RESUMO
Global environmental concerns and resource scarcity are driving the growth in sales of electric vehicles (EVs). Reusing and recycling retired batteries from EVs has significant economic value and reduces the environmental burden. Rising raw material prices have intensified competition among recyclers; in particular, recyclers without corporate social responsibility (CSR) have been added. These observations lead to a game-theoretical model consisting of three players: a battery manufacturer, a recycler with CSR and a recycler without CSR (non-CSR). The non-CSR recycler enjoys a cost advantage over the CSR recycler, but may not be considered by the consumers with high environmental awareness (CEA). We explore the incentive strategies for CSR recyclers outperform, and how the equilibrium is affected by the recyclers' Stackelberg game. Results show that (1) the deposit- refund is the most profitable strategy for all members and the whole supply chain if raw material price rises high enough; otherwise, a contract strategy should be adopted. (2) Improving CEA and echelon utilization ratio is more conducive to the implementation of revenue-sharing contract. In addition, increasing CEA contributed to CSR recycler collects more retired batteries instead of non-CSR recycler. (3) Stackelberg game between recyclers may hurt supply chain. However, CSR recycler may benefit from the non-CSR recycler-led Stackelberg game. Our work provides the basis of incentive strategies for different participants in the closed-loop supply chain of retired batteries, in particular, to encourage retired batteries flow to CSR recyclers.