Quality of evidence revealing subtle gender biases in science is in the eye of the beholder.

Scientists are trained to evaluate and interpret evidence without bias or subjectivity. Thus, growing evidence revealing a gender bias against women-or favoring men-within science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) settings is provocative and raises questions about the extent to which gender bias may contribute to women's underrepresentation within STEM fields. To the extent that research illustrating gender bias in STEM is viewed as convincing, the culture of science can begin to address the bias. However, are men and women equally receptive to this type of experimental evidence? This question was tested with three randomized, double-blind experiments-two involving samples from the general public (n = 205 and 303, respectively) and one involving a sample of university STEM and non-STEM faculty (n = 205). In all experiments, participants read an actual journal abstract reporting gender bias in a STEM context (or an altered abstract reporting no gender bias in experiment 3) and evaluated the overall quality of the research. Results across experiments showed that men evaluate the gender-bias research less favorably than women, and, of concern, this gender difference was especially prominent among STEM faculty (experiment 2). These results suggest a relative reluctance among men, especially faculty men within STEM, to accept evidence of gender biases in STEM. This finding is problematic because broadening the participation of underrepresented people in STEM, including women, necessarily requires a widespread willingness (particularly by those in the majority) to acknowledge that bias exists before transformation is possible.

Now Hiring! Empirically Testing a Three-Step Intervention to Increase Faculty Gender Diversity in STEM.

Workforce homogeneity limits creativity, discovery, and job satisfaction; nonetheless, the vast majority of university faculty in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields are men. We conducted a randomized and controlled three-step faculty search intervention based in self-determination theory aimed at increasing the number of women faculty in STEM at one US university where increasing diversity had historically proved elusive. Results show that the numbers of women candidates considered for and offered tenure-track positions were significantly higher in the intervention groups compared with those in controls. Searches in the intervention were 6.3 times more likely to make an offer to a woman candidate, and women who were made an offer were 5.8 times more likely to accept the offer from an intervention search. Although the focus was on increasing women faculty within STEM, the intervention can be adapted to other scientific and academic communities to advance diversity along any dimension.

Beliefs about expectations moderate the influence of expectations on pain perception.

BACKGROUND: Expectations congruently influence, or bias, pain perception. Recent social psychological research reveals that individuals differ in the extent to which they believe in expectation biases and that individuals who believe in expectation biases may adjust for this bias in their perceptions and reactions. That is, idiosyncratic beliefs about expectations can moderate the influence of expectations on experience. PURPOSE: Prior research has not examined whether idiosyncratic beliefs about expectations can alter the degree to which one's expectations influence pain perception. Using a laboratory pain stimulus, we examined the possibility that beliefs about expectation biases alter pain responses following both pain- and placebo-analgesic expectations. METHODS: Participants' beliefs about expectation biases were measured. Next, participants were randomly assigned to receive either a pain expectation or a placebo-analgesia expectation prior to a cold-pressor task. After the task, participants rated their pain. RESULTS: Beliefs about expectation biases significantly influenced pain reports. Specifically, pain reports were more influenced by provided expectations the less participants believed in expectation biases (i.e., pain expectations resulted in more pain than analgesia expectations). CONCLUSIONS: Beliefs about the expectation bias are an important and under-examined predictor of pain and placebo analgesia.

Suggestion Timing Moderates the Effects of Prior Pain Experiences on Pain Perception.

Two common elements in patient care are reoccurring painful events (eg, blood draws) and verbal suggestions from others for lessened pain. Research shows that verbal suggestions for lower pain can decrease subsequent pain perception from novel noxious stimuli, but it is less clear how these suggestions and prior painful experiences combine to influence the perception of a reoccurring painful event. The presented experiment tested the hypothesis that the order of these 2 factors influence pain perception for a reoccurring painful event. All participants (702 healthy college-student volunteers, 58% women, 85.5% White) experienced a novel painful event on one arm, then again on their other arm (now a familiar pain event). Participants who received the suggestion that they can tolerate more pain on the second arm relative to the first from the outset, before the initial pain event, perceived relatively less pain during the repeated event as compared to participants who received the same suggestion after the first painful event or no-suggestion (control). Given many pain events within medical contexts are, or become, familiar to patients, further researching the timing at which patients receive verbal suggestions for lower pain can inform practices to optimize the therapeutic, pain-reducing potential of such suggestions. PERSPECTIVE: Providing suggestions that a familiar pain event (ie, the second of 2) will be less painful than a prior event can reduce perceived pain for the familiar event depending on when it is presented. These findings can inform practices to optimize the therapeutic potential of verbal suggestions for reduced pain.

Participating in politics resembles physical activity: general action patterns in international archives, United States archives, and experiments.

A series of studies examined whether political participation can emerge from general patterns of indiscriminate activity. In the first two studies, general action tendencies were measured by combining national and state-level indicators of high activity (e.g., impulsiveness, pace of life, and physical activity) from international and U.S. data. This action-tendency index positively correlated with a measure of political participation that consisted of voting behaviors and participation in political demonstrations. The following two experimental studies indicated that participants exposed to action words (e.g., go, move) had stronger intentions to vote in an upcoming election and volunteered more time to make phone calls on behalf of a university policy than participants exposed to inaction words did (e.g., relax, stop). These studies suggest that political participation can be predicted from general tendencies toward activity present at the national and state levels, as well as from verbal prompts suggestive of activity.

Testing a positive-affect induction to reduce verbally induced nocebo hyperalgesia in an experimental pain paradigm.

There is an ethical obligation to notify individuals about potential pain associated with diagnoses, treatments, and procedures; however, supplying this information risks inducing nocebo hyperalgesia. Currently, there are few empirically derived strategies for reducing nocebo hyperalgesia. Because nocebo effects are linked to negative affectivity, we tested the hypothesis that a positive-affect induction can disrupt nocebo hyperalgesia from verbal suggestion. Healthy volunteers (N = 147) were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (affect induction: positive vs neutral) by 2 (verbal suggestion: no suggestion vs suggestion of pain increase) between-subjects design. Participants were induced to experience positive or neutral affect by watching movie clips for 15 minutes. Next, participants had an inert cream applied to their nondominant hand, and suggestion was manipulated by telling only half the participants the cream could increase the pain of the upcoming cold pressor test. Subsequently, all participants underwent the cold pressor test (8 ± 0.04°C), wherein they submerged the nondominant hand and rated pain intensity on numerical rating scales every 20 seconds up to 2 minutes. In the neutral-affect conditions, there was evidence for the nocebo hyperalgesia effect: participants given the suggestion of pain displayed greater pain than participants not receiving this suggestion, P's < 0.05. Demonstrating a blockage effect, nocebo hyperalgesia did not occur in the positive-affect conditions, P's > 0.5. This is the first study to show that positive affect may disrupt nocebo hyperalgesia thereby pointing to a novel strategy for decreasing nocebo effects without compromising the communication of medical information to patients in clinical settings.

Increasing and decreasing motor and cognitive output: a model of general action and inaction goals.

General action and inaction goals can influence the amount of motor or cognitive output irrespective of the type of behavior in question, with the same stimuli producing trivial and important motor and cognitive manifestations normally viewed as parts of different systems. A series of experiments examined the effects of instilling general action and inaction goals using word primes, such as "action" and "rest." The first 5 experiments showed that the same stimuli influenced motor output, such as doodling on a piece of paper and eating, as well as cognitive output, such as recall and problem solving. The last 2 experiments supported the prediction that these diverse effects can result from the instigation of general action and inaction goals. Specifically, these last 2 studies confirmed that participants were motivated to achieve active or inactive states and that attaining them decreased the effects of the primes on behavior.

Not Merely Experiential: Unconscious Thought Can Be Rational.

Individuals often form more reasonable judgments from complex information after a period of distraction vs. deliberation. This phenomenon has been attributed to sophisticated unconscious thought during the distraction period that integrates and organizes the information (Unconscious Thought Theory; Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006). Yet, other research suggests that experiential processes are strengthened during the distraction (relative to deliberation) period, accounting for the judgment and decision benefit. We tested between these possibilities, hypothesizing that unconscious thought is distinct from experiential processes, and independently contributes to judgments and decisions during a distraction period. Using an established paradigm, Experiment 1 (N = 319) randomly induced participants into an experiential or rational mindset, after which participants received complex information describing three roommates to then consider consciously (i.e., deliberation) or unconsciously (i.e., distraction). Results revealed superior roommate judgments (but not choices) following distraction vs. deliberation, consistent with Unconscious Thought Theory. Mindset did not have an influence on roommate judgments. However, planned tests revealed a significant advantage of distraction only within the rational-mindset condition, which is contrary to the idea that experiential processing alone facilitates complex decision-making during periods of distraction. In a second experiment (N = 136), we tested whether effects of unconscious thought manifest for a complex analytical reasoning task for which experiential processing would offer no advantage. As predicted, participants in an unconscious thought condition outperformed participants in a control condition, suggesting that unconscious thought can be analytical. In sum, the current results support the existence of unconscious thinking processes that are distinct from experiential processes, and can be rational. Thus, the experiential vs. rational nature of a process might not cleanly delineate conscious and unconscious thought.

Discerning the role of optimism in persuasion: the valence-enhancement hypothesis.

The valence-enhancement hypothesis argues that because of their active coping strategies, optimists are especially likely to elaborate on valenced information that is of high personal relevance. The hypothesis predicts that as a result, optimists will be more persuaded by personally relevant positive messages and less persuaded by personally relevant negative messages than pessimists. It also predicts that when the message is not personally relevant, optimism and persuasion will not be related in this manner. The results of 3 studies support these predictions and supply evidence against several alternative hypotheses. The possibility that the observed effects are not due to optimism but to the confounding influence of 7 additional variables is also addressed and ruled out. Implications are discussed.

Videotaped interrogations and confessions: a simple change in camera perspective alters verdicts in simulated trials.

Prior research has indicated that altering the perspective from which a videotaped confession is recorded influences assessments of the confession's voluntariness. The authors examined whether this camera perspective bias persists in more ecologically valid contexts. In Study 1, neither a realistic videotaped trial simulation nor potentially corrective judicial instruction was sufficient to mitigate the prejudicial effect of camera perspective on mock jurors' assessments of voluntariness or on their all-important final verdicts. Study 2 suggests that perhaps the best camera perspective to use is one that focuses trial fact finders' attention on the interrogator, as this particular vantage point may facilitate decision makers' capacity to detect coercive influences, which in turn could, in some cases, improve assessments of the confession's reliability.

The time for doing is not the time for change: effects of general action and inaction goals on attitude retrieval and attitude change.

Implicit in many informal and formal principles of psychological change is the understudied assumption that change requires either an active approach or an inactive approach. This issue was systematically investigated by comparing the effects of general action goals and general inaction goals on attitude change. As prior attitudes facilitate preparation for an upcoming persuasive message, general action goals were hypothesized to facilitate conscious retrieval of prior attitudes and therefore hinder attitude change to a greater extent than general inaction goals. Experiment 1 demonstrated that action primes (e.g., "go," "energy") yielded faster attitude report than inaction primes (e.g., "rest," "still") among participants who were forewarned of an upcoming persuasive message. Experiment 2 showed that the faster attitude report identified in Experiment 1 was localized on attitudes toward a message topic participants were prepared to receive. Experiments 3, 4, and 5 showed that, compared with inaction primes, action primes produced less attitude change and less argument scrutiny in response to a counterattitudinal message on a previously forewarned topic. Experiment 6 confirmed that the effects of the primes on attitude change were due to differential attitude retrieval. That is, when attitude expression was induced immediately after the primes, action and inaction goals produced similar amounts of attitude change. In contrast, when no attitude expression was induced after the prime, action goals produced less attitude change than inaction goals. Finally, Experiment 7 validated the assumption that these goal effects can be reduced or reversed when the goals have already been satisfied by an intervening task.

Deconstructing self-blame following sexual assault: the critical roles of cognitive content and process.

As part of a larger study, predictors of self-blame were investigated in a sample of 149 undergraduate sexual assault survivors. Each participant completed questionnaires regarding their preassault, peritraumatic, and postassault experiences and participated in an individual interview. Results confirmed the central hypothesis that, although several established correlates independently relate to self-blame, only cognitive content and process variables- negative self-cognitions and counterfactual-preventability cognitions-uniquely predict self-blame in a multivariate model.

When the expectations from a message will not be realized: Naïve theories can eliminate expectation-congruent judgments via correction.

Research typically reveals that individuals like an object more when a persuasive message convinces them that this object is pleasant. In this paper, two experiments were conducted to understand the influence of such message-induced affective-expectations on judgments of experienced affect following direct encounter with an alcohol type of drink. As predicted, before trying the drink, recipients of the positive-expectation message had more positive expectations than recipients of the negative-expectation message. After drinking, participants judged the beverage to elicit affect congruent with message-induced expectations to the extent they did not endorse a naïve theory that their affective expectations congruently influence their experienced affect. In contrast, after drinking, the effect of the message disappeared when participants did endorse this naïve theory. Moderation of these effects, as well as theoretical and practical implications, are addressed.