Critique of autonomy-based arguments against legalising assisted dying.

The aim of this article is to present and critically investigate a type of argument against legalising assisted dying on request (ADR) for patients who are terminally ill and experiencing suffering. This type of argument has several variants. These-which we call 'autonomy-based arguments' against legalising ADR-invoke different specifications of the premise that we ought not to respect requests for assistance in dying made by terminally ill and suffering patients because the basic conditions of autonomy cannot be met in scenarios where such requests are made. Specifically, it is argued either (1) that as a result of pain, anxiety or desperation, terminally ill patients are not competent decision makers or (2) that legalisation of ADR would lead to social pressure or in other ways change the patient's context of choice in ways that make such requests nonautonomous. We argue that these types of arguments are problematic in light both of empirical studies and the fact that we usually judge that it is morally right to respect the wishes and decisions of dying people even if they suffer.

Assisted Death, Dignity, and Respect for Humanity.

Recent works on the concept of dignity have opened up the otherwise quite deadlocked debate about assisted death (AD). Rather than just reinforcing already fixed positions, it seems to me that these conceptions of dignity make room for a moderate and normatively richer position on the moral permissibility of AD. I do not think that we have seen the full potential of the said conceptions and interpretations. I try in this article to contribute my part. First, I briefly recapitulate some of the paradoxical ways in which dignity is typically invoked in the debate and try to clear up some of the obvious confusions. Then, I go on to explore a particular Kantian line of thought in some recent works on dignity and AD that seems to pave the way for a moderate position with a more principled foundation than the usual compromise positions.

Occupational therapy, professional development, and ethics.

The aim of this article is to reflect on and contribute to developing occupational therapy as a profession. The author proposes an ethical interpretation of health and helping professions in general and occupational therapy in particular. According to this ethical interpretation, the essential function and mission of classical health and helping professions are defined by certain ethical values: the basic elements of a good human life. The author argues that the central concepts of occupational therapy, activity and participation, can plausibly be understood in this light. However, this seems to imply a rather substantial conception of well-being which the author tries to spell out. In addition, the basic principles of biomedical ethics are specified in the context of occupational therapy according to an ethical interpretation. In conclusion, four advantages of the ethical interpretation are highlighted: it adds precision and content to ethical principles and guidelines; it contributes to building up and preserving a shared professional identity; it puts emphasis on a client-centred perspective on professional work; and it provides a constructive framework for inter-professional cooperation.