Collaborative explanation and biological mechanisms.
Stud Hist Philos Sci
; 52: 67-78, 2015 Aug.
Article
em En
| MEDLINE
| ID: mdl-26193789
This paper motivates and outlines a new account of scientific explanation, which I term 'collaborative explanation.' My approach is pluralist: I do not claim that all scientific explanations are collaborative, but only that some important scientific explanations are-notably those of complex organic processes like development. Collaborative explanation is closely related to what philosophers of biology term 'mechanistic explanation' (e.g., Machamer et al., Craver, 2007). I begin with minimal conditions for mechanisms: complexity, causality, and multilevel structure. Different accounts of mechanistic explanation interpret and prioritize these conditions in different ways. This framework reveals two distinct varieties of mechanistic explanation: causal and constitutive. The two have heretofore been conflated, with philosophical discussion focusing on the former. This paper addresses the imbalance, using a case study of modeling practices in Systems Biology to reveals key features of constitutive mechanistic explanation. I then propose an analysis of this variety of mechanistic explanation, in terms of collaborative concepts, and sketch the outlines of a general theory of collaborative explanation. I conclude with some reflections on the connection between this variety of explanation and social aspects of scientific practice.
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Base de dados:
MEDLINE
Assunto principal:
Ciência
/
Biologia de Sistemas
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Modelos Biológicos
Idioma:
En
Ano de publicação:
2015
Tipo de documento:
Article