillance capacities and capabilities), the challenges identified with the implementation of OH surveillance, and the main barriers that contribute to its sub-optimal functioning, as well as possible solutions to address them. We conducted eleven case studies targeting the multi-sectoral surveillance systems for antimicrobial resistance in Portugal and France, Salmonella in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, Listeria in The Netherlands, Finland and Norway, Campylobacter in Norway and Sweden, and psittacosis in Denmark. These evaluations facilitated the identification of common strengths and weaknesses, focusing on the organization and functioning of existing collaborations and their impacts on the surveillance system. Lack of operational and shared leadership, adherence to FAIR data principles, sharing of techniques, and harmonized indicators led to poor organization and sub-optimal functioning of OH surveillance systems. In the majority of studied systems, the effectiveness, operational costs, behavioral changes, and population health outcomes brought by the OH surveillance over traditional surveillance (i.e. compartmentalized into sectors) have not been evaluated. To this end, the establishment of a formal governance body with representatives from each sector could assist in overcoming long-standing barriers. Moreover, demonstrating the impacts of OH-ness of surveillance may facilitate the implementation of OH surveillance systems.

How to move towards One Health surveillance? A qualitative study exploring the factors influencing collaborations between antimicrobial resistance surveillance programmes in France.

Introduction: Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a major public health issue, against which international organisations and governmental bodies call for integration between surveillance programmes involved in human, animal, and environmental sectors. Collaborations are the primary feature of integration and deserve to be supported. However, little is known about the factors that can foster collaborations between surveillance programmes. This study aimed to provide a better understanding of the factors for setting-up collaborations between AMR surveillance programmes in France. Methods: We performed a qualitative study based on 36 semi-structured interviews with programmes' coordinators and 15 with key-informant experts involved in AMR surveillance. Results: The implementation of collaboration between sectors was multifactorial: we identified 42 factors grouped into six categories (i.e., characteristics of the overall AMR surveillance system, features of the collaborating programme, profile of the actors involved, characteristics of the collaboration itself, broader context, and AMR research activities). Collaborations were mainly fostered by good interpersonal relationship between actors, their interest in transdisciplinary approaches and the benefits of collaboration on the programmes involved. Limited resources and the complexity of the AMR surveillance system hindered collaboration. Paradoxically, coordinators generally did not perceive collaborations as a resource-pooling tool since they generally set them up only after consolidating their own programme. Discussion: Since most factors identified were not specific to AMR, these results can be useful for other collaborative surveillance system. Ultimately, they provide a better understanding of stakeholders' motivations and influences driving collaboration, and can help researchers and risk managers promoting a One Health approach against public health threats.

Wastewater Knows Pathogen Spread: Analysis of Residential Wastewater for Infectious Microorganisms including SARS-CoV-2.

BACKGROUND: We aimed to identify the genes of 35 pathogens, including viruses, bacteria, and protozoa that cause waterborne infectious diseases, and to assess the feasibility of a wastewater-based surveillance system. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Wastewater was aseptically sampled once a month from 2 sites. A total of 1 L of wastewater from each site underwent 0.2 µm filtration to generate the sample A. Subsequently, 200 ul of the filtered water was ultra-filtered and concentrated to generate the sample B, which was mixed with sample A in a 1:1 ratio. We performed a Filmarray® Gastrointestinal (GI) panel (BioFire Diagnnostics', Salt Lake City, UT, USA) test to simultaneously detect 13 enterobacteria, 5 enterovirus, and 4 protozoa. RNA was extracted to assess 18 types of viruses. RESULTS: Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 adenovirus, bocavirus, and rhinovirus was detected at both site. Norovirus GI/GII was continuously detected at both sites. Moreover, adenovirus, group A rotaviruses, and hepatitis A virus were frequently detected; however, hepatitis E virus was absent at either site. Campylobacter, enteroaggregative Escherichia coli, enterotoxigenic E. coli, Shiga toxin-producing E. coli, and Clostridioides difficile toxin A/B were detected at both sites. Giardia lamblia was also detected in both sites. CONCLUSION: We analyze multiple infectious disease pathogens under sample surveillance with incidence. Further in-depth studies on wastewater-based surveillance will be feasible and important.

One health genomic insights into the host-specific evolution and cross-host transmission of Staphylococcus aureus in animal farm environments, food of animal origin, and humans.

OBJECTIVES: Staphylococcus aureus is an opportunistic pathogen that is considered a high priority for research. However, comparative studies of S. aureus strains from different environments and hosts are still lacking. METHODS: Here, we performed a high-resolution bioinformatics analysis of 576 S. aureus genomes isolated from livestock, farm environments, farm workers, animal-origin food, and humans. RESULTS: The S. aureus isolates showed high diversity in genetic lineages and demonstrated host specialization and multi-host range in the population phylogeny. Recent transmission events, historical divergences, and frequent host switching in specific sequence types (STs) and through the food chain and animal farm mediums were observed. Frequent gene transfer may quickly give rise to new fitness to colonize their host or switch to other hosts, even in isolates with the closest vertical evolutionary history. The large multi-host-shared antibiotic resistance gene (ARG) pool was the major factor shaping antibiotic resistance in S. aureus isolates. We revealed the genetic backgrounds of mec, cfr, and optrA, which could be spread among isolates from different species, hosts, and environments. CONCLUSION: Overall, our findings provide One Health genomic insights into the evolution, transmission, gene content characteristics, and antibiotic resistance profiles of S. aureus from different hosts, suggesting that, despite well-formed host specificity during the evolution of S. aureus, the ever-expanding host range and the cross-hosts/niches transmission (at both the strain and genetic level) may be facilitated by diverse bacterial vehicles (e.g., food chain, farm environments, and workers), which will lead to emerging antibiotic resistance consequences and threaten public health and food safety.

IRIDA-ARIES Genomics, a key player in the One Health surveillance of diseases caused by infectious agents in Italy.

Pathogen genomics is transforming surveillance of infectious diseases, deepening our understanding of evolution and diffusion of etiological agents, host-pathogen interactions and antimicrobial resistance. This discipline is playing an important role in the development of One Health Surveillance with public health experts of various disciplines integrating methods applied to pathogen research, monitoring, management and prevention of outbreaks. Especially with the notion that foodborne diseases may not be transmitted by food only, the ARIES Genomics project aimed to deliver an Information System for the collection of genomic and epidemiological data to enable genomics-based surveillance of infectious epidemics, foodborne outbreaks and diseases at the animal-human interface. Keeping in mind that the users of the system comprised persons with expertise in a wide variety of domains, the system was expected to be used with a low learning curve directly by the persons target of the analyses' results, keeping the information exchange chains as short as possible. As a result, the IRIDA-ARIES platform (https://irida.iss.it/) provides an intuitive web-based interface for multisectoral data collection and bioinformatic analyses. In practice, the user creates a sample and uploads the Next-generation sequencing reads, then an analysis pipeline is launched automatically performing a series of typing and clustering operations fueling the information flow. Instances of IRIDA-ARIES host the Italian national surveillance system for infections by Listeria monocytogenes (Lm) and the surveillance system for infections by Shigatoxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC). As of today, the platform does not provide tools to manage epidemiological investigations but serves as an instrument of aggregation for risk monitoring, capable of triggering alarms on possible critical situations that might go unnoticed otherwise.

One Health Surveillance System in Gujarat, India: A Health Policy and Systems Research Protocol for Exploring the Cross-Sectoral Collaborations to Detect Emerging Threats at the Human-Animal-Environment Interface.

The close interaction between humans, animals and the ecosystem has been a reason for the emergence and re-emergence of zoonotic diseases worldwide. Zoonoses are estimated to be responsible for 2.5 billion human illnesses and 2.7 million deaths worldwide. Gujarat is a western state in India with more than 65 million people and 26 million livestock, and includes surveillance systems for humans and animals; however, more evidence is needed on joint collaborative activities and their effect on the early warning response for zoonoses. Thus, this study aims to investigate sectoral collaborations for early warning and response systems for emerging and re-emerging zoonoses, aiming to develop a One Health surveillance (OHS) system in Gujarat, India. This case study uses policy content analysis followed by qualitative and quantitative data collection among state- and district-level surveillance actors to provide insight into the current cross-sectoral collaborations among surveillance actors. It helps identify triggers and documents factors helpful in strengthening cross-sectoral collaborations among these systems and facilitates the establishment of an OHS system in Gujarat, India.

Erratum: IRIDA-ARIES Genomics, a key player in the One Health surveillance of diseases caused by infectious agents in Italy.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.3389/fpubh.2023.1151568.].

One Health surveillance-A cross-sectoral detection, characterization, and notification of foodborne pathogens.

Introduction: Several Proficiency Test (PT) or External Quality Assessment (EQA) schemes are currently available for assessing the ability of laboratories to detect and characterize enteropathogenic bacteria, but they are usually targeting one sector, covering either public health, food safety or animal health. In addition to sector-specific PTs/EQAs for detection, cross-sectoral panels would be useful for assessment of the capacity to detect and characterize foodborne pathogens in a One Health (OH) perspective and further improving food safety and interpretation of cross-sectoral surveillance data. The aims of the study were to assess the cross-sectoral capability of European public health, animal health and food safety laboratories to detect, characterize and notify findings of the foodborne pathogens Campylobacter spp., Salmonella spp. and Yersinia enterocolitica, and to develop recommendations for future cross-sectoral PTs and EQAs within OH. The PT/EQA scheme developed within this study consisted of a test panel of five samples, designed to represent a theoretical outbreak scenario. Methods: A total of 15 laboratories from animal health, public health and food safety sectors were enrolled in eight countries: Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The laboratories analyzed the samples according to the methods used in the laboratory and reported the target organisms at species level, and if applicable, serovar for Salmonella and bioserotype for Yersinia. Results: All 15 laboratories analyzed the samples for Salmonella, 13 for Campylobacter and 11 for Yersinia. Analytical errors were predominately false negative results. One sample (S. Stockholm and Y. enterocolitica O:3/BT4) with lower concentrations of target organisms was especially challenging, resulting in six out of seven false negative results. These findings were associated with laboratories using smaller sample sizes and not using enrichment methods. Detection of Salmonella was most commonly mandatory to notify within the three sectors in the eight countries participating in the pilot whereas findings of Campylobacter and Y. enterocolitica were notifiable from human samples, but less commonly from animal and food samples. Discussion: The results of the pilot PT/EQA conducted in this study confirmed the possibility to apply a cross-sectoral approach for assessment of the joint OH capacity to detect and characterize foodborne pathogens.

One Health Consensus Report Annotation Checklist (OH-CRAC): A cross-sector checklist to support harmonized annotation of surveillance data in reports.

To facilitate cross-sector integration of surveillance data it is necessary to improve and harmonize the meta-information provided in surveillance data reports. Cross-sector integration of surveillance results in sector-specific reports is frequently difficult as reports with a focus on a single sector often lack aspects of the relevant meta-information necessary to clarify the surveillance context. Such reporting deficiencies reduce the value of surveillance reports to the One Health community. The One Health Consensus Report Annotation Checklist (OH-CRAC), described in this paper along with potential application scenarios, was developed to improve the current practice of annotating data presented in surveillance data reports. It aims to provide guidance to researchers and reporting officers on what meta-information should be collected and provided to improve the completeness and transparency of surveillance data reports. The OH-CRAC can be adopted by all One Health-related sectors and due to its cross-sector design, it supports the mutual mapping of surveillance meta-information from sector-specific surveillance reports on federal, national and international levels. To facilitate the checklist completion, OH-CRAC is also available as an online resource that allows the collection of surveillance meta-information in an easy and user-friendly manner. Completed OH-CRAC checklists can be attached as annexes to the corresponding surveillance data reports or even to individual data files regardless of the data source. In this way, reports and data become better interpretable, usable and comparable to information from other sectors, improving their value for all surveillance actors and providing a better foundation for advice to risk managers.

One Health Surveillance of Antimicrobial Resistance Phenotypes in Selected Communities in Thailand.

Integrated surveillance of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) using the One Health approach that includes humans, animals, food, and the environment has been recommended by responsible international organizations. The objective of this study was to determine the prevalence of AMR phenotypes in Escherichia coli and Klebsiella species isolated from humans, pigs, chickens, and wild rodents in five communities in northern Thailand. Rectal swabs from 269 pigs and 318 chickens; intestinal contents of 196 wild rodents; and stool samples from 69 pig farmers, 155 chicken farmers, and 61 non-farmers were cultured for E. coli and Klebsiella species, which were then tested for resistance to ceftriaxone, colistin, and meropenem. The prevalence of ceftriaxone-resistant E. coli and Klebsiella species in pigs, chickens, rodents, pig farmers, chicken farmers, and non-farmers was 64.3%, 12.9%, 4.1%, 55.1%, 38.7%, and 36.1%, respectively. Colistin resistance in pigs, chickens, rodents, pig farmers, chicken farmers, and non-farmers was 41.3%, 9.8%, 4.6%, 34.8%, 31.6%, and 24.6%, respectively. Meropenem resistance was not detected. The observed high prevalence of AMR, especially colistin resistance, in study food animals/humans is worrisome. Further studies to identify factors that contribute to AMR, strengthened reinforcement of existing regulations on antimicrobial use, and more appropriate interventions to minimize AMR in communities are urgently needed.

Bio-Ethics and One Health: A Case Study Approach to Building Reflexive Governance.

Surveillance programs supporting the management of One Health issues such as antibiotic resistance are complex systems in themselves. Designing ethical surveillance systems is thus a complex task (retroactive and iterative), yet one that is also complicated to implement and evaluate (e.g., sharing, collaboration, and governance). The governance of health surveillance requires attention to ethical concerns about data and knowledge (e.g., performance, trust, accountability, and transparency) and empowerment ethics, also referred to as a form of responsible self-governance. Ethics in reflexive governance operates as a systematic critical-thinking procedure that aims to define its value: What are the "right" criteria to justify how to govern "good" actions for a "better" future? The objective is to lay the foundations for a methodological framework in empirical bioethics, the rudiments of which have been applied to a case study to building reflexive governance in One Health. This ongoing critical thinking process involves "mapping, framing, and shaping" the dynamics of interests and perspectives that could jeopardize a "better" future. This paper proposes to hybridize methods to combine insights from collective deliberation and expert evaluation through a reflexive governance functioning as a community-based action-ethics methodology. The intention is to empower individuals and associations in a dialogue with society, which operation is carried out using a case study approach on data sharing systems. We based our reasoning on a feasibility study conducted in Québec, Canada (2018-2021), envisioning an antibiotic use surveillance program in animal health for 2023. Using the adaptive cycle and governance techniques and perspectives, we synthesize an alternative governance model rooted in the value of empowerment. The framework, depicted as a new "research and design (R&D)" practice, is linking operation and innovation by bridging the gap between Reflexive, Evaluative, and Deliberative reasonings and by intellectualizing the management of democratizing critical thinking locally (collective ethics) by recognizing its context (social ethics). Drawing on the literature in One Health and sustainable development studies, this article describes how a communitarian and pragmatic approach can broaden the vision of feasibility studies to ease collaboration through public-private-academic partnerships. The result is a process that "reassembles" the One Health paradigm under the perspective of global bioethics to create bridges between the person and the ecosystem through pragmatic ethics.

Surveillance of foodborne parasitic diseases in Europe in a One Health approach.

In 2012, WHO/FAO ranked 24 foodborne parasites (FBP) using multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA) to provide risk assessors with a basis for prioritising control of highly ranked FBP on the global level. One conclusion was that ranking may differ substantially per region. In Europe, the same methodology was used to rank FBP of relevance for Europe. Of the 24 FBP, the top-five prioritised FBP were identified for Europe as Echinococcus multilocularis, Toxoplasma gondii, Trichinella spiralis, E. granulosus, and Cryptosporidium spp., all of which are zoonotic. The objective of the present study was to provide an overview of surveillance and reporting systems in Europe for these top five prioritised FBP in the human and animal populations, to identify gaps, and give recommendations for improvement. Information on the surveillance systems was collected from 35 European countries and analysed according to the five different regions. For most FBP, human surveillance is passive in most countries and regions in Europe and notification differs between countries and regions. Adequate surveillance programmes for these FBP are lacking, except for T. spiralis, which is notifiable in 34 countries with active surveillance in susceptible animals under EU directive. Although human and animal surveillance data are available for the five prioritised FBP, we identified a lack of consistency in surveillance and reporting requirements between national experts and European bodies. Recommendations for improved surveillance systems are discussed.

Sensitivity and representativeness of one-health surveillance for diseases of zoonotic potential at health facilities relative to household visits in rural Guatemala.

Most human and animal disease notification systems are unintegrated and passive, resulting in underreporting. Active surveillance can complement passive efforts, but because they are resource-intensive, their attributes must be evaluated. We assessed the sensitivity and representativeness of One-Health surveillance conducted at health facilities compared to health facilities plus monthly household visits in three rural communities of Guatemala. From September 2017 to November 2018, we screened humans for acute diarrheal, febrile and respiratory infectious syndromes and canines, swine, equines and bovines for syndromic events or deaths. We estimated the relative sensitivity as the incidence rate ratio of detecting an event in health facility surveillance compared to household surveillance from Poisson models. We used interaction terms between the surveillance method and sociodemographic factors or time trends to assess effect modification as a measure of relative representativeness. We used generalized additive models with smoothing splines to model incidence over time by surveillance method. We randomized 216 households to health facility surveillance and 198 to health facility surveillance plus monthly household visits. Health facility surveillance alone was less sensitive than when combined with household surveillance by 0.42 (95% CI: 0.34, 0.53), 0.56 (95% CI: 0.39, 0.79), 0.02 (95% CI: 0.00, 0.10), 0.28 (95% CI: 0.15, 0.50) and 0.22 (95% CI: 0.03, 0.92) times for human acute infections, human severe acute infections, and deaths in canines, swine and equines, respectively. Health facility surveillance alone underrepresented Spanish speakers (interaction p-value = 0.0003) and persons in higher economic assets (interaction p-values = 0.0008). The trend in incidence over time was different between the two study groups, with a larger decrease in the group with household surveillance (all interaction p-values <0.10). Surveillance at health facilities under ascertains syndromes in humans and animals which leads to underestimation of the burden of zoonotic disease. The magnitude of under ascertainment was differentially by sociodemographic factors, yielding an unrepresentative sample of health events. However, it is less time-intensive, thus might be sustained over time longer than household surveillance. The choice between methodologies should be evaluated against surveillance goals and available resources.

Challenges of rabies surveillance in Madagascar based on a mixed method survey amongst veterinary health officers.

Introduction: In Madagascar, rabies is endemic and a notifiable disease. The objective of this mixed study was to understand the challenges faced by the Veterinary Health Officers (VHOs) in the current rabies surveillance system in Madagascar. Methods: A survey was conducted from mid-April to the end of July 2021 during which all officially-listed VHOs (N = 150) were contacted by phone at least twice. Participants, representative of the 22 regions of Madagascar, were interviewed by phone based on a semi-structured questionnaire on (1) their knowledge of rabies epidemiology in their area of activities, (2) the occurrence of human and animal rabies and the species affected in the region where they work, (3) the factors that might influence rabies surveillance depending on (a) their activities and area of operation, (b) the socio-cultural aspects of local communities, and (c) the general organization of animal rabies surveillance. Results: The majority (80/90) of VHOs declared having been informed of at least one suspected or confirmed case of human and/or animal rabies in their area of activity during their work as VHOs: at least once a month for 11 of them, at least once a year for 40 and with undetermined frequency for 29. Several obstacles hinder the surveillance of rabies resulting in under-reporting. The lack of funds to access suspect animals, collect, pack and ship samples in compliance with biosecurity measures and the cold chain, was mentioned as a major obstacle to surveillance. The second barrier is socio-cultural: in many large coastal regions, dogs are taboo and VHOs fear rejection by the community if they treat dogs. Discussion and conclusion: While the general population requires information on the rabies situation in Madagascar and on how to proceed in the event of a bite, veterinarians and decision-makers need to be fully aware of an evidence-based approach to rabies surveillance, prevention and control. Communication between the human and animal health sectors should be improved. Politicians need to be persuaded of the importance of funding to eliminate rabies in Madagascar. The adoption, in early 2023, of a national strategic plan for rabies control is a first step in this direction.