Inhibition and activation of interactions in networked weak prisoner's dilemma.

In the framework of the coevolution dynamics of the weak prisoner's dilemma, inspired by prior empirical research, we present a coevolutionary model with local network dynamics in a static network framework. Viewing the edges of the network as social interactions between individuals, when individuals play the weak prisoner's dilemma game, they accumulate both payoffs and social interaction willingness based on a payoff matrix of the social interaction willingness we constructed. The edges are then inhibiting or activating based on the social interaction willingness of the two individuals, and individuals only interact with others through activated edges, resulting in local network dynamics in a static network framework. Individuals who receive more cooperation will be more likely to activate the edges around them, meaning they will participate in more social interactions. Conversely, individuals who receive more defects will do the opposite. Specifically, we investigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation under different levels of sensitivity to social interaction willingness and the temptation to defect. Through the simulation, we find that sparse cooperator clusters can expand greatly when social interaction sensitivity and temptation to defect are low. In contrast, dense cooperator clusters form rapidly in a high social interaction sensitivity, which protects the cooperation from high temptation.