Enteric disease surveillance under the AFHSC-GEIS: current efforts, landscape analysis and vision forward.

The mission of the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, Division of Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System (AFHSC-GEIS) is to support global public health and to counter infectious disease threats to the United States Armed Forces, including newly identified agents or those increasing in incidence. Enteric diseases are a growing threat to U.S. forces, which must be ready to deploy to austere environments where the risk of exposure to enteropathogens may be significant and where routine prevention efforts may be impractical. In this report, the authors review the recent activities of AFHSC-GEIS partner laboratories in regards to enteric disease surveillance, prevention and response. Each partner identified recent accomplishments, including support for regional networks. AFHSC/GEIS partners also completed a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) survey as part of a landscape analysis of global enteric surveillance efforts. The current strengths of this network include excellent laboratory infrastructure, equipment and personnel that provide the opportunity for high-quality epidemiological studies and test platforms for point-of-care diagnostics. Weaknesses include inconsistent guidance and a splintered reporting system that hampers the comparison of data across regions or longitudinally. The newly chartered Enterics Surveillance Steering Committee (ESSC) is intended to provide clear mission guidance, a structured project review process, and central data management and analysis in support of rationally directed enteric disease surveillance efforts.

Modelling Risk to US Military Populations from Stopping Blanket Mandatory Polio Vaccination.

OBJECTIVES: Transmission of polio poses a threat to military forces when deploying to regions where such viruses are endemic. US-born soldiers generally enter service with immunity resulting from childhood immunization against polio; moreover, new recruits are routinely vaccinated with inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV), supplemented based upon deployment circumstances. Given residual protection from childhood vaccination, risk-based vaccination may sufficiently protect troops from polio transmission. METHODS: This analysis employed a mathematical system for polio transmission within military populations interacting with locals in a polio-endemic region to evaluate changes in vaccination policy. RESULTS: Removal of blanket immunization had no effect on simulated polio incidence among deployed military populations when risk-based immunization was employed; however, when these individuals reintegrated with their base populations, risk of transmission to nondeployed personnel increased by 19%. In the absence of both blanket- and risk-based immunization, transmission to nondeployed populations increased by 25%. The overall number of new infections among nondeployed populations was negligible for both scenarios due to high childhood immunization rates, partial protection against transmission conferred by IPV, and low global disease incidence levels. CONCLUSION: Risk-based immunization driven by deployment to polio-endemic regions is sufficient to prevent transmission among both deployed and nondeployed US military populations.

Seroepidemiologic investigation of an outbreak of pandemic influenza A H1N1 2009 aboard a US Navy vessel--San Diego, 2009.

BACKGROUND: During summer 2009, a US Navy ship experienced an influenza-like illness outbreak with 126 laboratory-confirmed cases of pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus among the approximately 2000-person crew. METHODS: During September 24-October 9, 2009, a retrospective seroepidemiologic investigation was conducted to characterize the outbreak. We administered questionnaires, reviewed medical records, and collected post-outbreak sera from systematically sampled crewmembers. We used real-time reverse transcription-PCR or microneutralization assays to detect evidence of H1N1 virus infection. RESULTS: Retrospective serologic data demonstrated that the overall H1N1 virus infection attack rate was 32%. Weighted H1N1 virus attack rates were higher among marines (37%), junior-ranking personnel (34%), and persons aged 19-24 years (36%). In multivariable analysis, a higher risk of illness was found for women versus men (odds ratio [OR] = 2.2; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.1-4.4), marines versus navy personnel (OR = 1.7; 95% CI, 1.0-2.9), and those aged 19-24 versus ≥ 35 years (OR = 3.9; 95% CI, 1.2-12.8). Fifty-three percent of infected persons did not recall respiratory illness symptoms. Among infected persons, only 35% met criteria for acute respiratory illness and 11% for influenza-like illness. CONCLUSIONS: Approximately half of H1N1 infections were asymptomatic, and thus, the attack rate was higher than estimated by clinical illness alone. Enhanced infection control measures including pre-embarkation illness screening, improved self-reporting of illness, isolation of ill and quarantine of exposed contacts, and prompt antiviral chemoprophylaxis and treatment might be useful in controlling shipboard influenza outbreaks.