An associative account of how the obesogenic environment biases adolescents' food choices.

Adolescents and children are the targets of much food advertising, the majority of which is for unhealthy snacks. Although the effects of advertising on food preferences and consummatory behavior are well documented, our understanding of the underlying mechanisms is still limited. The present study investigates an associative (ideomotor) mechanism by which exposure to rewarding (snack) outcomes may activate behavior that previously resulted in these rewards. Specifically, we used a computerized task to investigate whether exposing adolescents to food pictures directly, or to Pavlovian cues predictive of those food pictures, would bias their subsequent responses towards the presented/signaled food. Furthermore, we assessed whether this effect was particularly pronounced with palatable, high-calorie snacks (crisps and chocolate) relative to low-calorie snacks (tomatoes and cucumber). In two experiments, adolescents learnt that certain key presses would yield particular food pictures - some high calorie and others low calorie - before learning Pavlovian associations between cues (cartoon monsters) and these same food pictures. Subsequently, in a response-priming test, we examined the extent to which the food pictures and Pavlovian cues spontaneously primed the previously associated response. The results show that we replicated, in adolescents, previous demonstrations of ideomotor response priming in adults: food pictures biased responding towards the response that previously yielded them, and this effect transferred to the Pavlovian cues. Furthermore, the priming effect was significantly stronger for high-calorie rewards than for low-calorie. These findings indicate that the ideomotor mechanism plays an important role in the detrimental effect of our obesogenic environment, with its plethora of unhealthy food reminders, on adolescents' food-related choices.

Working for food you don't desire. Cues interfere with goal-directed food-seeking.

Why do we indulge in food-seeking and eating behaviors at times when we are already fully sated? In the present study we investigated the hypothesis that food-associated cues in the environment can interfere with goal-directed action by eliciting food-seeking that is independent of the current desirability of the outcome. To this end, we used a computerized task in which participants learned to press keys for chocolate and popcorn rewards. Subsequently, we investigated whether satiation on one of these rewards would bias choice toward the other, still desirable, food reward. We found that satiation did indeed selectively reduce responding on the associated key in the absence of food-associated cues. In contrast, in a Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT) test, satiation failed to reduce cue-elicited food-seeking: in line with our hypothesis, cues that had previously been paired with chocolate and popcorn led to increased responding for the signaled food reward, independent of satiation. Furthermore, we show that food-associated cues will not only bias choice toward the signaled food (outcome-specific transfer), but also enhance the vigor of responding generally (general transfer). These findings point to a mechanism that may underlie the powerful control that cues in our obesogenic environment exert over our behavior.

Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) over the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex affects stimulus conflict but not response conflict.

When the human brain encounters a conflict, performance is often impaired. Two tasks that are widely used to induce and measure conflict-related interference are the Eriksen flanker task, whereby the visual target stimulus is flanked by congruent or incongruent distractors, and the Simon task, where the location of the required spatial response is either congruent or incongruent with the location of the target stimulus. Interestingly, both tasks share the characteristic of inducing response conflict but only the flanker task induces stimulus conflict. We used a non-invasive brain stimulation technique to explore the role of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in dealing with conflict in the Eriksen flanker and Simon tasks. In different sessions, participants received anodal, cathodal, or sham transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) (2 mA, 20 min) on the right DLPFC while performing these tasks. The results indicate that cathodal tDCS over the right DLPFC increased the flanker interference effect while having no impact on the Simon effect. This finding provides empirical support for the role of the right DLPFC in stimulus-stimulus rather than stimulus-response conflict, which suggests the existence of multiple, domain-specific control mechanisms underlying conflict resolution. In addition, methodologically, the study also demonstrates the way in which brain stimulation techniques can reveal subtle yet important differences between experimental paradigms that are often assumed to tap into a single process.

The developing cognitive substrate of sequential action control in 9- to 12-month-olds: evidence for concurrent activation models.

Nine-month-olds start to perform sequential actions. Yet, it remains largely unknown how they acquire and control such actions. We studied infants' sequential-action control by employing a novel gaze-contingent eye tracking paradigm. Infants experienced occulo-motor action sequences comprising two elementary actions. To contrast chaining, concurrent and integrated models of sequential-action control, we then selectively activated secondary actions to assess interactions with the primary actions. Behavioral and pupillometric results suggest 12-month-olds acquire sequential action without elaborate strategy through exploration. Furthermore, the inhibitory mechanisms ensuring ordered performance develop between 9 and 12 months of age, and are best captured by concurrent models.

No role of beta receptors in cognitive flexibility: Evidence from a task-switching paradigm in a randomized controlled trial.

There is evidence that noradrenergic coeruleo-cortical projections are involved in different forms of cognitive flexibility. So far, no studies in humans have investigated the involvement of beta receptors on task-switching performance, a well-established measure of cognitive flexibility. The present study investigated whether the administration of propranolol (a central and peripheral beta-adrenergic antagonist) affected switching costs (i.e., the increase of reaction time in task-switching trials relative to task-repetition trials). Sixteen healthy adult human subjects performed a global-local task-switching paradigm in a double-blind, within-subjects design study investigating the effects of 80mg of propranolol hydrochloride (a ß1 and ß2 adrenergic receptor antagonist) vs. an oral dose of microcrystalline cellulose (placebo pill). The acute administration of propranolol did not affect the size of switching costs compared to the intake of the neutral placebo. Our results, corroborated by Bayesian inference, suggest that beta receptors do not modulate cognitive flexibility as measured by task-switching performance.

Practice explains abolished behavioural adaptation after human dorsal anterior cingulate cortex lesions.

The role of mid-cingulate cortex (MCC), also referred to as dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, in regulating cognitive control is a topic of primary importance in cognitive neuroscience. Although many studies have shown that MCC responds to cognitive demands, lesion studies in humans are inconclusive concerning the causal role of the MCC in the adaptation to these demands. By elegantly combining single-cell recordings with behavioural methods, Sheth et al. [Sheth, S. et al. Human dorsal anterior cingulate cortex neurons mediate ongoing behavioural adaptation. Nature 488, 218-22 (2012).] recently were able to show that neurons in MCC encode cognitive demand. Importantly, this study also claimed that focal lesions of the MCC abolished behavioural adaptation to cognitive demands. Here we show that the absence of post-cingulotomy behavioural adaptation reported in this study may have been due to practice effects. We run a control condition where we tested subjects before and after a dummy treatment, which substituted cingulotomy with a filler task (presentation of a documentary). The results revealed abolished behavioural adaptation following the dummy treatment. Our findings suggest that future work using proper experimental designs is needed to advance the understanding of the causal role of the MCC in behavioural adaptation.

Automatic stimulus-response translation in dual-task performance.

In bottleneck models of overlapping-task performance, stimulus-response translation for secondary tasks is postponed until the primary response is selected. If this is so, then compatibility between the secondary and primary responses, or between the secondary response and the primary stimulus, should not affect primary-task performance. Yet such effects were demonstrated in 5 dual-task experiments combining primary manual and secondary vocal tasks: Pronounced effects of compatibility between the secondary and primary response and between the secondary response and primary stimulus were found on primary-task performance. The latter effect was also found with the lowest level of an extensive stimulus onset asynchrony variation, when the secondary task was not speeded, and even when the 2 tasks were performed on different trials. Findings suggest that secondary responses were activated before primary response selection was completed and thus support an automatic-translation hypothesis holding that, although eventual response selection may be serial, stimulus-response translation is performed in parallel.

Effect anticipation and action control.

According to the authors' 2-phase model of action control, people first incidentally acquire bidirectional associations between motor patterns and movement-contingent events and then intentionally use these associations for goal-directed action. The authors tested the model in 4 experiments, each comprising an acquisition phase, in which participants experienced co-occurrences between left and right keypresses and low- and high-pitched tones, and a test phase, in which the tones preceded the responses in forced- and free-choice designs. Both reaction time and response frequency in the test phase depended on the learned associations, indicating that presenting a tone activated the associated response. Results are interpreted as evidence for automatic action-outcome integration and automatic response priming through learned action effects. These processes may be basic for the control of voluntary action by the anticipation of action goals.

Blindness to response-compatible stimuli.

This contribution is devoted to the question of whether action-control processes may be demonstrated to influence perception. This influence is predicted from a framework in which stimulus processing and action control are assumed to share common codes, thus possibly interfering with each other. In 5 experiments, a paradigm was used that required a motor action during the presentation of a stimulus. The participants were presented with masked right- or left-pointing arrows shortly before executing an already prepared left or right keypress response. We found that the identification probability of the arrow was reduced when the to-be-executed reaction was compatible with the presented arrow. For example, the perception of a right-pointing arrow was impaired when presented during the execution of a right response as compared with that of a left response. The theoretical implications of this finding as well as its relation to other, seemingly similar phenomena (repetition blindness, inhibition of return, psychological refractory period) are discussed.

S-R compatibility effects due to context-dependent spatial stimulus coding.

Responses are faster with spatial S-R correspondence than with noncorrespondence (spatial compatibility effect), even if stimulus location is irrelevant (Simon effect). In two experiments, we sought to determine whether stimuli located above and below a fixation point are coded as left and right (and thus affect the selection of left and right responses) if the visual context suggests such a coding. So, stimuli appeared on the left or right eye of a face's image that was tilted by 90° to one side or the other (Experiment 1) or varied between upright and 45° or 90° tilting (Experiment 2). Whether stimulus location was relevant (Experiment 1) or not (Experiment 2), responses were faster with correspondence of (face-based) stimulus location and (egocentrically defined) response location, even if stimulus and response locations varied on physically orthogonal dimensions. This suggests that object-based spatial stimulus codes are formed automatically and thus influence the speed of response selection.

The neural substrate of the ideomotor principle revisited: evidence for asymmetries in action-effect learning.

Ideomotor theory holds that the perception or anticipatory imagination of action effects activates motor tendencies toward the action that is known to produce these effects, herein referred to as ideomotor response activation (IRA). IRA presupposes that the agent has previously learned which action produces which effects, and that this learning process has created bidirectional associations between the sensory effect codes and the motor codes producing the sensory effects. Here, we refer to this process as ideomotor learning. In the presented fMRI study, we adopted a standard two-phase ideomotor learning paradigm; a mixed between/within-subjects design allowed us to assess the neural substrate of both, IRA and ideomotor learning. We replicated earlier findings of a hand asymmetry in ideomotor processing with significantly stronger IRA by left-hand than right-hand action effects. Crucially, we traced this effect back to more pronounced associative learning for action-contingent effects of the left hand compared with effects of the right hand. In this context, our findings point to the caudate nucleus and the angular gyrus as central structures of the neural network underlying ideomotor learning.

Genetic markers of striatal dopamine predict individual differences in dysfunctional, but not functional impulsivity.

Various psychiatric disorders are characterized by elevated levels of impulsivity. Although extensive evidence supports a specific role of striatal, but not frontal dopamine (DA) in human impulsivity, recent studies on genetic variability have raised some doubts on such a role. Importantly, impulsivity consists of two dissociable components that previous studies have failed to separate: functional and dysfunctional impulsivity. We compared participants with a genetic predisposition to have relatively high striatal DA levels (DAT1 9-repeat carriers, DRD2 C957T T/T homozygotes, and DRD4 7-repeat carriers) with participants with other genetic predispositions. We predicted that the first group would show high scores of dysfunctional, but not functional, self-reported impulsivity and greater difficulty in inhibiting a behavioral response to a stop-signal, a behavioral measure of impulsivity. In a sample of 130 healthy adults, we studied the relation between DAT1, DRD4, and C957T polymorphism at the DRD2 gene (polymorphisms related to striatal DA) and catechol-Omethyltransferase (COMT) Val158Met (a polymorphism related to frontal DA) on self-reported dysfunctional and functional impulsivity, assessed by the Dickman impulsivity inventory (DII), and the efficiency of inhibitory control, assessed by the stop-signal paradigm. DRD2 C957T T/T homozygotes and DRD4 7-repeat carriers indeed had significantly higher scores on self-reported dysfunctional, but not functional, impulsivity. T/T homozygotes were also less efficient in inhibiting prepotent responses. Our findings support the claim that dopaminergic variation affects dysfunctional impulsivity. This is in line with the notion that the over-supply of striatal DA might weaken inhibitory pathways, thereby enhancing the activation of, and the competition between responses.

Estrogen modulates inhibitory control in healthy human females: evidence from the stop-signal paradigm.

Animal studies point to a role of estrogen in explaining gender differences in striatal dopaminergic functioning, but evidence from human studies is still lacking. Given that dopamine is crucial for controlling and organizing goal-directed behavior, estrogen may have a specific impact on cognitive control functions, such as the inhibition of prepotent responses. We compared the efficiency of inhibitory control (as measured by the stop-signal task) in young women across the three phases of their menstrual cycle (salivary estradiol and progesterone concentrations were assessed) and in young men. Women were less efficient in inhibiting prepotent responses in their follicular phase, which is associated with higher estradiol levels and with higher dopamine turnover rates, than in their luteal or menstruation phase. Likewise, women showed less efficient inhibitory control than men in their follicular phase but not in their luteal or menstruation phase. Our results are consistent with models assuming that the over-supply of striatal dopamine in the follicular phase weakens inhibitory pathways, thus leading to enhanced competition between responses. We conclude that gender differences in response inhibition are variable and state dependent but not structural.

Methodological scheme for designing the monitoring of genetically modified crops at the regional scale.

According to EC regulations the deliberate release of genetically modified (GM) crops into the agro-environment needs to be accompanied by environmental monitoring to detect potential adverse effects, e.g. unacceptable levels of gene flow from GM to non-GM crops, or adverse effects on single species or species groups thus reducing biodiversity. There is, however, considerable scientific and public debate on how GM crops should be monitored with sufficient accuracy, discussing questions of potential adverse effects, agro-environmental variables or indicators to be monitored and respective detection methods; Another basic component, the appropriate number and location of monitoring sites, is hardly considered. Currently, no consistent GM crop monitoring approach combines these components systematically. This study focuses on and integrates spatial agro-environmental aspects at a landscape level in order to design monitoring networks. Based on examples of environmental variables associated with the cropping of Bt-Maize (Zea maize L.), herbicide-tolerant (HT) winter oilseed rape (Brassica napus L.), HT sugar beet (Beta vulgaris L.), and starch-modified potato (Solanum tuberosum L.), we develop a transferable framework and assessment scheme that comprises anticipated adverse environmental effects, variables to be measured and monitoring methods. These we integrate with a rule-based GIS (geographic information system) analysis, applying widely available spatial area and point information from existing environmental networks. This is used to develop scenarios with optimised regional GM crop monitoring networks.

Effects of irrelevant spatial S-R compatibility depend on stimulus complexity.

Choice-reaction time is known to depend on the spatial correspondence of stimulus and response, even if the stimulus location is irrelevant to the task (Simon effect). An experiment investigated whether this effect depends on stimulus complexity--i.e., on whether properties of the stimulus render stimulus discrimination easy or difficult. It was hypothesized that high demands on discrimination slow down the processing of stimulus identity in relation to location, so that the facilitating or conflicting location code has more time to decay, thus losing impact on response selection. In fact, the results revealed an effect or irrelevant spatial S-R correspondence with easy, but not with difficult, stimulus discrimination. This finding resolves an apparent contradiction between the results of several previous experiments on the Simon effect.

Spontaneous decay of response-code activation.

Two experiments investigated whether the Simon effect (i.e., faster responses to spatially corresponding than to noncorresponding stimuli, with stimulus location being irrelevant) is affected by the frequency of noncorrespondence trials. Stimulus discriminability (Experiment 1) and immediate or delayed stimulus formation (Experiment 2) was varied in order to manipulate the temporal relationship between coding of the relevant stimulus information and of stimulus location. As was expected, the Simon effect decreased from high to low discriminability and from immediate- to delayed-stimulus formation. This is consistent with the notion of a gradual decay of location-induced response-code activation. Moreover, the Simon effect decreased with increasing frequency of noncorrespondence trials and was even reversed with higher frequency. This demonstrates strategic preparation of stimulus processing and/or response selection based on irrelevant location information. However, frequency did not modify the interaction between S-R correspondence and stimulus discriminability or stimulus formation, this suggesting that code decay is not a result of a strategy, but an automatic process.

The cognitive representation of action: automatic integration of perceived action effects.

Actions have been assumed to be cognitively represented by codes of relevant action features. Six experiments investigated whether irrelevant action features--conditioned response-contingent auditory events--are also coded and integrated into action codes. Subjects responded to visual stimuli by pressing a left-versus right-hand button or by touching a single key once versus twice. Responses produced certain action effects: tones on the left versus the right or tones of low versus high pitch. After subjects had some practice, an "inducing stimulus" was presented together with the reaction stimulus; this inducing stimulus shared features with the action effect of the correct or incorrect response. If action effects were integrated into action codes, inducing stimuli should activate or prime the associated response. Indeed, substantial effects of correspondence or compatibility between inducing stimuli and irrelevant action effects were found in a variety of tasks. Results are interpreted as evidence for an automatic integration of information about action effects and taken as support of an action-concept model of action-effect integration and stimulus-response compatibility.

No prevalence of right-left over top-bottom spatial codes.

Reaction time is known to depend on spatial stimulus-response compatibility in both the horizontal and the vertical dimensions. However, if both dimensions are varied in the same task, horizontal but not vertical compatibility affects performance, even if subjects are instructed to attend to the vertical dimension only (Nicoletti & Umiltà, 1984). Experiment 1 compared the effect of horizontal and vertical instructions in a task with left-versus right-handed key responses placed at a top versus bottom location. A horizontal-prevalence effect was observed only with a horizontal, and not with a vertical, instruction. This suggests that subjects might not have heeded the vertical instruction in the Nicoletti and Umiltà study but instead attended to the horizontal dimension. Experiment 2 did not yield any horizontal prevalence with one-handed responses (joystick movements). This indicates that top-bottom codes become ineffective only if the responses suggest an exclusively horizontal response coding. In sum, results demonstrated multiple spatial coding of stimuli and responses under appropriate conditions and suggest that the right-left codes do not dominate the top-bottom spatial codes.