When imagining yourself in pain, visual perspective matters: the neural and behavioral correlates of simulated sensory experiences.

Via mental simulation, imagined events faithfully reproduce the neural and behavioral activities that accompany their actual occurrence. However, little is known about how fundamental characteristics of mental imagery-notably perspectives of self-shape neurocognitive processes. To address this issue, we used fMRI to explore the impact that vantage point exerts on the neural and behavioral correlates of imaginary sensory experiences (i.e., pain). Participants imagined painful scenarios from three distinct visual perspectives: first-person self (1PS), third-person self (3PS), and third-person other (3PO). Corroborating increased ratings of pain and embodiment, 1PS (cf. 3PS) simulations elicited greater activity in the right anterior insula, a brain area that supports interoceptive and emotional awareness. Additionally, 1PS simulations evoked greater activity in brain areas associated with visual imagery and the sense of body ownership. Interestingly, no differences were observed between 3PS and 3PO imagery. Taken together, these findings reveal the neural and behavioral correlates of visual perspective during mental simulation.

Turning I into me: Imagining your future self.

A widely endorsed belief is that perceivers imagine their present selves using a different representational format than imagining their future selves (i.e., near future=first-person; distant future=third-person). But is this really the case? Responding to the paucity of work on this topic, here we considered how temporal distance influences the extent to which individuals direct their attention outward or inward during a brief imaginary episode. Using a non-verbal measure of visual perspective taking (i.e., letter-drawing task) our results confirmed the hypothesized relation between temporal distance and conceptions of the self. Whereas simulations of an event in the near future were dominated by a first-person representation of the self, this switched to a third-person depiction when the event was located in the distant future. Critically, this switch in vantage point was restricted to self-related simulations. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are considered.

The shape of things to come: exploring goal-directed prospection.

Through the ability to preview the future (i.e., prospection), people can anticipate how best to think, feel and act in just about any setting. But exactly what factors determine the contents of prospection? Extending research on action identification and temporal construal, here we explored how action goals and temporal distance modulate the characteristics of future previews. Participants were required to imagine travelling to Egypt (in the near or distant future) to climb or photograph a pyramid. Afterwards, to probe the contents of prospection, participants provided a sketch of their imaginary experience. Results elucidated the impact of goal type and temporal distance on mental imagery. While a climbing goal prompted participants to draw a larger pyramid in the near than distant future, a photographic goal influenced only the compositional complexity of the sketches. These findings reveal how action goals and temporal distance shape the contents of future simulations.

Taming temptation: Visual perspective impacts consumption and willingness to pay for unhealthy foods.

While thinking about food is a ubiquitous facet of daily life, the perils of imaginary eating are well documented; food-related mental imagery elevates both cravings and consumption. Given the serious health issues that often arise from overeating and obesity, identifying strategies that can be used to combat the link between imagination and consumption is, therefore, of considerable theoretical and practical importance. Here we explored the possibility that a fundamental property of mental imagery-the visual perspective from which an event is viewed-may alter the appraisal of unhealthy foods. Specifically, because it is accompanied by attenuated sensorimotor activity, third-person (cf. first-person) imagery was expected to weaken the link between imagination and consumption. The results of 3 studies supported this prediction showing that third-person (cf. first-person) simulations decreased the mental representation, actual consumption, and willingness to pay for desirable items. Driving these effects was the natural reduction of sensory components furnished by third-person imagery. Together, these findings suggest that adoption of a third-person vantage point during mental imagery may be a viable and effective tactic for curbing consumption in everyday life.

Noticing Future Me: Reducing Egocentrism Through Mental Imagery.

People drastically overestimate how often others attend to them or notice their unusual features, a phenomenon termed the spotlight effect Despite the prevalence of this egocentric bias, little is known about how to reduce the tendency to see oneself as the object of others' attention. Here, we tested the hypothesis that a basic property of mental imagery-the visual perspective from which an event is viewed-may alleviate a future-oriented variant of the spotlight effect. The results of three experiments supported this prediction. Experiment 1 revealed a reduction in egocentric spotlighting when participants imagined an event in the far compared with near future. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated reduced spotlighting and feelings of embarrassment when participants viewed an impending event from a third-person (vs. first-person) vantage point. Simple changes in one's visual perspective may be sufficient to diminish the illusion of personal salience.

When do I wear me out? Mental simulation and the diminution of self-control.

Exerting self-control can diminish people's capacity to engage in subsequent acts of behavioral regulation, a phenomenon termed ego depletion. But what of imaginary regulatory experiences-does simulated restraint elicit comparable lapses in self-control? Here we demonstrate such effects under theoretically tractable imagery conditions. Across 3 experiments, temporal, structural, and spatial components of mental simulation were observed to drive the efficacy of imaginary self-control. In Experiment 1, lapses in restraint (i.e., financial impulsivity) were more pronounced when imaginary regulation (i.e., dietary restraint) focused on an event in the near versus distant future. In Experiment 2, comparable effects (i.e., increased stereotyping) emerged when simulated self-control (i.e., emotional suppression) was imagined from a first-person (cf. third-person) visual perspective. In Experiment 3, restraint was diminished (i.e., increased risk taking) when self-regulation (i.e., action control) centered on an event at a near versus distant location. These findings further delineate the conditions under which mental simulation impacts core aspects of social-cognitive functioning.

Visual perspective and the characteristics of mind wandering.

When the mind wanders away from the here-and-now toward imaginary events, it typically does so from one of two visual vantage points-a first-person perspective (i.e., the world is seen as it is in everyday life) or a third-person perspective (i.e., the world is seen from the viewpoint of an outside observer). While extant evidence has detailed consequences that ensue from the utilization of these distinct points of view, less is known about their more basic properties. Here, we investigated the prevalence, demographics and qualities associated with the visual perspective that people spontaneously adopt when the mind wanders. The results from a cross-cultural survey (N = 400) revealed that almost half of the participants (46%) typically utilize a third-person perspective when mind wandering. Further, culture and gender were shown to impact the distribution of first- and third-person imagers. Specifically, a first-person perspective was more common among participants from Western nations and females, while participants from Eastern cultures resonated more strongly with a third-person perspective. Moreover, these factors were also shown to impact qualities (e.g., temporal locus, vividness) of mental imagery. Taken together, the current findings elucidate the prevalence of first- and third-person visual perspectives and detail individual differences that influence the qualia of mind wandering.

Your space or mine? Mapping self in time.

While humans are capable of mentally transcending the here and now, this faculty for mental time travel (MTT) is dependent upon an underlying cognitive representation of time. To this end, linguistic, cognitive and behavioral evidence has revealed that people understand abstract temporal constructs by mapping them to concrete spatial domains (e.g. past=backward, future=forward). However, very little research has investigated factors that may determine the topographical characteristics of these spatiotemporal maps. Guided by the imperative role of episodic content for retrospective and prospective thought (i.e., MTT), here we explored the possibility that the spatialization of time is influenced by the amount of episodic detail a temporal unit contains. In two experiments, participants mapped temporal events along mediolateral (Experiment 1) and anterioposterior (Experiment 2) spatial planes. Importantly, the temporal units varied in self-relevance as they pertained to temporally proximal or distal events in the participant's own life, the life of a best friend or the life of an unfamiliar other. Converging evidence from both experiments revealed that the amount of space used to represent time varied as a function of target (self, best friend or unfamiliar other) and temporal distance. Specifically, self-time was represented as occupying more space than time pertaining to other targets, but only for temporally proximal events. These results demonstrate the malleability of space-time mapping and suggest that there is a self-specific conceptualization of time that may influence MTT as well as other temporally relevant cognitive phenomena.