Links between law enforcement and veterinary animal health: a case study of the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

The anthrax attacks carried out in the United States of America in the latter part of 2001 served as a clarion call to most law enforcement agencies among developed countries as, until this time, they had not recognised the threat posed by the criminal use of pathogens and/or toxins. Law enforcement agencies include the local and federal police, Customs, Immigration and any other agencies that perform a law-enforcing role. That a criminal or terrorist group could commit such an act was considered nearly inconceivable, even though biological weapons had been used against humans and animals in warfare many times over the last several hundred years. Similarly, it is without doubt that the terrorist threat to all societies changed after the events of 11 September 2001 during which the clear intention had been to cause as many fatalities and casualties as possible. As a result, the biological threat to human health became a focus for many governments.

Les attaques à la fièvre charbonneuse perpétrés aux États-Unis d'Amérique à la fin de l'année 2001 ont lancé un signal d'alerte à la plupart des agences chargées de l'application des lois des pays développés, qui n'avaient jusqu'alors pas pris conscience des menaces posées par l'utilisation criminelle des agents pathogènes et/ou des toxines. Les agences chargées de l'application des lois sont notamment les forces de police locales et fédérales, les services des douanes, les services d'immigration et toute autre agence gouvernementale chargée du maintien de l'ordre et de la justice. Il était pratiquement inconcevable qu'un groupe criminel ou terroriste puisse commettre un tel acte, même si des armes biologiques avaient déjà été utilisées contre les populations humaines et animales au cours de certains conflits armés des siècles précédents. De même, il va sans dire que la menace terroriste pesant sur les sociétés dans leur ensemble a pris un nouveau visage après les événements du 11 septembre 2001, dont le but était clairement de faire le plus de victimes possible et de tuer le plus grand nombre de personnes possible. En conséquence, la menace biologique pesant sur la santé publique est devenue un domaine central d'attention pour nombre de gouvernements.

Los ataques con la bacteria del carbunco perpetrados en los Estados Unidos de América a finales de 2001 marcaron un antes y un después para la mayoría de los cuerpos de seguridad de los países desarrollados, que hasta la fecha no habían advertido la amenaza que planteaba el uso de patógenos y/o toxinas con fines criminales. Forman parte de los cuerpos de seguridad las fuerzas de policía local y federal, los cuerpos de aduanas, inmigración y demás instituciones cuya función consiste en velar por el cumplimiento de la ley. Que un grupo delictivo o terrorista pudiera cometer semejante acto era algo prácticamente inconcebible, aun cuando en los últimos siglos hayan menudeado los ejemplos de utilización de armas biológicas contra la población humana o animal como instrumento de guerra. Análogamente, no cabe duda alguna de que la amenaza terrorista que planea sobre todas las sociedades cambió a partir de los acontecimientos del 11 de septiembre de 2001, en los que la intención era claramente de causar tantos muertos y heridos como fuera posible. A resultas de aquello, las amenazas biológicas para la salud humana pasaron a ser una de las preocupaciones cardinales de muchos gobiernos.

Military Importance of Natural Toxins and Their Analogs.

Toxin weapon research, development, production and the ban on its uses is an integral part of international law, with particular attention paid to the protection against these weapons. In spite of this, hazards associated with toxins cannot be completely excluded. Some of these hazards are also pointed out in the present review. The article deals with the characteristics and properties of natural toxins and synthetic analogs potentially constituting the basis of toxin weapons. It briefly describes the history of military research and the use of toxins from distant history up to the present age. With respect to effective disarmament conventions, it mentions certain contemporary concepts of possible toxin applications for military purposes and the protection of public order (suppression of riots); it also briefly refers to the question of terrorism. In addition, it deals with certain traditional as well as modern technologies of the research, synthesis, and use of toxins, which can affect the continuing development of toxin weapons. These are, for example, cases of new toxins from natural sources, their chemical synthesis, production of synthetic analogs, the possibility of using methods of genetic engineering and modern biotechnologies or the possible applications of nanotechnology and certain pharmaceutical methods for the effective transfer of toxins into the organism. The authors evaluate the military importance of toxins based on their comparison with traditional chemical warfare agents. They appeal to the ethics of the scientific work as a principal condition for the prevention of toxin abuse in wars, military conflicts, as well as in non-military attacks.

John Bartlett and bioterrorism.

Until 1997, the subject of bioterrorism was not discussed within the medical community and deliberately ignored in national planning efforts. Biological weapons were regarded as "morally repulsive." This complacency stemmed from a 1972 Biological Weapons Convention where all countries agreed to cease offensive biological weapons research. In the 1990s, however, the Soviet Union was discovered to have an extensive bioweapons program and a Japanese religious cult sought to launch an anthrax attack on Tokyo. Biological weapons such as smallpox and anthrax had the potential to cause a national catastrophe. However, little was done until John Bartlett in 1997 led a symposium and program to educate the medical community and the country of the need for definitive bioweapons programs. It was highly persuasive and received a final stimulus when the anthrax attack occurred in the United States in 2001.

Insects as weapons of war, terror, and torture.

For thousands of years insects have been incorporated into human conflict, with the goals of inflicting pain, destroying food, and transmitting pathogens. Early methods used insects as "found" weapons, functioning as tactical arms (e.g., hurled nests) or in strategic habitats (e.g., mosquito-infested swamps). In the twentieth century the relationship between insects and disease was exploited; vectors were mass-produced to efficiently deliver pathogens to an enemy. The two most sophisticated programs were those of the Japanese in World War II with plague-infected fleas and cholera-coated flies and of the Americans during the Cold War with yellow fever-infected mosquitoes. With continued advances, defenses in the form of insecticides and vaccines meant that insects were no longer considered as battlefield weapons. However, in recent times sociopolitical changes have put insects back into the realm of human conflict through asymmetrical conflicts pitting combatants from nonindustrialized regions against forces from militarily and economically superior nations.

The Emergency Use Authorization of Pharmaceuticals: History and Utility During the COVID-19 Pandemic.

The Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) originated in 2004 because of the need for emergency medical countermeasures (MCMs) against potential bioterrorist attacks. The EUA also proved useful in dealing with subsequent pandemics and has emerged as a critical regulatory pathway for therapeutics and vaccines throughout the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. With the EUA process in the USA, we witnessed emergency authorizations, their expansions, as well as withdrawal of previously authorized products, which exemplifies the dynamic nature of scientific review of EUA products. EUAs proved vital for the first group of COVID-19 vaccines, including the temporary pause of one vaccine while emergency safety issues were evaluated. Although this review on the EUA is primarily focused on the USA, distinctions were made with other jurisdictions such as Europe and Canada with respect to the emergency authorizations of the vaccines. Finally, we discuss some important differences following EUA and formal new drug/vaccine application (NDA/BLA) approvals.

Biological warfare agents.

Biological warfare agents are a group of pathogens and toxins of biological origin that can be potentially misused for military or criminal purposes. The present review attempts to summarize necessary knowledge about biological warfare agents. The historical aspects, examples of applications of these agents such as anthrax letters, biological weapons impact, a summary of biological warfare agents and epidemiology of infections are described. The last section tries to estimate future trends in research on biological warfare agents.

Biowarfare, bioterrorism and biocrime: A historical overview on microbial harmful applications.

Microbial Forensics is a field that continues to grow in interest and application among the forensic community. This review, divided into two sections, covers several topics associated with this new field. The first section presents a historic overview concerning the use of microorganisms (or its product, i.e. toxins) as harmful biological agents in the context of biological warfare (biowarfare), bioterrorism, and biocrime. Each case is illustrated with the examination of case reports that span from prehistory to the present day. The second part of the manuscript is devoted to the role of MF and highlights the necessity to prepare for the pressing threat of the harmful use of biological agents as weapons. Preventative actions, developments within the field to ensure a timely and effective response and are discussed herein.

Extracting key information from historical data to quantify the transmission dynamics of smallpox.

BACKGROUND: Quantification of the transmission dynamics of smallpox is crucial for optimizing intervention strategies in the event of a bioterrorist attack. This article reviews basic methods and findings in mathematical and statistical studies of smallpox which estimate key transmission parameters from historical data. MAIN FINDINGS: First, critically important aspects in extracting key information from historical data are briefly summarized. We mention different sources of heterogeneity and potential pitfalls in utilizing historical records. Second, we discuss how smallpox spreads in the absence of interventions and how the optimal timing of quarantine and isolation measures can be determined. Case studies demonstrate the following. (1) The upper confidence limit of the 99th percentile of the incubation period is 22.2 days, suggesting that quarantine should last 23 days. (2) The highest frequency (61.8%) of secondary transmissions occurs 3-5 days after onset of fever so that infected individuals should be isolated before the appearance of rash. (3) The U-shaped age-specific case fatality implies a vulnerability of infants and elderly among non-immune individuals. Estimates of the transmission potential are subsequently reviewed, followed by an assessment of vaccination effects and of the expected effectiveness of interventions. CONCLUSION: Current debates on bio-terrorism preparedness indicate that public health decision making must account for the complex interplay and balance between vaccination strategies and other public health measures (e.g. case isolation and contact tracing) taking into account the frequency of adverse events to vaccination. In this review, we summarize what has already been clarified and point out needs to analyze previous smallpox outbreaks systematically.

Project Coast: eugenics in apartheid South Africa.

It is a decade since the exposure of Project Coast, apartheid South Africa's covert chemical and biological warfare program. In that time, attention has been focused on several aspects of the program, particularly the production of narcotics and poisons for use against anti-apartheid activists and the proliferation of both chemical and biological weapons. The eugenic dimension of Project Coast has, by contrast, received scant attention. It is time to revisit the testimony that brought the suggestion of eugenic motives to light, reflect on some of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's findings and search for lessons that can be taken from this troubled chapter in South Africa's history.

Plague: a review of its history and potential as a biological weapon.

The increased threat of terrorism has revealed the importance of various diseases as potential weapons of destruction. Among the diseases that have been identified by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as being caused by category A organisms is plague. An ancient disease, it has played a role in both natural disasters and war and has been used as a weapon since at least medieval times. This article provides a brief historical overview of the disease in its natural occurrence and in its use as a biological weapon, as well as its potential for future use.

Contextual Factors Among Indiscriminate or Large Attacks on Food or Water Supplies, 1946-2015.

This research updates previous inventories of malicious attacks on food and water and includes data from 1946 through mid-2015. A systematic search of news reports, databases, and previous inventories of poisoning events was undertaken. Incidents that threatened or were intended to achieve direct harm to humans and that were either relatively large (more than 4 victims) or indiscriminate in intent or realization were included. Agents could be chemical, biological, or radionuclear. Reports of candidate incidents were subjected to systematic inclusion and exclusion criteria as well as validity analysis (not always clearly undertaken in previous inventories of such attacks). We summarize contextual aspects of the attacks that may be important for scenario prioritization, modelling, and defensive preparedness. Opportunity, and particularly access to dangerous agents, is key to most realized attacks. The most common motives and relative success rate in causing harm were very different between food and water attacks. The likelihood that people were made ill or died also varied by food or water mode and according to motive and opportunity for delivery of the hazardous agent. Deaths and illness associated with attacks during food manufacture and prior to sale have been fewer than those in some other contexts. Valuable opportunities for food defense improvements are identified in other contexts, especially food prepared in private or community settings.

Vaccines against Francisella tularensis--past, present and future.

Francisella tularensis is a facultative intracellular bacterial pathogen capable of causing a spectrum of human diseases collectively called tularemia. The pathogen is highly infectious and some strains can cause rapidly lethal infection especially when inhaled. The latter were developed as biological weapons in the past and nowadays cause concern as potential bioterrorism agents. A live attenuated strain of the pathogen was developed more that 40 years ago and remains the sole prophylactic measure against the pathogen. Research to develop better live and subunit vaccines is under way. The former will require an understanding of the virulence factors of F. tularensis and a facile means of mutating them and the latter will require identification of the protective antigens of the pathogen. The current vaccine and its potential replacements are the focus of this review.

Biological warfare in a historical perspective.

There are some early examples of biological warfare (BW), but in modern times it was used first for sabotage by Germany during WWI. Development of biological weapons on a military significant scale was initiated in several countries in the period between the world wars. During WWII, several countries had active programs such as the USA, UK, Canada, Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union. It was only Japan that on a fairly large scale used BW. The US program continued until 1969, when President Nixon took a decision to end it in connection with signing the BTWC. The Soviet Union had also continued its program after the war, and this was enhanced after signing the BTWC: in the 1980s the program consisted of around fifty facilities and involved around 60,000 people. The Soviet Union produced and maintained a large stockpile of BW-agents. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and due to pressure from USA and UK, President Yeltsin issued a decree in 1992 banning continued offensive BW activity. However, there are still concerns of residual activity in Russia. Another program of concern is the Iraqi BW-program. After 10 years of UN inspections that were stopped in 1998, there are still many unanswered questions concerning the BW program. There was also a covert BW-program in South Africa that was terminated around 1993. There have also been a number of allegations of alleged use or possession. In addition, there are indications that 10-12 states are now trying to acquire BW, and this assessment is based on intelligence information, mainly from the USA. For example Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Sudan and Libya. Another aspect is the strong driving force of technology developments to promote this type of program, opening new risks for future potential military misuse.

Bioterrorism--a new challenge for public health.

The opening years of the new millennium have presented a new and worrisome possibility to the public, including travellers: the threat of deadly infectious diseases from biological agents being deliberately released. The possibility of bioterrorism had always seemed remote but the recent anthrax attacks by mail have made this threat of immediate relevance. The deliberate use of Bacillus anthracis with the intent to harm civilian populations has raised public health concerns about potential exposure to intentionally released Variola virus and other biological agents. There is an urgent need for countries to examine their preparedness to respond to biological weapons attacks. Given the emotional shock of even an alleged threat of a biological release, it will be wise for governments to consider how to address such dangers as an integral part of the national response to other threats to public health and well being. Physicians and other health professionals, including those providing guidance to international and domestic travellers, need to have a clear understanding of the possible agents and the appropriate therapy or prophylaxis. This paper attempts to give a perspective on the threat of bioterrorism, the consequences of its use, the likely biological agents that may be used, and the clinical presentation and management of diseases caused by some agents most likely to be used.

The history and threat of biological warfare and terrorism.

The inevitable conclusion is that the availability of biological warfare agents and supporting technologic infrastructure, coupled with the fact that there are many people motivated to do harm to the United States, means that America must be prepared to defend her homeland against biological agents. Some have argued to the contrary, that the threat and risks from a biological weapon attack are not to be considered serious, because [39]: They've not been used yet on a large scale so they probably won't be in the near future. Their use is so morally repugnant that they probably won't be used at all. The technologic hurdles associated with isolating, growing, purifying, weaponizing, and disseminating adequate quantities of pathologic agents are so high that only the most advanced laboratories could attempt the process. Similar to a 'nuclear winter,' the aftermath of a biological attack is so unthinkable that none would attempt it. Unfortunately, the trends associated with biotechnology globalization, terrorist group dynamics, and global/regional politics render these beliefs untenable and inappropriate, as recent events have underscored. To that end, the United States has accelerated its program of defense against biological weapons, as it must. Biological weapons are such dreadful weapons of uniqueness and complexity that a specific defense strategy is paramount. Elements of this program include pharmaceutical stockpiles, heightened surveillance systems, energized vaccine development programs, and comprehensive training initiatives. Although the depth and breadth of these efforts are unprecedented, above all these efforts is the absolute necessity for medical and public health care professionals to be educated and actively involved. These professionals are the sine qua non of future defensive readiness. This is just the start; unfortunately, there is no end yet in sight.

Food for thought: the use of hazard and critical control point analysis to assess vulnerability of food to terrorist attack in deployment locations.

As part of a screening study, a literature review, personal interviews, and field work at several deployment locations, we examined the historical use of biological warfare agents and the vulnerability of food at military deployment locations to bioterrorist attack. The results of our experience suggest the following: historically, food has occasionally been used as a weapon by individuals; a benchmark procedure already exists to evaluate and ensure the safety of foods procured and used by the U.S. federal government; and food sources at the deployment locations examined are vulnerable to terrorist attack as determined by a critical control point analysis. Recommendations to potentially decrease the vulnerability of the U.S. military food supply to intentional contamination are also provided.

[Biological warfare, bioterrorism and public health]. / Guerra biológica, bioterrorismo e saúde pública.

Biological agents as weapons are not new to mankind. For centuries and into the present, biological warfare has been the subject of much research and speculation, but little action. Their limited use has probably been due to fear of unexpected counter-effects and doubts about their efficiency as weapons. Recently a new form of terrorism employing infectious agents has emerged slowly and without much fanfare, until the recent events with Bacillus anthracis in the United States. Smallpox is potentially the most devastating of these agents. Less than 25 years after the eradication of smallpox, the public health field is now forced to deal with the possibility of its re-introduction. The author discusses the scenario of smallpox re-introduction into Brazil.