Research on Carbon Emissions Reduction Strategy Considering Government Subsidy and Free Riding Behavior.

Government subsidy can greatly encourage supply chain enterprises to reduce carbon emissions. To quickly occupy the market, supply chain enterprises form alliances. However, enterprises in the alliance have speculative psychology, and the impact of such free riding behavior on the carbon emissions reduction willingness of supply chain enterprises is still unclear. In this article, government subsidies and free riding behavior parameters are introduced to build a carbon emissions reduction decision model for the government, manufacturers, and suppliers, and the impact of government subsidies and free riding behavior on the decision making of supply chain enterprises is analyzed through evolutionary game theory. The analysis shows that government subsidies have an incentive effect on carbon emissions reduction of supply chain enterprises. After the market stabilizes, even if the government subsidies are gradually withdrawn, the carbon emissions reduction of supply chain enterprises still converges to Pareto optimal equilibrium. The influence of free riding behavior on supply chain enterprises depends on the carbon emissions reduction profit. When the carbon emissions reduction profit is different, the decision of manufacturers and suppliers will be different. The above conclusions provide a reference for governments to strengthen control or enterprises to make decisions on carbon emissions reduction.

The impact of collective action dilemma on vaccine hesitancy: Evidence from China.

Vaccine hesitancy has dramatically decreased the speed of vaccination and stalled global health development. While the factors influencing vaccine hesitancy and mitigation measures have been explored in depth by existing studies, research from the perspective of human interaction is lacking. Based on the theory of collective action, this paper analyzes how free riding behavior affects vaccine hesitancy and how the vaccine hesitancy caused by free riding behavior can be solved. Using 2,203 survey data sets from China, this paper examines the influence of the collective action dilemma - represented by free riding behavior - on COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy. The empirical results show that the existence of free riding behavior is an essential cause of vaccine hesitancy. Based on this conclusion, this paper discusses how to further alleviate the problem of vaccine hesitancy caused by collective action dilemmas by promoting cooperation. The findings of this paper may be helpful to promote various types of vaccines and further suggest that countries should assume the perspective of solving the collective action dilemma to achieve increased vaccination rates.