Artificial Intelligence and Human Enhancement: Can AI Technologies Make Us More (Artificially) Intelligent?

This paper discusses two opposing views about the relation between artificial intelligence (AI) and human intelligence: on the one hand, a worry that heavy reliance on AI technologies might make people less intelligent and, on the other, a hope that AI technologies might serve as a form of cognitive enhancement. The worry relates to the notion that if we hand over too many intelligence-requiring tasks to AI technologies, we might end up with fewer opportunities to train our own intelligence. Concerning AI as a potential form of cognitive enhancement, the paper explores two possibilities: (1) AI as extending-and thereby enhancing-people's minds, and (2) AI as enabling people to behave in artificially intelligent ways. That is, using AI technologies might enable people to behave as if they have been cognitively enhanced. The paper considers such enhancements both on the level of individuals and on the level of groups.

Neurotechnology and ethics guidelines for human enhancement: The case of the hippocampal cognitive prosthesis.

Neurotechnologies offer both therapeutic and enhancement potential. In this article, we demonstrate how ethics guidelines can help with critical reflection on their potential for enhancement. We do this through the case of the hippocampal cognitive prosthesis. This prothesis developed in the US, has primarily therapeutic ends, with scope for enhancement. This technology raises several ethical issues, including as related to identity and memory, autonomy and authenticity. In the first section, we outline what we mean by enhancement, and introduce neurotechnologies generally and the hippocampal cognitive prosthesis specifically, with an introduction to generally relevant ethical issues. In the second section, we outline ethical issues pertinent to the hippocampal cognitive prosthesis and explore how ethics guidelines can help to promote essential critical reflection on a technology like this. Through all this, our emphasis is to balance between technological optimism and caution, especially where technologies have enhancement potential.

A world of difference: The fundamental opposition between transhumanist "welfarism" and disability advocacy.

From the standpoint of disability advocacy, further exploration of the concept of well-being stands to be availing. The notion that "welfarism" about disability, which Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane debuted, qualifies as helpful is encouraged by their claim that welfarism shares important commitments with that advocacy. As becomes clear when they apply their welfarist frame to procreative decisions, endorsing welfarism would, in fact, sharply undermine it. Savulescu and Kahane's Principle of Procreative Beneficence-which reflects transhumanism, or advocacy of radical bioenhancement-morally requires parents to choose the child who will, in all probability, have "the best life." Assuming the emergence of potent biotechnologies, procreative decision-making would be highly standardized, for prospective parents would be morally obliged to maximize select capacities, including intelligence, self-control, and hedonic set-point, in their children. Welfarism, applied to reproduction, is staunchly objectivist about what course is incumbent on decision-makers, giving no credence to first-personal values, aspirations, and experiences. Though this dismissal of individual perspectives applies to everyone, its implications for disability advocacy are especially severe. With that advocacy in view, greater attention to "well-being" should, therefore, be severed from the welfarism of Savulescu and Kahane.

Pharmacological cognitive enhancement and the value of achievements: An intervention.

Pharmacological cognitive enhancements nontherapeutically improve cognitive functioning, though recent critics have challenged their use by claiming that cognitive success, aided by the use of cognitive enhancement, is less valuable than otherwise. We criticize two recent responses to this objection, due to Carter and Pritchard and Wang, and propose a different response on behalf of proponents of cognitive enhancement that is shown to be more promising.

An ethical analysis of a prospective new paradigm of life: Nanotechnology-enabled human beings within the framework of principlism.

Nanotechnology (NT)-enabled disease-free life is a form of reconstruction of the human body that promises a paradigm shift toward a new form of human existence in an imaginable life. However, as human reconstruction may be within the limits of the concept of "human enhancement," it is not clear to what extent "enhanced humans" will be ethically acceptable or desired. This study discusses the ethical implications of NT-embedded enhanced humans and this new imaginable life. First, ethical concerns arising from the existence of a grey zone of certain dilemmas regarding benefits and possible/unpredicted risks are addressed in terms of the four main principles of bioethics. Then, we focus on the ethical problems in human nano-enhancement. Finally, we study the methods of analyzing these ethical problems within the framework of principlism to conceive a comprehensive and coherent bioethical understanding.

Human Germline Genome Editing: On the Nature of Our Reasons to Genome Edit.

Ever since the publication of Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons, bioethicists have tended to distinguish between two different ways in which reproductive technologies may have implications for the welfare of future persons. Some interventions harm or benefit particular individuals: they are "person affecting." Other interventions determine which individual, of a number of possible individuals, comes into existence: they are "identity affecting" and raise the famous "non-identity problem." For the past several decades, bioethical debate has, for the most part, proceeded on the assumption that direct genetic modification of human embryos would be person affecting. In this paper, I argue that that genome editing is highly unlikely to be person affecting for the foreseeable future and, as a result, will neither benefit nor harm edited individuals.

On the (Non-)Rationality of Human Enhancement and Transhumanism.

The human enhancement debate has over the last few decades been concerned with ethical issues in methods for improving the physical, cognitive, or emotive states of individual people, and of the human species as a whole. Arguments in favour of enhancement defend it as a paradigm of rationality, presenting it as a clear-eyed, logical defence of what we stand to gain from transcending the typical limits of our species. If these arguments are correct, it appears that adults should in principle be able to make rational and informed decisions about enhancing themselves. In this paper, however, we suggest that a rational and informed choice to enhance oneself may in some cases be impossible. Drawing on L. A. Paul's work on 'transformative experience', we argue that some enhancements-such as certain moral or cognitive modifications-may give rise to unbridgeable epistemic gaps in key domains. Importantly, such gaps could prove to be not merely contingently unbridgeable due to a lack of information at a given moment, but radically unbridgeable, making someone in a non-enhanced state inherently unable to conceive of what it would be like to be enhanced in a particular way. Where this experience is key to understanding what values are being pursued by the enhancement itself, it may prove impossible for a person to be sufficiently informed, and to make a rational decision about whether or not to enhance herself. This poses a challenge for human enhancement proponents in general, and for transhumanists in particular.

The Ethics of Supernumerary Robotic Limbs. An Enactivist Approach.

Supernumerary robotic limbs are innovative devices in the field of wearable robotics which can provide humans with unprecedented sensorimotor abilities. However, scholars have raised awareness of the ethical issues that would arise from the large adoption of technologies for human augmentation in society. Most negative attitudes towards such technologies seem to rely on an allegedly clear distinction between therapy and enhancement in the use of technological devices. Based on such distinction, people tend to accept technologies when used for therapeutic purposes (e.g., prostheses), but tend to raise issues when similar devices are used for upgrading a physical or cognitive ability (e.g., supernumerary robotics limbs). However, as many scholars have pointed out, the distinction between therapy and enhancement might be theoretically flawed. In this paper, we present an alternative approach to the ethics of supernumerary limbs which is based on two related claims. First, we propose to conceive supernumerary limbs as tools that necessarily modify our psychological and bodily identity. At the same time, we stress that such a modification is not ethically bad in itself; on the contrary, it drives human interaction with the environment. Second, by comparing our view with the extended mind thesis, we claim that the mediation through tools is crucial for the formation of novel meanings and skills that constitute human interaction with the world. We will relate the latter claim to enactivism as a helpful theoretical perspective to frame issues related to artificial limbs and, more in general, to technologies for augmentation. Based on this approach, we finally sketch some suggestions for future directions in the ethics of supernumerary limbs.

Disability, Enhancement, and Flourishing.

Recent debate among bioethicists concerns the potential to enhance human beings' physical or cognitive capacities by means of genetic, pharmacological, cybernetic, or surgical interventions. Between "transhumanists," who argue for unreserved enhancement of human capabilities, and "bioconservatives," who warn against any non-therapeutic manipulation of humanity's natural condition, lie those who support limited forms of enhancement for the sake of individual and collective human flourishing. Many scholars representing these views also share a concern over the status and interests of human beings with various types of cognitive and physical disabilities, some of which may be ameliorable by enhancement interventions. The question addressed in this paper is whether valuing the enhancement of human capabilities may be reconciled with valuing the existence and phenomenological experiences of human beings with various disabilities. Can we value enhanced capabilities without disvaluing those whose capabilities fall below a defined threshold of "normal function"? Furthermore, if certain forms of disability, particularly cognitive disabilities, negatively impact one's flourishing, could the enhancement of one's cognitive capacities through biotechnological means enhance one's flourishing.

Toward Informed User Decisions About Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement.

Pharmacological cognitive enhancement (PCE) refers to the use of pharmaceuticals to improve cognitive function when that use is not intended to prevent or treat disease. Those who favour a liberal approach to PCE trust users to make informed decisions about whether enhancing is in their best interest. The author argues that making informed decisions about PCE requires a nuanced risk-benefit analysis that is not accessible to many users. Presently, the PCE use of prescription medications such as methylphenidate and modafinil is widespread but most commonly happens without medical supervision. Direct and indirect barriers generate a situation where the risks and benefits of PCE are inequitably distributed; as a result, PCE is sometimes not in the user's best interest. This is likely to also be the case for future pharmaceuticals. As a result, even if PCE pharmaceuticals were equitably distributed, its associated risks and benefits would not be. The article concludes with a discussion of the prospects of the clinical consultation on one hand, and e-health solutions on the other, in ameliorating the situation, arguing for cautious optimism.

(Re)-Emerging Challenges in Christian Bioethics: Leading Voices in Christian Bioethics.

This is the third installment in a Christian Bioethics series that gathers leading voices in Christian bioethics to examine the themes and issues they find most pressing. The papers address fundamental theoretical questions about the nature of Christian bioethics itself, long-standing ethical issues that remain significant today, including physician-assisted suicide, euthanasia, the definition of death, the allocation of scarce resources, and finally, more futuristic questions regarding transhumanism. The contributions underscore the enduring significance of Christian engagement in bioethics.

Space bioethics: Why we need it and why it should be a feminist space bioethics.

Space philosophy offers rich insights in the future and is already well-developed new branch of philosophy. However, space philosophers still do not pay much attention to a number of bioethical issues that may occur in space. This paper aims to introduce space bioethics, as a new branch in space philosophy, space ethics and space policy, to the philosophical and bioethical discourse. The basic issues discussed in space bioethics include-but are not limited to-human reproduction in space and human enhancement for space. This paper concludes that the new space bioethics should be a feminist new bioethics that is free from many of the historical biases associated with a male-centred perspective in philosophy and bioethics. Bioethical issues in space have also impact on future political decisions related to objectives and nature of space missions.

A Q methodology study on divergent perspectives on CRISPR-Cas9 in the Netherlands.

BACKGROUND: CRISPR-Cas9, a technology enabling modification of the human genome, is developing rapidly. There have been calls for public debate to discuss its ethics, societal implications, and governance. So far, however, little is known about public attitudes on CRISPR-Cas9. This study contributes to a better understanding of public perspectives by exploring the various holistic perspectives Dutch citizens have on CRISPR-Cas9. METHODS: This study used Q methodology to identify different perspectives of Dutch citizens (N = 30) on the use of CRISPR-Cas9. The Q-sort method aims at segmenting audiences based on the structural characteristics of their perspectives. Participants individually ranked 32 statements about CRISPR-Cas9 and discussed their rankings in small groups. By-person factor analysis was performed using PQMethod. Participants' contributions to the discussions were used to further make sense of the audience segments identified. RESULTS: Five perspectives on CRISPR-Cas9 were identified: (1) pragmatic optimism (2) concerned scepticism; (3) normative optimism; (4) enthusiastic support; and (5) benevolent generalism. Each perspective represents a unique position motivated by different ranking rationales. Sorting rationales included improving health, preventing negative impacts on society, and fear of a slippery slope. Overall, there is broad, but not universal support for medical uses of CRISPR-Cas9. CONCLUSIONS: Research on CRISPR-Cas9 should prioritise the broadly supported applications of the technology. Research and public debates on CRISPR-Cas9, its uses, its broader implications, and the governance of CRISPR-Cas9 are recommended. A discourse that includes all perspectives can contribute to the embedding of future uses of CRISPR-Cas9 in society. This study shows that Q methodology followed by group discussions enables citizens to contribute meaningfully to discourses about research.

Enhancing the collectivist critique: accounts of the human enhancement debate.

Individualist ethical analyses in the enhancement debate have often prioritised or only considered the interests and concerns of parents and the future child. The collectivist critique of the human enhancement debate argues that rather than pure individualism, a focus on collectivist, or group-level ethical considerations is needed for balanced ethical analysis of specific enhancement interventions. Here, I defend this argument for the insufficiency of pure individualism. However, existing collectivist analyses tend to take a negative approach that hinders them from adequately contributing to balanced ethical analysis, and often leads to a prohibitive stance. I argue this is due to two common problems with collectivist analyses: inappropriate acceptance of individualist assumptions, and failure to appropriately weigh individual vs collective ethical considerations. To further develop the collectivist critique in the enhancement debate, I suggest we may look to collectivism in public health ethics, which avoids these problems.

Doctor, please make me freer: Capabilities enhancement as a goal of medicine.

Biomedical innovations are making possible the enhancement of human capabilities. There are two philosophical stances on the role that medicine should play in this respect. On the one hand, naturalism rejects every medical intervention that goes beyond preventing and treating disease. On the other hand, welfarism advocates enhancements that foster subjective well-being. We will show that both positions have considerable shortcomings. Consequently, we will introduce a third characterization in which therapies and enhancements can be reconciled with the legitimate objectives of medicine inasmuch as they improve the capabilities that enable the freedom to pursue personal well-being.

Is human enhancement intrinsically bad?

A pertinent concern in the human enhancement debate is that human enhancement technologies (HET) are intrinsically bad and, hence, morally impermissible. This article evaluates the related claims about the intrinsic badness of HET by looking into philosophical theories of intrinsic value. It investigates how well-established conceptions of intrinsic value map onto typical bioconservative arguments about HET's intrinsic badness. Three predominant variants of these arguments are explored and found wanting: (i) HET are intrinsically bad owing to their unnaturalness; (ii) the pursuit of HET reveals intrinsically bad character ("the desire for mastery"); and (iii) HET will necessarily undermine intrinsically valuable things (e.g., human dignity). My analysis shows that the debate on intrinsic value places serious constraints on claims about the intrinsic badness of HET. More specifically, the analysis shows that bioconservative arguments are, for the most part, inconsistent, misconceived, and overly speculative. Enhancement interventions cannot be bearers of intrinsic value on any of its plausible understandings, and, even if we could grant such a possibility, there are no compelling reasons to presume that the intrinsic value of HET would be necessarily negative. As a result, claims regarding their moral impermissibility are unwarranted.

Cryonics for all?

In fascinating recent work, some philosophers have argued that it would be morally permissible and prudentially rational to sign up for cryonics-if you can afford the price tag of the procedure. In this paper I ask: why not share the elixir of extended life with everyone? Should governments financially support, positively encourage, or even require people to undergo cryonics? From a general principle of beneficence, I construct a formal argument for cryonics promotion policies. I consider the objection that a subset of these policies would violate autonomy, but I argue that-to the contrary-considerations of autonomy weigh in their favour. I then consider objections based on cost and population, but argue that neither is fatal. Finally, I raise the objection that I believe poses the most serious challenge: that those who revive the cryonically preserved might inflict suffering upon them.

Procreation machines: Ectogenesis as reproductive enhancement, proper medicine or a step towards posthumanism?

Full ectogenesis as the complete externalization of human reproduction by bypassing the bodily processes of gestation and childbirth can be considered the culmination of genetic and reproductive technologies. Despite its still being a hypothetical scenario, it has been discussed for decades as the ultimate means to liberate women from their reproductive tasks in society and hence finally end fundamental gender injustices generally. In the debate about the application of artificial wombs to achieve gender equality, one aspect is barely mentioned but is of crucial relevance from a medical-ethical perspective: whether and how could full ectogenesis be justified as a proper use of medicine? After characterizing the technology as a special form of human enhancement and as an extension of medical practice that goes beyond the traditional field of medicine, this paper critically assesses the theoretical possibilities of legitimizing this extension. We identify two ways of justification: either one argues that ectogenesis fulfils a proper goal of medicine (a justification we call pathologization), or one argues that the application of ectogenesis achieves a non-medical goal (which we call medicalization). Because it is important from a medical-ethical point of view to avoid an inappropriate instrumentalization or misuse of medicine and thus an undue medicalization of non-medical problems, a set of necessary conditions has to be met. It is doubtful whether full ectogenesis for non-medical purposes could fulfil these conditions. Rather, its comprehensive usage could be seen as a revolutionary modification of what it means to be human.

Ethical Challenges in Human Space Missions: A Space Refuge, Scientific Value, and Human Gene Editing for Space.

This article examines some selected ethical issues in human space missions including human missions to Mars, particularly the idea of a space refuge, the scientific value of space exploration, and the possibility of human gene editing for deep-space travel. Each of these issues may be used either to support or to criticize human space missions. We conclude that while these issues are complex and context-dependent, there appear to be no overwhelming obstacles such as cost effectiveness, threats to human life or protection of pristine space objects, to sending humans to space and to colonize space. The article argues for the rationality of the idea of a space refuge and the defensibility of the idea of human enhancement applied to future deep-space astronauts.

Is Human Enhancement in Space a Moral Duty? Missions to Mars, Advanced AI and Genome Editing in Space.

Any space program involving long-term human missions will have to cope with serious risks to human health and life. Because currently available countermeasures are insufficient in the long term, there is a need for new, more radical solutions. One possibility is a program of human enhancement for future deep space mission astronauts. This paper discusses the challenges for long-term human missions of a space environment, opening the possibility of serious consideration of human enhancement and a fully automated space exploration, based on highly advanced AI. The author argues that for such projects, there are strong reasons to consider human enhancement, including gene editing of germ line and somatic cells, as a moral duty.