Time from Start of Quarantine to SARS-CoV-2 Positive Test Among Quarantined College and University Athletes - 17 States, June-October 2020.

To safely resume sports, college and university athletic programs and regional athletic conferences created plans to mitigate transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Mitigation measures included physical distancing, universal masking, and maximizing outdoor activity during training; routine testing; 10-day isolation of persons with COVID-19; and 14-day quarantine of athletes identified as close contacts* of persons with confirmed COVID-19. Regional athletic conferences created testing and quarantine policies based on National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) guidance (1); testing policies varied by conference, school, and sport. To improve compliance with quarantine and reduce the personal and economic burden of quarantine adherence, the quarantine period has been reduced in several countries from 14 days to as few as 5 days with testing (2) or 10 days without testing (3). Data on quarantined athletes participating in NCAA sports were used to characterize COVID-19 exposures and assess the amount of time between quarantine start and first positive SARS-CoV-2 test result. Despite the potential risk for transmission from frequent, close contact associated with athletic activities (4), more athletes reported exposure to COVID-19 at social gatherings (40.7%) and from roommates (31.7%) than they did from exposures associated with athletic activities (12.7%). Among 1,830 quarantined athletes, 458 (25%) received positive reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) test results during the 14-day quarantine, with a mean of 3.8 days from quarantine start (range = 0-14 days) until the positive test result. Among athletes who had not received a positive test result by quarantine day 5, the probability of having a positive test result decreased from 27% after day 5 to <5% after day 10. These findings support new guidance from CDC (5) in which different options are provided to shorten quarantine for persons such as collegiate athletes, especially if doing so will increase compliance, balancing the reduced duration of quarantine against a small but nonzero risk for postquarantine transmission. Improved adherence to mitigation measures (e.g., universal masking, physical distancing, and hand hygiene) at all times could further reduce exposures to SARS-CoV-2 and disruptions to athletic activities because of infections and quarantine (1,6).

The next public health revolution: public health information fusion and social networks.

Social, political, and economic disruptions caused by natural and human-caused public health emergencies have catalyzed public health efforts to expand the scope of biosurveillance and increase the timeliness, quality, and comprehensiveness of disease detection, alerting, response, and prediction. Unfortunately, efforts to acquire, render, and visualize the diversity of health intelligence information are hindered by its wide distribution across disparate fields, multiple levels of government, and the complex interagency environment. Achieving this new level of situation awareness within public health will require a fundamental cultural shift in methods of acquiring, analyzing, and disseminating information. The notion of information "fusion" may provide opportunities to expand data access, analysis, and information exchange to better inform public health action.

An academic/government partnership to provide technical assistance with pandemic influenza planning to local health departments in North Carolina.

In 2006, the North Carolina Division of Public Health (NC DPH) required all 85 local health departments (LHDs) in North Carolina to develop a pandemic influenza plan. Because few LHDs had experience in developing such plans, NC DPH engaged in a unique partnership with an academic center, the North Carolina Center for Public Health Preparedness (NCCPHP), to provide technical assistance to local planners. This article describes the technical assistance program implemented by NCCPHP, the use of technical assistance by local planners, subsequent completeness of local pandemic influenza plans, and lessons learned throughout the program. We discuss selected topic areas (surveillance, vaccine/antiviral, and vulnerable populations) observed within local pandemic influenza plans to highlight the variability in planning approaches and identify potential opportunities for state and local standardization.

Critical assessment of statewide hospital pharmaceutical surge capabilities for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive incidents.

INTRODUCTION: In recent years, government and hospital disaster planners have recognized the increasing importance of pharmaceutical preparedness for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) events, as well as other public health emergencies. The development of pharmaceutical surge capacity for immediate use before support from the (US) Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) becomes available is integral to strengthening the preparedness of local healthcare networks. METHODS: The Pharmaceutical Response Project served as an independent, multidisciplinary collaboration to assess statewide hospital pharmaceutical response capabilities. Surveys of hospital pharmacy directors were conducted to determine pharmaceutical response preparedness to CBRNE threats. RESULTS: All 45 acute care hospitals in Maryland were surveyed, and responses were collected from 80% (36/45). Ninety-two percent (33/36) of hospitals had assessed pharmaceutical inventory with respect to biological agents, 92% (33/36) for chemical agents, and 67% (24/36) for radiological agents. However, only 64% (23/36) of hospitals reported an additional dedicated reserve supply for biological events, 67% (24/36) for chemical events, and 50% (18/36) for radiological events. More than 60% of the hospitals expected to receive assistance from the SNS within < or = 48 hours. CONCLUSIONS: From a pharmaceutical perspective, hospitals generally remain under-prepared for CBRNE threats and many expect SNS support before it realistically would be available. Collectively, limited antibiotics and other supplies are available to offer prophylaxis or treatment, suggesting that hospitals may have insufficient pharmaceutical surge supplies for a large-scale event. Although most state hospitals are improving pharmaceutical surge capabilities, further efforts are needed.

Are regional hospital pharmacies prepared for public health emergencies?

INTRODUCTION: In the event of a major chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) attack or a natural disaster, large quantities of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies may be required with little or no warning. Pharmaceutical surge capacity for immediate response, before Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) supplies become available, remains a significant gap in emergency preparedness. To date, limited attempts have been made to assess collective regional hospital pharmaceutical response capabilities. In this project, we characterized the level of hospital pharmaceutical response preparedness in a major metropolitan region. METHODS: The Johns Hopkins Office of Critical Event Preparedness and Response (CEPAR) convened a collaborative partnership to assess hospital pharmaceutical response capabilities. A survey was developed to characterize pharmaceutical response preparedness to CBRNE threats. RESULTS: All 22 acute care hospitals in the Maryland region were sent pharmaceutical response surveys, and responses were received from 86% (19/22). Within the past year, 84% (16/19) of hospitals had implemented an exercise with pharmacy participation. More than half of the hospitals expect to receive assistance from the SNS in 48 hours or less. Seventy-four percent (14/19) of the hospitals reported an additional dedicated reserve supply for biological events, 74% (14/19) for chemical events, and 58% (11/19) for radiological events. CONCLUSION: Many hospitals in this metropolitan region have taken important steps toward enhancing pharmaceutical preparedness. However, hospitals generally remain underprepared for CBRNE threats and collectively have limited supplies of antibiotics to provide prophylaxis or treatment for hospital staff, their families, and patients in the event of a significant biological incident.

Regional public health preparedness teams in North Carolina: an analysis of their structural capacity and impact on services provided.

In December 2001, the North Carolina Division of Public Health established Public Health Regional Surveillance Teams (PHRSTs) to build local public health capacity to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from public health incidents and events. Seven PHRSTs are colocated at local health departments (LHDs) around the state. The authors assessed structural capacity of the PHRSTs and analyzed the relationship between structural capacity and the frequency of support and services provided to LHDs by PHRSTs. Five categories of structural capacity were measured: human, fiscal, informational, physical, and organizational resources. In addition, variation in structural capacity among teams was also examined. The most variation was seen in human resources. Although each team was originally designed to include a physician/epidemiologist, industrial hygienist, nurse/epidemiologist, and administrative support technician, team composition varied such that only the administrative support technician is common to all teams. Variation in team composition was associated with differences in the support and services that PHRSTs provide to LHDs. Teams that reported having a medical doctor or a doctor of osteopathic medicine (chi2 = 9.95; p < 0.01) or an epidemiologist (chi2 = 5.35; p < 0.02) had larger budgets and provided more support and services, and teams that housed a pharmacist reported more partners (chi2 = 52.34; p < 0.01). Teams that received directives from more groups (such as LHDs) also provided more support and services in planning (Z = 21.71; p < 0.01), communication and liaison (Z = 12.11; p < 0.01), epidemiology and surveillance (Z = 5.09; p < 0.01), consultation and technical support (Z = 2.25; p = 0.02), H1N1 outbreak assistance (Z = 10.25; p < 0.01), and public health event response (Z = 2.19; p = 0.03). In the last 10 years, significant variation in structural capacity, particularly in human resources, has been introduced among PHRSTs. These differences explain much of the variation in support and services provided to LHDs by PHRSTs.

The National Capitol Region's Emergency Department syndromic surveillance system: do chief complaint and discharge diagnosis yield different results?

We compared syndromic categorization of chief complaint and discharge diagnosis for 3,919 emergency department visits to two hospitals in the U.S. National Capitol Region. Agreement between chief complaint and discharge diagnosis was good overall (kappa=0.639), but neurologic and sepsis syndromes had markedly lower agreement than other syndromes (kappa statistics 0.085 and 0.105, respectively).