Quasi-neutral evolution in populations under small demographic fluctuations.

We study an eco-evolutionary dynamics in finite populations of two haploid asexually reproducing allelic types. We focus on the quasi-neutral case when individual types differ only in their intrinsic birth and death rates but have the same expected lifetime reproductive output. We assume that the population size can fluctuate stochastically. We solve the Kolmogorov forward equation in the population whose size fluctuates only minimally and show that the fixation probability is decreasing with the increasing turnover rate. We also show that when the mutant's turnover is small enough, selection favors the mutant replacing residents. Similarly, when the turnover is high enough, selection opposes the replacement. This basic result has previously been demonstrated numerically for the contact process and shown analytically for the Moran process; the current paper extends this analysis to provide an analytical proof for the contact process. We also demonstrate numerically that our results extend for general fluctuating populations and beyond the quasi-neutral case.

A mathematical model of kin selection in floral displays.

Plants can adjust their competitive traits for acquiring resources in response to the relatedness of their neighbours. Recently, it has been found that plants can alter their investment in traits of attracting pollinators based on kin-interaction. We build a mathematical model to study the optimal floral display to attract pollinators in a patch with kin structure. We show that when plants can attract pollinators to a whole patch through the magnet effect, the floral display should increase with the increasing relatedness of the plants in the patch. Our model also indicates that increasing investment into attracting pollinators is a form of altruism, reducing a plant's own seed production but increasing the contribution of other plants to its fitness. We also predict that seed production should increase with increasing relatedness in the patch. Our model provides the explicit conditions when resource allocation to attract pollinators in response to neighbour relatedness can be favoured by kin selection, and a possible mechanism for the plants to deal with the consequent loss of pollinator diversity and abundance.

The effect of fight cost structure on fighting behaviour involving simultaneous decisions and variable investment levels.

In the "producer-scrounger" model, a producer discovers a resource and is in turn discovered by a second individual, the scrounger, who attempts to steal it. This resource can be food or a territory, and in some situations, potentially divisible. In a previous paper we considered a producer and scrounger competing for an indivisible resource, where each individual could choose the level of energy that they would invest in the contest. The higher the investment, the higher the probability of success, but also the higher the costs incurred in the contest. In that paper decisions were sequential with the scrounger choosing their strategy before the producer. In this paper we consider a version of the game where decisions are made simultaneously. For the same cost functions as before, we analyse this case in detail, and then make comparisons between the two cases. Finally we discuss some real examples with potentially variable and asymmetric energetic investments, including intraspecific contests amongst spiders and amongst parasitoid wasps. In the case of the spiders, detailed estimates of energetic expenditure are available which demonstrate the asymmetric values assumed in our models. For the wasps the value of the resource can affect the probabilities of success of the defender and attacker, and differential energetic investment can be inferred. In general for real populations energy usage varies markedly depending upon crucial parameters extrinsic to the individual such as resource value and intrinsic ones such as age, and is thus an important factor to consider when modelling.

The effect of fight cost structure on fighting behaviour.

A common feature of animal populations is the stealing by animals of resources such as food from other animals. This has previously been the subject of a range of modelling approaches, one of which is the so called "producer-scrounger" model. In this model a producer finds a resource that takes some time to be consumed, and some time later a (generally) conspecific scrounger discovers the producer with its resource and potentially attempts to steal it. In this paper we consider a variant of this scenario where each individual can choose to invest an amount of energy into this contest, and the level of investment of each individual determines the probability of it winning the contest, but also the additional cost it has to bear. We analyse the model for a specific set of cost functions and maximum investment levels and show how the evolutionarily stable behaviour depends upon them. In particular we see that for high levels of maximum investment, the producer keeps the resource without a fight for concave cost functions, but for convex functions the scrounger obtains the resource (albeit at some cost).