Principles of representation: why you can't represent the same concept twice.
Top Cogn Sci
; 6(3): 390-406, 2014 Jul.
Article
em En
| MEDLINE
| ID: mdl-24895329
ABSTRACT
As embodied theories of cognition are increasingly formalized and tested, care must be taken to make informed assumptions regarding the nature of concepts and representations. In this study, we outline three reasons why one cannot, in effect, represent the same concept twice. First, online perception affects offline representation Current representational content depends on how ongoing demands direct attention to modality-specific systems. Second, language is a fundamental facilitator of offline representation Bootstrapping and shortcuts within the computationally cheaper linguistic system continuously modify representational content. Third, time itself is a source of representational change As the content of underlying concepts shifts with the accumulation of direct and vicarious experience, so too does the content of representations that draw upon these concepts. We discuss the ramifications of these principles for research into both human and synthetic cognitive systems.
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Texto completo:
1
Base de dados:
MEDLINE
Assunto principal:
Cognição
/
Formação de Conceito
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Idioma
Limite:
Humans
Idioma:
En
Ano de publicação:
2014
Tipo de documento:
Article