Specific emotions as mediators of the effect of intergroup contact on prejudice: findings across multiple participant and target groups.

Emotions are increasingly being recognised as important aspects of prejudice and intergroup behaviour. Specifically, emotional mediators play a key role in the process by which intergroup contact reduces prejudice towards outgroups. However, which particular emotions are most important for prejudice reduction, as well as the consistency and generality of emotion-prejudice relations across different in-group-out-group relations, remain uncertain. To address these issues, in Study 1 we examined six distinct positive and negative emotions as mediators of the contact-prejudice relations using representative samples of U.S. White, Black, and Asian American respondents (N = 639). Admiration and anger (but not other emotions) were significant mediators of the effects of previous contact on prejudice, consistently across different perceiver and target ethnic groups. Study 2 examined the same relations with student participants and gay men as the out-group. Admiration and disgust mediated the effect of past contact on attitude. The findings confirm that not only negative emotions (anger or disgust, based on the specific types of threat perceived to be posed by an out-group), but also positive, status- and esteem-related emotions (admiration) mediate effects of contact on prejudice, robustly across several different respondent and target groups.

Representation and Incorporation of Close Others' Responses: The RICOR Model of Social Influence.

We propose a new model of social influence, which can occur spontaneously and in the absence of typically assumed motives. We assume that perceivers routinely construct representations of other people's experiences and responses (beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and behaviors), when observing others' responses or simulating the responses of unobserved others. Like representations made accessible by priming, these representations may then influence the process that generates perceivers' own responses, without intention or awareness, especially when there is a strong social connection to the other. We describe evidence for the basic properties and important moderators of this process, which distinguish it from other mechanisms such as informational, normative, or social identity influence. The model offers new perspectives on the role of others' values in producing cultural differences, the persistence and power of stereotypes, the adaptive reasons for being influenced by others' responses, and the impact of others' views about the self.

Improving the dependability of research in personality and social psychology: recommendations for research and educational practice.

In this article, the Society for Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP) Task Force on Publication and Research Practices offers a brief statistical primer and recommendations for improving the dependability of research. Recommendations for research practice include (a) describing and addressing the choice of N (sample size) and consequent issues of statistical power, (b) reporting effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals (CIs), (c) avoiding "questionable research practices" that can inflate the probability of Type I error, (d) making available research materials necessary to replicate reported results, (e) adhering to SPSP's data sharing policy, (f) encouraging publication of high-quality replication studies, and (g) maintaining flexibility and openness to alternative standards and methods. Recommendations for educational practice include (a) encouraging a culture of "getting it right," (b) teaching and encouraging transparency of data reporting, (c) improving methodological instruction, and (d) modeling sound science and supporting junior researchers who seek to "get it right."

Group-Based Emotions Over Time: Dynamics of Experience and Regulation.

People's emotions toward their ingroups and salient outgroups often change over time as a result of changing circumstances or intentional self-regulation. To investigate such dynamics, two studies assessed participants' perceived past, present, and ideal levels of group-based emotions toward ingroups and outgroups, for several different types of groups. Consistent with predictions, participants ideally wanted to feel more positive and less negative emotions toward the ingroup compared to their present levels. However, contrary to predictions, ideal emotions toward competitive outgroups were more positive than negative. Several effects over time suggested the successful regulation of emotion: Ideal levels of positive ingroup emotion predicted group-related behavioral intentions as well as emotions reported at a later time, over and above present levels. This work puts group-based emotions in a subjective temporal context and opens new directions for theory-driven investigation and new possibilities for interventions.

Group-based meta-emotion and emotion responses to intergroup threat.

In a secularizing world, religious groups are increasingly threatened by anti-religious groups. We present two studies investigating religious peoples' responses to anti-religious threats. We expected intergroup threats to shape group-based emotions and behavioural intentions through a novel pathway whereby threat affects group-based meta-emotions: the ingroup's perception of the outgroup's emotions towards the ingroup. In Study 1, we experimentally manipulated threat and group salience with participants from two different cultures (British and Latinx/Hispanic). Study 1 demonstrated non-interactive effects of threat increasing negative emotional responses and of group salience strengthening emotional responses. The results illustrated the role of group-based meta-emotions in predicting outgroup-directed emotions and behavioural response intentions. Study 2 used a different manipulation of threat in an American sample and an identity-based manipulation of salience to assess the impact of real-world anti-religious campaigns involving symbolic and realistic threats. Both threat types increased negative group-based meta-emotions, negative outgroup-directed emotions, desire to respond, and opposition to the anti-religious campaign compared to no threat. Overall, religious identity salience had little impact on outcomes. The indirect pathway through meta-emotion replicated, suggesting the importance of considering this novel meta-emotion pathway in intergroup relations.

The impact of repetition-induced familiarity on agreement with weak and strong arguments.

Repeated statements are perceived as more valid than novel ones, termed the illusion of truth effect, presumably because repetition imbues the statement with familiarity. In 3 studies, the authors examined the conditions under which and the processes by which familiarity signals from repetition and argument quality signals from processing of message content influenced agreement with persuasive arguments. Participants with low or high motivation to process information were presented persuasive arguments seen once or twice. In all 3 studies, repetition increased the persuasiveness of weak and strong arguments when little processing of message content occurred. Two of the studies used a process dissociation procedure to reveal that both greater controlled processing (which reflected argument content) and the greater automatic influence of familiarity (which reflected repetition) were associated with increased acceptance of strong arguments but that greater controlled processing dissipated the benefits of familiarity for agreement with weak arguments.

Emotions in Group Sports: A Narrative Review From a Social Identity Perspective.

Recently, novel lines of research have developed to study the influence of identity processes in sport-related behaviors. Yet, whereas emotions in sport are the result of a complex psychosocial process, little attention has been paid to examining the mechanisms that underlie how group membership influences athletes' emotional experiences. The present narrative review aims at complementing the comprehensive review produced by Rees et al. (2015) on social identity in sport by reporting specific work on identity-based emotions in sport. To that end, we firstly overview the different terminology currently used in the field of emotions in groups to clarify the distinct nature of emotions that result from an individual's social identity. Secondly, we discuss key concepts of social identity to better understand the mechanisms underlying identity-based emotions. Thirdly, we address existing knowledge on identity-based emotions in sport. We close the present narrative review by suggesting future research perspectives based on existing meta-theories of social identity. Evidence from the social psychology literature is discussed alongside existing works from the sport literature to propose a crucial theoretical approach to better understand emotions in sport.

Group-Based Emotions: Evidence for Emotion-Performance Relationships in Team Sports.

PURPOSE: In team sports, players have to manage personal interests and group goals, emphasizing intricacies between personal and social identities. The focus of this article was to examine the effect of identity mechanisms on appraisal processes, based on the following research question: Does the level of self-abstraction (low [personal identity] versus high [social identity]) lead to group-based emotions and influence performances? METHOD: An experimental design was used in which the level of self-abstraction was manipulated through the induction of a self- versus a team-oriented goal. Thirty elite male rugby players (Mage = 19.06, SD = 0.78, randomly split) participated in a match reproducing conditions similar to those of official games. Individual and perceived team-level emotions and performance were measured 17 times during the match. RESULTS: Linear Mixed Effects models showed that a high level of self-abstraction: (a) led to more positive and less negative individual (variances explained: 52% and 46%) and perceived team-referent (variances explained: 57% and 40%) emotions; (b) reduced the correlation of team-referent emotions with individual ones; and (c) positively influenced team and individual performances (variances explained: 50% and 19%). Moreover, after controlling for potential effects of the level of self-abstraction, only positive team-referent emotions influenced performance. CONCLUSIONS: This study is the first to experimentally manipulate athletes' social identity to examine group-based emotions in sport. Challenging the usual intrapersonal approaches, these findings suggested that social identity and its association with team-referent emotions could be one of the key dimensions of emotion-performance relationships in team sports.

Forming implicit and explicit attitudes toward individuals: social group association cues.

The authors explored how social group cues (e.g., obesity, physical attractiveness) strongly associated with valence affect the formation of attitudes toward individuals. Although explicit attitude formation has been examined in much past research (e.g., S. T. Fiske & S. L. Neuberg, 1990), in the current work, the authors considered how implicit as well as explicit attitudes toward individuals are influenced by these cues. On the basis of a systems of evaluation perspective (e.g., R. J. Rydell & A. R. McConnell, 2006; R. J. Rydell, A. R. McConnell, D. M. Mackie, & L. M. Strain, 2006), the authors anticipated and found that social group cues had a strong impact on implicit attitude formation in all cases and on explicit attitude formation when behavioral information about the target was ambiguous. These findings obtained for cues related to obesity (Experiments 1 and 4) and physical attractiveness (Experiment 2). In Experiment 3, parallel findings were observed for race, and participants holding greater implicit racial prejudice against African Americans formed more negative implicit attitudes toward a novel African American target person than did participants with less implicit racial prejudice. Implications for research on attitudes, impression formation, and stigma are discussed.

Arousal, processing, and risk taking: consequences of intergroup anger.

Intergroup emotions theory (IET) posits that when social categorization is salient, individuals feel the same emotions as others who share their group membership. Extensive research supporting this proposition has relied heavily on self-reports of group-based emotions. In three experiments, the authors provide converging evidence that group-based anger has subtle and less explicitly controlled consequences for information processing, using measures that do not rely on self-reported emotional experience. Specifically, the authors show that intergroup anger involves arousal (Experiment 1), reduces systematic processing of persuasive messages (Experiment 2), is moderated by group identification (Experiment 2, posttest), and compared to intergroup fear, increases risk taking (Experiment 3). These findings provide converging evidence that consistent with IET, emotions triggered by social categorization have psychologically consequential effects and are not evident solely in self-reports.

Can emotions be truly group level? Evidence regarding four conceptual criteria.

Recent advances in understanding prejudice and intergroup behavior have made clear that emotions help explain people's reactions to social groups and their members. Intergroup emotions theory (D. M. Mackie, T. Devos, & E. R. Smith, 2000; E. R. Smith, 1993) holds that intergroup emotions are experienced by individuals when they identify with a social group, making the group part of the psychological self. What differentiates such group-level emotions from emotions that occur purely at the individual level? The authors argue that 4 key criteria define group-level emotions: Group emotions are distinct from the same person's individual-level emotions, depend on the person's degree of group identification, are socially shared within a group, and contribute to regulating intragroup and intergroup attitudes and behavior. Evidence from 2 studies supports all 4 of these predictions and thus points to the meaningfulness, coherence, and functionality of group-level emotions.

Thinking straight while seeing red: the influence of anger on information processing.

Because angry people apparently rely on heuristic cues when making judgments, anger has been claimed to trigger superficial, nonanalytic information processing. In three studies, the authors found that induced anger promoted analytic processing. Experiment 1 showed that angry participants were more likely to discriminate between weak and strong arguments than participants in neutral moods. Experiment 2 demonstrated that anger overrode dispositional preferences not to process, causing even those low in need for cognition to process analytically. Experiment 3 reconciled these findings with previous work by showing that angry people used accessible, valid, and relevant heuristics but otherwise processed analytically, as indicated by attitude change and elaboration data. Together, these experiments showed that angry people can have both the capacity and motivation to process and that their selective use of heuristics reflects the cue's perceived validity and not the failure to process analytically.

Implicit theories about groups and stereotyping: the role of group entitativity.

The consequences of holding an entity (i.e., the belief that a group's characteristics are fixed) or incremental (i.e., the belief that a group's characteristics are malleable) implicit theory about groups was examined for stereotyping and perceptions of group entitativity. Two studies showed that implicit theories about groups affect stereotyping by changing perceptions of group entitativity. Study 1 found that entity theorists were more likely to stereotype than incremental theorists and that perception of group entitativity significantly accounted for this relation. In Study 2, implicit theories of groups were manipulated via instruction set and entity theorists stereotyped more and perceived groups as more entitative than incremental theorists. Again, the effect of implicit theory was significantly, although partially, mediated by perceptions of group entitativity. The roles of implicit theories about groups and perceptions of group entitativity are discussed regarding stereotyping.

Stereotypes: static abstractions or dynamic knowledge structures?

Stereotypes have been assumed to be long-lasting knowledge structures that persist even in the face of contrary evidence. However, there is almost no within-participant research relevant to this assumption. The authors describe 4 studies (N=267), the first 3 of which assessed within-participant stereotype stability over a few weeks with measures of stereotypic trait verification, typicality ratings of exemplar sets, and exemplar retrieval. In the 4th study, the authors manipulated context stability. Overall, results showed only low-to-moderate stereotype stability. The stability obtained was a function of the perceived centrality of traits or exemplars and of context constancy. The authors discuss the implications of these results for abstractionist, exemplar, mixed, and connectionist models and identify possible mechanisms that underlie within-participant stereotype instability.

Reducing Prejudice With Labels: Shared Group Memberships Attenuate Implicit Bias and Expand Implicit Group Boundaries.

In three experiments, we used a novel Implicit Association Test procedure to investigate the impact of group memberships on implicit bias and implicit group boundaries. Results from Experiment 1 indicated that categorizing targets using a shared category reduced implicit bias by increasing the extent to which positivity was associated with Blacks. Results from Experiment 2 revealed that shared group membership, but not mere positivity of a group membership, was necessary to reduce implicit bias. Quadruple process model analyses indicated that changes in implicit bias caused by shared group membership are due to changes in the way that targets are evaluated, not to changes in the regulation of evaluative bias. Results from Experiment 3 showed that categorizing Black targets into shared group memberships expanded implicit group boundaries.

Prior source exposure and persuasion: further evidence for misattributional processes.

To assess the persuasive impact of prior source exposure, two studies paired persuasive messages with a source to whom participants had previously been exposed subliminally, explicitly, or not at all. In Experiment 2, participants' attention also was drawn to information that potentially undermined the implications of any reaction to re-exposure. Compared to no exposure, prior subliminal exposure increased the source's persuasiveness, an effect not mediated by source liking. Explicit exposure increased source persuasiveness to the extent that the source was liked more and only absent a recall cue. Results favored misattributional accounts of prior exposure effects.

Positivity can cue familiarity.

Given that familiarity is closely associated with positivity, the authors sought evidence for the idea that positivity would increase perceived familiarity. In Experiment 1, smiling and thus positively perceived novel faces were significantly more likely to be incorrectly judged as familiar than novel faces with neutral expressions. In Experiment 2, subliminal association with positive affect (a positively valenced prime) led to false recognition of novel words as familiar. In Experiment 3, validity judgments, known to be influenced by familiarity, were more likely to occur if participants were in happy mood states than neutral mood states. Despite their different paradigms and approaches, the results of these three studies converge on the idea that, at least under certain circumstances, the experience of positivity itself can signal familiarity, perhaps because the experience of familiarity is typically positive.

Of two minds: forming and changing valence-inconsistent implicit and explicit attitudes.

Because different processes underlie implicit and explicit attitudes, we hypothesized that they are differentially sensitive to different kinds of information. We measured implicit and explicit attitudes over time, as different types of attitude-relevant information about a single attitude object were presented. As expected, explicit attitudes formed and changed in response to the valence of consciously accessible, verbally presented behavioral information about the target. In contrast, implicit attitudes formed and changed in response to the valence of subliminally presented primes, reflecting the progressive accretion of attitude object-evaluation pairings. As a consequence, when subliminal primes and behavioral information were of opposite valence, people formed implicit and explicit attitudes of conflicting valence.