Indiscriminate, Irrelevant, and Sometimes Wrong: Causal Misconceptions about Climate Change.

Prior research demonstrates widespread persistence of beliefs about climate change causes and risks that are arguably misconceptions. They include believing pollution causes climate change, believing ozone depletion causes climate change, the combination of these two "green beliefs," referred to as environmental problems, and believing natural climate variation significantly contributes to current climate trends. Each of these causal beliefs has the potential to weaken or divert support away from effective climate change risk mitigation policies. To assess this potential, we explore the nature and prevalence of these beliefs in the United States with a national sample of interviews (N = 77) and two national surveys (N = 1,013, N = 1,820), and apply regression and mediation analyses to explore whether they explain any of the variation in individuals' concern or support for policy to mitigate climate change. Adherence to these beliefs-which reflect a variety of misconceptions illustrated in the interviews-differs by political ideology but is common, with over a third of interviewees mentioning one or more. Controlling for general knowledge, political ideology, and other factors, misconceptions about environmental problems are still associated directly with support for climate change policies. On average adherence to the belief that environmental problems cause climate change is associated with a 25% higher probability of policy support. In contrast, believing natural climate variability is a major recent cause of climate change is associated with a 7% lower probability of supporting climate policy, even after controlling for political ideology and other knowledge about climate change.

Is muscular strength a critical physical attribute for the apprehension of a simulated non-compliant suspect?

This investigation determined the influence of technique and experience on arm retraction force required to apprehend a non-compliant suspect. Phase-One: Nine experienced RAAF military-police completed four apprehension simulations, peak arm retraction force was measured; i) Control(CON), ii) Pressure-Point(PP), iii) Targeted-Striking(TS) and iv) 2-Person(2Per) techniques. Phase-Two: Experienced (EXP, n = 8) or Inexperienced (INEXP, n = 22) military-police completed CON, PP and Pressure-Point + Coaching(PP + C). Strength was assessed in INEXP. EXP produced more force (178.7 N ± 25.9) than INEXP during CON, but no participant successfully apprehended the suspect. All EXP were successful with PP, arm retraction force 357 N (CI: 233.7,480.2) was lower compared to CON, but no difference was observed between PP and CON for INEXP. PP + C, 82% of INEXP were successful, force declined 138.2 N (CI: 67.8,208.5) compared to CON. All EXP required PP for successful apprehension. INEXP required PP + C for apprehension success. Muscular strength had a limited relationship with arm retraction force. Practitioner summary: For law enforcement personnel, apprehension of a suspect is a critical and physically demanding task, where success is associated with muscular strength and technique. We observed success in the apprehension of a simulated suspect by military law enforcement personnel was primarily determined by participant skill and experience and not muscular strength.

Efficacy Foundations for Risk Communication: How People Think About Reducing the Risks of Climate Change.

Believing action to reduce the risks of climate change is both possible (self-efficacy) and effective (response efficacy) is essential to motivate and sustain risk mitigation efforts, according to current risk communication theory. Although the public recognizes the dangers of climate change, and is deluged with lists of possible mitigative actions, little is known about public efficacy beliefs in the context of climate change. Prior efficacy studies rely on conflicting constructs and measures of efficacy, and links between efficacy and risk management actions are muddled. As a result, much remains to learn about how laypersons think about the ease and effectiveness of potential mitigative actions. To bring clarity and inform risk communication and management efforts, we investigate how people think about efficacy in the context of climate change risk management by analyzing unprompted and prompted beliefs from two national surveys (N = 405, N = 1,820). In general, respondents distinguish little between effective and ineffective climate strategies. While many respondents appreciate that reducing fossil fuel use is an effective risk mitigation strategy, overall assessments reflect persistent misconceptions about climate change causes, and uncertainties about the effectiveness of risk mitigation strategies. Our findings suggest targeting climate change risk communication and management strategies to (1) address gaps in people's existing mental models of climate action, (2) leverage existing public understanding of both potentially effective mitigation strategies and the collective action dilemma at the heart of climate change action, and (3) take into account ideologically driven reactions to behavior change and government action framed as climate action.

Efficacy, Action, and Support for Reducing Climate Change Risks.

A growing body of research demonstrates that believing action to reduce the risks of climate change is both possible (self-efficacy) and effective (response efficacy) is essential to motivate and sustain risk mitigation efforts. Despite this potentially critical role of efficacy beliefs, measures and their use vary wildly in climate change risk perception and communication research, making it hard to compare and learn from efficacy studies. To address this problem and advance our understanding of efficacy beliefs, this article makes three contributions. First, we present a theoretically motivated approach to measuring climate change mitigation efficacy, in light of diverse proposed, perceived, and previously researched strategies. Second, we test this in two national survey samples (Amazon's Mechanical Turk N = 405, GfK Knowledge Panel N = 1,820), demonstrating largely coherent beliefs by level of action and discrimination between types of efficacy. Four additive efficacy scales emerge: personal self-efficacy, personal response efficacy, government and collective self-efficacy, and government and collective response efficacy. Third, we employ the resulting efficacy scales in mediation models to test how well efficacy beliefs predict climate change policy support, controlling for specific knowledge, risk perceptions, and ideology, and allowing for mediation by concern. Concern fully mediates the relatively strong effects of perceived risk on policy support, but only partly mediates efficacy beliefs. Stronger government and collective response efficacy beliefs and personal self-efficacy beliefs are both directly and indirectly associated with greater support for reducing the risks of climate change, even after controlling for ideology and causal beliefs about climate change.

MEMS-based handheld scanning probe with pre-shaped input signals for distortion-free images in Gabor-domain optical coherence microscopy.

High-speed scanning in optical coherence tomography (OCT) often comes with either compromises in image quality, the requirement for post-processing of the acquired images, or both. We report on distortion-free OCT volumetric imaging with a dual-axis micro-electro-mechanical system (MEMS)-based handheld imaging probe. In the context of an imaging probe with optics located between the 2D MEMS and the sample, we report in this paper on how pre-shaped open-loop input signals with tailored non-linear parts were implemented in a custom control board and, unlike the sinusoidal signals typically used for MEMS, achieved real-time distortion-free imaging without post-processing. The MEMS mirror was integrated into a compact, lightweight handheld probe. The MEMS scanner achieved a 12-fold reduction in volume and 17-fold reduction in weight over a previous dual-mirror galvanometer-based scanner. Distortion-free imaging with no post-processing with a Gabor-domain optical coherence microscope (GD-OCM) with 2 µm axial and lateral resolutions over a field of view of 1 × 1 mm2 is demonstrated experimentally through volumetric images of a regular microscopic structure, an excised human cornea, and in vivo human skin.

The physiological demand of a task simulation varies when developed by independent groups of experiential experts.

OBJECTIVE: To investigate the disparity in the specification and physiological demand of a task simulation when developed by two independent panels of experiential experts. DESIGN: Independent groups design. METHODS: Two groups of experiential experts from the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) worked independently to design, and then complete a simulation of a generic occupational task; the establishment of a security control point. Task duration, oxygen consumption, and cardiac frequency were measured whilst each panel completed the task simulation. Maximal acceptable work duration (MAWD) and the percentage of MAWD (%MAWD) were also calculated. Independent t-tests were used to determine differences (P < 0.05) between the measured variables. RESULTS: No differences were observed in the average oxygen consumption (1.26 ± 0.25 L min-1 and 1.28 ± 0.29 L min-1 respectively; P = 0.84), or cardiac frequency (134 ± 16.4 beats·min-1 and 125 ± 8.5 beats·min-1 respectively; P = 0.12) between Panel 1 and Panel 2. However, there was a significant difference between panels with respect to task duration (Panel 1: 15.5 ± 3.68 min; Panel 2: 34.20 ± 9.60 min; P < 0.01), and the %MAWD (Panel 1: 5.32 ± 3.17%, Panel 2: 12.15 ± 9.40%, P = 0.04). CONCLUSIONS: The physiological demand of a task simulation is dependent upon the group of experts consulted to develop the simulation. It is critical that input from a wide representation of experiential experts is considered when developing task simulations to avoid bias towards the perceptions of the experts consulted.

Credible Threat: Perceptions of Pandemic Coronavirus, Climate Change and the Morality and Management of Global Risks.

Prior research suggests that the pandemic coronavirus pushes all the "hot spots" for risk perceptions, yet both governments and populations have varied in their responses. As the economic impacts of the pandemic have become salient, governments have begun to slash their budgets for mitigating other global risks, including climate change, likely imposing increased future costs from those risks. Risk analysts have long argued that global environmental and health risks are inseparable at some level, and must ultimately be managed systemically, to effectively increase safety and welfare. In contrast, it has been suggested that we have worry budgets, in which one risk crowds out another. "In the wild," our problem-solving strategies are often lexicographic; we seek and assess potential solutions one at a time, even one attribute at a time, rather than conducting integrated risk assessments. In a U.S. national survey experiment in which participants were randomly assigned to coronavirus or climate change surveys (N = 3203) we assess risk perceptions, and whether risk perception "hot spots" are driving policy preferences, within and across these global risks. Striking parallels emerge between the two. Both risks are perceived as highly threatening, inequitably distributed, and not particularly controllable. People see themselves as somewhat informed about both risks and have moral concerns about both. In contrast, climate change is seen as better understood by science than is pandemic coronavirus. Further, individuals think they can contribute more to slowing or stopping pandemic coronavirus than climate change, and have a greater moral responsibility to do so. Survey assignment influences policy preferences, with higher support for policies to control pandemic coronavirus in pandemic coronavirus surveys, and higher support for policies to control climate change risks in climate change surveys. Across all surveys, age groups, and policies to control either climate change or pandemic coronavirus risks, support is highest for funding research on vaccines against pandemic diseases, which is the only policy that achieves majority support in both surveys. Findings bolster both the finite worry budget hypothesis and the hypothesis that supporters of policies to confront one threat are disproportionately likely also to support policies to confront the other threat.