Products of in Situ Corrosion of Depleted Uranium Ammunition in Bosnia and Herzegovina Soils.

Hundreds of tons of depleted uranium (DU) ammunition were used in previous armed conflicts in Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia/Kosovo. The majority (>90%) of DU penetrators miss their target and, if left in the environment, corrode in these postconflict zones. Thus, the best way to understand the fate of bulk DU material in the environment is to characterize the corrosion products of intact DU penetrators under field conditions for extended periods of time. However, such studies are scarce. To fill this knowledge gap, we characterized corrosion products formed from two intact DU penetrators that remained in soils in Bosnia and Herzegovina for over seven years. We used a combination of X-ray powder diffraction, electron microscopy, and X-ray absorption spectroscopy. The results show that metaschoepite (UO3(H2O)2) was a main component of the two DU corrosion products. Moreover, studtite ((UO2)O2(H2O)2·2(H2O)) and becquerelite (Ca(UO2)6O4(OH)6·8(H2O)) were also identified in the corrosion products. Their formation through transformation of metaschoepite was a result of the geochemical conditions under which the penetrators corroded. Moreover, we propose that the transformation of metaschoepite to becquerelite or studtite in the DU corrosion products would decrease the potential for mobilization of U from corroded DU penetrators exposed to similar environments in postconflict areas.

Migration of depleted uranium from a corroded penetrator in soil vadose zone in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Depleted uranium (DU) from corroded armor penetrators can migrate through the soil vadose zone and cause environmental problems, yet studies on such migration at former theatres of war are scarce. Here, we investigated vertical DU migration in a soil profile due to a penetrator (3-8 cm beneath the soil surface) corroded over 7 years in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The highest concentration of DU was ∼45,300 mg/kg at 6-10 cm, with the concentration decreasing markedly with increasing depth. The majority of the DU accumulated within the top 20 cm and the DU front reached ∼42 cm beneath the penetrator. In addition, particles with varying U concentrations (3-65 wt%) were observed at 0-15 cm, with U primarily co-located with O, Si, Al, maghemite, and hematite. Particularly, metaschoepite was identified at 6-10 cm. Finally, X-ray absorption spectroscopy analysis found U was hexavalent in the soil profile. These findings suggest that the downward migration of DU was likely present as a soluble form adsorbed on clay minerals and Fe oxides. Overall, we show that the rate of DU migration within the vadose zone is comparatively slow, although if the penetrator is left in the soil for decades, it could pose a serious long-term risk. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS: Over 90 % of the depleted uranium (DU) penetrators fired in previous conflicts missed their armored targets and were left in the soil to corrode. The corroded penetrators can not only contaminate soil but also pose a risk to groundwater. The present study examined the migration of DU in a soil profile that included a DU penetrator that had been corroding for over 7 years. Studying the dynamics of DU migration is essential to develop effective remediation strategies to mitigate long-term environmental risks and safeguard ecosystems and human health from DU contamination.

Integrating the theory of sampling into a nuclear forensic investigation.

We present a study case where the theory of sampling (TOS) is used to make defensible inferences in a nuclear forensic investigation. The forensic investigations focused on five suspicious radioactive materials seized in 2019. All errors introduced by sampling and sub-sampling the radioactive materials are evaluated according to TOS. A maximum sampling error of 35% was tolerated. The uses of TOS enabled the forensic team to make inferences about the seized materials and therefore make confidence-based statements about the exceeding of limits established in the Swiss Radiological Protection Ordinance for radioactive substances. The analysis of the isotope and activity ratios allowed the team to exclude some potential sources of the radioactive contamination; however, it was not possible to determine its origin precisely.