Athletic enhancement and human nature.

There is a well-established asymmetry in our judgments of performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) in sports and in other competitive activities. When an athlete is found using such drugs, it is a scandal that prompts public outrage, fan disappointment, and even loss of title. It seems that we judge enhanced results cannot be genuinely attributed to athletes. There is no similar reaction to use of PEDs in art, science, music, literature, business, and other human endeavors. The question I tackle in this paper is whether this disanalogy is justified: Is there some underlying difference in virtue of which PEDs should be thus stigmatized in sports but not elsewhere? I survey a couple of potential justifications that I find lacking. I then consider the difference in our judgments of the participation of superman-like characters in sports (which we censure) and in other activities (which we endorse). I argue that the fact that the athlete is human is relevant to the value of sports-and by extension, the status of the effort involved-while this fact plays no significant role with regard to the value of other activities and that this difference in the value of activities ultimately justifies our differing judgments here. I then return to my initial question and examine whether similar appeal to what is human can justify the varying judgments of the use of PEDs. I argue that it can but only under certain assumptions. I conclude by discussing wider implication of my suggestion.

Notes on [post]human nursing: What It MIGHT Be, What it is Not.

With this paper, we walk out some central ideas about posthumanisms and the ways in which nursing is already deeply entangled with them. At the same time, we point to ways in which nursing might benefit from further entanglement with other ideas emerging from posthumanisms. We first offer up a brief history of posthumanisms, following multiple roots to several points of formation. We then turn to key flavors of posthuman thought to differentiate between them and clarify our collective understanding and use of the terms. This includes considerations of the threads of transhumanism, critical posthumanism, feminist new materialism, and the speculative, affirmative ethics that arise from critical posthumanism and feminist new materialism. These ideas are fruitful for nursing, and already in action in many cases, which is the matter we occupy ourselves with in the final third of the paper. We consider the ways nursing is already posthuman-sometimes even critically so-and the speculative worldbuilding of nursing as praxis. We conclude with visions for a critical posthumanist nursing that attends to humans and other/more/nonhumans, situated and material and embodied and connected, in relation.

No evidence that belief in conspiracy theories is negatively related to attitudes toward transhumanism.

Transhumanism is a movement that emphasizes the improvement of the human condition by developing technologies and making them widely available. Conspiracy theories regularly refer to the allegedly transhumanist agenda of elites. We hypothesized that belief in conspiracy theories would be related to more unfavorable attitudes toward the transhumanist movement. We examined this association through two pre-registered studies (based on two French samples, total N after exclusion = 550). We found no evidence of a negative relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and attitudes toward transhumanism. This null result was further corroborated by Bayesian analysis, an equivalence test, and an internal mini meta-analysis. This work plays a precursory role in understanding attitudes toward an international cultural and intellectual movement that continues to grow in popularity and influence.

Genetic enhancement from the perspective of transhumanism: exploring a new paradigm of transhuman evolution.

Transhumanism is a movement that advocates for the enhancement of human capabilities through the use of advanced technologies such as genetic enhancement. This article explores the definition, history, and development of transhumanism. Then, it compares the stance on genetic enhancement from the perspectives of bio-conservatism, bio-liberalism, and transhumanism. This article posits that transhuman evolution has twofold implications, allowing for the integration of transhumanist research and evolutionary biology. First, it offers a compelling scientific framework for understanding genetic enhancement, avoiding technological progressivism, and incorporating concepts of evolutionary biology. Second, it represents a new evolutionary paradigm distinct from traditional Lamarckism and Darwinism. It marks the third synthesis of evolutionary biology, offering fresh perspectives on established concepts such as artificial selection and gene-culture co-evolution. In recent decades, human enhancement has captivated not only evolutionary biologists, neurobiologists, psychologists, and philosophers, but also those in fields such as cybernetics and artificial intelligence. In addition to genetic enhancement, other human enhancement technologies, including brain-computer interfaces and brain uploading, are currently under development, which the paradigm of transhuman evolution can better integrate into its framework.

A world of difference: The fundamental opposition between transhumanist "welfarism" and disability advocacy.

From the standpoint of disability advocacy, further exploration of the concept of well-being stands to be availing. The notion that "welfarism" about disability, which Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane debuted, qualifies as helpful is encouraged by their claim that welfarism shares important commitments with that advocacy. As becomes clear when they apply their welfarist frame to procreative decisions, endorsing welfarism would, in fact, sharply undermine it. Savulescu and Kahane's Principle of Procreative Beneficence-which reflects transhumanism, or advocacy of radical bioenhancement-morally requires parents to choose the child who will, in all probability, have "the best life." Assuming the emergence of potent biotechnologies, procreative decision-making would be highly standardized, for prospective parents would be morally obliged to maximize select capacities, including intelligence, self-control, and hedonic set-point, in their children. Welfarism, applied to reproduction, is staunchly objectivist about what course is incumbent on decision-makers, giving no credence to first-personal values, aspirations, and experiences. Though this dismissal of individual perspectives applies to everyone, its implications for disability advocacy are especially severe. With that advocacy in view, greater attention to "well-being" should, therefore, be severed from the welfarism of Savulescu and Kahane.

Is enhancement inherently ableist?

Transhumanists and other proponents of enhancement have been criticized for their attitude to disability. Melinda Hall argues that transhumanists denigrate disabled people by devaluing interdependence and vulnerability, and implying that disabled people are dangerous. It might also be thought that further development of enhancement technologies would have bad consequences within current, ableist and otherwise oppressive social contexts. This paper responds to these objections, arguing that enhancement needn't be in conflict with disability justice. While enhancements can be used and promoted in ways that reinforce ableism and other oppression, ways of mitigating these problems might be found by drawing on ideas from the disability rights movement, and social justice movements more broadly. The development of more accessible environments, and a general openness to surprises about which traits promote well-being, can help to create conditions under which people have genuine choice over which enhancement technologies, if any, to use.

Moral enhancement, acquired virtue, and theism: A response to Brummett and Crutchfield.

Recently, Brummett and Crutchfield advanced two critiques of theists who object to moral enhancement. First, a conceptual critique: theists who oppose moral enhancement commonly do so because virtue is thought to be acquired only via a special kind of process. Enhancement does not involve such processes. Hence, enhancement cannot produce virtue. Yet theists also commonly claim that God is perfectly virtuous and not subject to processes. If virtue requires a process and God is perfectly virtuous without a process, however, then theists contradict themselves. Second, a moral critique: theists who reject moral enhancement are selfish, because accepting moral enhancement would (allegedly) reduce widespread suffering. Theists often condemn selfishness, however. By condemning selfishness and (simultaneously) rejecting enhancement, therefore, theists contradict themselves yet again. We argue that both critiques fail. Both substantially misrepresent their target. First, Brummett and Crutchfield confuse metaphysical enhancement (attempts to alter human nature) with moral enhancement (attempts to become better human beings). Authors that Brummett and Crutchfield cite object to the former, not the latter. Second, both conceptual and moral critiques overlook the many resources within theistic traditions that can quickly resolve relevant (alleged) contradictions. The conceptual critique, for example, misrepresents both common views held among theists (regarding God's virtue) and the ways in which virtue may be acquired. Similarly, the moral critique mischaracterizes the relationship commonly posited by theists between enhancement and agency. By attending to what theists actually claim-rather than relying on caricatures-it becomes clear that each of Brummett and Crutchfield's critiques fail.

Genetic enhancement, human extinction, and the best interests of posthumanity.

The cumulative impact of enhancement technologies may alter the human species in the very long-term future. In this article, I will start showing how radical genetic enhancements may accelerate the conversion into a novel species. I will also clarify the concepts of 'biological species', 'transhuman' and 'posthuman'. Then, I will summarize some ethical arguments for creating a transhuman or posthuman species with a substantially higher level of well-being than the human one. In particular, I will present what I shall call the Principle of the Best Interests of Posthumanity, which states that the enhancement of the human and transhuman species must be directed towards the creation of a posthuman existence that is substantially more valuable than its predecessors. I suggest that human extinction may be considered, within that principle, as one of the best interests of posthumanity. Finally, I will develop three objections that make that principle unattractive and that show that pursuing a full-blown programme of posthuman evolution is ethically flawed.

On the (Non-)Rationality of Human Enhancement and Transhumanism.

The human enhancement debate has over the last few decades been concerned with ethical issues in methods for improving the physical, cognitive, or emotive states of individual people, and of the human species as a whole. Arguments in favour of enhancement defend it as a paradigm of rationality, presenting it as a clear-eyed, logical defence of what we stand to gain from transcending the typical limits of our species. If these arguments are correct, it appears that adults should in principle be able to make rational and informed decisions about enhancing themselves. In this paper, however, we suggest that a rational and informed choice to enhance oneself may in some cases be impossible. Drawing on L. A. Paul's work on 'transformative experience', we argue that some enhancements-such as certain moral or cognitive modifications-may give rise to unbridgeable epistemic gaps in key domains. Importantly, such gaps could prove to be not merely contingently unbridgeable due to a lack of information at a given moment, but radically unbridgeable, making someone in a non-enhanced state inherently unable to conceive of what it would be like to be enhanced in a particular way. Where this experience is key to understanding what values are being pursued by the enhancement itself, it may prove impossible for a person to be sufficiently informed, and to make a rational decision about whether or not to enhance herself. This poses a challenge for human enhancement proponents in general, and for transhumanists in particular.

Human Nature and Aspiring the Divine: On Antiquity and Transhumanism.

Many transhumanists see their respective movement as being rooted in ancient ethical thought. However, this alleged connection between the contemporary transhumanist doctrine and the ethical theory of antiquity has come under attack. In this paper, we defend this connection by pointing out a key similarity between the two intellectual traditions. Both traditions are committed to the "radical transformation thesis": ancient ethical theory holds that we should assimilate ourselves to the gods as far as possible, and transhumanists hold that we should enhance ourselves beyond the physical and intellectual parameters of being human so as to become posthuman. By considering the two views in tandem, we develop an account of the assimilation directive that is palatable to contemporary readers and provide a view of posthumanism worth wanting.

(Re)-Emerging Challenges in Christian Bioethics: Leading Voices in Christian Bioethics.

This is the third installment in a Christian Bioethics series that gathers leading voices in Christian bioethics to examine the themes and issues they find most pressing. The papers address fundamental theoretical questions about the nature of Christian bioethics itself, long-standing ethical issues that remain significant today, including physician-assisted suicide, euthanasia, the definition of death, the allocation of scarce resources, and finally, more futuristic questions regarding transhumanism. The contributions underscore the enduring significance of Christian engagement in bioethics.

Transhumanism and African humanism: How to pursue the transhumanist vision without jeopardizing humanity.

African humanism should be considered more in the theoretical discussion on transhumanism. Using an underexplored humanistic philosophy of Ubuntu, this article shows how the perspective from the global south provides guidelines for pursuing transhumanism without jeopardizing humanism. It argues that heuristics from African (Ubuntu) humanism can serve transhumanist goals. While transhumanism has attracted severe criticisms from bio-conservatives, this article counterargues some salient objections. Drawing on an Ubuntu understanding of humanism, this article posits that the transhumanist vision of the posthuman does not threaten our humanity. Ubuntu humanism is shown to be supportive of transhumanism and can plausibly serve as a guide to protecting transhumanist trajectories from potential abuses. This article concludes that the embedded values of African humanism deserve to be taken seriously in galvanizing global trust in transhuman futures.

Treatise on the influence of theism, transhumanism, and posthumanism on nursing and rehabilitation healthcare practice.

Reservations concerning the ontologies of theism, transhumanism and posthumanism compel an explicatory discourse on their influences on Nursing and rehabilitation healthcare. Key journals in Nursing and health sciences have recently devoted themed issues on intelligent machine technologies such as humanoid healthcare robots and other highly technological healthcare devices and practice initiatives. While the technological advance witnessed has been a cause for celebration, questions still remain that are focused on the epistemological concerns. The purpose of this article is to discuss theistic ontologies such as the Judeo-Christian, Shinto-Buddhist and Islamic religious belief systems on transhumanism and posthumanism in the assimilation of symbiotic technological beings in Nursing and rehabilitation healthcare practice. In view of the approaching technological singularity dominating arguments regarding the future of human beings, a treatise on Nursing and rehabilitation health care is positioned well within the realms of human care. Theism, transhumanism and posthumanism are directing discussions regarding human beings and healthcare processes. It is imperative that the beneficial effects of these discussions be acknowledged within the highly technological world of Nursing and rehabilitative healthcare.

Transhumanism, Moral Perfection, and Those 76 Trombones.

Transhumanism advances an ideology promising a positive human advance through the application of new and as yet unrealized technologies. Underlying the whole is a libertarian ethos married to a very Christian eschatology promising a miraculous transformation that will answer human needs and redress human failings. In this paper, the supposedly scientific basis on which transhumanist promises are built is critiqued as futurist imaginings with little likelihood of actualization. Transhumanists themselves are likened to the affable con man Professor Harold Hill who, in The Music Man, describes as dire social problems whose solution is a youth band he seeks to sell but has no intention of building. Even were some of the transhumanist imaginings to be realized, I argue, the result would be a dystopia in which the few received benefits denied to the many. In advancing imaginary technologies as a solution to human needs, transhumanists and their bioethical fellow travelers handily avoid discussion of or advocacy for the kind of pedestrian social actions that demonstrably could achieve many of their purported goals. So their enthusiasms, I conclude, are not merely fanciful but damaging to the humanist goals they pretend to advance.

Why Should We Become Posthuman? The Beneficence Argument Questioned.

Why should we become posthuman? There is only one morally compelling answer to this question: because posthumanity will be a more beneficial state, better than present humanity. This is the Posthuman Beneficence Argument (PBA), the centerpiece of the liberal transhumanist defense of "directed evolution." In this article, I examine PBA and find it deficient on a number of lethal counts. My argument focuses on the writings of transhumanist philosopher Nick Bostrom, who has developed the most articulate defense of PBA and disclosed its metaethical framework. I begin by locating PBA in the context of wider transhumanist claims for the desirability of posthumanity. I identify two crucial components: (1) a model of deliberative rationality, requiring reasons to endorse claims; and (2) the reasons themselves (i.e., the greater beneficence that posthumanity represents). I examine these two conditions, in turn, specifying the claims that they ask us to accept. Following Bostrom, I argue that there is a need for a foundationalist approach that assures us of some universality in the process of valuation. This is required to appropriately ground the moral continuity and appeal to universality that PBA demands. I examine the reasons why this approach ultimately fails, leaving posthumanity as an unintelligible concept with no moral force. I conclude by identifying (and endorsing) a more mature approach to the debate on human enhancement, one that forfeits the grandiose but baseless claims too often found in transhumanist defenses of directed evolution. In short, posthumanity may be a good science fiction trope, but it has no normative force in the moral philosophy of human enhancement.

Can the Thought of Teilhard de Chardin Carry Us Past Current Contentious Discussions of Gene Editing Technologies?

The advent of CRISPR-Cas9 technology has increased attention, and contention, regarding the use and regulation of genome editing technologies. Public discussions continue to give evidence of this debate falling back into the previous polarized positions of technological enthusiasts versus those who are more cautious in their approach. One response to this contentious relapse could be to view this promising and problematic new technology from a radically different perspective that embraces both the excitement of this technological advance and the prudence necessary to use it well. The thought of Teilhard de Chardin provides this desired perspective, and some insights that may help carry forward public discussions to achieve widely accepted uses and regulations.

Transhumanist Medicine: Can We Direct Its Power to the Service of Human Dignity?

The medicalization of transhumanist technologies demands our prompt and undivided attention. This article surveys the principal body/mind enhancement goals of transhumanist medicine and the means it would employ-genetic, robo, info-, and nanotechnologies-to accomplish those ends (Part One). Second, it engages Christian anthropological and natural law principles to evaluate the populist and essentialist concerns these therapeutic/enhancement interventions provoke (Part Two). And, third, it proposes formation of a Catholic medical think tank to appraise whether transhumanist biotechnologies can serve human dignity and, to the extent they can, to formulate wise clinical/administrative guidelines for their inclusion in US Catholic healthcare settings (Part Three). NONTECHNICAL SUMMARY: This article explores the body/mind enhancement goals of transhumanist medicine, evaluates the biotechnological means to accomplish those therapeutic/enhancement goals, and suggests the formation of a Catholic medical think tank to formulate wise clinical/administrative guidelines for the inclusion of genetic, robo, info-, and nanotechnologies in US Catholic healthcare settings.

Will Life Be Worth Living in a World Without Work? Technological Unemployment and the Meaning of Life.

Suppose we are about to enter an era of increasing technological unemployment. What implications does this have for society? Two distinct ethical/social issues would seem to arise. The first is one of distributive justice: how will the (presumed) efficiency gains from automated labour be distributed through society? The second is one of personal fulfillment and meaning: if people no longer have to work, what will they do with their lives? In this article, I set aside the first issue and focus on the second. In doing so, I make three arguments. First, I argue that there are good reasons to embrace non-work and that these reasons become more compelling in an era of technological unemployment. Second, I argue that the technological advances that make widespread technological unemployment possible could still threaten or undermine human flourishing and meaning, especially if (as is to be expected) they do not remain confined to the economic sphere. And third, I argue that this threat could be contained if we adopt an integrative approach to our relationship with technology. In advancing these arguments, I draw on three distinct literatures: (1) the literature on technological unemployment and workplace automation; (2) the antiwork critique-which I argue gives reasons to embrace technological unemployment; and (3) the philosophical debate about the conditions for meaning in life-which I argue gives reasons for concern.

Bioethics and Transhumanism.

Transhumanism is a "technoprogressive" socio-political and intellectual movement that advocates for the use of technology in order to transform the human organism radically, with the ultimate goal of becoming "posthuman." To this end, transhumanists focus on and encourage the use of new and emerging technologies, such as genetic engineering and brain-machine interfaces. In support of their vision for humanity, and as a way of reassuring those "bioconservatives" who may balk at the radical nature of that vision, transhumanists claim common ground with a number of esteemed thinkers and traditions, from the ancient philosophy of Plato and Aristotle to the postmodern philosophy of Nietzsche. It is crucially important to give proper scholarly attention to transhumanism now, not only because of its recent and ongoing rise as a cultural and political force (and the concomitant potential ramifications for bioethical discourse and public policy), but because of the imminence of major breakthroughs in the kinds of technologies that transhumanism focuses on. Thus, the articles in this issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy are either explicitly about transhumanism or are on topics, such as the ethics of germline engineering and criteria for personhood, that are directly relevant to the debate between transhumanists (and technoprogressives more broadly) and bioconservatives.

The Posthuman as Hollow Idol: A Nietzschean Critique of Human Enhancement.

In this paper, the author aims to show that transhumanists are confused about their own conception of the posthuman: transhumanists anticipate radical transformation of the human through technology and at the same time assume that the criteria to determine what is "normal" and what is "enhanced" are univocal, both in our present time and in the future. Inspired by Nietzsche's notion of the Overhuman, the author argues that the slightest "historical and phenomenological sense" discloses copious variations of criteria, both diachronic and synchronic, for what can be considered "normal" and "enhanced." Radical transformation through technology does not simply enable us to become "stronger," "smarter," or "healthier," but it can and often will also change the very standard or yardstick with which we measure what counts as "stronger," "smarter," or "healthier." Put yet differently: new and emerging technologies are not neutral means but often bring about different and, from our current perspective, foreign standards for determining what are "normal" and "enhanced" capacities. Since the qualitative meanings of these terms are themselves not fixed, it is unintelligible and too reassuring to simply predict that new technologies will enhance human beings.