Hemispheric functional asymmetries and sex effects in visual bistable perception.

This study investigates bistable perception as a function of the presentation side of the ambiguous figures and of participants' sex, to evaluate left-right hemispheric (LH-RH) asymmetries related to consciousness. In two experiments using the divided visual field paradigm, two Rubin's vase-faces figures were projected simultaneously and continuously 180 s long to the left (LVF) and right (RVF; Experiment 1) or to the upper (UVF) and lower (DVF; Experiment 2) visual hemifields of 48 healthy subjects monitored with eye-tracker. Experiment 1 enables stimulus segregation from the LVF to the RH and from the RVF to the LH, whereas Experiment 2 does not. Results from Experiment 1 show that males perceived the face profiles for more time in the LVF than in the RVF, with an opposite trend for the vase, whereas females show a similar pattern of perception in the two hemifields. A related result confirmed the previously reported possibility to have simultaneously two different percepts (qualia) in the two hemifields elicited by the two identic ambiguous stimuli, which was here observed to occur more frequently in males. Similar effects were not observed in Experiment 2. These findings suggest that the percepts display the processing abilities of the hemisphere currently processing the stimulus eliciting them (e.g., RH-faces), and that females and males reflect in bistable perception, a genuine manifestation of consciousness, the well-known hemispheric asymmetry differences they show in ordinary perception.

Divergent Thinking Influences the Perception of Ambiguous Visual Illusions.

This study investigated the relationships between personality and creativity in the perception of two different ambiguous visual illusions. Previous research has suggested that Industriousness and Openness/Intellect (as measured by the Big Five Aspects Scale) are both associated with individual differences in perceptual switching rates for binocular rivalry stimuli. Here, we examined whether these relationships generalise to the Necker Cube and the Spinning Dancer illusions. In the experimental phase of this study, participants viewed these ambiguous figures under both static and dynamic, as well as free-view and fixation, conditions. As predicted, perceptual switching rates were higher: (a) for the static Necker Cube than the Spinning Dancer, and (b) in free-view compared with fixation conditions. In the second phase of the study, personality type and divergent thinking were measured using the Big Five Aspects Scale and the Alternate Uses Task, respectively. Higher creativity/divergent thinking (as measured by the Alternate Uses Task) was found to predict greater switching rates for the static Necker Cube (but not the Spinning Dancer) under both free-view and fixation conditions. These findings suggest that there are differences in the perceptual processing of creative individuals.

Independent perceptual reversals for simultaneously presented ambiguous figures.

In two successive experiments using the divided visual field paradigm with vertical or horizontal division, two ambiguous figures, the Rubin's vase-face or the Necker cube, were projected to the right and left or to the upper and lower visual hemifields of 108 healthy volunteers. Stimulation time was 120 s. The main hypotheses were (a) that different percepts of the same ambiguous figure may be simultaneously experienced in the two hemifields and (b) that the type (vertical vs. horizontal) of visual field division influences the reversal frequency and the temporal interdependence of the percepts. Results from the first experiment showed that the temporal interdependence of reversals was very low for both ambiguous figures, suggesting that during part of the stimulation time the subjects could experience different percepts of the same figure (e.g. a vase in the right and face profiles in the left visual hemifields). The second experiment showed that this perceptual dissociation occurred on average during one third of the stimulation time. In both experiments the type of visual field division did not influence either frequency or temporal interdependence of the reversals. When one single ambiguous figure was presented in the centre of the screen, the number of reversals was approximately the sum of the reversals observed with two figures presented simultaneously each in one hemifield.

Unconscious retinotopic motion processing affects non-retinotopic motion perception.

Unconscious visual stimuli can affect conscious perception: For example, an invisible prime can affect responses to a subsequent target. The invisible interpretation of an ambiguous figure can have similar effects. Invisibility in these situations is typically explained by stimulus-suppression in early, retinotopic brain areas. We have previously argued that invisibility is closely linked to Gestalt ("object") organization principles. For example, motion is typically perceived in non-retinotopic, object-centered, and not in retinotopic coordinates. Such is the case for a bicycle-reflector that is perceived as circling, although its retinotopic trajectory is cycloidal. Here, we used a modified Ternus-Pikler display in which, just as in everyday vision, the retinotopic motion is invisible and the non-retinotopic motion is perceived. Nevertheless, the invisible retinotopic motion, can strongly degrade the conscious non-retinotopic motion percept. This effect cannot be explained by inhibition at a retinotopic processing stage.

EEG correlates of cognitive time scales in the Necker-Zeno model for bistable perception.

The Necker-Zeno model of bistable perception provides a formal relation between the average duration of meta-stable percepts (dwell times T) of ambiguous figures and two other basic time scales (t0, ΔT) underlying cognitive processing. The model predicts that dwell times T covary with t0, ΔT or both. We tested this prediction by exploiting that observers, in particular experienced meditators, can volitionally control dwell times T. Meditators and non-meditators observed bistable Necker cubes either passively or tried to hold their current percept. The latencies of a centro-parietal event-related potential (CPP) were recorded as a physiological correlate of t0. Dwell times T and the CPP latencies, correlated with t0, differed between conditions and observer groups, while ΔT remained constant in the range predicted by the model. The covariation of CPP latencies and dwell times, as well as their quadratic functional dependence extends previous psychophysical confirmation of the Necker-Zeno model to psychophysiological measures.

Assessing perceptual change with an ambiguous figures task: Normative data for 40 standard picture sets.

In many research domains, researchers have employed gradually morphing pictures to study perception under ambiguity. Despite their inherent utility, only a limited number of stimulus sets are available, and those sets vary substantially in quality and perceptual complexity. Here we present normative data for 40 morphing picture series. In all sets, line drawings of pictures of common objects are morphed over 15 iterations into a completely different object. Objects are either morphed from an animate to an inanimate object (or vice versa) or morphed within the animate and inanimate object categories. These pictures, together with the normative naming data presented here, will be of value for research on a diverse range of questions, from perceptual processing to decision making.

Implicit perceptual memory modulates early visual processing of ambiguous images.

The way we perceive the present visual environment is influenced by past visual experiences. Here we investigated the neural basis of such experience dependency. We repeatedly presented human observers with an ambiguous visual stimulus (structure-from-motion) that can give rise to two distinct perceptual interpretations. Past visual experience is known to influence the perception of such stimuli. We recorded fast dynamics of neural activity shortly after stimulus onset using event-related electroencephalography. The number of previous occurrences of a certain percept modulated early posterior brain activity starting as early as 50 ms after stimulus onset. This modulation developed across hundreds of percept repetitions, reflecting several minutes of accumulating perceptual experience. Importantly, there was no such modulation when the mere number of previous stimulus presentations was considered regardless of how they were perceived. This indicates that the effect depended on previous perception rather than previous visual input. The short latency and posterior scalp location of the effect suggest that perceptual history modified bottom-up stimulus processing in early visual cortex. We propose that bottom-up neural responses to a given visual presentation are shaped, in part, by feedback modulation that occurred during previous presentations, thus allowing these responses to be biased in light of previous perceptual decisions.

Inhibitory processes in visual perception: a bilingual advantage.

Bilingual inhibitory control advantages are well established. An open question is whether inhibitory superiority also extends to visual perceptual phenomena that involve inhibitory processes. This research used ambiguous figures to assess inhibitory bilingual superiority in 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old mono- and bilingual children (N=141). Findings show that bilinguals across all ages are superior in inhibiting a prevalent interpretation of an ambiguous figure to perceive the alternative interpretation. In contrast, mono- and bilinguals revealed no differences in understanding that an ambiguous figure can have two distinct referents. Together, these results suggest that early bilingual inhibitory control superiority is also evident in visual perception. Bilinguals' conceptual understanding of figure ambiguity is comparable to that of their monolingual peers.

The linear impact of concurrent working memory load on dynamics of Necker cube perceptual reversals.

Ambiguous figures are visual stimuli that may be perceived in multistable interpretations. The role of attention in modulating perceptual reversals of ambiguous stimuli is not clear. We tested whether perceptual reversals depend on working memory by manipulating its load while the participants were viewing the Necker cube. Increasing working memory load delayed the latency and decreased the frequency of reversals. These effects followed a linear function of load. The findings imply shared resources of the mechanisms responsible for perceptual reversals and working memory maintenance. However, reversals were not completely abolished even with the hard seven-consonants load, suggesting that bottom-up processes continue to operate in the bistable perception dynamics when top-down mechanisms are attenuated.

Effects of alcohol on attentional mechanisms involved in figure reversals.

OBJECTIVE: The impairing effects of alcohol on attention are well documented and are thought to involve inhibitory mechanisms. We used ambiguous figures (Face-Vase and Necker cube) to test whether the intentional control mechanism is more vulnerable to the effects of alcohol than the automatic mechanism. METHOD: Participants were assigned to an alcohol (Study 1, N = 15; Study 2, N = 18), placebo (Study 1, N = 15; Study 2, N = 20) or control (Study 1 only, N = 10) group. The doses of alcohol were 0.8 g/kg for men and 0.75 g/kg for women. Participants were shown the Face-Vase and Necker cube figures and two variants of each, which were biased in varying degrees towards one interpretation. Study 1 assessed the automatic control mechanism by asking participants to report spontaneous reversals. Study 2 assessed the intentional control mechanism by asking participants to increase reversal rate. RESULTS: In Study 1, reversal rate was similar for all groups, whereas in Study 2, the alcohol group reported more reversals than the control group, although this was true only for the biased versions of the Face-Vase illusion. CONCLUSIONS: The effect of alcohol on reversal rate is observed only during intentional reversals of semantically meaningful stimuli and only when the stimulus is biased.

Spontaneous Necker-cube reversals may not be that spontaneous.

Introduction: During observation of the ambiguous Necker cube, our perception suddenly reverses between two about equally possible 3D interpretations. During passive observation, perceptual reversals seem to be sudden and spontaneous. A number of theoretical approaches postulate destabilization of neural representations as a pre-condition for reversals of ambiguous figures. In the current study, we focused on possible Electroencephalogram (EEG) correlates of perceptual destabilization, that may allow prediction of an upcoming perceptual reversal. Methods: We presented ambiguous Necker cube stimuli in an onset-paradigm and investigated the neural processes underlying endogenous reversals as compared to perceptual stability across two consecutive stimulus presentations. In a separate experimental condition, disambiguated cube variants were alternated randomly, to exogenously induce perceptual reversals. We compared the EEG immediately before and during endogenous Necker cube reversals with corresponding time windows during exogenously induced perceptual reversals of disambiguated cube variants. Results: For the ambiguous Necker cube stimuli, we found the earliest differences in the EEG between reversal trials and stability trials already 1 s before a reversal occurred, at bilateral parietal electrodes. The traces remained similar until approximately 1100 ms before a perceived reversal, became maximally different at around 890 ms (p = 7.59 × 10-6, Cohen's d = 1.35) and remained different until shortly before offset of the stimulus preceding the reversal. No such patterns were found in the case of disambiguated cube variants. Discussion: The identified EEG effects may reflect destabilized states of neural representations, related to destabilized perceptual states preceding a perceptual reversal. They further indicate that spontaneous Necker cube reversals are most probably not as spontaneous as generally thought. Rather, the destabilization may occur over a longer time scale, at least 1 s before a reversal event, despite the reversal event as such being perceived as spontaneous by the viewer.

Modest effect of knowledge on bistable perception of structure-from-motion.

When faced with ambiguous visual input, observers may experience various perceptual interpretations of the same input. Indeed, such input can cause perception to unpredictably switch between interpretations over time. Theories of such so-called multistable perception broadly fall into two categories: top-down theories that emphasize dependence on higher-level cognitive factors such as knowledge, and bottom-up theories that suggest more vital involvement of aspects of lower-order information processing such as adaptation in the visual system. Most present-day accounts hold that both factors play a role, so that perceptual reversals arise inevitably due to factors like adaptation, yet can be delayed or hastened by higher-level cognitive influences. We revisited a body of work that shows the occurrence of perceptual reversals to depend dramatically on the observer's knowledge that the input is, indeed, ambiguous: without such knowledge many observers in that work did not experience any reversals, in apparent conflict with the idea that reversals are inevitable. We used an ambiguous animation that allowed subjects to report perceptual reversals without realizing the ambiguity. We found that subjects who were aware of the animation's ambiguity reported slightly more perceptual reversals than uninformed subjects, but that this between-group difference was small, and was overshadowed by inter-observer variability within each group. These findings suggest that knowledge of ambiguity can influence perception of ambiguous stimuli, but only mildly, in keeping with most present-day accounts. We discuss potential explanations for the discrepancy with the earlier work.

Adults with autism spectrum condition have atypical perception of ambiguous figures when bottom-up and top-down interactions are incongruous.

We examined the perception of an ambiguous squares stimulus evoking bistable perception in a sample of 31 individuals with autistic spectrum condition and 22 matched typical adults. The perception of the ambiguous figure was manipulated by adaptation to unambiguous figures and/or by placing the ambiguous figure into a context of unambiguous figures. This resulted in four conditions testing the independent and combined (congruent and incongruent) manipulations of adaptation (bottom-up) and spatial context (top-down) effects. The strength of perception, as measured by perception of the first reported orientation of the ambiguous stimulus, was affected comparably between groups. Nevertheless, the strength of perception, as measured by perceptual durations, was affected differently between groups: the perceptual effect was strongest for the autistic spectrum condition group when combined bottom-up and top-down conditions were congruent. In contrast, the strength of the perceptual effect in response to the same condition in the typical adults group was comparable to the adaptation, but stronger than both the context and the incongruent combined bottom-up and top-down conditions. Furthermore, the context condition was stronger than the incongruent combined bottom-up and top-down conditions for the typical adults group. Thus, our findings support the view of stimulus-specific top-down modulation in autistic spectrum condition.

Lateralized embodiment of ambiguous human silhouettes: Data on sex differences.

Whereas the role of observers' sex has already been addressed in research on embodied cognition, so far it has been neglected as regards laterality effects in embodied cognition. Here, we report further analyses of the data used in our paper "Hemispheric asymmetries in the processing of body sides: A study with ambiguous human silhouettes" [1], where participants had to indicate the perceived orientation of silhouettes with ambiguous front/back orientation and handedness presented in the right and left hemifield. Specifically, the variables examined in the associated paper (the number of right- and left-sided silhouettes perceived as front- and back-facing in each hemifield; the number of silhouettes perceived as right- and left-handed in each hemifield) are analyzed by also factoring in participant's sex). Moreover, data are provided and analyses are performed both for the total sample of participants and for the sample of right-handed participants only. For further details, as well as for the interpretation and discussion of the data, the reader is referred to the main article [1] and its Supplementary Material.

Perceptual flexibility is coupled with reduced executive inhibition in students of the visual arts.

Artists often report that seeing familiar stimuli in novel and interesting ways plays a role in visual art creation. However, the attentional mechanisms which underpin this ability have yet to be fully investigated. More specifically, it is unclear whether the ability to reinterpret visual stimuli in novel and interesting ways is facilitated by endogenously generated switches of attention, and whether it is linked in turn to executive functions such as inhibition and response switching. To address this issue, the current study explored ambiguous figure reversal and executive function in a sample of undergraduate students studying arts and non-art subjects (N = 141). Art students showed more frequent perceptual reversals in an ambiguous figure task, both when viewing the stimulus passively and when eliciting perceptual reversals voluntarily, but showed no difference from non-art students when asked to actively maintain specific percepts. In addition, art students were worse than non-art students at inhibiting distracting flankers in an executive inhibition task. The findings suggest that art students can elicit endogenous shifts of attention more easily than non-art students but that this faculty is not directly associated with enhanced executive function. It is proposed that the signature of artistic skill may be increased perceptual flexibility accompanied by reduced cognitive inhibition; however, future research will be necessary to determine which particular subskills in the visual arts are linked to aspects of perception and executive function.

Bilingual Advantages in Inhibition or Selective Attention: More Challenges.

A large sample (N = 141) of college students participated in both a conjunctive visual search task and an ambiguous figures task that have been used as tests of selective attention. Tests for effects of bilingualism on attentional control were conducted by both partitioning the participants into bilinguals and monolinguals and by treating bilingualism as a continuous variable, but there were no effects of bilingualism in any of the tests. Bayes factor analyses confirmed that the evidence substantially favored the null hypothesis. These new findings mesh with failures to replicate language-group differences in congruency-sequence effects, inhibition-of-return, and working memory capacity. The evidence that bilinguals are better than monolinguals at attentional control is equivocal at best.

The relationship between bilingualism and selective attention in young adults: Evidence from an ambiguous figures task.

Previous research has shown that bilinguals outperform monolinguals on a variety of tasks that have been described as involving executive functioning, but the precise mechanism for those effects or a clear definition for "executive function" is unknown. This uncertainty has led to a number of studies for which no performance difference between monolingual and bilingual adults has been detected. One approach to clarifying these issues comes from research with children showing that bilinguals were more able than their monolingual peers to perceive both interpretations of an ambiguous figure, an ability that is more tied to a conception of selective attention than to specific components of executive function. The present study extends this notion to adults by assessing their ability to see the alternative image in an ambiguous figure. Bilinguals performed this task more efficiently than monolinguals by requiring fewer cues to identify the second image. This finding has implications for the role of selective attention in performance differences between monolinguals and bilinguals.

Changing What You See by Changing What You Know: The Role of Attention.

Attending is a cognitive process that incorporates a person's knowledge, goals, and expectations. What we perceive when we attend to one thing is different from what we perceive when we attend to something else. Yet, it is often argued that attentional effects do not count as evidence that perception is influenced by cognition. I investigate two arguments often given to justify excluding attention. The first is arguing that attention is a post-perceptual process reflecting selection between fully constructed perceptual representations. The second is arguing that attention as a pre-perceptual process that simply changes the input to encapsulated perceptual systems. Both of these arguments are highly problematic. Although some attentional effects can indeed be construed as post-perceptual, others operate by changing perceptual content across the entire visual hierarchy. Although there is a natural analogy between spatial attention and a change of input, the analogy falls apart when we consider other forms of attention. After dispelling these arguments, I make a case for thinking of attention not as a confound, but as one of the mechanisms by which cognitive states affect perception by going through cases in which the same or similar visual inputs are perceived differently depending on the observer's cognitive state, and instances where cuing an observer using language affects what one sees. Lastly, I provide two compelling counter-examples to the critique that although cognitive influences on perception can be demonstrated in the laboratory, it is impossible to really experience them for oneself in a phenomenologically compelling way. Taken together, the current evidence strongly supports the thesis that what we know routinely influences what we see, that the same sensory input can be perceived differently depending on the current cognitive state of the viewer, and that phenomenologically salient demonstrations are possible if certain conditions are met.

Ego depletion in visual perception: Ego-depleted viewers experience less ambiguous figure reversal.

This study examined the effects of ego depletion on ambiguous figure perception. Adults (N = 315) received an ego depletion task and were subsequently tested on their inhibitory control abilities that were indexed by the Stroop task (Experiment 1) and their ability to perceive both interpretations of ambiguous figures that was indexed by reversal (Experiment 2). Ego depletion had a very small effect on reducing inhibitory control (Cohen's d = .15) (Experiment 1). Ego-depleted participants had a tendency to take longer to respond in Stroop trials. In Experiment 2, ego depletion had small to medium effects on the experience of reversal. Ego-depleted viewers tended to take longer to reverse ambiguous figures (duration to first reversal) when naïve of the ambiguity and experienced less reversal both when naïve and informed of the ambiguity. Together, findings suggest that ego depletion has small effects on inhibitory control and small to medium effects on bottom-up and top-down perceptual processes. The depletion of cognitive resources can reduce our visual perceptual experience.