Voluntary task switching is affected by modality compatibility and preparation.

Cognitive task control can be examined in task-switching studies. Performance costs in task switches are usually smaller with compatible stimulus-response modality mappings (visual-manual and auditory-vocal) than with incompatible mappings (visual-vocal and auditory-manual). Modality compatibility describes the modality match of sensory input and of the anticipated response effect (e.g., vocal responses produce auditory effects, so that auditory stimuli are modality-compatible with vocal responses). Fintor et al. (Psychological Research, 84(2), 380-388, 2020) found that modality compatibility also biased task choice rates in voluntary task switching (VTS). In that study, in each trial participants were presented with a visual or auditory spatial stimulus and were free to choose the response modality (manual vs. vocal). In this free-choice task, participants showed a bias to create more modality-compatible than -incompatible mappings. In the present study, we assessed the generality of Fintor et al.'s (2020) findings, using verbal rather than spatial stimuli, and more complex tasks, featuring an increased number of stimulus-response alternatives. Experiment 1 replicated the task-choice bias to preferentially create modality-compatible mappings. We also found a bias to repeat the response modality just performed, and a bias to repeat entire stimulus-response modality mappings. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the response-stimulus interval (RSI) to examine whether more time for proactive cognitive control would help resolve modality-specific crosstalk in this free-choice paradigm. Long RSIs led to a decreased response-modality repetition bias and mapping repetition bias, but the modality-compatibility bias was unaffected. Together, the findings suggest that modality-specific priming of response modality influences task choice.

Attention for future reward.

When stimuli are consistently paired with reward, attention toward these stimuli becomes biased (e.g., Abrahamse, Braem, Notebaert & Verguts, et al., Psychological Bulletin 142:693-728, 2016, https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000047). An important premise is that participants need to repeatedly experience stimulus-reward pairings to obtain these effects (e.g., Awh, Belopolsky & Theeuwes, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16:437-443, 2012, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.06.010). This idea is based on associative learning theories (e.g., Pearce & Bouton, Annual Review of Psychology 52:111-139, 2001) that suggest that exposure to stimulus-reward pairings leads to the formation of stimulus-reward associations, and a transfer of salience of the reward to the neutral stimulus. However, novel learning theories (e.g., De Houwer, Learning and Motivation 53:7-23, 2009, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lmot.2015.11.001) suggest such effects are not necessarily the result of associative learning, but can be caused by complex knowledge and expectancies as well. In the current experiment, we first instructed participants that a correct response to one centrally presented stimulus would be followed by a high reward, whereas a correct response to another centrally presented stimulus would be paired with a low reward. Before participants executed this task, they performed a visual probe task in which these stimuli were presented as distractors. We found that attention was drawn automatically toward high-reward stimuli relative to low-reward stimuli. This implies that complex inferences and expectancies can cause automatic attentional bias, challenging associative learning models of attentional control (Abrahamse et al., 2016; Awh et al., 2012).

Motor imagery entails task-set inhibition.

Motor imagery requires the covert execution of a movement without any overt motor output. Previous studies indicated that motor imagery results in the prolonged inhibition of motor commands. In the present study, we investigated whether motor imagery also leads to the inhibition of more abstract task representations. To do so, we investigated the effect of motor imagery on n - 2 repetition costs, which offer an index of the extent to which task representations are inhibited. Participants switched among three tasks and among two response modes: overt and covert responding (i.e., motor imagery). N - 2 repetition costs were present when the current trial required an overt response but absent when the current trial required a covert response. Furthermore, n - 2 repetition costs were more pronounced when trial n - 1 required a covert response rather than an overt response. This pattern of results suggests that motor imagery also leads to the inhibition of abstract task representations. We discuss our findings in view of current conceptualizations of motor imagery and argue that the inhibitory mechanism entailed by motor imagery targets more than motor commands alone. Finally, we also relate our findings to the mechanisms underlying the inhibition of task representations.

The instruction-based congruency effect predicts task execution efficiency: Evidence from inter- and intra-individual differences.

In contrast to traditional conflict paradigms, which measure interference from (over)trained associations, recent paradigms have been introduced that investigate automatic interference from newly instructed, but never executed, associations. In these prospective-instruction paradigms, participants receive new task instructions (e.g., if cat press left, if dog press right), but before they have to apply the instructions, they are first presented with another task that measures the automatic interference from the instructed task information. The resulting instruction-based congruency (IBC) effect is assumed to reflect the strength with which instructions are encoded and maintained in view of their future application. If this assumption holds true, the IBC effect should be inversely related to the speed with which the task instructions are eventually executed. To test this hypothesis, we administered a prospective-instruction paradigm to a large sample of 184 participants and observed a negative correlation between the IBC effect and mean reaction time on the instructed task. Similarly, an analysis looking at within-subject variations in the IBC effect and instructed task reaction times showed the same negative relation. Finally, we also present additional analyses suggesting this effect is independent from standard (experience-based) interference effects, and report explorative analyses that tested possible correlations with personality trait questionaires. Together, these findings confirm a key assumption of the IBC effect in prospective-instruction paradigms, and further support the use of this paradigm in instruction research.

There is more into 'doing' than 'knowing': The function of the right inferior frontal sulcus is specific for implementing versus memorising verbal instructions.

In the present study we examine the mechanism underlying the human ability to implement newly instructed stimulus-response mappings for their future application. We introduce a novel procedure in which we can investigate the processes underlying such implementation while controlling for more general working-memory demands. The results indicate that a region within the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in the vicinity of the inferior frontal sulcus (IFS) is specifically recruited when new instructions are implemented compared to when new instructions are memorised. In addition, we observed that this area is more strongly activated when task performance is effective. Together, these findings suggest that the DLPFC, and more specific the IFS, plays an important role during the formation of procedural representations in working memory.

Attention to future actions: the influence of instructed S-R versus S-S mappings on attentional control.

Even though there is ample evidence that planning future actions plays a role in attentional processing (e.g., Downing Visual Cognition 11:689-703, 2000; Soto et al., Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12:248-342, 2008), it is not clear to what extent planning in itself (rather than the prior experience of the planned actions) controls attention. We suggest that attention can be biased towards stimuli that are associated with instructions for tasks that will be performed in the future even if those tasks have not yet been experienced. We performed two experiments in which participants receive instructions in which some objects were associated with a response (i.e., instructed S-R objects; "Experiment 1") or a stimulus property (i.e., instructed S-S objects; "Experiment 2"), whereas control objects were not. However, before participants were required to perform the S-R task ("Experiment 1") or perform an S-S memory task ("Experiment 2"), they performed a visual probe task in which target objects and control objects served as irrelevant cues. Our results show that attention was biased towards the S-R objects (compared to control stimuli) but not to S-S objects. These findings suggest that future plans can bias attention toward specific stimuli, but only when these stimuli are associated with a specific action. We discuss these findings in light of research concerning automatic effects of instructions and theories that view attention as a selection-for-action mechanism.

A functional approach for research on cognitive control: Analysing cognitive control tasks and their effects in terms of operant conditioning.

Cognitive control is an important mental ability that is examined using a multitude of cognitive control tasks and effects. The present paper presents the first steps in the elaboration of a functional approach, which aims to uncover the communalities and differences between different cognitive control tasks and their effects. Based on the idea that responses in cognitive control tasks qualify as operant behaviour, we propose to reinterpret cognitive control tasks in terms of operant contingencies and cognitive control effects as instances of moderated stimulus control. We illustrate how our approach can be used to uncover communalities between topographically different cognitive control tasks and can lead to novel questions about the processes underlying cognitive control.

Learning through instructions vs. learning through practice: flanker congruency effects from instructed and applied S-R mappings.

We compared flanker congruency effects (FCE) for flanker stimuli that were part of merely instructed S-R mappings or S-R mappings that had already been practiced. Four new S-R mappings were instructed before each block of trials. In applied flanker blocks, each instructed stimulus could appear as target and as flanker. In merely instructed flanker blocks, two stimuli only served as targets, whereas the other two exclusively appeared as flankers. Significant FCEs were observed for both flanker conditions even though the instruction-based FCE was (a) smaller than the FCE from applied mappings and (b) decreased with task practice. These results suggest that instructions alone can induce S-R associations that lead to automatic response activation when instructed stimuli appear as flankers. Execution of instructed rules seems to strengthen the instructed associations, leading to increased response conflict.

Lie, truth, lie: the role of task switching in a deception context.

A cornerstone of the task switching literature is the finding that task performance is typically slower and more error-prone when the task switches than when it repeats. So far, deception research has largely ignored that such cognitive switch costs should also emerge when switching between truth telling and lying, and may affect the cognitive cost of lying as reflected in higher prefrontal brain activity and slower and less accurate responding compared to truth telling. To get a grasp on the relative size of the switch costs associated with lying and truth telling, the current study had participants perform a reaction time-based deception task, in which they alternated between lying and telling the truth to yes/no questions that were related to activities performed in the lab (Experiment 1) or neutral autobiographical facts (Experiment 2). In both experiments, the error and reaction time switch costs were found to be equally large for switching from truth telling to lying and from lying to truth telling. This symmetry in switch costs can be explained from the hypothesis that lying requires a first step of truth telling, and demonstrates that task switching does not contribute to the cognitive cost of lying when the repetition/switch ratio is balanced. Theoretical and methodological implications are considered.

Automatic motor activation by mere instruction.

Previous behavioral studies have shown that instructions about stimulus-response (S-R) mappings can influence task performance even when these instructions are irrelevant for the current task. In the present study, we tested whether automatic effects of S-R instructions occur because the instructed stimuli automatically activate their corresponding responses. We registered the lateralized readiness potentials (LRPs) that were evoked by the instructed stimuli while participants were performing a task for which those mappings were irrelevant. Instructed S-R mappings clearly affected task performance in electrophysiological and behavioral measures. The LRP was found to deflect in the direction of the response tendency that corresponded with the instructed S-R mapping. Early activation of the instructed response was observed but occurred predominantly on slow trials. In contrast, response conflict evoked by instructed S-R mappings did not modulate the N2 amplitude. The results strongly suggest that, like experienced S-R mappings, instructed S-R mappings can lead to automatic response activation, but possibly via a different route.

The Curve of Learning With and Without Instructions.

In skill acquisition, instructing individuals the stimulus-response mappings indicating how to perform and act, yields better performance. Additionally, performance is helped by repeated practice. Whether providing instructions and repeated practice interact to achieve optimal performance remains debated. This paper addresses that question by analyzing the learning curves of individuals learning stimulus-response mappings of varying complexity. We particularly focus on the question whether instructions lead to improved performance in the longer run. Via evidence accumulation modeling, we find no evidence for this assertion. Instructions seem to provide individuals with a head start, leading to better initial performance in the early stages of learning, without long-lasting effects on behavior. We discuss the results in light of related studies that do report long-lasting effects of instructions, and propose that the complexity of a skill determines whether long-lasting benefits of initial instructions exist.

Perceptions of artificial intelligence system's aptitude to judge morality and competence amidst the rise of Chatbots.

This paper examines how humans judge the capabilities of artificial intelligence (AI) to evaluate human attributes, specifically focusing on two key dimensions of human social evaluation: morality and competence. Furthermore, it investigates the impact of exposure to advanced Large Language Models on these perceptions. In three studies (combined N = 200), we tested the hypothesis that people will find it less plausible that AI is capable of judging the morality conveyed by a behavior compared to judging its competence. Participants estimated the plausibility of AI origin for a set of written impressions of positive and negative behaviors related to morality and competence. Studies 1 and 3 supported our hypothesis that people would be more inclined to attribute AI origin to competence-related impressions compared to morality-related ones. In Study 2, we found this effect only for impressions of positive behaviors. Additional exploratory analyses clarified that the differentiation between the AI origin of competence and morality judgments persisted throughout the first half year after the public launch of popular AI chatbot (i.e., ChatGPT) and could not be explained by participants' general attitudes toward AI, or the actual source of the impressions (i.e., AI or human). These findings suggest an enduring belief that AI is less adept at assessing the morality compared to the competence of human behavior, even as AI capabilities continued to advance.

Concurrent response and action effect representations across the somatomotor cortices during novel task preparation.

Instructions allow us to fulfill novel and complex tasks on the first try. This skill has been linked to preparatory brain signals that encode upcoming demands in advance, facilitating novel performance. To deepen insight into these processes, we explored whether instructions pre-activated task-relevant motoric and perceptual neural states. Critically, we addressed whether these representations anticipated activity patterns guiding overt sensorimotor processing, which could reflect that internally simulating novel tasks facilitates the preparation. To do so, we collected functional magnetic resonance imaging data while female and male participants encoded and implemented novel stimulus-response associations. Participants also completed localizer tasks designed to isolate the neural representations of the mappings-relevant motor responses, perceptual consequences, and stimulus categories. Using canonical template tracking, we identified whether and where these sensorimotor representations were pre-activated. We found that response-related templates were encoded in advance in regions linked with action control, entailing not only the instructed responses but also their somatosensory consequences. This result was particularly robust in primary motor and somatosensory cortices. While, following our predictions, we found a systematic decrease in the irrelevant stimulus templates' representational strength compared to the relevant ones, this difference was due to below-zero estimates linked to the irrelevant category activity patterns. Overall, our findings reflect that instruction processing relies on the sensorimotor cortices to anticipate motoric and kinesthetic representations of prospective action plans, suggesting the engagement of motor imagery during novel task preparation. More generally, they stress that the somatomotor system could participate with higher-level frontoparietal regions during anticipatory task control.

The effects of social presence on cooperative trust with algorithms.

Algorithms support many processes in modern society. Research using trust games frequently reports that people are less inclined to cooperate when believed to play against an algorithm. Trust is, however, malleable by contextual factors and social presence can increase the willingness to collaborate. We investigated whether situating cooperation with an algorithm in the presence of another person increases cooperative trust. Three groups of participants played a trust game against a pre-programmed algorithm in an online webhosted experiment. The first group was told they played against another person who was present online. The second group was told they played against an algorithm. The third group was told they played against an algorithm while another person was present online. More cooperative responses were observed in the first group compared to the second group. A difference in cooperation that replicates previous findings. In addition, cooperative trust dropped more over the course of the trust game when participants interacted with an algorithm in the absence another person compared to the other two groups. This latter finding suggests that social presence can mitigate distrust in interacting with an algorithm. We discuss the cognitive mechanisms that can mediate this effect.

A chain-retrieval model for voluntary task switching.

To account for the findings obtained in voluntary task switching, this article describes and tests the chain-retrieval model. This model postulates that voluntary task selection involves retrieval of task information from long-term memory, which is then used to guide task selection and task execution. The model assumes that the retrieved information consists of acquired sequences (or chains) of tasks, that selection may be biased towards chains containing more task repetitions and that bottom-up triggered repetitions may overrule the intended task. To test this model, four experiments are reported. In Studies 1 and 2, sequences of task choices and the corresponding transition sequences (task repetitions or switches) were analyzed with the help of dependency statistics. The free parameters of the chain-retrieval model were estimated on the observed task sequences and these estimates were used to predict autocorrelations of tasks and transitions. In Studies 3 and 4, sequences of hand choices and their transitions were analyzed similarly. In all studies, the chain-retrieval model yielded better fits and predictions than statistical models of event choice. In applications to voluntary task switching (Studies 1 and 2), all three parameters of the model were needed to account for the data. When no task switching was required (Studies 3 and 4), the chain-retrieval model could account for the data with one or two parameters clamped to a neutral value. Implications for our understanding of voluntary task selection and broader theoretical implications are discussed.

Three levels at which the user's cognition can be represented in artificial intelligence.

Artificial intelligence (AI) plays an important role in modern society. AI applications are omnipresent and assist many decisions we make in daily life. A common and important feature of such AI applications are user models. These models allow an AI application to adapt to a specific user. Here, we argue that user models in AI can be optimized by modeling these user models more closely to models of human cognition. We identify three levels at which insights from human cognition can be-and have been-integrated in user models. Such integration can be very loose with user models only being inspired by general knowledge of human cognition or very tight with user models implementing specific cognitive processes. Using AI-based applications in the context of education as a case study, we demonstrate that user models that are more deeply rooted in models of cognition offer more valid and more fine-grained adaptations to an individual user. We propose that such user models can also advance the development of explainable AI.

Tenacious instructions: How to dismantle newly instructed task rules?

Humans excel in instruction following to boost performance in unfamiliar situations. We can do so through so-called prepared reflexes: Abstract instructions are instantly translated into appropriate task rules in procedural working memory, after which imperative stimuli directly trigger their corresponding responses in a ballistic, reflex-like manner. But how much control do we have over these instructed task rules when their reflexes suddenly lose their relevance? Inspired by the phenomenon of directed forgetting in declarative working memory, we here tested across four experiments whether the presentation of (implicit or explicit) task cancellation cues results in the directed dismantling of recently instructed task rules. Our findings suggest that-even when cancelation cues are actively processed-such dismantling does not occur (Experiment 1-3) unless the no-longer relevant task rules are replaced by a new set of rules (Experiment 4). These findings and their implications are discussed in the broader context of action control and working memory. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Examining mechanistic explanations for ideomotor effects.

Ideomotor (IM) theory provides a popular mechanistic account for understanding how goal-directed action can be learned and instigated. That is, when associations between actions and outcomes have been established in memory, the perception or thought of the outcome could automatically activate the associated action. Whereas a sizable literature provides evidence in line with this account, it does not successfully exclude alternative explanations in terms of propositions based on causal inferences. In the present paper, we present an online IM paradigm, in which learning and testing occurs on the same trials. In line with recent findings, we demonstrate that IM effects can emerge within a couple of trials, but also that people can update learned action-outcome associations immediately when a new mapping of outcomes on actions is introduced, without any switch costs. Together, this suggests that IM effects may be driven by propositions about causal relations, rather than bidirectional associations stored in memory. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Automatic effects of covert practice.

Automatic behaviour is supposedly underlain by the unintentional retrieval of processing episodes, which are stored during the repeated overt practice of a task or activity. In the present study, we investigated whether covertly practicing a task (e.g., repeatedly imagining responding to a stimulus) also leads to the storage of processing episodes and thus to automatic behaviour. Participants first either responded overtly or covertly to stimuli according to a first categorization task in a practice phase. We then measured the presence of automatic response-congruency effects in a subsequent test phase that involved a different categorization task but the same stimuli and responses. Our results indicate that covert practice can lead to a response-congruency effect. We conclude that covert practice can lead to automatic behaviour and discuss the different components of covert practice, such as motor imagery, visual imagery, and inner speech, that contribute to the formation of processing episodes in memory.

Exploring the Link between Novel Task Proceduralization and Motor Simulation.

Our ability to generate efficient behavior from novel instructions is critical for our adaptation to changing environments. Despite the absence of previous experience, novel instructed content is quickly encoded into an action-based or procedural format, facilitating automatic task processing. In the current work, we investigated the link between proceduralization and motor simulation, specifically, whether the covert activation of the task-relevant responses is used during the assembly of action-based instructions representations. Across three online experiments, we used a concurrent finger-tapping task to block motor simulation during the encoding of novel stimulus-response (S-R) associations. The overlap between the mappings and the motor task at the response level was manipulated. We predicted a greater impairment at mapping implementation in the overlapping condition, where the mappings' relevant response representations were already loaded by the motor demands, and thus, could not be used in the upcoming task simulation. This hypothesis was robustly supported by the three datasets. Nonetheless, the overlapping effect was not modulated by further manipulations of proceduralization-related variables (preparation demands in Exp.2, mapping novelty in Exp.3). Importantly, a fourth control experiment ruled out that our results were driven by alternative accounts as fatigue or negative priming. Overall, we provided strong evidence towards the involvement of motor simulation during anticipatory task reconfiguration. However, this involvement was rather general, and not restricted to novelty scenarios. Finally, these findings can be also integrated into broader models of anticipatory task control, stressing the role of the motor system during preparation.