pH1N1 - a comparative analysis of public health responses in Ontario to the influenza outbreak, public health and primary care: lessons learned and policy suggestions.

BACKGROUND: Ontario's 36 Public Health Units (PHUs) were responsible for implementing the H1N1 Pandemic Influenza Plans (PIPs) to address the first pandemic influenza virus in over 40 years. It was the first under conditions which permitted mass immunization. This is therefore the first opportunity to learn and document what worked well, and did not work well, in Ontario's response to pH1N1, and to make recommendations based on experience. METHODS: Our objectives were to: describe the PIP models, obtain perceptions on outcomes, lessons learned and to solicit policy suggestions for improvement. We conducted a 3-phase comparative analysis study comprised of semi-structured key informant interviews with local Medical Officers of Health (n=29 of 36), and Primary Care Physicians (n=20) and in Phase 3 with provincial Chief-Medical Officers of Health (n=6) and a provincial Medical Organization. Phase 2 data came from a Pan-Ontario symposium (n=44) comprised leaders representing: Public Health, Primary Care, Provincial and Federal Government. RESULTS: PIPs varied resulting in diverse experiences and lessons learned. This was in part due to different PHU characteristics that included: degree of planning, PHU and Primary Care capacity, population, geographic and relationships with Primary Care. Main lessons learned were: 1) Planning should be more comprehensive and operationalized at all levels. 2) Improve national and provincial communication strategies and eliminate contradictory messages from different sources. 3) An integrated community-wide response may be the best approach to decrease the impact of a pandemic. 4) The best Mass Immunization models can be quickly implemented and have high immunization rates. They should be flexible and allow for incremental responses that are based upon: i) pandemic severity, ii) local health system, population and geographic characteristics, iii) immunization objectives, and iv) vaccine supply. CONCLUSION: "We were very lucky that pH1N1 was not more severe." Consensus existed for more detailed planning and the inclusion of multiple health system and community stakeholders. PIPs should be flexible, allow for incremental responses and have important decisions (E.g., under which conditions Public Health, Primary Care, Pharmacists or others act as vaccine delivery agents.) made prior to a crisis.

Asymptomatic surveillance testing for COVID-19 in health care professional students: lessons learned from a low prevalence setting.

The novel coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has severely impacted the training of health care professional students because of concerns of potential asymptomatic transmission to colleagues and vulnerable patients. From May 27th, 2020, to June 23rd 2021; at a time when B.1.1.7 (alpha) and B.1.617.2 (delta) were the dominant circulating variants, PCR testing was conducted on 1,237 nasopharyngeal swabs collected from 454 asymptomatic health care professional students as they returned to their studies from across Canada to Kingston, ON, a low prevalence area during that period for COVID-19. Despite 46.7% of COVID-19 infections occurring in the 18-29 age group in Kingston, severe-acute-respiratory coronavirus-2 was not detected in any of the samples suggesting that negligible asymptomatic infection occurred in this group and that PCR testing in this setting may not be warranted as a screening tool.

Recommendations for action: a community meeting in preparation for a mass-casualty opioid overdose event in Southeastern Ontario.

Given the steady rise of overdose morbidity and mortality in North America, and increasing frequency of sudden clusters of non-fatal and fatal overdoses in other jurisdictions, regional preparedness plans to respond effectively to clusters of overdoses may reduce the impact of such events on the population. On the 27th of February 2017 in Kingston, Ontario, KFL&A Public Health, in collaboration with public health partners, hosted a full-day workshop involving table-top exercises and discussions for service partners on how to prepare for, respond to, and manage a mass-casualty event secondary to opioid overdose in Southeastern Ontario. The workshop assisted in identifying the various challenges faced by service partners, provided an understanding of the roles and responsibilities of partner agencies, and helped to determine next steps in preparation to address a mass opioid overdose situation at the local level. This report suggests key roles and responsibilities of partners involved in responding to a mass-casualty event secondary to opioid overdose, recommendations to address the feedback and challenges raised throughout the workshop, and a protocol to help determine when to activate an Incident Management System (IMS).