Surveillance for avian influenza in wild birds in the European Union in 2007.

Surveillance of wild birds for avian influenza viruses has been compulsory in the European Union (EU) since 2005, primarily as a means of detecting H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus and of monitoring the circulation of low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) virus H5 and H7 strains. In 2007, 79,392 wild birds were tested throughout the EU. H5N1 HPAI was detected in 329 birds from four Member States (MS); affected birds were almost entirely of the orders Podicipediformes (grebes) and Anseriformes (waterfowl) during the summer months. LPAI was detected in 1485 wild birds among 21 MS. A total of 1250 birds were positive for influenza A but were not discriminated any further; LPAI H5 was detected in 105 birds, exclusively of the order Anseriformes. LPAI H7 was detected in seven birds. LPAI of other subtypes was found in 123 birds. Epidemiologic evidence and phylogenetic analysis of H5N1 viruses indicate that H5N1 did not appear to persist in the EU from 2006 but was reintroduced, probably from the Middle East.

Risk factors for H5 avian influenza virus prevalence on urban live bird markets in Jakarta, Indonesia-Evaluation of long-term environmental surveillance data.

In the re-emergence of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI), live bird markets have been identified to play a critical role. In this repeated cross-sectional study, we combined surveillance data collected monthly on Jakarta's live bird markets over a five-year period, with risk factors related to the structure and management of live bird markets, the trading and slaughtering of birds at these markets, and environmental and demographic conditions in the areas where the markets were located. Over the study period 36.7% (95% CI: 35.1, 38.3) of samples (N = 1315) tested HPAI H5 virus positive. Using General Estimation Equation approaches to account for repeated observations over time, we explored the association between HPAI H5 virus prevalence and potential risk factors. Markets where only live birds and carcasses were sold, but no slaughtering was conducted at or at the vicinity of the markets, had a significantly reduced chance of being positive for H5 virus (OR = 0.2, 95% CI 0.1-0.5). Also, markets, that used display tables for poultry carcasses made from wood, had reduced odds of being H5 virus positive (OR = 0.7, 95% CI 0.5-1.0), while having at least one duck sample included in the pool of samples collected at the market increased the chance of being H5 virus positive (OR = 5.7, 95% CI 3.6-9.2). Markets where parent stock was traded, were more at risk of being H5 virus positive compared to markets where broilers were traded. Finally, the human population density in the district, the average distance between markets and origins of poultry sold at markets and the total rainfall per month were all positively associated with higher H5 virus prevalence. In summary, our results highlight that a combination of factors related to trading and marketing processes and environmental pressures need to be considered to reduce H5 virus infection risk for customers at urban live bird markets. In particular, the relocation of slaughter areas to well-managed separate locations should be considered.

Avian influenza surveillance in wild birds in the European Union in 2006.

BACKGROUND: Infections of wild birds with highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI) subtype H5N1 virus were reported for the first time in the European Union in 2006. OBJECTIVES: To capture epidemiological information on H5N1 HPAI in wild bird populations through large-scale surveillance and extensive data collection. METHODS: Records were analysed at bird level to explore the epidemiology of AI with regard to species of wild birds involved, timing and location of infections as well as the applicability of different surveillance types for the detection of infections. RESULTS: In total, 120,706 records of birds were sent to the Community Reference Laboratory for analysis. Incidents of H5N1 HPAI in wild birds were detected in 14 EU Member States during 2006. All of these incidents occurred between February and May, with the exception of two single cases during the summer months in Germany and Spain. CONCLUSIONS: For the detection of H5N1 HPAI virus, passive surveillance of dead or diseased birds appeared the most effective approach, whilst active surveillance offered better detection of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses. No carrier species for H5N1 HPAI virus could be identified and almost all birds infected with H5N1 HPAI virus were either dead or showed clinical signs. A very large number of Mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) were tested in 2006 and while a high proportion of LPAI infections were found in this species, H5N1 HPAI virus was rarely identified in these birds. Orders of species that appeared to be very clinically susceptible to H5N1 HPAI virus were swans, diving ducks, mergansers and grebes, supporting experimental evidence. Surveillance results indicate that H5N1 HPAI virus did not establish itself successfully in the EU wild bird population in 2006.