What Makes a Discovery Successful? The Story of Linda Buck and the Olfactory Receptors.

In 1991, Buck and Axel published a landmark study in Cell for work that was awarded the 2004 Nobel Prize. The identification of the olfactory receptors as the largest family of GPCRs catapulted olfaction into mainstream neurobiology. This BenchMark revisits Buck's experimental innovation and its surprising success at the time.

Great ape interaction: Ladyginian but not Gricean.

Nonhuman great apes inform one another in ways that can seem very humanlike. Especially in the gestural domain, their behavior exhibits many similarities with human communication, meeting widely used empirical criteria for intentionality. At the same time, there remain some manifest differences, most obviously the enormous range and scope of human expression. How to account for these similarities and differences in a unified way remains a major challenge. Here, we make a key distinction between the expression of intentions (Ladyginian) and the expression of specifically informative intentions (Gricean), and we situate this distinction within a "special case of" framework for classifying different modes of attention manipulation. We hence describe how the attested tendencies of great ape interaction-for instance, to be dyadic rather than triadic, to be about the here-and-now rather than "displaced," and to have a high degree of perceptual resemblance between form and meaning-are products of its Ladyginian but not Gricean character. We also reinterpret video footage of great ape gesture as Ladyginian but not Gricean, and we distinguish several varieties of meaning that are continuous with one another. We conclude that the evolutionary origins of linguistic meaning lie not in gradual changes in communication systems, but rather in gradual changes in social cognition, and specifically in what modes of attention manipulation are enabled by a species' cognitive phenotype: first Ladyginian and in turn Gricean. The second of these shifts rendered humans, and only humans, "language ready."

Asking a question.

While scientific research should be carried out objectively, the choices of questions asked and approaches taken are deeply personal and subjective. I urge individuals to pursue questions they love and to periodically scrutinize the reasons (the philosophies) that drive that love. As a case study, I scrutinize the "whys" behind some of the scientific questions I pursued during my career.

Rethinking plasticity: Analysing the concept of "destructive plasticity" in the light of neuroscience definitions.

As a multilevel and multidisciplinary field, neuroscience is designed to interact with various branches of natural and applied sciences as well as with humanities and philosophy. The continental tradition in philosophy, particularly over the past 20 years, tended to establish strong connections with biology and neuroscience findings. This cross fertilization can however be impeded by conceptual intricacies, such as those surrounding the concept of plasticity. The use of this concept has broadened as scientists applied it to explore an ever-growing range of biological phenomena. Here, we examine the consequences of this ambiguity in an interdisciplinary context through the analysis of the concept of "destructive plasticity" in the philosophical writings of Catherine Malabou. The term "destructive plasticity" was coined by Malabou in 2009 to refer to all processes leading to psycho-cognitive and emotional alterations following traumatic or nontraumatic brain injuries or resulting from neurodevelopmental disorders. By comparing it with the neuroscientific definitions of plasticity, we discuss the epistemological obstacles and possibilities related to the integration of this concept into neuroscience. Improving interdisciplinary exchanges requires an advanced and sophisticated manipulation of neurobiological concepts. These concepts are not only intended to guide research programmes within neuroscience but also to organize and frame the dialogue between different theoretical backgrounds.

Exploring undiscovered public knowledge in neuroscience.

In this essay, I argue that the combination of research synthesis and philosophical methods can fill an important methodological gap in neuroscience. While experimental research and formal modelling have seen their methods progressively increase in rigour and sophistication over the years, the task of analysing and synthesizing the vast literature reporting new results and models has lagged behind. The problem is aggravated because neuroscience has grown and expanded into a vast mosaic of related but partially independent subfields, each with their own literatures. This fragmentation not only makes it difficult to see the full picture emerging from neuroscience research but also limits progress in individual subfields. The current neuroscience literature has the perfect conditions to create what the information scientist Don Swanson called "undiscovered public knowledge"-knowledge that exists in the mutual implications of different published pieces of information but that is nonetheless undiscovered because those pieces have not been explicitly connected. Current methods for rigorous research synthesis, such as systematic reviews and meta-analyses, mostly focus on combining similar studies and are not suited for exploring undiscovered public knowledge. To that aim, they need to be adapted and supplemented. I argue that successful exploration of the hidden implications in the neuroscience literature will require the combination of these adapted research synthesis methods with philosophical methods for rigorous (and creative) analysis and synthesis.

The motifs of radical embodied neuroscience.

In this paper, I analyse how the emerging scientific framework of radical embodied neuroscience is different from contemporary mainstream cognitive neuroscience. To do so, I propose the notion of motif to enrich the philosophical toolkit of cognitive neuroscience. This notion can be used to characterize the guiding ideas of any given scientific framework in psychology and neuroscience. Motifs are highly unconstrained, open-ended concepts that support equally open-ended families of explanations. Different scientific frameworks-e.g., psychophysics or cognitive neuroscience-provide these motifs to answer the overarching themes of these disciplines, such as the relationship between stimuli and sensations or the proper methods of the sciences of the mind. Some motifs of mainstream cognitive neuroscience are the motif of encoding, the motif of input-output systems, and the motif of algorithms. The two first ones answer the question about the relationship between stimuli, sensations and experience (e.g., stimuli are input and are encoded by brain structures). The latter one answers the question regarding the mechanism of cognition and experience. The three of them are equally unconstrained and open-ended, and they serve as an umbrella for different kinds of explanation-i.e., different positions regarding what counts as a code or as an input. Along with the articulation of the notion of motif, the main aim of this article is to present three motifs for radical embodied neuroscience: the motif of complex stimulation, the motif of organic behaviour and the motif of resonance.

Why nature matters: A systematic review of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values.

In this article, we present results from a literature review of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values of nature conducted for the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, as part of the Methodological Assessment of the Diverse Values and Valuations of Nature. We identify the most frequently recurring meanings in the heterogeneous use of different value types and their association with worldviews and other key concepts. From frequent uses, we determine a core meaning for each value type, which is sufficiently inclusive to serve as an umbrella over different understandings in the literature and specific enough to help highlight its difference from the other types of values. Finally, we discuss convergences, overlapping areas, and fuzzy boundaries between different value types to facilitate dialogue, reduce misunderstandings, and improve the methods for valuation of nature's contributions to people, including ecosystem services, to inform policy and direct future research.

Emergent Properties in Chemistry - Relating Molecular Properties to Bulk Behavior.

Certain properties of an object only emerge when a sufficient number of those objects are present in a definite arrangement. For example, one or two water molecules cannot said to be in a liquid state, but a drop of water can be. This concept of emergence has been studied extensively, but only occasionally discussed explicitly in the context of chemistry. In this paper, we aim to show the fruitfulness of the concept of emergence for chemical inquiry by considering four case studies of emergent chemical properties, i. e., the liquidity and freezing of water, structural properties of crystals, thermodynamical phase transitions and quantum mechanical phenomena. We show that some of these properties emerge gradually, some at discrete points, and some should be taken to emerge only when the number of constituents tends to infinity. We argue that studying the way in which chemical properties emerge presents a useful avenue for research that promises greater insight into the nature of those properties.

Methodological advice for the young at heart investigator: Triangulation to build better foundations.

In medicine and science, one is typically taught the main theories in a discipline or field along with standard models before receiving more instructions on how to apply certain methods. The aim of this work is not to address one method, but rather methodology, the study and evaluation of methods, by taking a philosophy of science detour. In this, a critique of biomedicine will be used as a starting point to address some positions regarding reductionism, specifying notions such as systems and mechanisms, as well as regarding the mind-body problem discussing psychosomatic medicine and psychoneuroimmunology. Some recommendations to make science more pluralistic, robust and translationally-relevant will then be made as a way to foster constructive debates on reductionism and the mind-body problem and, in turn, favor more interdisciplinary research.

On the scientific credibility of paleoanthropology.

Smith and Smith and Wood proposed that the human fossil record offers special challenges for causal hypotheses because "unique" adaptations resist the comparative method. We challenge their notions of "uniqueness" and offer a refutation of the idea that there is something epistemologically special about human prehistoric data. Although paleontological data may be sparse, there is nothing inherent about this information that prevents its use in the inductive or deductive process, nor in the generation and testing of scientific hypotheses. The imprecision of the fossil record is well-understood, and such imprecision is often factored into hypotheses and methods. While we acknowledge some oversteps within the discipline, we also note that the history of paleoanthropology is clearly one of progress, with ideas tested and resolution added as data (fossils) are uncovered and new technologies applied, much like in sciences as diverse as astronomy, molecular genetics, and geology.