The Transmissibility of Antibiotic-Resistant Enterobacteriaceae in Intensive Care Units.

Background: The global emergence of infections caused by Enterobacteriaceae resistant to expanded-spectrum cephalosporins (ESCs) in intensive care units (ICUs) is, at least partly, driven by cross-transmission. Yet, individual transmission capacities of bacterial species have not been quantified. Methods: In this post hoc analysis of a multicenter study in 13 European ICUs, prospective surveillance data and a mathematical model were used to estimate transmission capacities and single-admission reproduction numbers (RA) of Escherichia coli and non-E. coli Enterobacteriaceae (non-EcE), all being ESC resistant. Surveillance was based on a chromogenic selective medium for ESC-resistant Enterobacteriaceae, allowing identification of E. coli and of Klebsiella, Enterobacter, Serratia, and Citrobacter species, grouped as non-EcE. Results: Among 11420 patients included, the admission prevalence was 3.8% for non-EcE (74% being Klebsiella pneumoniae) and 3.3% for E. coli. Acquisition rates were 7.4 and 2.6 per 100 admissions at risk for non-EcE and E. coli, respectively. The estimated transmission capacity of non-EcE was 3.7 (95% credibility interval [CrI], 1.4-11.3) times higher than that of E. coli, yielding single-admission reproduction numbers (RA) of 0.17 (95% CrI, .094-.29) for non-EcE and 0.047 (95% CrI, .018-.098) for E. coli. Conclusions: In ICUs, non-EcE, mainly K. pneumoniae, are 3.7 times more transmissible than E. coli. Estimated RA values of these bacteria were below the critical threshold of 1, suggesting that in these ICUs outbreaks typically remain small with current infection control policies.

Cost and effects of different admission screening strategies to control the spread of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus.

Nosocomial infection rates due to antibiotic-resistant bacteriae, e.g., methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) remain high in most countries. Screening for MRSA carriage followed by barrier precautions for documented carriers (so-called screen and isolate (S&I)) has been successful in some, but not all settings. Moreover, different strategies have been proposed, but comparative studies determining their relative effects and costs are not available. We, therefore, used a mathematical model to evaluate the effect and costs of different S&I strategies and to identify the critical parameters for this outcome. The dynamic stochastic simulation model consists of 3 hospitals with general wards and intensive care units (ICUs) and incorporates readmission of carriers of MRSA. Patient flow between ICUs and wards was based on real observations. Baseline prevalence of MRSA was set at 20% in ICUs and hospital-wide at 5%; ranges of costs and infection rates were based on published data. Four S&I strategies were compared to a do-nothing scenario: S&I of previously documented carriers ("flagged" patients); S&I of flagged patients and ICU admissions; S&I of flagged and group of "frequent" patients; S&I of all hospital admissions (universal screening). Evaluated levels of efficacy of S&I were 10%, 25%, 50% and 100%. Our model predicts that S&I of flagged and S&I of flagged and ICU patients are the most cost-saving strategies with fastest return of investment. For low isolation efficacy universal screening and S&I of flagged and "frequent" patients may never become cost-saving. Universal screening is predicted to prevent hardly more infections than S&I of flagged and "frequent" patients, albeit at higher costs. Whether an intervention becomes cost-saving within 10 years critically depends on costs per infection in ICU, costs of screening and isolation efficacy.

Successful Veterans Affairs initiative to prevent methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus infections revisited.

In 2011 Jain et al reported a 62% reduction of healthcare-associated methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus infections that resulted from an intervention bundle. Here we present a mathematical model and prove, using parameters from the study by Jain et al, that the universal screen and isolate strategy can have contributed only marginally to the reduction in infections.