Does dispositional preference for solitude predict better psychological outcomes during times of social distancing? Beliefs and reality.

OBJECTIVE: People value solitude for themselves. Yet little is known about how people perceive dispositional preference for solitude in others. Does dispositional preference for solitude represent a protective factor from psychological distress during times of social distancing? And do laypeople have accurate beliefs about the role of preference for solitude? METHOD: To answer these questions, we conducted four studies (three preregistered, Ntotal  = 1418) at the early and a later stage of the COVID-19 pandemic using experimental, longitudinal, and experience sampling designs. RESULTS: People expected targets with a higher solitude preference to be more resilient (e.g., less lonely, more satisfied with life) during social distancing, and consequently prioritize them less when allocating supportive resources for maintaining social connections (Studies 1 and 2). Compared to these beliefs, the actual difference between individuals with higher versus lower solitude preference was smaller (Study 2) or even negligible (Study 3). Did people form more calibrated beliefs two years into the pandemic? Study 4 suggested no. CONCLUSIONS: Together, these studies show that people overestimate the role of preference for solitude in predicting others' psychological experience. As a result, solitude-seeking individuals may miss out on supportive resources, leading to higher risks for mental health issues.

The Relative Importance of Joke and Audience Characteristics in Eliciting Amusement.

The current work estimated the relative importance of joke and audience characteristics for the occurrence of amusement. Much psychological research has focused on stimulus characteristics when searching for sources of funniness. Some researchers have instead highlighted the importance of perceiver characteristics, such as dispositional cheerfulness. Across five preregistered studies (Ns = 118-54,905) with varied stimuli and perceiver samples (website visitors, students, Mechanical Turk and Prolific users), variance-decomposition analyses found that perceiver characteristics account for more variance in funniness ratings than stimulus characteristics. Thus, psychological theories focusing on between-persons differences have a relatively high potential for explaining and predicting humor appreciation (here, funniness ratings). Crucially, perceiver-by-stimulus interactions explained the largest amount of variance, highlighting the importance of fit between joke and audience characteristics when predicting amusement. Implications for humor-appreciation theories and applications are discussed.

Effects of Facial Skin Smoothness and Blemishes on Trait Impressions.

People make trait inferences based on facial appearance, and these inferences guide social approach and avoidance. Here, we investigate the effects of textural features on trait impressions from faces. In contrast to previous work, which exclusively manipulated skin smoothness, we manipulated smoothness and the presence of skin blemishes independently (Study 1) and orthogonally (Study 2). We hypothesized that people are particularly sensitive to skin blemishes because blemishes potentially indicate poor health and the presence of an infectious disease. We therefore predicted that the negative effect of blemished skin is stronger than the positive effect of smoothed skin. The results of both studies are in line with this reasoning. Across ratings of trustworthiness, competence, maturity, attractiveness, and health, the negative influence of skin blemishes was stronger and more consistent than the positive influence of skin smoothness (Study 1). Moreover, the presence of skin blemishes diminished the positive effect of skin smoothness on attractiveness ratings (Study 2). In sum, both facial skin blemishes and facial skin smoothness influence trait impression, but the negative effect of blemished skin is larger and more salient than the positive effect of smooth skin.

The unthinking or confident extremist? Political extremists are more likely than moderates to reject experimenter-generated anchors.

People with extreme political opinions are alternatively characterized as being relatively unthinking or as confident consumers and practitioners of politics. In three studies, we tested these competing hypotheses using cognitive anchoring tasks (total N = 6,767). Using two different measures of political extremity, we found that extremists were less influenced than political moderates by two types of experimenter-generated anchors (Studies 1-3) and that this result was mediated by extremists' belief superiority (Study 2). Extremists and moderates, however, were not differentially influenced by self-generated anchors (Study 2), which suggests that extremists differentiated between externally and internally generated anchors. These results are consistent with the confident-extremist perspective and contradict the unthinking-extremist perspective. The present studies demonstrate the utility of adopting a basic cognitive task to investigate the relationship between ideology and cognitive style and suggest that extremity does not necessarily beget irrationality.

The Effects of Partner Extraversion and Agreeableness on Trust.

Existing research has documented the social benefits (i.e., higher popularity and liking) of extraversion and agreeableness. Do these positive reputational consequences extend to social dilemma situations that require trust? We found that people do not trust extraverts more than introverts. Instead, people's trust decisions are guided by their partner's level of agreeableness. In a trust game (Studies 1 and 2), individuals were more likely to trust a partner who was described as agreeable (vs. disagreeable); and, in a laboratory study of work groups, participants trusted more (vs. less) agreeable group members (Study 3). Individuals anticipated others' preferences for agreeable partners and tried to come across as more agreeable, but not more extraverted, in social dilemmas (Study 4). These findings suggest that the social benefits of agreeableness (but not extraversion) extend to social interactions involving trust and highlight the importance of target personality traits in shaping trust decisions.

Leaving the Loners Alone: Dispositional Preference for Solitude Evokes Ostracism.

What are the interpersonal consequences of seeking solitude? Leading theories in developmental research have proposed that having a general preference for solitude may incur significant interpersonal costs, but empirical studies are still lacking. In five studies (total N = 1,823), we tested whether target individuals with a higher preference for solitude were at greater risk for ostracism, a common, yet extremely negative, experience. In studies using self-reported experiences (Study 1) and perceptions of others' experiences (Study 2), individuals with a stronger preference for solitude were more likely to experience ostracism. Moreover, participants were more willing to ostracize targets with a high (vs. low) preference for solitude (Studies 3 and 4). Why do people ostracize solitude-seeking individuals? Participants assumed that interacting with these individuals would be aversive for themselves and the targets (Study 5; preregistered). Together, these studies suggest that seeking time alone has important (and potentially harmful) interpersonal consequences.

Ecological dimensions explain the past but do not predict future changes in trust.

Concerns about declining trust and rising cynicism are recurrent in academic research and the media. Yet, prior studies focused on explaining, rather than predicting, temporal changes in trust. We tested prediction models of trust change across (up to) 98 countries over six measurement waves (from 1981 to 2014). We tested whether different ecological predictors (e.g., pathogen prevalence, population diversity, inequality) explain the past and predict future trust levels across countries. We used societal growth curve models to disentangle between- from within-country effects and evaluated the accuracy of the models' out-of-sample predictions using the train-test split method: We used data from 1981-2009 to "train" the models and obtain predictions of trust for the period of 2010-2014. None of our models was more accurate in predicting future trust than a simpler baseline model. Moreover, we did not observe a universal decline in trust. Instead, temporal changes in trust were country-specific, highlighting the locality of cultural change. Most ecological predictors were correlated with between-country differences in trust. Only resource availability and moral opinion polarization were associated with within-country changes in trust: Countries that became less wealthy and more morally polarized over time also became less trustful. These results highlight important differences between explanatory and predictive models and suggest that ecological theories of trust might be of limited use when predicting future cultural shifts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Cooperation and decision time.

We review two fundamentally different ways that decision time is related to cooperation. First, studies have experimentally manipulated decision time to understand how cooperation is related to the use of intuition versus deliberation. Current evidence supports the claim that time pressure (and, more generally, intuition) favors cooperation. Second, correlational studies reveal that self-paced decision times are primarily related to decision conflict, not the use of intuition or deliberation. As a result, extreme cooperation decisions occur more quickly than intermediate decisions, and the relative speed of highly cooperative versus non-cooperative decisions depends on details of the design and participant pool. Finally, we discuss interpersonal consequences of decision time: people are judged based on how quickly they cooperate, and decision time is used as a cue to predict cooperation.

Explaining the persistent influence of facial cues in social decision-making.

Impressions of trustworthiness based on facial cues influence many consequential decisions, in spite of their (generally) poor accuracy. Here, we test whether reliance on facial cues can be better explained by (a) the belief that facial cues are more valid than other cues or by (b) the quick and primary processing of faces, which makes relying on facial cues relatively effortless. Six studies (N = 2,732 with 73,182 trust decisions) test the two accounts by comparing the effects of facial cues and economic payoffs on trust decisions. People believe that facial cues are less valid than economic payoffs (Study 1) but relying on facial cues takes less time than relying on economic payoffs (Study 2). Critically, introducing facial cues causes people to discount payoff information, but introducing payoff information does not reduce the effect of facial cues (Studies 3a-c). Finally, when making intuitive (vs. reflective) trust decisions, people rely less on payoff information, but they do not rely less on facial cues (Study 4). Together, these findings suggest that persistent reliance on facial trustworthiness is better explained by the intuitive accessibility of facial cues, rather than beliefs that facial cues are particularly valid. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

The Reputational Consequences of Generalized Trust.

The present research examines the reputational consequences of generalized trust. High-trust individuals are seen as moral and sociable, but not necessarily competent. When controlling for other traits, there is a negative relationship between trust and perceived competence (Studies 1 and 2). Compared with optimism, generalized trust has stronger effects on morality and sociability (Study 2). Furthermore, people judge those who do not discriminate between trustworthy and untrustworthy groups (unconditional trustors) more negatively than those who only trust groups that are, in fact, trustworthy (conditional trustors). Unconditional trust and unconditional distrust are both viewed negatively (Study 3), even after controlling for attitudinal similarity (Study 4). Critically, both generalized trust and discriminant ability (i.e., conditional trust) have independent reputational benefits (Study 5). These studies suggest that generalized trust plays an important role in how we perceive and judge others.

Social Environment Shapes the Speed of Cooperation.

Are cooperative decisions typically made more quickly or slowly than non-cooperative decisions? While this question has attracted considerable attention in recent years, most research has focused on one-shot interactions. Yet it is repeated interactions that characterize most important real-world social interactions. In repeated interactions, the cooperativeness of one's interaction partners (the "social environment") should affect the speed of cooperation. Specifically, we propose that reciprocal decisions (choices that mirror behavior observed in the social environment), rather than cooperative decisions per se, occur more quickly. We test this hypothesis by examining four independent decision time datasets with a total of 2,088 subjects making 55,968 decisions. We show that reciprocal decisions are consistently faster than non-reciprocal decisions: cooperation is faster than defection in cooperative environments, while defection is faster than cooperation in non-cooperative environments. These differences are further enhanced by subjects' previous behavior - reciprocal decisions are faster when they are consistent with the subject's previous choices. Finally, mediation analyses of a fifth dataset suggest that the speed of reciprocal decisions is explained, in part, by feelings of conflict - reciprocal decisions are less conflicted than non-reciprocal decisions, and less decision conflict appears to lead to shorter decision times.

Fast but not intuitive, slow but not reflective: Decision conflict drives reaction times in social dilemmas.

When people have the chance to help others at a cost to themselves, are cooperative decisions driven by intuition or reflection? To answer this question, recent studies have tested the relationship between reaction times (RTs) and cooperation, reporting both positive and negative correlations. To reconcile this apparent contradiction, we argue that decision conflict (rather than the use of intuition vs. reflection) drives response times, leading to an inverted-U shaped relationship between RT and cooperation. Studies 1 through 3 show that intermediate decisions take longer than both extremely selfish and extremely cooperative decisions. Studies 4 and 5 find that the conflict between self-interested and cooperative motives explains individual differences in RTs. Manipulating conflictedness causes longer RTs and more intermediate decisions, and RTs mediate the relationship between conflict and intermediate decisions. Finally, Studies 6 and 7 demonstrate that conflict is distinct from reflection by manipulating the use of intuition (vs. reflection). Experimentally promoting reliance on intuition increases cooperation, but has no effects on decision extremity or feelings of conflictedness. In sum, we provide evidence that RTs should not be interpreted as a direct proxy for the use of intuitive or reflective processes, and dissociate the effects of conflict and reflection in social decision making.