Dealing with death in cancer care: should the oncologist be an amicus mortis?

The way death is (not) dealt with is one of the main determinants of the current crisis of cancer care. The tendency to avoid discussions about terminal prognoses and to create unrealistic expectations of fighting death is seriously harming patients, families and healthcare professionals, and the delivery of high-quality and equitable care. Drawing on different literature sources, we explore key dimensions of the taboo of death: medical, policy, cultural. We suggest that the oncologist, from a certain moment, could take on the role of amicus mortis, a classical figure in the past times, and thus accompanying patients towards the end of their life through palliation and linking them to psychosocial and ethical/existential resources. This presupposes the implementation of Supportive Care in Cancer and the ethical idea of relational autonomy based on understanding patients' needs considering their sociocultural contexts. It is also key to encourage public conversations beyond the area of medicine to re-integrate death into life.

Deliberative ethics in a biomedical institution: an example of integration between science and ethics.

The deliberative ethics guidelines elaborated and implemented by members of the IFOM-IEO Campus (Firc Institute of Molecular Oncology (IFOM) and the European Institute of Oncology (IEO)). These should serve the dual purpose of establishing a minimal set of standard rules for bioethical debate and any ensuing decision-making process, especially for the perspective of providing real instruments to foster public engagement and public awareness on the ethical issues involved in biomedical research. It is shown that these guidelines instantiate the scheme of one of the correct ways of debating formalised by the western thought.

Fearing a non-existing Minotaur? The ethical challenges of research on cytoplasmic hybrid embryos.

In this paper we address the ethical challenges of research on cytoplasmic hybrid embryos, or "cybrids". The controversial pronouncement of the UK's Human Embryology and Fertilisation Authority of September 2007 on the permissibility of this area of research is the starting point of our discussion, and we argue in its favour. By a rigorous definition of the entities at issue, we show how the terms "chimera" and "hybrid" are improper in the case of cybrids, and how their use can bias the debate creating moral prejudices. After analysing the scientific aspects of cybrids research and sketching out current alternatives, we enter the ethical debate, starting from the premise that research on early human embryos is ethically permissible under some circumstances. We emphasise how research on cybrids has positive consequences in terms of scientific and therapeutic applications, since it allows the derivation of human embryonic stem cells genetically tailored to the somatic cell donor. Such cell lines offer a unique in vitro model both for studies of human pathogenesis and for drug screening and discovery. Research on cybrids also circumvents the problem of the scarcity of human oocytes and their ethically dubious donation. Finally, we object to the most common arguments against cybrids research, that is, moral repugnance, the slippery slope argument, the appeal to "nature", and the unfair distribution of economical resources.

The ethical plausibility of the 'Right To Try' laws.

'Right To Try' (RTT) laws originated in the USA to allow terminally ill patients to request access to early stage experimental medical products directly from the producer, removing the oversight and approval of the Food and Drug Administration. These laws have received significant media attention and almost equally unanimous criticism by the bioethics, clinical and scientific communities. They touch indeed on complex issues such as the conflict between individual and public interest, and the public understanding of medical research and its regulation. The increased awareness around RTT laws means that healthcare providers directly involved in the management of patients with life-threatening conditions such as cancer, infective, or neurologic conditions will deal more frequently with patients' requests of access to experimental medical products. This paper aims to assess the ethical plausibility of the RTT laws, and to suggest some possible ethical tools and considerations to address the main issues they touch.

Supporting Supportive Care in Cancer: The ethical importance of promoting a holistic conception of quality of life.

Advances in anticancer therapies and increasing attention towards patient quality of life make Supportive Care in Cancer (SCC) a key aspect of excellence in oncological care. SCC promotes a holistic conception of quality of life encompassing clinical, ethical/existential, and spiritual dimensions. Despite the calls of international oncology societies empirical evidence shows that SCC has not yet been implemented. More efforts are needed given the clinical and ethical value of SCC not only for patients, but also for clinicians and hospitals. Drawing on different literature sources, we identify and discuss three important barriers to the implementation of SCC: 1) organisational - lack of adequate resources and infrastructures in over-stretched clinical environments, 2) professional- burnout of cancer clinicians; and 3) cultural - stigma towards death and dying. We add an ethical counselling framework to the SCC implementation toolkit- which, could offer a flexible and resource-light way of embedding SCC, addressing these barriers.

Why genes are like lemons.

In the last few years, the lack of a unitary notion of gene across biological sciences has troubled the philosophy of biology community. However, the debate on this concept has remained largely historical or focused on particular cases presented by the scientific empirical advancements. Moreover, in the literature there are no explicit and reasonable arguments about why a philosophical clarification of the concept of gene is needed. In our paper, we claim that a philosophical clarification of the concept of gene does not contribute to biology. Unlike the question, for example, "What is a biological function?", we argue that the question "What is a gene?" could be answered by means of empirical research, in the sense that biologists' labour is enough to shed light on it.