Universal Patterns in Color-Emotion Associations Are Further Shaped by Linguistic and Geographic Proximity.

Many of us "see red," "feel blue," or "turn green with envy." Are such color-emotion associations fundamental to our shared cognitive architecture, or are they cultural creations learned through our languages and traditions? To answer these questions, we tested emotional associations of colors in 4,598 participants from 30 nations speaking 22 native languages. Participants associated 20 emotion concepts with 12 color terms. Pattern-similarity analyses revealed universal color-emotion associations (average similarity coefficient r = .88). However, local differences were also apparent. A machine-learning algorithm revealed that nation predicted color-emotion associations above and beyond those observed universally. Similarity was greater when nations were linguistically or geographically close. This study highlights robust universal color-emotion associations, further modulated by linguistic and geographic factors. These results pose further theoretical and empirical questions about the affective properties of color and may inform practice in applied domains, such as well-being and design.

Are We Modular Lying Cues Detectors? The Answer Is "Yes, Sometimes".

We quickly form first impressions about newly encountered people guiding our subsequent behaviour (approach, avoidance). Such instant judgments might be innate and automatic, being performed unconsciously and independently to other cognitive processes. Lying detection might be subject to such a modular process. Unfortunately, numerous studies highlighted problems with lying detection paradigms such as high error rates and learning effects. Additionally, humans should be motivated doing both detecting others' lies and disguising own lies. Disguising own lies might even be more challenging than detecting other people's lies. Thus, when trying to disguise cheating behaviour, liars might display a mixture of disguising (fake) trust cues and uncontrolled lying cues making the interpretation of the expression difficult (perceivers are guessing). In two consecutive online studies, we tested whether seeing an increasing amount (range 0-4) of lying cues (LC) and non-lying cues (NLC) on a standard face results in enhanced guessing behaviour (studies 1 and 2) and that enhanced guessing is accompanied by slower responding (study 2). Results showed that pronounced guessing and slowest responding occurred for faces with an intermediate number and not with the highest number of LC and NLC. In particular, LC were more important than NLC to uncertain lying decisions. Thus, only a few LC may interfere with automatic processing of lying detection (irrespective of NLC), probably because too little lying cue information is yet available.