Values-Based Medicine Is an Ethical Concept for Implementing the Ethical Principles in Daily Practice.

Values-based medicine (VsBM) is an ethical concept, and bioethical framework has been developed to ensure that medical ethics and values are implemented, pervasive, and powerful parameters influencing decisions about health, clinical practice, teaching, medical industry, career development, malpractice, and research. Neurosurgeons tend to adopt ethics according to their own values and to what they see and learn from teachers. Neurosurgeons, in general, are aware about ethical codes and the patient's rights. However, the philosophy, concept, and principles of medical ethics are rarely included in the training programs or in training courses. The impact of implementing, observing the medical ethics and the patients' value and culture on the course, and outcome of patients' management should not underestimate. The main principles of medical ethics are autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice, dignity, and honesty, which should be strictly observed in every step of medical practice, research, teaching, and publication. Evidence-based medicine has been popularized in the last 40-50 years in order to raise up the standard of medical practice. Medical ethics and values have been associated with the medical practice for thousands of years since patients felt a need for treatment. There is no conflict between evidence-based medicine and values-based medicine, as a medical practice should always be performed within a frame of ethics and respect for patients' values. Observing the principles of values-based medicine became very relevant as multicultural societies are dominant in some countries and hospitals in different corners of the world.

John Gregory's medical ethics elucidates the concepts of compassion and empathy.

PURPOSE: This paper draws on eighteenth-century British medical ethics to elucidate compassion and empathy and explains how compassion and empathy can be taught, to rectify their frequent conflation. COMPASSION IN THE HISTORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS: The professional virtue of compassion was first described in eighteenth-century British medical ethics by the Scottish physician-ethicist, John Gregory (1724-1773) who built on the moral psychology of David Hume (1711-1776) and its principle of sympathy. COMPASSION AND EMPATHY DEFINED: Compassion is the habitual exercise of the affective capacity to engage, with self-discipline, in the experience of the patient and therefore become driven to provide effective care for the patient. Empathy is the habitual exercise of the cognitive capacity to imagine the experience of patient and to have reasons to care for the patient. There are rare clinical circumstances in which empathy should replace compassion, for example, in responding to abusive patients. Because the abstract concepts of medical ethics are translated into clinical practice by medical educators, we identify the pedagogical implications of these results by setting out a process for teaching compassion and empathy. THE TASK AHEAD: Eighteenth-century British medical ethics provides a clinically applicable, philosophical response to conflation of the moral virtue of compassion and the intellectual virtue of empathy and applying them clinically.

Understanding the research-care demarcation and why it must be revised.

BACKGROUND: A clean-cut separation between research and care was artificially created at the time of the Belmont report more than 40 years ago. The demarcation was initially controversial but eventually was implemented for political reasons. We examine why it must be revised. METHODS: We review historical research scandals as well as the theoretical basis for the Belmont demarcation. We then discuss consequences on medical practice and propose an alternative. DISCUSSION: Most research scandals involved abusing human beings supposedly for the sake of science. Belmont commissioners were aware the research/care problem was double-headed. While research subjects should be protected from abuse in the research context, patients need to be protected from unvalidated medical and surgical interventions in the care context. For political reasons the Commission recommended the regulation of research but to leave medical practice untouched. Thus the Commission had to distinguish research from care. The notion of 'generalizable knowledge' was introduced to define and regulate research, but the inadvertent result was that by trying to protect research subjects, the regulation has not only failed to protect all other patients, but also encouraged the widespread practice of unvalidated interventions within the care context. The notion of validated care should be re-introduced into a proper analysis of the care-research demarcation, for care research is an integral ingredient of a good medical practice. CONCLUSION: The research-care demarcation should be revised to leave room for the validated/unvalidated care distinction. Care research, essential to guide medical practice, should be facilitated at all levels.

From Prussia to Russia: Russian critics of "Aerztliche Ethik".

The aim of this paper is to compare "Zapiski Vracha" ("Confessions of a Physician", first published in 1901) by Vikenty Veresaev to "Aerztliche Ethik" ("Doctors' Ethics", first published in 1902; two Russian editions were published in 1903 and 1904) by Albert Moll. It starts with an overview of medical ethics in Russia at the turn of the 20th century in relation to zemstvo medicine, followed by reception of Veresaev's "Confessions of a Physician" by Russian and German physicians, and of Moll's "Doctors' Ethics" in Russia. Comparison of these two books may serve as a good example of a search for common philosophical foundations of medical ethics as well as the impact of national cultural traditions.