Power to Detect What? Considerations for Planning and Evaluating Sample Size.

ACADEMIC ABSTRACT: In the wake of the replication crisis, social and personality psychologists have increased attention to power analysis and the adequacy of sample sizes. In this article, we analyze current controversies in this area, including choosing effect sizes, why and whether power analyses should be conducted on already-collected data, how to mitigate the negative effects of sample size criteria on specific kinds of research, and which power criterion to use. For novel research questions, we advocate that researchers base sample sizes on effects that are likely to be cost-effective for other people to implement (in applied settings) or to study (in basic research settings), given the limitations of interest-based minimums or field-wide effect sizes. We discuss two alternatives to power analysis, precision analysis and sequential analysis, and end with recommendations for improving the practices of researchers, reviewers, and journal editors in social-personality psychology. PUBLIC ABSTRACT: Recently, social-personality psychology has been criticized for basing some of its conclusions on studies with low numbers of participants. As a result, power analysis, a mathematical way to ensure that a study has enough participants to reliably "detect" a given size of psychological effect, has become popular. This article describes power analysis and discusses some controversies about it, including how researchers should derive assumptions about effect size, and how the requirements of power analysis can be applied without harming research on hard-to-reach and marginalized communities. For novel research questions, we advocate that researchers base sample sizes on effects that are likely to be cost-effective for other people to implement (in applied settings) or to study (in basic research settings). We discuss two alternatives to power analysis, precision analysis and sequential analysis, and end with recommendations for improving the practices of researchers, reviewers, and journal editors in social-personality psychology.

Social-functional characteristics of Chinese terms translated as "shame" or "guilt": a cross-referencing approach.

Previous research has found a rich lexicon of shame and guilt terms in Chinese, but how comparable these terms are to "shame" or "guilt" in English remains a question. We identified eight commonly used Chinese terms translated as "shame" and "guilt". Study 1 assessed the Chinese terms' intensities, social characteristics, and action tendencies among 40 Chinese speakers. Testing term production in the reverse direction, Study 2 asked another Chinese-speaking sample (N = 85) to endorse emotion terms in response to eight eliciting scenarios generated using each term's social characteristics from Study 1. A native English-speaking sample (N = 83) was also included to examine the production of English emotion terms and compare motivational tendencies cross-culturally. Using this cross-referencing method, we found that some of the Chinese terms shared similar social-functional characteristics to their English translation, but some had distinct profiles. The two large shame-like and guilt-like term categories yielded in Study 1 were replicated in Study 2's Chinese term-production task where larger-scale correspondences between categorised elicitors and term clusters were found. Meanwhile, English speakers' term use provided further evidence for the equivalence between some Chinese terms and "shame" or "guilt" both in terms of their social and motivational characteristics.

On cooperative libertines and wicked puritans.

We agree with Fitouchi et al. that self-denial is sometimes moralized to signal capacity for cooperation, but propose that a person's cooperative character is more precisely judged by willingness to follow cultural, group, and interpersonal goals, for which many rules can serve as proxies, including rules about abstention. But asceticism is not a moral signal if its aims are destructive, while indulging impulses in a culturally approved way can also signal cooperation.

The past thirty years of emotion research: appraisal and beyond.

For this Special Issue, I highlight the past and present importance of appraisal theory as well as the challenges to its status as a total theory of emotions from the other functions of emotions: associative learning, self-regulation and social communication. This theoretical view applies both to emotion research in general and the specific fields of my interest in the emotions of moral judgment and intergroup processes. Methodologically, developments in analyses of large and more naturally occurring data sets will give an opportunity to square psychology's structural models of discrete emotions with the more complicated reality that exists. Both for the field and for individual researchers picking up the study of emotions, my advice is to pay special attention to measures, their assumptions and their context.

Perceiving mixed valence emotions reduces intergroup dehumanisation.

To deny others' humanity is one of the most heinous forms of intergroup prejudice. Given evidence that perceiving various forms of complexity in outgroup members reduces intergroup prejudice, we investigated across three experiments whether the novel dimension of emotional complexity, or outgroup members' joint experience of mixed-valence emotions, would also reduce their dehumanisation. Experiment 1 found that perceiving fictitious aliens' experience of the same primary emotions (e.g. sadness) presented in mixed vs. non-mixed valence pairs led to reduced prejudice via attenuated dehumanisation, i.e. attribution of uniquely human emotions. Experiment 2 confirmed these results, using an unfamiliar real-world group as an outgroup target. Experiment 3 used a familiar outgroup and found generally similar effects, reducing social distance through reduced dehumanisation. These processes suggest that an alternate route to reduced dehumanising of outgroups might involve presenting mixed valence emotions.

Three strong moves to improve research and replications alike.

We suggest three additional improvements to replication practices. First, original research should include concrete checks on validity, encouraged by editorial standards. Second, the reasons for replicating a particular study should be more transparent and balance systematic positive reasons with selective negative ones. Third, methodological validity should also be factored into evaluating replications, with methodologically inconclusive replications not counted as non-replications.

Beyond Purity.

Previous studies support a link between moral disgust and impurity, whereas anger is linked to harm. We challenged these strict correspondences by showing that disgust is activated in response to information about moral character, even for harm violations. By contrast, anger is activated in response to information about actions, including their moral wrongness and consequences. Study 1 examined disgust and anger in response to an action that suggests bad moral character (animal cruelty) versus an action that is seen as inherently more wrong (domestic abuse). Animal cruelty was associated with more disgust than domestic abuse was, whereas domestic abuse was associated with more anger. Studies 2 and 3 manipulated character by varying the agent's desire to cause harm and also varied the action's harmful consequences. Desire to harm predicted only disgust (controlling for anger), whereas consequences were more closely related to anger (controlling for disgust). Taken together, these results indicate that disgust arises in response to evidence of bad moral character, not just to impurity.

Contempt, like any other social affect, can be an emotion as well as a sentiment.

Gervais & Fessler assert that contempt is (a) not an emotion (or an attitude) but (b) a sentiment. Here, we challenge the validity and empirical basis of these two assertions, arguing that contempt, like many other emotions, can be both an emotion and a sentiment.

"It was only harmless banter!" The development and preliminary validation of the moral disengagement in sexual harassment scale.

Sexual harassment represents aggressive behavior that is often enacted instrumentally, in response to a threatened sense of masculinity and male identity. To date, however, theoretical attention to the social cognitive processes that regulate workplace harassment is scant. This article presents the development and preliminary validation of the Moral Disengagement in Sexual Harassment Scale (MDiSH); a self-report measure of moral disengagement in the context of hostile work environment harassment. Three studies (total n = 797) document the excellent psychometric properties of this new scale. Male U.K. university students (Study 1: n = 322) and U.S. working males (Studies 2 and 3: n = 475) completed the MDiSH and an array of measures for construct validation. The MDiSH exhibited positive correlations with sexual harassment myth acceptance, male gender identification, and hostile sexism. In Study 3, participants were exposed to a fictitious case of hostile work environment harassment. The MDiSH attenuated moral judgment, negative emotions (guilt, shame, and anger), sympathy, and endorsement of prosocial behavioral intentions (support for restitution) associated with the harassment case. Conversely, the MDiSH increased positive affect (happiness) about the harassment and attribution of blame to the female complainant. Implications for practice and future research avenues are discussed.

Deciding what to replicate: A decision model for replication study selection under resource and knowledge constraints.

Robust scientific knowledge is contingent upon replication of original findings. However, replicating researchers are constrained by resources, and will almost always have to choose one replication effort to focus on from a set of potential candidates. To select a candidate efficiently in these cases, we need methods for deciding which out of all candidates considered would be the most useful to replicate, given some overall goal researchers wish to achieve. In this article we assume that the overall goal researchers wish to achieve is to maximize the utility gained by conducting the replication study. We then propose a general rule for study selection in replication research based on the replication value of the set of claims considered for replication. The replication value of a claim is defined as the maximum expected utility we could gain by conducting a replication of the claim, and is a function of (a) the value of being certain about the claim, and (b) uncertainty about the claim based on current evidence. We formalize this definition in terms of a causal decision model, utilizing concepts from decision theory and causal graph modeling. We discuss the validity of using replication value as a measure of expected utility gain, and we suggest approaches for deriving quantitative estimates of replication value. Our goal in this article is not to define concrete guidelines for study selection, but to provide the necessary theoretical foundations on which such concrete guidelines could be built. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

The process of replication target selection in psychology: what to consider?

Increased execution of replication studies contributes to the effort to restore credibility of empirical research. However, a second generation of problems arises: the number of potential replication targets is at a serious mismatch with available resources. Given limited resources, replication target selection should be well-justified, systematic and transparently communicated. At present the discussion on what to consider when selecting a replication target is limited to theoretical discussion, self-reported justifications and a few formalized suggestions. In this Registered Report, we proposed a study involving the scientific community to create a list of considerations for consultation when selecting a replication target in psychology. We employed a modified Delphi approach. First, we constructed a preliminary list of considerations. Second, we surveyed psychologists who previously selected a replication target with regards to their considerations. Third, we incorporated the results into the preliminary list of considerations and sent the updated list to a group of individuals knowledgeable about concerns regarding replication target selection. Over the course of several rounds, we established consensus regarding what to consider when selecting a replication target. The resulting checklist can be used for transparently communicating the rationale for selecting studies for replication.

Just an anger synonym? Moral context influences predictors of disgust word use.

Are verbal reports of disgust in moral situations specific indicators of the concept of disgust, or are they used metaphorically to refer to anger? In this experiment, participants read scenarios describing a violation of a norm either about the use of the body (bodily moral) or about harm and rights (socio-moral). They then expressed disgust and anger on verbal scales, and through facial expression endorsement measures. The use of disgust words in the socio-moral condition was largely predicted by anger words and only secondarily by disgust faces, whereas in the bodily moral condition the use of disgust words was predicted to a similar extent by disgust faces and anger words. Angry faces, however, never predicted disgust words independently of anger words. These results support a middle-ground position in which disgust words concerning socio-moral violations are not entirely a metaphor for anger, but bear some relationship to other representations of disgust. In the case of socio-moral violations, however, the use of disgust language is more strongly related to anger language, and less strongly to facial representations of disgust than in the case of bodily moral violations.

Emotions in sexual morality: testing the separate elicitors of anger and disgust.

Recent work suggests that negative moral judgements of sexual activities are informed by disgust and anger. A correlational study (N=62) and an experiment (N=176) examined the specific antecedents that elicit these distinct, though correlated, moral emotions. Participants in Study 1 rated their emotional reactions to, and judgements of, 10 sexual scenarios. Across scenarios, judgements of abnormality predicted disgust independent of anger, and judgements of harm/rights violation predicted anger independent of disgust. Study 2 replicated these results in an experimental design. Participants rated their emotions and judgements in response to behaviours that varied in degree of potential sexual morality violation (non-sexual, heterosexual, homosexual) and rights violation (no harm, indirect harm, direct harm). Judgement of rights violation mediated the effects of harm on anger. Judgements of abnormality, but not other antecedents proposed to elicit moral disgust, mediated the effects of sexual immorality on disgust.

Examining acculturation in mixed-couples to test cultural transmission mechanisms.

The project sought to understand the factors which underlie cultural transmission, adapting self-reported methods from cross-cultural psychology and sociology to test the external validity of several constructs from existing evolutionary models. The target population were native-foreigner mixed-couples, allowing the analyses to benefit from asymmetrical cultural inputs. Sampling took place in Italy and Portugal, with recruitment relying on social networks, online newspapers, friends, organizations, universities, parishes, and embassies. The questionnaire was personally delivered or filled online. The validated variables were: contact with a population in which the majority endorses the culture being acquired, the relative quantity of friends from that culture, the perceived relationship quality with the companion, affective ties with one's own family, and the desire and emotional components behind the culture-transmission motive (a concept similar to cultural conservatism). An unexpected strong, positive association between both cultural identities was found. Thus, it was suggested that these participants adopted an integrative orientation, allowing both cultural identities to blend, whereas most research so far focuses on assimilation scenarios. Overall, acculturation was driven by either conformity to the majority or random learning, without discarding the influence of preferred demonstrators, and the emotional bounds embedded in the individual's cultural identity. Acculturation proved to be flexible and potentially changing according to the cultural trait being examined.

Social cuing of guilt by anger and of shame by disgust.

Scholars have proposed a conceptual structure for the self-critical moral emotions of guilt and shame and the other-critical emotions of anger and disgust. In this model, guilt is linked with anger and shame with disgust. This relationship may express itself in asymmetrical social cuing between emotions: In a social context, other people's angry facial expressions may communicate that the target should feel guilty, and other people's disgusted facial expressions may communicate that the target should feel ashamed. We conducted two experiments, one in the United Kingdom and the other in Spain, in which participants were shown pictures of faces expressing either anger or disgust. Participants rated the degree to which the faces would make them feel guilt or shame in a casual social encounter, and they answered questions about inferences concerning the emotional expressions. In both studies, angry expressions led to greater guilt and less shame than did disgusted expressions. This relationship was explained better by the type of norm violation inferred than by whether the violation was thought to involve the target's action or personality versus the target's character.

Anger, disgust, and presumption of harm as reactions to taboo-breaking behaviors.

Three experiments investigated the relationship between the presumption of harm in harmfree violations of creatural norms (taboos) and the moral emotions of anger and disgust. In Experiment 1, participants made a presumption of harm to others from taboo violations, even in conditions described as harmless and not involving other people; this presumption was predicted by anger and not disgust. Experiment 2 manipulated taboo violation and included a cognitive load task to clarify the post hoc nature of presumption of harm. Experiment 3 was similar but more accurately measured presumed harm. In Experiments 2 and 3, only without load was symbolic harm presumed, indicating its post hoc function to justify moral anger, which was not affected by load. In general, manipulations of harmfulness to others predicted moral anger better than moral disgust, whereas manipulations of taboo predicted disgust better. The presumption of harm was found on measures of symbolic rather than actual harm when a choice existed. These studies clarify understanding of the relationship between emotions and their justification when people consider victimless, offensive acts.

Imagining wrong: Fictitious contexts mitigate condemnation of harm more than impurity.

Over 5 experiments, we test the fictive pass asymmetry hypothesis. Following observations of ethics and public reactions to media, we propose that fictional contexts, such as reality, imagination, and virtual environments, will mitigate people's moral condemnation of harm violations, more so than purity violations. That is, imagining a purely harmful act is given a "fictive pass," in moral judgment, whereas imagining an abnormal act involving the body is evaluated more negatively because it is seen as more diagnostic of bad character. For Experiment 1, an undergraduate sample (N = 250) evaluated 9 vignettes depicting an agent committing either violations of harm or purity in real life, watching them in films, or imagining them. For Experiments 2 and 3, online participants (N = 375 and N = 321, respectively) evaluated a single vignette depicting an agent committing a violation of harm or purity that either occurred in real life, was imagined, watched in a film, or performed in a video game. Experiment 4 (N = 348) used an analysis of moderated mediation to demonstrate that the perceived wrongness of fictional purity violations is explained both by the extent to which they are seen as a cue to, and a cause of, a poor moral character. Lastly, Experiment 5 (N = 484) validated our manipulations and included the presumption of desire as an additional mediator of the fictive pass asymmetry effects. We discuss implications for moral theories of act and character, anger and disgust, and for media use and regulation. (PsycINFO Database Record

Not quite human: infrahumanization in response to collective responsibility for intergroup killing.

The present research examines how awareness of violence perpetrated against an out-group by one's in-group can intensify the infrahumanization of the out-group, as measured by a reduced tendency to accord uniquely human emotions to out-groups. Across 3 experiments that used different in-groups (humans, British, White Americans) and out-groups (aliens, Australian Aborigines, and Native Americans), when participants were made aware of the in-group's mass killing of the out-group, they infrahumanized the victims more. The perception of collective responsibility, not just the knowledge that the out-group members had died in great numbers, was shown to be necessary for this effect. Infrahumanization also occurred concurrently with increased collective guilt but was unrelated to it. It is proposed that infrahumanization may be a strategy for people to reestablish psychological equanimity when confronted with a self-threatening situation and that such a strategy may occur concomitantly with other strategies, such as providing reparations to the out-group.

'Imagined guilt' vs 'recollected guilt': implications for fMRI.

Guilt is thought to maintain social harmony by motivating reparation. This study compared two methodologies commonly used to identify the neural correlates of guilt. The first, imagined guilt, requires participants to read hypothetical scenarios and then imagine themselves as the protagonist. The second, recollected guilt, requires participants to reflect on times they personally experienced guilt. In the fMRI scanner, participants were presented with guilt/neutral memories and guilt/neutral hypothetical scenarios. Contrasts confirmed a priori predictions that guilt memories, relative to guilt scenarios, were associated with significantly greater activity in regions associated with affect [anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), Caudate, Insula, orbital frontal cortex (OFC)] and social cognition [temporal pole (TP), precuneus). Similarly, results indicated that guilt memories, relative to neutral memories, were also associated with greater activity in affective (ACC, amygdala, Insula, OFC) and social cognition (mPFC, TP, precuneus, temporo-parietal junction) regions. There were no significant differences between guilt hypothetical scenarios and neutral hypothetical scenarios in either affective or social cognition regions. The importance of distinguishing between different guilt inductions inside the scanner is discussed. We offer explanations of our results and discuss ideas for future research.