When is cognitive penetration a plausible explanation?

Albert Newen and Petra Vetter argue that neurophysiological considerations and psychophysical studies provide striking evidence for cognitive penetration. This commentary focuses mainly on the neurophysiological considerations, which have thus far remained largely absent in the philosophical debate concerning cognitive penetration, and on the cognitive penetration of perceptual experiences, which is the form of cognitive penetration philosophers have debated about the most. It is argued that Newen and Vetter's evidence for cognitive penetration is unpersuasive because they do not sufficiently scrutinize the details of the empirical studies they make use of-the details of the empirical studies are crucial also when the studies are used in philosophical debates. The previous does not mean that cognitive penetration could not occur. Quite the contrary, details of the feedback connections to the visual perceptual module and one of the candidates presented by Newen and Vetter suggest that cognitive penetration can occur in rare cases.

Keeping postdiction simple.

Postdiction effects are phenomena in which a stimulus influences the appearance of events taking place before it. In metacontrast masking, for instance, a masking stimulus can render a target stimulus shown before the mask invisible. This and other postdiction effects have been considered incompatible with a simple explanation according to which (i) our perceptual experiences are delayed for only the time it takes for a distal stimulus to reach our sensory receptors and for our neural mechanisms to process it, and (ii) the order in which the processing of stimuli is completed corresponds with the apparent temporal order of stimuli. As a result, the theories that account for more than a single postdiction effect reject at least one of these theses. This paper presents a new framework for the timing of experiences-the non-linear latency difference view-in which the three most discussed postdiction effects-apparent motion, the flash-lag effect, and metacontrast masking-can be accounted for while simultaneously holding theses (i) and (ii). This view is grounded in the local reentrant processes, which are known to have a crucial role in perception. Accordingly, the non-linear latency difference view is both more parsimonious and more empirically plausible than the competing theories, all of which remain largely silent about the neural implementation of the mechanisms they postulate.

[Can consciousness be measured?]. / Voidaanko tietoisuutta mitata?

New methods of measurement and imaging have enabled the objective measurement of phenomena of consciousness. These methods have yielded surprising results indicating that patients may be conscious despite fulfilling the typical criteria of unconsciousness, such as unresponsiveness to environmental stimuli. The assessments of the contents of consciousness have especially elucidated the localization and time of generation of a conscious visual sensation. It has recently been suggested that it might even be possible to "read" the contents of consciousness directly from the brain by using cerebral imaging.

Mapping out the philosophical questions of AI and clinical practice in diagnosing and treating mental disorders.

How to classify the human condition? This is one of the main problems psychiatry has struggled with since the first diagnostic systems. The furore over the recent editions of the diagnostic systems DSM-5 and ICD-11 has evidenced it to still pose a wicked problem. Recent advances in techniques and methods of artificial intelligence and computing power which allows for the analysis of large data sets have been proposed as a possible solution for this and other problems in classification, diagnosing, and treating mental disorders. However, mental disorders contain some specific inherent features, which require critical consideration and analysis. The promises of AI for mental disorders are threatened by the unmeasurable aspects of mental disorders, and for this reason the use of AI may lead to ethically and practically undesirable consequences in its effective processing. We consider such novel and unique questions AI presents for mental health disorders in detail and evaluate potential novel, AI-specific, ethical implications.

Event timing in human vision: Modulating factors and independent functions.

Essential for successful interaction with the environment is the human capacity to resolve events in time. Typical event timing paradigms are judgements of simultaneity (SJ) and of temporal order (TOJ). It remains unclear whether SJ and TOJ are based on the same underlying mechanism and whether there are fixed thresholds for resolution. The current study employed four visual event timing task versions: horizontal and vertical SJ and TOJ. Binary responses were analysed using multilevel binary regression modelling. Modulatory effects of potential explanatory variables on event timing perception were investigated: (1) Individual factors (sex and age), (2) temporal factors (SOA, trial number, order of experiment, order of stimuli orientation, time of day) and (3) spatial factors (left or right stimulus first, top or bottom stimulus first, horizontal vs. vertical orientation). The current study directly compares for the first time, performance on SJ and TOJ tasks using the same paradigm and presents evidence that a variety of factors and their interactions selectively modulate event timing functions in humans, explaining the variance found in previous studies. We conclude that SJ and TOJ are partially independent functions, because they are modulated differently by individual and contextual variables.

Is there a generalized timing impairment in Autism Spectrum Disorders across time scales and paradigms?

Individuals with ASD have abnormal motor and perceptual functions that do not currently form diagnostic criteria of ASD, but nevertheless may affect everyday behaviour. Temporal processing seems to be one of such non-diagnostic yet impaired domains, although the lack of systematic studies testing different aspects of timing in the same sample of participants prevents a conclusive assessment of whether there is a generalized temporal deficit in ASD associated with diagnostic symptoms. 17 children diagnosed with ASD and 18 typically developing age- and IQ-matched controls carried out a set of motor and perceptual timing tasks: free tapping, simultaneity judgment, auditory duration discrimination, and verbal duration estimation. Parents of participants filled in a questionnaire assessing the sense and management of time. Children with ASD showed faster and more variable free tapping than controls. Auditory duration discrimination thresholds were higher in the ASD group than controls in a sub-second version of the task, while there were no group differences in a supra-second discrimination of intervals. Children with ASD showed more variable thresholds of simultaneity judgment, and they received lower parental scores for their sense and management of time. No group differences were observed in the verbal duration estimation task in the minute-range. Different timing functions were correlated in the ASD group but not among controls, whilst several timing measures correlated with ASD symptoms. We conclude that children with ASD show a broad range of abnormalities in temporal processing tasks including motor timing, perceptual timing, and temporal perspective.

Time Slows Down during Accidents.

The experienced speed of the passage of time is not constant as time can seem to fly or slow down depending on the circumstances we are in. Anecdotally accidents and other frightening events are extreme examples of the latter; people who have survived accidents often report altered phenomenology including how everything appeared to happen in slow motion. While the experienced phenomenology has been investigated, there are no explanations about how one can have these experiences. Instead, the only recently discussed explanation suggests that the anecdotal phenomenology is due to memory effects and hence not really experienced during the accidents. The purpose of this article is (i) to reintroduce the currently forgotten comprehensively altered phenomenology that some people experience during the accidents, (ii) to explain why the recent experiments fail to address the issue at hand, and (iii) to suggest a new framework to explain what happens when people report having experiences of time slowing down in these cases. According to the suggested framework, our cognitive processes become rapidly enhanced. As a result, the relation between the temporal properties of events in the external world and in internal states becomes distorted with the consequence of external world appearing to slow down. That is, the presented solution is a realist one in a sense that it maintains that sometimes people really do have experiences of time slowing down.

Perception of short time scale intervals in a hypnotic virtuoso.

Previous studies showed that hypnotized individuals underestimate temporal intervals in the range of several seconds to tens of minutes. However, no previous work has investigated whether duration perception is equally disorderly when shorter time intervals are probed. In this study, duration perception of a hypnotic virtuoso was tested using repeated standard temporal generalization and duration estimation tasks. When compared to the baseline state, hypnosis affected perception of intervals spread around 600 ms in the temporal generalization task but did not alter perception of slightly longer intervals spread around 1000 ms. Furthermore, generalization of temporal intervals was more orderly under hypnosis than in the baseline state. In contrast, the hypnotic virtuoso showed a typical time underestimation effect when perception of longer supra-second intervals was tested in the duration estimation task, replicating results of the previous hypnosis studies.