Representations in dynamical embodied agents: re-analyzing a minimally cognitive model agent.
Cogn Sci
; 36(5): 870-95, 2012 Jul.
Article
en En
| MEDLINE
| ID: mdl-22417067
ABSTRACT
Understanding the role of ''representations'' in cognitive science is a fundamental problem facing the emerging framework of embodied, situated, dynamical cognition. To make progress, I follow the approach proposed by an influential representational skeptic, Randall Beer building artificial agents capable of minimally cognitive behaviors and assessing whether their internal states can be considered to involve representations. Hence, I operationalize the concept of representing as ''standing in,'' and I look for representations in embodied agents involved in simple categorization tasks. In a first experiment, no representation can be found, but the relevance of the task is undermined by the fact that agents with no internal states can reach high performance. A simple modification makes the task more "representationally hungry," and in this case, agents' internal states are found to qualify as representations. I conclude by discussing the benefits of reconciling the embodied-dynamical approach with the notion of representation.
Texto completo:
1
Banco de datos:
MEDLINE
Asunto principal:
Cognición
Límite:
Humans
Idioma:
En
Año:
2012
Tipo del documento:
Article