Enmity then empathy: How militarisation facilitated collaborative but exclusive exchange in Sierra Leone's Ebola response.

In the autumn of 2014, with the 2013-16 West Africa Ebola epidemic spiralling out of control, the United Kingdom announced a bespoke military mission to support-and in some ways lead-numerous Ebola response functions in Sierra Leone. This study examines the nature and effect of the civil-military relationships that subsequently developed between civilian and military Ebola response workers (ERWs). In total, 110 interviews were conducted with key involved actors, and the findings were analysed by drawing on the neo-Durkheimian theory of organisations. This paper finds that stereotypical opposition between humanitarian and military actors helps to explain how and why there was initial cooperative and collaborative challenges. However, all actors were found to have similar hierarchical structures and operations, which explains how and why they were later able to cooperate and collaborate effectively. It also explains how and why civilian ERWs might have served to exclude and further marginalise some local actors.

Examining the militarised hierarchy of Sierra Leone's Ebola response and implications for decision making during public health emergencies.

BACKGROUND: In September, 2014, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) called for militarised assistance in response to the rapidly escalating West Africa Ebola Epidemic. Soon after, the United Kingdom deployed its military to Sierra Leone, which (among other contributions) helped to support the establishment of novel and military-led Ebola Virus Disease (Ebola) response centres throughout the country. To examine these civil-military structures and their effects, 110 semi-structured interviews with civilian and military Ebola Response Workers (ERWs) were conducted and analysed using neo-Durkheimian theory. RESULTS: The hierarchical Ebola response centres were found to be spaces of 'conflict attenuation' for their use of 'rule-bound niches', 'neutral zones', 'co-dependence', and 'hybridity', thereby not only easing civil-military relationships (CMRel), but also increasing the efficiency of their application to Ebola response interventions. Furthermore, the hierarchical response centres were also found to be inclusive spaces that further increased efficiency through the decentralisation and localisation of these interventions and daily decision making, albeit for mostly privileged groups and in limited ways. CONCLUSIONS: This demonstrates how hierarchy and localisation can (and perhaps should) go hand-in-hand during future public health emergency responses as a strategy for more robustly including typically marginalised local actors, while also improving necessary efficiency-in other words, an 'inclusive hierarchical coordination' that is both operationally viable and an ethical imperative.

From pity to fear: security as a mechanism for (re)production of vulnerability.

Vulnerability is not only a shared basic condition, but also a condition of potential. In the context of disasters and crises, the concept of vulnerability is frequently used to portray individuals and groups as 'weak', 'threatened', and 'in need of help'. Occasionally, though, a shift occurs and the 'threatened'-and therefore usually the pitied-become those who are feared and hated, that is, they become a 'threat'. This paper explores how apparently incompatible discursive regimes of 'threatened' and 'threat' intertwine, merge, and feed upon each other, and how vulnerability can be and is consequently securitised. It demonstrates that too often the freedoms and opportunities prescribed by the neoliberal state are impossible to actualise when 'normality' and hence 'otherness' are also defined by the state, where people are first and foremost subjects of a global market. These considerations are critical if we are truly to reduce vulnerabilisation by focusing on justice.

Crisis politics of dehumanisation during COVID-19: A framework for mapping the social processes through which dehumanisation undermines human dignity.

The COVID-19 global pandemic is understood to be a multidimensional crisis, and yet undertheorised is how it reinforced the politics of dehumanisation. This article proposes an original framework that explains how dehumanisation undermines the human dignity of individuals with minoritised socio-economic identities during the COVID-19 pandemic. The framework identifies four interrelated mechanisms of crisis-driven dehumanisation: threat construction, expanded state coercion, reinforcement of hierarchies, and normalisation of deaths. The article argues that an understanding of these mechanisms is crucial for capturing the complexity of human rights deterioration during the COVID-19 pandemic. The article uses the plausibility probe method to demonstrate macro-processes of dehumanisation, with illustrative empirical examples from diverse societies during COVID-19. It proposes a framework for understanding these dehumanisation processes that can apply to other transnational crises.

Providing pandemic business interruption coverage with double trigger cat bonds.

The aim of this paper is to show how qualified investors in cat bonds can offer adequate pandemic business interruption protection in a comprehensive public-private coverage scheme. First, we propose a numerical model to expose how cat bonds can contribute to complement standard re/insurance by improving coverage of cedents even though risks are positively correlated during a pandemic. Second, we introduce double trigger pandemic business interruption cat bonds, which we name PBI bonds, and discuss their precise characteristics to provide efficient coverage. A first trigger should be pulled when the World Health Organization declares a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). The second trigger determines the payout of the bond based on the modelised business interruption losses of an industry in a country. We discuss moral hazard, basis risk, correlation and liquidity issues which are critical in the context of a pandemic. Third, we simulate the life of theoretical PBI bonds in the restaurant industry in France by using data gathered during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Border Governance, Migration Securitisation, and Security Challenges in Nigeria.

Nigerian politicians accuse foreigners of contributing to the many security challenges in the country. As a result, the government of Nigeria securitised foreigners' immigration to justify its policy of land border closure in 2019, which it claimed was aimed at mitigating the security problems bedevilling Nigeria. This study analyses how Nigeria's national security is impacted by the securitisation of border governance and migration. Relying on the securitisation theory and qualitative methods based on focus group discussions, key informant interviews, and desk reviews of existing literature, it found that the securitisation of migration to establish strict border governance represents the interests of the political elite who have failed to address security challenges in Nigeria. The study concludes that government should de-securitise foreigners' immigration by addressing underlying domestic and external factors driving insecurity in Nigeria.

Governance and planning in a 'perfect storm': Securitising climate change, migration and Covid-19 in Sweden.

The article describes and reflects upon how multi-level governance and planning in Sweden have been affected by and reacted upon three pending major challenges confronting humanity, namely climate change, migration and the Covid-19 pandemic. These 'crises' are broadly considered 'existential threats' in need of 'securitisation'. Causes and adequate reactions are contested, and there are no given solutions how to securitise the perceived threats, neither one by one, no less together. Government securitisation strategies are challenged by counter-securitisation demands, and plaguing vulnerable groups in society by in-securitising predicaments. Taking Sweden as an example the article applies an analytical approach drawing upon strands of securitisation, governance and planning theory. Targeting policy responses to the three perceived crises the intricate relations between government levels, responsibilities, capacities, and actions are scrutinized, including a focus upon the role of planning. Overriding research questions are: How has the governance and planning system - central, regional and local governments - in Sweden responded to the challenges of climate change, migration and Covid-19? What threats were identified? What solutions were proposed? What consequences could be traced? What prospects wait around the corner? Comparing crucial aspects of the crises' anatomies the article adds to the understanding of the way multilevel, cross-sectional, hybrid governance and planning respond to concurrent crises, thereby also offering clues for action in other geopolitical contexts. The article mainly draws upon recent and ongoing research on manifestations of three cases in the Swedish context. Applying a pragmatic, methodological approach combining elements of securitisation, governance and planning theories with Carol Lee Bacchi's 'What is the problem represented to be' and a touch of interpretive/narrative theory, the study reveals distinct differences between the anatomies of the three crises and their handling. Urgency, extension, state of knowledge/epistemology, governance and planning make different imprints on crises management. Sweden's long-term climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies imply slow, micro-steps forward based on a combination of social-liberal, 'circular' and a touch of 'green growth' economies. Migration policy displays a Janus face, on the one hand largely respecting the UN refugee quota system on the other hand applying a detailed regulatory framework causing severe insecurity especially for minor refugees wanting to stay and make their living in Sweden. The Covid-19 outbreak revealed a lack of foresight and eroded/fragmented responsibility causing huge stress upon personnel in elderly and health care and appalling death rates among elderly patients, although governance and planning slowly adapted through securitising policies, leading to potential de-securitisation of the issue. The three crises have caused a security wake-up among governments at all levels and the public in general, and the article concludes by discussing whether this 'perfect storm' of crises will result in a farewell to neoliberalism - towards a neo-regulatory state facing further challenges and crises for governance, planning and the role of planners. The tentative prospect rather indicates a mixture of context-dependent 'hybrid governance', thus also underlining the crucial role of planners' role as 'chameleons' in complicated governance processes of politics, policy and planning.

Nationality-Based Criminalisation of South-South Migration: the Experience of Venezuelan Forced Migrants in Peru.

This article examines how Venezuelan forced migrants in Peru experience xenophobic discrimination, which has become increasingly linked to their criminalisation as thieves and murderers. Based on 12 months of qualitative fieldwork, including 72 in-depth interviews, five focus groups, and a survey (N116) in five Peruvian cities, we explore how Venezuelans experience, and make sense of, discrimination and criminalisation in everyday life. First, we discuss how criminalisation compares to general xenophobic discrimination, and other types of discrimination experiences. Second, we juxtapose the prevalence of xenophobic discrimination and criminalisation experiences across the five cities of our study, and between public spaces and the workspace. We then move to the qualitative discussion of the criminalisation experience in these different spaces. Fourth, we discuss how Venezuelan migrants perceive this criminalising discrimination as linked to their villanisation in the media and political discourses. Finally, we discuss our findings and make suggestion for further research. The paper contributes to the literature on migrant criminalisation by exploring how criminalisation processes play out in the context of large-scale intraregional forced displacement in the global South.

Disasters, climate change, and securitisation: the United Nations Security Council and the United Kingdom's security policy.

Since climate change was included on the United Nations Security Council's agenda in 2007, there has been much debate about whether or not it has been securitised. This paper starts from the premise that climate change has undergone a partial securitisation-that is, a gradual process wherein political choices are made to frame certain issues in particular ways. Climate change has been reframed from a purely developmental and environmental concern to one that impels foreign policy and security domains. This paper makes a novel contribution to disasters, climate change, and security studies by arguing that explicit and implicit links to natural hazard-related disasters have been employed as part of a gradual process of securitisation, or, more specifically, the partial securitisation of climate change. This is demonstrated by drawing on two cases: United Nations Security Council debates between 2007 and 2017; and the United Kingdom's security policy between 1997 and 2017.

Securitisation of COVID-19 pandemic: policy measures in India and implications for health governance.

Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, states throughout India, headed by the Centre, backed punitive policy actions that took precedence over democratic norms. Securitisation measures implemented by the government resulted in harsh restrictions on citizens' daily lives, the imprisonment of journalists reporting the pandemic and its management by authorities, and substantial invasions of people's privacy through the deployment of intrusive digital technology. These problems are investigated by looking at how the COVID-19 pandemic functioned as justification for authorities to violate democratic procedures as a consequence of the pandemic itself being characterised as a state of exception necessitating such ostensible measures. It is also demonstrated how securitisation as a means to monitor health, and health as a reason for greater securitisation, came to the fore in state responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Environmentally driven migration in EU discourse: norms, policies and realities.

For decades, the European Union (EU) has been addressing issues related to climate change and ecological degradation as a self-proclaimed pro-environmental and human rights-oriented actor. Correspondingly, the topic of the so-called environmentally driven migration entered the EU discourse at the dawn of the new millennium. Considering the EU's interest in the human rights and environmental/climate issue areas, I argue it is important to ask what the Union's approach to this matter has been. Thus, this article assesses the European Union discourse related to the topic of environmental migration over the past 20-year period. Through the theoretical lens of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies and the normative power EU conception, this paper critically analyses the EU's securitisation of climate change in relation to persons referred to as environmental migrants. Based on a qualitative discourse analysis, the preliminary results imply that the topic has been receding into the background of the EU agenda. In line, environmental migrants have been pushed aside by a multiplicity of other subjects threatened by climate change, thus receiving lesser attention in the EU climate change and migration management policies. Overall, the findings show a shift from an alarmist discourse to more pragmatism on the EU's behalf and a larger focus on adaptation and resilience in most affected areas. With this in mind, this article questions the normative standard the EU sets for itself when it comes to the case of environmental migrant protection.

The political economy of expedience: examining perspectives on military support to Sierra Leone's Ebola response.

The 2013-2016 West Africa Ebola Epidemic is the largest outbreak of Ebola in history. By September, 2014 the outbreak was worsening significantly, and the international president of Médecins Sans Frontières called for military assistance. In Sierra Leone, the British and Sierra Leonean militaries intervened. They quickly established a National Ebola Response Centre and a constituent network of District Ebola Response Centres. Thereafter, these inherently militarised centres are where almost all Ebola response activities were coordinated. In order to examine perspectives on the nature of the militaries' intervention, 110 semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted and analysed. Military support to Sierra Leone's Ebola response was felt by most respondents to be a valuable contribution to the overall effort to contain the outbreak, especially in light of the perceived weakness of the Ministry of Health and Sanitation to effectively do so. However, a smaller number of respondents emphasised that the military deployments facilitated various structural harms, including for how the perceived exclusion of public institutions (as above) and other local actors from Ebola response decision making was felt to prevent capacity building, and in turn, to limit resilience to future crises. The concurrent provision of life-saving assistance and rendering of structural harm resulting from the militaries' intervention is ultimately found to be part of a vicious cycle, which this article conceptualises as the 'political economy of expedience', a paradox that should be considered inherent in any militarised intervention during humanitarian and public health crises.

Limits to blue economy: challenges to accessing fishing livelihoods in Ghana's port communities.

The blue economy concept has drawn global attention to the maritime economy, recognising expanding maritime industries such as shipping as crucial drivers of economic growth. In recent decades, seaports have correspondingly witnessed significant expansion, allowing them to play a substantial role in achieving blue growth. This study examines the challenges faced by small-scale fishing actors in gaining access to fishing livelihoods in coastal fishing communities close to Ghanaian ports. Drawing on political ecology, the study demonstrates how securitisation in port areas and dispossession has resulted in unstable fishing livelihoods in port communities. The study shows that the growth-oriented goals of port expansions and port security measures have restricted fishing communities' access to coastal fishing spaces and caused congestion in the canoe bays of Ghana's fishing harbours. In addition, the urbanisation around the ports has impacted fishers' ability to meet the rising cost of living in fishing communities with fishing incomes. Furthermore, the study discusses how the new Jamestown fishing harbour complex project has displaced small-scale fishing actors and become a site of contestation between a coastal fishing community and local government authorities. In conclusion, as coastal fishing actors lose their only source of livelihood, resistance may escalate into different forms of maritime conflicts in the blue economy. The study recommends addressing the marginalisation and exclusion of traditional coastal fishing livelihoods to ensure a more equitable blue economy.

Analysing the EU's collective securitisation moves towards China.

This research responds to an increasing volume of scholarly literature unpacking the recent dynamics of EU foreign policy discourses and practices vis-à-vis China. Drawing on the theoretical approach of collective securitisation, this article shows that EU foreign policy towards China since the mid-2010s has witnessed increasing collective securitisation moves directed at multiple policy frames, including Asian regional security frame, economic security frame, political security frame and information and technology and cybersecurity frame. The EU's attempts to securitise China as an existential threat across multiple issue areas have been triggered by a combination of long-term trends and specific sets of precipitating events, which contributed to galvanising the EU's collective securitising discourses and subsequent policy initiatives. However, this research finds that the EU's securitising moves and relevant speech acts have not resulted in a coherent audience response among the EU member states. The divergent views held by the EU's internal audience on whether China should be perceived as an existential threat have hampered the implementation of the EU's collective policy outputs.

"Remember this picture when you take more than you need": Constructing morality through instrumental ageism in COVID-19 memes on social media.

As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, a parallel pandemic of ageism is spreading through social media. This paper argues that COVID-19 health securitisation logic and the urgent need to disseminate public health information have allowed nuanced forms of ageism to be reproduced in online forums. I use a critical discourse analysis and social semiotic analysis to deconstruct the use of ageist representations of older adults in COVID-19 memes, which have been organised into four illustrative categories. The analysis attends to ageist representations that both reinforce stereotypical messages and exacerbate intergenerational tensions. Drawing upon moral anthropology, I propose that the memes employ "instrumental ageism," a nuanced form of ageism that advances the health securitisation agenda during the pandemic. The paper concludes with a recognition of the impact of ageist pandemic memes on intergenerational tensions and a call for attention to nuanced forms of ageism in our online and offline social worlds.

Who is watching? Refugee protection during a pandemic - responses from Uganda and South Africa.

Both Uganda and South Africa were quick to respond to the global pandemic - Uganda for example imposing quarantine on foreign travellers after only a handful of cases before shutting off all international flights, and South Africa imposing one of the first lockdowns on the continent. Reflecting on the first 6 months of the pandemic responses in terms of refugee protection, the two countries have taken diverging pathways. South Africa used the pandemic to start building a border fence on the border with Zimbabwe, initially curtailed all foreign shop owners from opening under lockdown and excluded asylum seekers from emergency relief grants. In contrast, Uganda opened its borders to refugees from the DRC in June, when border closures were still the global norm. Whilst both responses are not unusual in light of their standard governance approaches, they highlight the own self-image the countries espouse - with Uganda positioning itself as the world's premier refugee protector at a time when it is desperately in need of more funds and South Africa looking to politically capitalize internally from reiterating a division between migrant communities as a threat to poor and disenfranchised South Africans. Even during a pandemic, the practice of refugee protection does not happen in a political vacuum. This paper is based on over 50 in-person and digital interviews conducted in Uganda and South Africa in 2020, as well as nine focus groups with refugee and host communities.

States simply do not care: The failure of international securitisation of drug control in Afghanistan.

The link between the world drug problem and securitisation has been predominantly established to argue that an existential threat discourse reinforces the international prohibitionist regime and makes it harder for alternative policy models to arise. This analysis is problematic for three main reasons. Firstly, it overestimates the current strength of the international drug control regime as a normative and regulatory system that prescribes state behaviour. Secondly, the current international regime does not inhibit policy reforms. While the international treaty system proves resistant to change, it is at the national and local levels where new drug policies arise. Moreover, these are generally not the draconian or emergency measures that successful securitisation would predict. Thirdly, the analysis so far misinterprets criminalisation or militarisation as evidence of securitisation. As the case of Afghanistan shows, securitisation attempts, such as those linking the Taliban and the illicit opium economy, may have reinforced the militarisation of drug control in Afghanistan, but did not elevate the illicit drug economy as an external threat or a top priority. While there have been short-lived spikes of attention and provincial level campaigns to eradicate poppy cultivation, these have never translated into a sustained structural effort to combat illicit drugs in Afghanistan. Even the latest push for militarisation, the US-led campaign of airstrikes on drug processing laboratories since November 2017, represents more a shift in counter-insurgency strategy than successful securitisation. While Afghanistan's illicit drug economy has been politicised for several reasons, states are not convinced that this economy somehow represents an existential threat to their survival.

Framing post-pandemic preparedness: Comparing eight European plans.

Framing has previously been studied in the field of pandemic preparedness and global health governance and influenza pandemics have usually been framed in terms of security and evidence-based medicine on a global scale. This paper is based on the pandemic preparedness plans, published after 2009, from eight European countries. We study how pandemic preparedness is framed and how pandemic influenza in general is narrated in the plans. All plans contain references to 'uncertainty', 'pandemic phases', 'risk management', 'vulnerability' and 'surveillance'. These themes were all framed differently in the studied plans. The preparedness plans in the member states diverge in ways that will challenge the ambition of the European Union to make the pandemic preparedness plans interoperable and to co-ordinate the member states during future pandemics.

The Janus face of precarity - Securitisation of Roma mobility in the UK.

Technological developments and the free movement of people within the EU have enabled Member States to implement new geopolitical control measures to increase migration control and social sorting of undesired migrant groups. As part of a securitisation process, these measures are often expanded upon and justified in terms of economic threat that aims to restrain 'opportunist Central East European migrants', who are associated with welfare dependence and cheap labour. Although unemployed Roma migrants are exposed to social exclusion due to the stigma of 'benefit shoppers', this paper explores how current neoliberal labour market structures facilitate new securitisation processes and fuel the precarity of Roma, even if they are employed in the host country. Based on a multi-sited ethnography completed in The United Kingdom, it will be illustrated how communitarianism of Member States stratifies the moral values of migrants' labour in a manner that defines the preconditions of social inclusion of newcomers in host societies. In short, this paper argues that even for migrants who are not welfare dependent and who are self-sustaining, their social inclusion is defined by engagement in the sort of labour that is culturally acknowledged by the host society.

Mobilising "vulnerability" in the public health response to pandemic influenza.

Analysis of public health's growing interest in "vulnerability" has largely focused on health policy, with little interrogation of how vulnerability is being actively appropriated, countered, ignored or reworked by the publics whose health such policy is designed to protect. Once the assemblage of public health is understood as comprised of different forms of expertise and actors, including publics, addressing this gap matters. We examine the use of vulnerability in the specific context of pandemic influenza preparedness. Pandemic preparedness raises some familiar dilemmas for public health governance: how to engage with publics without fuelling social divisions and disruption; and whether to invoke publics as passive recipients of public health advice or to recognise publics as collective agents responding to the threat of pandemic influenza. Thus, we ask how the mobilisation of vulnerability connects with these dilemmas. To examine vulnerability in pandemic preparedness, two forms of qualitative data are analysed: 1) interviews and focus groups with "vulnerable" and "healthy" people (conducted 2011-12) discussing seasonal and pandemic influenza and; 2) international, Australian national and state level pandemic plans (1999-2013). Vulnerability is variously used in plans as a way to identify groups at particular risk of infection because of pre-existing clinical conditions, and as a free-floating social category that could apply to a broad range of people potentially involved in the social disruption a pandemic might entail. Our interview and focus group data indicate that healthy people rework the free-floating extension of vulnerability, and that people designated vulnerable encounter an absence of any collective responsibility for the threat of pandemic influenza. Our analysis suggests that vulnerability's mobilisation in pandemic preparedness limits the connection between public health governance and its publics: here, the openness and unpredictability of people's collective agency is something to be tightly controlled by a government concerned with protecting people from themselves.