Implementing clinical and financial collaboration between payers and providers.

An IPA learned three important lessons while implementing a clinical and financial collaboration with its payers: Eliminate mixed messages. Focus on delivery and operational changes, not just payment change. Set realistic expectations and deliver on them.

Delivery system reform tracking: a framework for understanding change.

The health care delivery system is changing rapidly, with providers forming patient-centered medical homes and exploring the creation of accountable care organizations. Enactment of the Affordable Care Act will likely accelerate these changes. Significant delivery system reforms will simultaneously affect the structures, capabilities, incentives, and outcomes of the delivery system. With so many changes taking place at once, there is a need for a new tool to track progress at the community level. Many of the necessary data elements for a delivery system reform tracking tool are already being collected in various places and by different stakeholders. The authors propose that all elements be brought together in a unified whole to create a detailed picture of delivery system change. This brief provides a rationale for creating such a tool and presents a framework for doing so.

Do integrated medical groups provide higher-quality medical care than individual practice associations?

BACKGROUND: The association between the organizational structure of physician groups and health care quality has never been evaluated empirically. OBJECTIVE: To examine whether integrated medical groups (IMGs) provide higher-quality primary care than individual practice associations (IPAs). DESIGN: Cross-sectional study. SETTING: PacifiCare, a large health maintenance organization. PARTICIPANTS: Approximately 1.7 million enrollees of PacifiCare cared for by 119 California physician groups between July 1999 and June 2000. MEASUREMENTS: The percentage of eligible PacifiCare enrollees who received mammography, Papanicolaou smear screening, chlamydia screening, diabetic eye examination, an asthma controller medication, or a beta-blocker after acute myocardial infarction. RESULTS: Physician groups identified as IMGs, compared with those identified as IPAs, had higher rates of mammography (relative risk, 1.15 [95% CI, 1.01 to 1.33]), Papanicolaou smear screening (relative risk, 2.29 [CI, 1.53 to 3.42]), chlamydia screening (relative risk, 2.17 [CI, 1.04 to 4.55]), and diabetic eye screening (relative risk, 1.55 [CI, 1.28 to 1.88]). Leaders of IMGs were more likely to report using EMRs (37% vs. 2%; P < 0.001) and quality improvement strategies, but these characteristics explained little of the quality differences between IMGs and IPAs. LIMITATIONS: Organizational characteristics, including group type, were reported by physician group leaders and not directly assessed. Patient characteristics that could have accounted for some of the observed differences also were not assessed. CONCLUSIONS: Patients cared for in IMGs generally received higher-quality primary care than those cared for in IPAs. Having an EMR and implementation of quality improvement strategies did not explain the differences in quality. These findings suggest that physician group type influences health care quality.

Incentive implementation in physician practices: A qualitative study of practice executive perspectives on pay for performance.

Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs offer health care providers financial incentives to achieve predefined quality targets. Practice executives sit at a key nexus point for determining how P4P programs are implemented in physician practices. Using a qualitative interview design, this article examines the role practice executives play in the implementation of P4P programs and how their perspectives and decisions can influence the success of these programs. The authors identified five key findings related to practice executives' views on P4P: quality incentives are better than utilization incentives, quality incentives are bonus rewards, quality incentives are agents for change, providers do not feel they have control over attaining quality targets, and the ways in which quality is measured are problematic. The authors discuss five different ways in which practice executives distribute rewards to physicians. These findings may help payers more effectively design and implement financial rewards for quality.

Pay for performance: its influence on the use of IT in physician organizations.

The introduction of information technology (IT) in physician organizations and practices is a source of great interest to physician leaders and policy makers. In this article, the authors describe what may be the nation's largest pay-for-performance program, its performance metrics, and incentives for the implementation and use of IT in medical groups and independent physician associations (IPAs). Results include the increased use of electronic clinical data, point-of-care technology, and the generation of more actionable reports for quality improvement. Noteworthy are the efforts by physician organizations to enhance data collection to demonstrate improved clinical performance and earn financial incentives.

An empirical assessment of high-performing medical groups: results from a national study.

The performance of medical groups is receiving increased attention. Relatively little conceptual or empirical work exists that examines the various dimensions of medical group performance. Using a national database of 693 medical groups, this article develops a scorecard approach to assessing group performance and presents a theory-driven framework for differentiating between high-performing versus low-performing medical groups. The clinical quality of care, financial performance, and organizational learning capability of medical groups are assessed in relation to environmental forces, resource acquisition and resource deployment factors, and a quality-centered culture. Findings support the utility of the performance scorecard approach and identification of a number of key factors differentiating high-performing from low-performing groups including, in particular, the importance of a quality-centered culture and the requirement of outside reporting from third party organizations. The findings hold a number of important implications for policy and practice, and the framework presented provides a foundation for future research.

Physicians as gatekeepers. The impact of financial incentives.

Incentives encouraging physicians to reduce their use of diagnostic tests are controversial. We studied physicians enrolled in an independent practitioner association who see both fee-for-service and prepaid (health maintenance organization [HMO]) patients concurrently. We asked the following questions: (1) Do physicians order fewer tests for their patients enrolled in an HMO relative to their patients seen on a fee-for-service basis? (2) Are any reductions in testing selective or indiscriminate? We reviewed the charts of 273 new patients, 167 enrolled in a fee-for-service system and 106 enrolled in an HMO, who were seen by 17 physicians "for a check-up," and graded test use as "indicated" or "discretionary." We used multiple logistic regression to control for the effects of patient age and sex. Patients in the HMO underwent fewer tests than did patients in the fee-for-service system, as well as fewer discretionary tests, but received the same proportion of preventive services. We conclude that physicians ordered fewer tests for patients in the HMO, apparently because of selective omission of discretionary tests. Physicians also did not reduce preventive services for patients in the HMO relative to all other physicians.

Organizational factors affecting the adoption of diabetes care management processes in physician organizations.

OBJECTIVE: To describe the extent of adoption of diabetes care management processes in physician organizations in the U.S. and to investigate the organizational factors that affect the adoption of diabetes care management processes. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS: Data are derived from the National Survey of Physician Organizations and the Management of Chronic Illness, conducted in 2000-2001. A total of 1,104 of the 1,590 physician organizations identified responded to the survey. The extent of adoption of four diabetes care management processes is measured by an index consisting of the organization's use of diabetic patient registries, clinical practice guidelines, case management, and physician feedback. The ordinary least-squares model is used to determine the association of organizational characteristics with the adoption of diabetes care management processes in physician organizations. A logistic regression model is used to determine the association of organizational characteristics with the adoption of individual diabetes care management processes. RESULTS: Of the 987 physician organizations studied that treat patients with diabetes, 48% either do not use any or use only one of the four diabetes care management processes. A total of 20% use two care management processes, and 32% use three or four processes. External incentives to improve quality, computerized clinical information systems, and ownership by hospitals or health maintenance organizations are strongly associated with the diabetes care management index and the adoption of individual diabetes care management processes. CONCLUSIONS: Policies to encourage external incentives to improve quality and to facilitate the adoption of computerized clinical information technology may promote greater use of diabetes care management processes.

Scale and structure of capitated physician organizations in California.

Physician organizations in California broke new ground in the 1980s by accepting capitated contracts and taking on utilization management functions. In this paper we present new data that document the scale, structure, and vertical affiliations of physician organizations that accept capitation in California. We provide information on capitated enrollment, the share of revenue derived by physician organizations from capitation contracts, and the scope of risk sharing with health maintenance organizations (HMOs). Capitation contracts and risk sharing dominate payment arrangements with HMOs. Physician organizations appear to have responded to capitation by affiliating with hospitals and management companies, adopting hybrid organizational structures, and consolidating into larger entities.

Independent practice association physician groups in California.

We surveyed independent practice association (IPA) physician groups in California about their approaches to staffing, physician payment, and governance. Most IPAs desired more primary care physicians but not more specialists. Capitation was the major mode of remuneration for primary care physicians in 77 percent of IPAs, and for specialists in 30 percent of IPAs. Most IPAs also used financial incentives related to use of referral or ancillary services. Boards of directors were dominated by physicians, but governance tended to be centralized rather than highly democratic. We found that IPAs mirror many of the broader trends in physician staffing and physician payment that exist in managed care organizations.