EEG evidence that morally relevant autobiographical memories can be suppressed.

Remembering unpleasant events can trigger negative feelings. Fortunately, research indicates that unwanted retrieval can be suppressed to prevent memories from intruding into awareness, improving our mental state. The current scientific understanding of retrieval suppression, however, is based mostly on simpler memories, such as associations between words or pictures, which may not reflect how people control unpleasant memory intrusions in everyday life. Here, we investigated the neural and behavioural dynamics of suppressing personal and emotional autobiographical memories using a modified version of the Think/No-Think task. We asked participants to suppress memories of their own past immoral actions, which were hypothesised to be both highly intrusive and motivating to suppress. We report novel evidence from behavioural, ERP, and EEG oscillation measures that autobiographical memory retrieval can be suppressed and suggest that autobiographical suppression recruits similar neurocognitive mechanisms as suppression of simple laboratory associations. Suppression did fail sometimes, and EEG oscillations indicated that such memory intrusions occurred from lapses in sustained control. Importantly, however, participants improved at limiting intrusions with repeated practice. Furthermore, both behavioural and EEG evidence indicated that intentional suppression may be more difficult for memories of our morally wrong actions than memories of our morally right actions. The findings elucidate the neurocognitive correlates of autobiographical retrieval suppression and have implications for theories of morally motivated memory control.

False memories through auditory distraction: When irrelevant speech produces memory intrusions in the absence of semantic interference.

Task-irrelevant speech is known to cause disruption of short-term memory, either through specific interference with encoding processes (e.g., seriation, semantic processing) or by diverting attention from the focal task. Previous studies found that semantically related background speech can induce memory intrusions of words that were not part of the to-be-remembered list. While these findings suggest false memories due to semantic interference, the present study aims to test whether the presence of task-irrelevant speech affects the susceptibility to memory intrusions also in the absence of semantic interference. Therefore, incomprehensible to-be-ignored speech was presented during encoding of semantically related words. It was found across three experiments that incomprehensible changing-state speech increased the rate of false memories of non-presented but semantically related words in a subsequent recognition (Experiments 1 and 2) or recall test (Experiment 3), compared with white noise or steady-state speech. The findings indicate that speech interfered with serial-order processing of the to-be-remembered items, thus urging participants to rely on semantic information to encode and retrieve the presented words. While a focus on semantic information enabled participants to correctly recollect the majority of presented words, it most likely also increased the proportion of false memories of words with semantic associations to the presented words both in recall and recognition tests. In all three experiments, the presence of an auditory deviant in background speech did not increase the rate of false memories, suggesting that attentional capture alone does not necessarily induce source monitoring errors. However, Experiment 3 revealed that an increase in visual task-encoding load attenuated the changing-state effect on the production of false memories. This indicates that the semantic organisation processes initiated as a result of the loss of order information in case of changing-state speech may be sensitive to attentional control.

The memory trace of an intrusive trauma-analog episode.

Intrusive memories are a core symptom of posttraumatic stress disorder. Compared with memories of everyday events, they are characterized by several seemingly contradictory features: intrusive memories contain distinct sensory and emotional details of the traumatic event and can be triggered by various perceptually similar cues, but they are poorly integrated into conceptual memory. Here, we conduct exploratory whole-brain analyses to investigate the neural representations of trauma-analog experiences and how they are reactivated during memory intrusions. We show that trauma-analog movies induce excessive processing and generalized representations in sensory areas but decreased blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) responses and highly distinct representations in conceptual/semantic areas. Intrusive memories activate generalized representations in sensory areas and reactivate memory traces specific to trauma-analog events in the anterior cingulate cortex. These findings provide the first evidence of how traumatic events could distort memory representations in the human brain, which may form the basis for future confirmatory research on the neural representations of traumatic experiences.

Bilateral eye movements disrupt the involuntary perceptual representation of trauma-related memories.

Bilateral eye movement (EM) is a critical component in eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR), an effective treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder. However, the role of bilateral EM in alleviating trauma-related symptoms is unclear. Here we hypothesize that bilateral EM selectively disrupts the perceptual representation of traumatic memories. We used the trauma film paradigm as an analog for trauma experience. Nonclinical participants viewed trauma films followed by a bilateral EM intervention or a static Fixation period as a control. Perceptual and semantic memories for the film were assessed with different measures. Results showed a significant decrease in perceptual memory recognition shortly after the EM intervention and subsequently in the frequency and vividness of film-related memory intrusions across one week, relative to the Fixation condition. The EM intervention did not affect the explicit recognition of semantic memories, suggesting a dissociation between perceptual and semantic memory disruption. Furthermore, the EM intervention effectively reduced psychophysiological affective responses, including the skin conductance response and pupil size, to film scenes and subjective affective ratings of film-related intrusions. Together, bilateral EMs effectively reduce the perceptual representation and affective response of trauma-related memories. Further theoretical developments are needed to elucidate the mechanism of bilateral EMs in trauma treatment.