Moral hazard and selection for voluntary deductibles.
Health Econ
; 29(10): 1251-1269, 2020 10.
Article
em En
| MEDLINE
| ID: mdl-32734647
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates whether the voluntary deductible in the Dutch health insurance system reduces moral hazard or acts only as a cost reduction tool for low-risk individuals. We use a sample of 14,089 observations, comprising 2,939 individuals over seven waves from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences panel for the analysis. We employ bivariate models that jointly model the choice of a deductible and health care utilization and supplement the identification with an instrumental variable strategy. The results show that the voluntary deductible reduces moral hazard, especially in the decision to visit a doctor (extensive margin) compared with the number of visits (intensive margin). In addition, a robustness test shows that selection on moral hazard is not present in this context.
Palavras-chave
Texto completo:
1
Base de dados:
MEDLINE
Assunto principal:
Gastos em Saúde
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Dedutíveis e Cosseguros
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Seguro Saúde
/
Princípios Morais
Tipo de estudo:
Etiology_studies
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Prognostic_studies
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Risk_factors_studies
Limite:
Humans
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Male
Idioma:
En
Ano de publicação:
2020
Tipo de documento:
Article